Hi Rajiv, For what it’s worth, my Internet draft also discourages connection/destination logging - draft-daveor-cgn-logging-04 (see section 3).
Re the Indian government mandated connection logging that you mentioned - I was not aware of this but it is a piece of strong supporting evidence for exactly the point I was making in an email earlier this week (https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/int-area/current/msg06442.html) where I outlined the regulatory alternatives that are the only options left for dealing with CGN crime attribution (if source port logging at internet facing servers does not become routine) - one of which was this form of connection logging. As I said at the time, the crime attribution information gap introduced by CGN is a problem right now, and something is going to have be done about it, either by the “internet” (as I’m trying to advocate for), or if not, then by regulatory action that will be introduced in individual jurisdictions in due course. I reiterate the point I made at the time: when ISP regulators get their hands on a problem, they come up with ISP-centric solutions, all of which are far worse from a privacy point of view than source port logging. I predict that many other national ISP regulators will be forced to act on this problem in the coming years, and in the absence of meaningful alternatives will mandate similar logging. daveor > On 3 May 2018, at 22:50, Rajiv Asati (rajiva) <[email protected]> wrote: > > Is there an RFC (besides 6269) that encourages / discourages CGN logging of > destination IP+Port if source IP+port is already logged? > > RFC6269 does mention the below, as compared to the server side logging of > source IP+port - > // logging the destination address on the NAT is inferior > to logging the source port at the server. > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6269 > // > > (BTW, having both source+destination in the NAT log implicitly means no bulk > allocation of source ports possible) > > Separately, this prohibits using stateless NAT based solutions such as MAP or > using deterministic NAT, since there is no logging in such solutions. If such > a guideline was also mandated for native IPv6, then it would pose an > interesting deployment issue. > > -- > Cheers, > Rajiv Asati > Distinguished Engineer, Cisco > > PS: Few may be aware of Govt. of India’s mandate* to log both source and > destination IP+port pair. > Click on “Parameter to be stored in SYS Log of Network Address Translation > (NAT) for Internet Access” on this page - > https://www.corestack.io/blog/the-log-mandate-enabling-indian-isps-to-adhere-to-dot-compliance-rules/ > > PS: > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6302 > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7422 > > > Session and service continuity > _______________________________________________ > Int-area mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area _______________________________________________ Softwires mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/softwires
