http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1197
Strategic Culture Foundation (Russia) February 7, 2008 Georgia: Heading for NATO. Abkhazia: A Union with Russia? Leonid Ivashov -The Kosovo problem arose as a consequence of the direct aggression by the United States and NATO against the sovereign Yugoslavia and the destruction of the integrity of that state and the forced ousting of the Yugoslavian army and security forces out of Kosovo. -Georgia’s NATO entry would inevitably lead to the deployment on its territory of military facilities targeted at Russia. The prospects of Ukraine’s getting a membership in the North Atlantic alliance would narrow to the limit the potential of Russian Black Sea Fleet, as the whole of the Black Sea basin would be surrounded by NATO member states (Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania and Georgia). The fleet would be blocked and that would throw Russia back to the days before Peter the Great, depriving it of its status of a sea-power. The 2014 Olympic Games would also be under the sights, and NATO special services would not waste time getting down to the business of destabilising the North Caucasian region. Now that the presidential elections in Serbia are over, the prospects of recognition of Kosovo and Metohia have become more tangible after the presidential elections in Serbia. This has made a number of Russian experts resume discussing the similarities of the legal status of Kosovo on the one hand and on the other, the statuses of the unrecognised republics on the territory of the former USSR, in particular, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Under the circumstances, the experts argue that the next move should be the recognition by Russia of the independent status of these Georgian autonomies immediately after Kosovo secedes from Serbia. This move would make ever more expedient resolving the issue of independence of the Transdniester Republic and Nagorno Karabakh with the ensuing aggravation of tensions with Moldova and Azerbaijan. But does this view fit in the picture of the historical realities and Russia’s interests? No, and once again “No.” On the face of it, there is similarity between the legal status of Kosovo on the one hand and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other. The Kosovo problem arose as a consequence of the direct aggression by the United States and NATO against the sovereign Yugoslavia and the destruction of the integrity of that state and the forced ousting of the Yugoslavian army and security forces out of Kosovo. The fact that Albanians, whose protection was the chief argument for the West to vindicate its armed intervention in the internal affairs of the SFRYu, have a state formation of their own, Greater Albania, should also be taken into consideration. On the contrary, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have determined their legal statuses in full conformity with international law in force at the time (the early 1990s). The status of these two republics was predetermined by Georgia’s secession from the legal space of the Soviet Union. The move was not supported by either Abkhazians or South Ossetians. At the time Russia had a hard time getting back onto the path of sovereign development, so it could not rely on authority to support the just right of Abkhazians, Adjarians and South Ossetians for self-determination. Later on, the problem grew more complicated due to growing tensions between Russia and Georgia. Expert community needs to take an objective view of the reasons of their aggravation. I think that we are overstraining our emphasis on the objective causes. It pays to take a deeper look. Take Georgia. - At the time the USSR was growing weaker and then finally broke up, the Georgian wish of sovereignty grew stronger and stronger. Such a striving is natural, provided it develops based on an objective assessment of the history of relations with Russia. Tbilisi played it differently, exhibiting the Great Nation syndrome. All other national minorities became for the Georgian elite the vassals of Georgian nobility and seigneurs, less civilised and culturally undeveloped people; - The defeats suffered at the hands of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were a severe hurt to Georgian national pride; - The preponderance of Georgians are still confident that neither Abkhazians nor South Ossetians were the winners, but it was Russia that stole the victory. So all through these years Georgians have been imploring Russia to give these territories back to them; - Georgia’s dalliance with the West (first and foremost, the United States) is nothing but an attempt to assert itself as a state commensurate with Russia with an eye to solving its territorial problems and getting rid of the loser syndrome. Saakashvili and those around him fail to realise that as a result Georgia may lose its identity as a civilisation, and probably, even its statehood. However the Georgian elite does not register this threatening prospect. The most important thing to them is to assert Georgia as an independent state free from Russia’s influence. This is not the first time that Tbilisi resorts to this kind of manoeuvring. In 1918 when Russia was weakened, Georgia declared its independence and opened the doors to German, Turkish and later – British troops. Similar events took place in the 1990s. As for official Russian authorities, they failed to find a proper formula to resolve the conflict situations between Tbilisi and Sukhumi [Abkhazia], as well as Tbilisi and Tskhinvali [South Ossetia]. The most important thing for Moscow was to keep the developments within the boundaries of the negotiating process, avoiding military clashes. On top of that for many years another obstacle was the duality of Moscow’s position as the Kremlin sided with official Tbilisi, while the sympathies of Russian parliament and general public were unchangingly with Sukhumi and Tskhinval. Moscow also failed to have its way demanding direct participation of the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the sessions of CIS heads of states discussing the settlement of the conflict not promoting the negotiation process in a two-side format. Much was lost. What follows is Russia should put more effort into developing the Caucasian vector of its foreign policies. Given that Tbilisi will continue drifting towards the USA and NATO, whether the Kremlin people want it or not, Moscow will have to pay especial attention to the issue of the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the sense of Russia’s security and stability in the North Caucasus. Georgia’s NATO entry would inevitably lead to the deployment on its territory of military facilities targeted at Russia. The prospects of Ukraine’s getting a membership in the North Atlantic alliance would narrow to the limit the potential of Russian Black Sea Fleet, as the whole of the Black Sea basin would be surrounded by NATO member states (Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania and Georgia). The fleet would be blocked and that would throw Russia back to the days before Peter the Great, depriving it of its status of a sea-power. That is why Moscow should on no account allow the NATO war machine to swallow Abkhazia. What would we be, should we not prevent the situation whereby the residence of Russian presidents in Sochi would be within a firing distance of NATO cannons? The 2014 Olympic Games would also be under the sights, and NATO special services would not waste time getting down to the business of destabilising the North Caucasian region. So my statement is: the solution of the Kosovo problem should on no account become a “precedent” for the declaration of the complete independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is would be both right in terms of the essence of the problem and would save this country from the traditional (since the Gorbachev and Yeltsin times) reflex dependence on Western diplomacy waiting for the next time about the Western next move. Only proactive policies can help us stand for our national interests. Russian diplomats should immediately clarify their stance over the issue of the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, linking this issue with Georgia’s invitation to became a NATO member rather than with the declaring of Kosovo’s independent status, and upon the recognition of Kosovo’s independence to sign without delay a package of agreements with Abkhazia on close cooperation and a union security treaty, allowing Russian troops to enter this new independent state. =============== Group Moderator: [Е-ПОШТА ЗАШТИЋЕНА] page at http://magazine.sorabia.net for more informations about current situation in Serbia http://www.sorabia.net Slusajte GLAS SORABIJE nas talk internet-radio (Serbian Only) http://radio.sorabia.net Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/sorabia/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/sorabia/join (Yahoo! 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