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* **Serbia’s Choice* <http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=497>
 

by Srdja Trifkovic

 

The political consequences of the first round of presidential election 
in Serbia, held on January 20, are significant, and they will remain 
that significance regardless of the outcome of the second round on 
February 3. President Boris Tadic lost the first round last Sunday to 
Tomislav Nikolic of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) by almost five 
percentage points and is fighting an uphill battle to retain the presidency.

The voters have given overwhelming support—over 55 percent—to the 
candidates who are adamant that there can be no compromise over Serbia’s 
fundamental position on Kosovo. Those three candidates, Tomislav Nikolic 
(the Radical Party, SRS), Velimir Ilic (Our Serbia, NS) and Milutin 
Mrkonjic (the Socialist Party, SPS), say that there can be no compromize 
over the status of Kosovo in exchange for some vague promise of Serbia’s 
eventual “European integration.”

It appears that Boris Tadic and his followers have badly overestimated 
the President’s popularity. They may have mecome the victims of their 
own peopaganda, which is easier to understand in view of the fact that 
all the mainstream print and electronic media in Serbia—which are either 
financed or owned Western corporations, governments and quasi-NGOs—are 
openly pro-Tadic. Such unfounded self-confidence had prompted the 
pro-Western camp to force this election prematurely, and without any 
regard for the views of their coalition partners, the Democratic Party 
of Serbia of Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. Accordingly, on December 
12 of last year Speaker of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia Oliver 
Dulic—a ranking official of Tadic’s Democratic Party (DS)—called an 
early presidential election for January 20.

This decision was made with prior approval of Brussels and Washington 
but, let us emphasize, without any previous consultation with Prime 
Minister Kostunica. He and the DSS were opposed to the poll, arguing 
that it was highly inappropriate to call an early presidential election 
at a time when the threat of unilateral secession of Kosovo is real and 
ought to take precedence over domestic political squabbles. The turmoil 
of an election campaign, it was argued from Kostunica’s camp, could 
threaten unity of the country and the coherence of the shaky ruling 
coalition at a vulnerable moment.

The result of the first round makes Kostunica’s position decisive for 
the outcome of the second. The Prime Minister set his terms on January 
23, when he asked Tadic to formally commit himself not to sign the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union if the 
EU decides to dispatch a civilian administrative and police mission to 
Kosovo—a key move that is viewed as an implicit go-ahead for 
independence. Kostunica favors a resolution stating that the EU mission 
would violate UN resolution 1244 as well as the Serbian Constitution, 
which would mean that the EU has voluntarily cancelled the agreement 
initialled last November.

Tadic would be loath to accept such terms, because he claims that the 
association process should proceed regardless of the Kosovo issue. On 
the other hand, without Kostunica’s endorsement he will find it haerd to 
garner an additional 15 percent of votes necessary for victory. In other 
words, things are becoming uncomfortably complicated for Tadic. He and 
his supporters had wanted this election to be held as early as possible 
because they feared that the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo’s 
independence (UDI)—which is certain to be be supported by most key 
Western powers—would fuel Serbian anger and work to the detriment of 
“pro-Western, moderate reformists.” The timing of the election was 
accordingly chosen by the European Union (EU), the United States, and 
the leaders of the DS, as a means of getting Tadic re-elected before the 
unilateral declaration of independence in Pristina.

In this manner Serbia has been subjected to the repetition of a sordid 
scenario we have witnessed just over a year ago. Last January the 
unveiling of the Ahtisaari plan was deliberately postponed by a month, 
so that the Serbian parliamentary election could be held on January 21st 
before its terms were known. At that time the ruse had the same 
objective as today: to help Tadic by not burdening his party with the 
mortgage of Ahtisaari’s disastrous plan supported by all major Western 
powers.

Both then and today, Tadic’s rhetoric promised the squaring of the 
circle: saving Kosovo on the one hand, but getting ever closer to Europe 
on the other. This is palpably an impossibility. All key Western leaders 
have stated, in one form or another, that Serbia would have to chose 
between retaining its claim on Kosovo and getting closer to the EU. Such 
statements have come from British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and his 
predecessor Tony Blair, from French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and a 
veritable array of American bureaucrats.

