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http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/2006/12/26/reportage-01 What's next for Kosovo? 25/12/2006 With Belgrade and Pristina unable to bridge their differences over Kosovo's future, a decision on status is now up to the international community. That poses its own set of challenges. By Robert C. Austin for Southeast European Times – 26/12/06 Regional stability in Southeast Europe depends ultimately on the resolution of Kosovo's status, a process which the UN Security Council formally launched in late 2005. Several rounds of talks under UN auspices were then held between Kosovo Albanian and Serbian representatives, in the hope that a solution acceptable to both sides could be reached. That hope has not borne fruit. The Kosovo Albanians want nothing less than statehood. The Serbian side, meanwhile, has stuck to its refrain of "more than autonomy but less than independence", though it remains unclear what this would amount to in practice. In October, Serbian voters approved a constitution which describes Kosovo as an integral part of the country. The idea of continued Serb sovereignty faces an obvious hurdle: the sheer impracticality of imposing it on a population that overwhelmingly opposes it. For this reason, it has been widely taken for granted that Kosovo on its way to succeeding Montenegro as Europe's newest state. However, there are obstacles here too. The failure of the direct talks to yield a compromise means the decision will be up to the international community. And while support for Kosovo independence is widespread, it is by no means unanimous. Russia, which is both a member of the UN Security Council and the Contact Group, says it will only accept a solution that is palatable to both sides -- the same two sides, in other words, that have failed for the last several months to bridge their fundamental differences. In late November, Kosovo President Agim Ceku visited Moscow in a bid to overcome objections there. Russian officials, however, told him their country would recognise an independent Kosovo only after Belgrade does. To avoid the threat of a Russian veto, the UN is now considered likely to hedge the issue, stopping short of using the word "independence" but opening the door for Kosovo to seek international recognition. This could produce additional headaches. Kosovo's future is meant to develop within an EU framework, with the present UN mission being replaced by an EU one. But there are differences within the bloc over the question of sovereignty. Greece, for example, has historically aligned itself with Serbia. Much as he did in Moscow, Ceku lobbied for independence during a November meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis. But Bakoyannis responded by advocating "a solution that is acceptable for both parties and that is in favour of everybody". Moreover, the EU has lately been perceived as wavering in its commitment to the Western Balkans. This is worrying, as accession prospects remain the strongest incentive for states in the region to act as good neighbours. Anticipated membership in Euro-Atlantic clubs has spurred all kinds of changes that would otherwise not have happened. For the most part, the states in the region have played relatively positive roles as the Kosovo dilemma is slowly untangled, but a weakening European perspective could push momentum in the other direction. In part to prevent this from happening, NATO took a decisive step forward in November at its summit in Riga, offering membership in the Partnership for Peace to BiH, Montenegro and Serbia. A similar signal is now awaited from Brussels. The challenge facing the international community is a formidable one. It must somehow come up with a way forward that is ambiguous enough to receive Security Council approval, while definite enough to reassure the Kosovo Albanians, who are expecting fundamental change. Their government has repeatedly told them that independence is imminent, and trust in the international process has hinged on the expectation that statehood will be achieved. Settling the political issue of status is a prerequisite for addressing Kosovo's economic problems, which are severe. Lack of a clearly defined status, for example, is a major hindrance to investment. The longer Kosovo's future remains uncertain, the longer its economy will remain in limbo. While other parts of the region are taking steps forward, Kosovo faces mass unemployment, a decline in remittances from abroad and a further economic blow as the UN mission winds down. A jobless, impoverished and restive population, disillusioned with the international community and disgruntled with their own government, poses a clear danger to stability. That danger could spill over into ethnic Albanian parts of Serbia, as well as Macedonia and even tiny Montenegro. At the same time, international muddiness of the question of independence could also open the door for Serbs in northern Kosovo to attempt a <I>de facto</I> partition, refusing to honour any proclamation of sovereignty put forward by the Kosovo parliament. Indeed, as though in preparation for such a move, Belgrade has already pushed Kosovo Serbs to withdraw from UN institutions and the provisional government. Amid the many possible perils, however, there is at least one significant reason for optimism: namely, that a number of potential crises have already been deftly avoided. There was much worry that Montenegro's split from its state union with Serbia would be messy and inconclusive; instead, it came off without a hitch. Macedonia faced the prospect of renewed ethnic tensions over the issue of decentralisation; with the help of a timely US decision to recognise Macedonia's constitutional name, the problem was defused. A crucial milestone now lies ahead, in the form of Serbia's January 21st elections. The West has made a conspicuous effort to persuade Serb voters to stay on the path of integration and reform. The choice they make will be an important harbinger for Kosovo, Serbia and potentially the entire region.
