On Thu, 20 Jan 2005, Mike Outmesguine wrote: > The reason wireless security is of more concern than wired is that untrusted > people are sitting in between you and the server you are visiting. > > When I surf the web over a wired connection, my data goes over lines buried > outside my house, to a telephone or cable company with a locked building, > over T1 lines to other telecom companies, hopping on several routers run by > ISPs and broadband providers, eventually to the server I am surfing on. > > I trust the people between here and there. For example, I trust that Google > will resist the urge to hack into my account. just like I trust my network > administrator at the office. I trust PacBell that they do not want to read > my email or steal my identity. > > But in a wireless network, you now introduce "anyone with a laptop and some > free software" into the mix. Sitting between my laptop and the wi-fi access > point could be someone watching for any purpose. > > I don't trust everyone in Los Angeles with technical abilities. But I do > trust network carriers and service providers for most of my surfing. > > I even trust the government sniffers employed at my ISP... Well, for most > of my transmissions ;)
Well as always it depends on what kind of attack you are worried about. There is only one new attack vector introduced by an unencrypted hot spot: a person with (cheap) surveillance equipment somewhere nearby, recording the transmissions of a handful of people using the WAP. So that's the new risk if I use an unencrypted hot spot. But my questions are, who would such an attacker be? Should I spend any effort defending against that attack, or are there already cheaper attacks that I should defend against first? In the cases where I have seen significant damage done by network attacks, it has been either the work of organized crime (as when our customer database was stolen at CD Universe in the highly publicized case around 1999), or our own government (as when the "Regen" co-op in Pomona was raided under the PATRIOT Act two years ago, and Josh Connole was arrested for-but never charged-with the Hummer dealership arsons). From all I have seen, when professionals want to sniff packets, they do it wholesale at the backbone, whether "they" are the FBI or crackers in Rumania. So I don't think that big-time criminals motivated by money are going to care about my wireless packets: It requires a physical presence, which is expensive and exposes a high risk of getting caught, and they could only steal information from a handful of people at a time. Why bother? The government isn't going to care about my wireless packets, since again, why bother? They already have a Carnivore box at the ISP for that purpose. If I had specific well funded enemies, such as if I had classified information to protect, I would have already considered the risk of a person sitting nearby with (expensive) Tempest equipment, which can eavesdrop on ordinary computers doing ordinary things. So surely if I ran such an installation, I wouldn't be exposed to any new risks then either. Who else is left? I can only think of two more potential adversaries that I've encountered: Small time criminals with a little technical sophistication, and people with a personal interest in my business--e.g. an ex-girlfriend, or somebody like a PI hired to dig up dirt on me by an opponent's political campaign. The small time criminal can mug me in the parking lot and take my wallet, which is a hell of a lot easier than getting kismet to work, I can attest. Finally, a person snooping on me would get more and better information the old fashioned ways, following me around and looking at my trash and so on. That's certainly possible but still not a NEW risk. Maybe other people have different adversaries with different characteristics, or maybe I've forgotten something important, but so far I just don't see what's the big deal with 802.11 security. Thanks.. M.D. -- Michael A. Dickerson : Unix Systems Administrator : Pomona College Andrew 252a : 909.607.8653 : [EMAIL PROTECTED]