Most Serbs are not a priori Euro-skeptics. A Gallup Poll conducted a 
year ago shows that, generally speaking, the majority looked favourably 
on the EU. Thdere is a catch, however: an even greater majority is 
adamant that Kosovo is an inalienable part of Serbia. In subsequent 
polls, most Serbs have said that they would not give up the title to 
Kosovo in return for the accelerated prospect of EU membership. 
Furthermore, in the same Gallup poll, they said they viewed Russia—which 
has said it would veto a Western-backed UN Security Council plan for 
Kosovo’s statehood—even more positively than the EU: 63 percent of those 
polled approved of Russia’s leadership.

On January 20, Serbia responded to this Euro-dilemma with greater 
clarity and decisiveness than Tadic and his sponsors had ever expected. 
Over 55 percent of Serbia’s voters supported three candidates (Tomislav 
Nikolic, vise-president of the Radical Party; Velimir-Velja Ilic who 
leads “Our Serbia,” a DSS coalition partner; and Milutin Mrkonjic of the 
Socialist Party) who are uncopromizing in their rejection of any “deal” 
with the West over Kosovo. The voters’ message was clear: if Serbia is 
forced by the West to choose between preserving the title to Kosovo and 
joining “Europe” on Western terms—which evidently demands the amputation 
of Kosovo—Serbia will opt for the former. If the EU sends the illegal 
mission to Kosovo—and it is almost certain that this will happen shortly 
after the second round—that would be a clear sign for Serbia that time 
has come to say that further aspirations to the membership of the EU are 
not only futile but so demeaning and degrading.

The tables have been turned: it is now up to Washington and Brussels to 
choose between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. Do they wants an illegally 
constituted Kosovo that is going to be a black hole of jihad-terrorism, 
ethnic cleansing, unprecedented corruption, institutionalized 
criminality, drug peddling and white slave trading? Or do they want a 
solid partnership with Serbia—the key country in the Western Balkans and 
a civilized country, which the Albanian controlled Kosovo never will 
be—on the basis of the recognition of her territorial integrity?.

In the run-up to the second round on February 3 the media in Belgrade, 
which is overwhelmingly pro-Tadic, will exert massive pressure on the 
Serbs by invoking the ghosts of sanctions and economic collapse, if not 
yet another war, if Nikolic is successful. They will insist that Tadic’s 
defeat would mean further isolation. But before making their choice the 
Serbs will look at the outside world and see what the supporters of 
Kosovo’s independence abroad are hoping for, who do they want to win in 
Serbia. The supporters of Kosovo’s independence want Boris Tadic to be 
the winner on February 3 because they see in him the embodiment of the 
kind of “pro-Western reformist” now prevalent all over post-Communist 
Eastern Europe. They are pleased that Tadic keeps repeating—strictly for 
the domestic consumption—all the right patriotic platitudes, without 
believing them for one moment. While parroting “Serbian” rhetoric for 
the popular consumption, Tadic & Co. are sending messages to Brussels 
and Washington, sotto voce, that when the time comes they will be 
cooperative and do what needs to be done. Tadic and his protégé, 
Serbia’s current foreign minister, have been winking and nudging to 
their Western interlocutors throughout the Kosovo negotiating process. 
If Tadic can appoint a man of so uncertain personal loyalty and so 
dubious moral qualities such as Vuk Jeremic to the post of Serbia’s 
foreign minister, he is not to be trusted on any other front.

By re-electing Boris Tadic the Serbian voters would provide the 
supporters of Kosovo independence with the sure signal that Serbia is 
effectively reconciled to the amputation of the Province, and resigned 
to the endless continuation of never-to-be-completed “European 
integrations” that will always entail new conditions to be met, ever 
higher prices to be paid, and ever more brazen blackmails.

In the second round of the Serbian election the name of the eventual 
winner is perhaps less significant than the fact that the nation has 
displayed a remarkable level of unity and spontaneous determination. 
Whoever wins, he will have to take account of the fact that a small yet 
proud Balkan nation has had enough humiliation and that it will bend no 
more to either Washington or Brussels.


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