www.serbianna.com http://serbianna.com/columns/borojevic/ http://f2.pg.briefcase.yahoo.com/pertep INTERVIEW SERBIAS NO TO AHTISAARI Report by Boba Borojevic The results of Serbias parliamentary elections, held on January 28, have not produced any significant surprises or fundamental changes in the countrys political landscape. In his interview to Mondays Encounter on CKCU 93.1 FM in Ottawa, Dr. Srdja Trifkovic*, a prominent expert on the Balkans, gives his assessment of the elections and the subsequent pressure on Serbia to relinquish Kosovo. The Serbian Radical Party can reliably count on up to around thirty percent of the vote. Their percentage has remained static, although with 81 seats they have actually lost a few mandates in the Assembly of 250 deputies. It was a somewhat disappointing result for the Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, and the coalition of his Democratic Party of Serbia and the New Serbia Party who had hoped to exceed twenty percent, but received under 18 and a total of 47 seats, said Trifkovic. A significant surprise is the entry into Parliament the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Cedomir Jovanovic. He is the darling of a wide array of Western NGOs and donors. His is the only party that has openly declared its support for Kosovos independence. Even though it has barely managed to get into parliament with just over five percent of the vote and has only 14 deputies, from now on the acceptance of Kosovos separation nevertheless will be regarded abroad especially as one legitimate point of view in the Assembly of Serbia. The secret of LDPs ability to get into Parliament is in the votes of thousands of Albanians in the Presevo Valley and the separatists in Vojvodina. The latter are represented in Jovanovics team by the leading opponent of Vojislav Kostunica and a proponent of Vojvodinas separation from Serbia, Nenad Canak, Trifkovic had said. He believes that, The Democratic Party has done reasonably well by increasing its number of seats to 64, apparently cashing in on the relative popularity of President Boris Tadic. He can afford to make all sorts of optimistic statements about Serbias European future and to remain vague on how to fit in the strategy of Euro-Atlantic integration with the commitment to defending Serbias claim to Kosovo, because Tadic has media visibility but no responsibility. He can make optimistic promises because he is not the one who would be called to task for the failure to perform. After all, the constitutional powers of the President of Serbia are very limited. In the absence of significant surprises we can expect many rounds of tense and at times sordid negotiations aimed at the formation of a new government. Kostunica has already announced that he will not accept any coalition in which he is not Prime Minister. It is widely assumed that he will insist on retaining the portfolios of police and justice, and on taking over the Foreign Ministry, soon to be vacated with the departure of Vuk Draskovic who, let it be added was defeated very soundly and has ended his political career. His likely coalition partner, the one that the West will push forward as the logical option for Kostunica, is the Democratic Party. Kostunica would hope to give them all key economic ministries, such as energy, foreign trade and industry, which is significant in view of the fact that two of Serbias most valuable state corporations electricity generation (EPS) and oil refineries and distribution (NIS) are due for privatization soon. If G-17 Plus is brought into government yet again, the former Minister of Finance, Mladjen Dinkic, will expect to get his old portfolio back, and to retain control over the National Bank. There are people in the Democratic Party of Boris Tadic who would gladly accept the deal that would give them control of the ministries that could give them rich dividends in the process of privatization of the EPS and the NIS. These two shiny jewels in the remaining portfolio of yet-to-be privatized enterprises in Serbia will yield a lot of money and a lot of power for the people who control the relevant ministries. On the other hand, Tadic and the Democratic Party are under heavy of pressure from the West not to settle for these rich pickings that are irrelevant to foreign affairs. Foreign advocated of an independent Kosovo want the Democratic Party to control the foreign ministry if Kostunica remains prime minister, or else to refrain from entering any coalition with him. If there is no coalition that can command a simple majority in Parliament, another possibility mentioned in Belgrade is minority government, led by the DSS, which would be tacitly supported by the Radicals, just as the previous coalition had been tacitly supported by the Socialist Party. At the end of the day, however, if the deadlock in Belgrade continues for another week or two, a new election will be the most likely outcome. Outside pressure on Serbia to give up Kosovo Trifkovic adds that it is remarkable that Marti Ahtisaari went ahead and presented his proposals although there is no permanent government in place in Belgrade: A truly, neutral, evenhanded and fair negotiator would have waited for the new government to take shape. After Arafats death, or in the aftermath of the stroke that incapacitated Ariel Sharon, international negotiators were naturally loath to come up with any significant new initiative while the political scene in either Israel or the Palestinian authority was in a state of flux. Unfortunately, no such standard exist when Serbia is at stake and Ahtisaaris behavior, despicable as it is, is hardly surprising. After Ahrisaari a number of high-ranking EU bureaucrats and government officials have visited Belgrade or are expected later this week, among them Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht, US chairman of the negotiating team for Kosovo, Frank Wiesner, the EU foreign minister Xavier Solana, and British Minister for Europe Geoffrey Hoon. Trifkovic believes that the purpose of their visit to Belgrade is obvious, to get the Serbs to give up Kosovo, to say well sign, well accept: The difficulty they face is that there is absolutely no counter-favor on offer that could possibly compensate for the lose one seventh of Serbias sovereign territory. If they could come to Belgrade