***/ I was referring to the situation which would
exist if AMI proposals were adopted, not what happens
now. \***

An important clarification.  The greenbacks were
indeed "weak" against bank credit and traded at a
substantial discount in terms of specie.  Banks would
not accept them for deposit.  Speculators purchased
them with the expectation that they would eventually
be redeemed with specie, which eventually did happen
with the Specie Resumption Act of 1875.

It was obvious who was boss from the git-go.  They
were declared to be legal tender for all debts
"except...interest on the public debt."
--

***/ Some extremists ("greenbackers") envisage all
gov expenditure being financed by unredeemable
treasury notes. \***

It was not such an extremist position in the context
of the times immediately following the Civil War.
Government was a much smaller percentage of the total
economy than it is now.  It was thought that all
money was government issued specie.  There was little
conception of the role of credit.  Bank credit was
thought to merely consist of banknotes backed one
hundred percent by specie so it was thought to be
merely proxy for specie, which of course we know it
wasn't.

The greenbacks could have substituted for specie if
the banks had cooperated.  What has happened within
the division of labor of finance is that government
has become excluded from that division--contrary to
the assertions of the Moslerites.

It didn't necessarily have to have happened that way.
What we have now is central bank credit functioning
as the monopoly source of quasi-specie within the
division of labor of banking.  It is what we call
"reserves" which are required for inter-bank and
inter-central bank account-settlement in the case of
the U.S. dollar.

It is spent into circulation by the central bank not
for goods and services but for securities, therefore
it does nothing to close the "gap" between "prices"
and "purchasing power" resulting from the
displacement of labor.

There is no theoretical reason why government
spending for goods and services needed by government
could not serve the purpose of supplying reserves.
It could not however be for all government spending;
it would have to be limited to the amount needed for
reserves.

There is a third possibility:  Instead of introducing
reserves through the purchase of securities, the
central bank could introduce reserves in the form of
dividends directly to consumers.

***/ Whether as notes or deposits with the BofE, the
(weak) money earns nothing. So everyone, including
banks, tries to get rid of it by spending it. But it
just bounces back, and inflation accelerates. \***

I disagree with this.  It is the old "velocity of
circulation" fallacy.  The rate of inflation (ceteris
paribus in the theoretically ideal economy) is
directly proportional to the rate of injection of
reserves in excess of the demand for reserves.  There
is no add-on effect whatever.

There is no "acceleration" beyond the rate of
injection.  That is to say, the rate of inflation
accelerates only if the rate of injection of reserves
accelerates.  Simply through the injection of
reserves--through the right channels--you could
engineer a constant inflation rate without fear of
"acceleration."  Or, it could be zero inflation with
"full employment."  There doesn't have to be a
"Phillips' Curve" trade-off.

Orthodox theory is that you have to err on the side
of restraint--keeping the economy in the permanent
state of underperformance--due to the fear that
inflation would quickly accelerate out of control
destroying the economy.

There are more complete explanations for the
historical examples of accelerating inflation.


----original message---- Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2003 08:35:29 +0100 From: "Geoffrey Gardiner" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: [gang8] Re: Cartalism weak money and HPM

Chris,

I was referring to the situation which would exist if
AMI proposals were adopted, not what happens now.
Some extremists ("greenbackers") envisage all gov
expenditure being financed by unredeemable treasury
notes.

Whether as notes or deposits with the BofE, the
(weak) money earns nothing. So everyone, including
banks, tries to get rid of it by spending it. But it
just bounces back, and inflation accelerates. I said
the notes would exist for ever because Zarlenga does
not approve the mopping up with bond issues, the
normal practice, though you will recall that in TTM I
doubted if the "sterilising" effect was as strong as
thought by monetarists

I know this is standard Friedmanite doctrine, but not
all monetarist theory is wrong.

Geoff

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