and say, if you give up Kosovo now, you can join the EU this year and no visas would be needed to travel to the rest of Europe, some Serbs would be tempted. If they could say, if you give up, The Hague Tribunal will be abolished, the pressure over Mladic will be ended, and Serbias debts to the international financial institutions will be cancelled, again some Serbs would be tempted. But they are offering none of the above. All they are offering is a vague promise that Serbias surrender over Kosovo would be taken into account when eventually the countrys integration into the EU comes on the agenda many years down the road. There is simply no incentive for anyone in Serbia to go along with Ahtisaaris proposal, unless he wants to secure his own self-promotion vis-à-vis the West, and there is a steep political price to be paid at the next election. Some Serbian politicians would like to have it both ways, which explains the eccentric statement by President Tadic, made some weeks ago, that he would do his utmost to save Kosovo, but that he did not believe it could be saved. In the absence of a juicy plum that would tempt the Serbs, such statements simply display the desire of certain players on Serbias political scene to signal to Washington and Brussels that they can be counted upon as reliable partners further down the road, said Trifkovic. Kostunica: break off diplomatic relations Prime Minister Kostunicas statement that Serbia would sever diplomatic relations with any country that recognizes Kosovos illegally proclaimed independence has a solid international legal precedent, continues Trifkovic. The Federal Republic of Germany, known as West Germany at that time, for decade had pursued the so called Halstein Doctrine, which postulated that Bonn would break off diplomatic relations with any country that recognized the GDR (East Germany). Likewise, China has a long-established practice of breaking off relations, or not establishing them, with any country that recognizes Taiwan. What Kostunica had said was neither remarkable, nor unusual, nor extreme in any way. If there is unilateral declaration of independence by a secessionist movement in some part of a sovereign countrys territory, and if another country then recognizes that territory as a state, it is obviously an unfriendly act made in violation of international laws and in violation on the assumptions on which the international system has rested since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. It would be, basically in the same league as if during WWII a country recognized the independent state of Croatia, the Ustasa puppet state established by Germans and Italians, and yet expected that the royal Yugoslav government in exile to continue to maintain normal diplomatic relations with it. But reading between the lines of Kostunicas statement, it should be clear that Kosovo simply cannot function without Serbias acceptance of the final solution. The only railroad and the only two road links between Kosovo and the heart of Europe go across Serbia. All other alternative transit routes, through Montenegro, Albania, or Macedonia, are taking Kosovo away from Europe, not into it, believes Trifkovic. In any event, he adds, Dr. Kostunica has no prerogatives right now, as the head of a caretaker government, to make any commitments or to negotiate issues of substance. He can give his personal opinion on the Ahtisaaris plan, of course, and declare that it is unacceptable. Even though it does not use the word independence, it obviously represents de facto separation of Kosovo from Serbia and independence in everything but name. Ahtisaaris primary focus at this point is to finalize the detachment of Kosovo from Serbia, even without clearly defining its future status. Since Kostunica has already said on previous occasions that Belgrade will resist not only any attempt to make Kosovo independent, but also any attempt to base the solution on any framework that detaches it from Serbia, his position is predictable and clear. By contrast Tadics position is ambivalent. He is trying to be all things to all men. He is trying to be E.U.-friendly, NATO-friendly. He goes around repeating that Serbias integration into those institutions has no alternative and should continue, regardless of the way the Kosovo situation plays itself out; but he does not have constitutional prerogatives to make commitments or promises. In the end that decision will have to reflect the will of the majority in the Assembly. That majority still belongs to those parties that have already stated and repeated on many occasions that under no circumstances would they agree with Kosovos independence that is, the Radicals, the Socialists, the Democratic Party of Serbia, and their coalition partner, New Serbia. Prediction The pressure on Serbia will fail for two reasons, said Trifkovic. One, there is no serious incentive for the Serbs to give up and cave in. Two, there is no government in Belgrade right now qualified to negotiate on the issues of substance and to promise, let alone sign anything. We will not see any significant movement until there is a new coalition. If there isnt one in the next week or two, we may have yet another election. Let me add that Prime Minister Kostunica should at least consider the possibility of a deal with the Radical Party of Serbia and the coalition between his Democratic Party of Serbia and the Radicals. His refusal thus far to consider this possibility has created an anomalous situation, that close to one-third of Serbias electorate is effectively disenfranchised, concludes Trifkovic. *** DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC is foreign-affairs editor of Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture and director of The Rockford Institutes Center for International Affairs. He is the author of several books, two of which became best sellers on amazon.com: The Sword of the Prophet and Defeating Jihad. http://www.trifkovic.mysite.com/ http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/cgi-bin/newsviews.cgi _____ Be smarter than spam. See how smart SpamGuard is at giving junk email the boot with the <http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=40705/*http:/mrd.mail.yahoo.com/try_beta?.intl=c a> All-new Yahoo! 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