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Wolfowitz the Undead
by Srdja Trifkovic
Former World Bank chief Paul Wolfowitz will head a high-level advisory panel on 
arms control and disarmament, the State Department announced on January 24. He 
is returning to government as chairman of the International Security Advisory 
Board (ISAB). This is appalling news. It is deplorable that this devious and 
tainted man, who has been wrong—spectacularly, damagingly and provenly wrong—on 
every issue of substance in the post-Cold War era, is to get any government 
post ever again. It defies belief that he is getting the one that entrusts him 
with “supplying independent advice on arms control, disarmament, 
nonproliferation and related subjects,” which means that he will be able to 
have an impact on the U.S. Iran policy.
Almost three years ago, upon learning of President Bush’s nomination of 
then-Deputy Defense Secretary to become the new president of the World Bank, I 
expressed relief (Chronicles, May 2005) that “at his new post Wolfowitz will 
not be able to do nearly as much damage as he has done at the Pentagon.”
Last May came Wolfowitz’s resignation and departure in disgrace from the World 
Bank. Ostensibly his ouster was the result of a sordid corruption scandal 
involving his role in securing improper salary raises for his mistress, and 
trying to cover it all up. According to the Bank insiders, however, her 
employment contract was used as the handy pretext to get rid of Wolfowitz, the 
true reasons being gross mismanagement, utter misunderstanding the Bank’s role 
in the world, and an extreme of arrogance. Either way, however, I assumed that 
his public service career was finally over:
Wolfowitz is no longer able to engineer doomed foreign adventures that cost 
thousands of American lives and hundreds of billions of our dollars. The fruits 
of his past labors are still with us, but at least he is no longer directly 
involved in foreign policy making. Other officials also make mistakes and 
blunders; but he is unique in being certain to make them all the time, and on a 
grand scale.
I was wrong. Like Glenn Close in Fatal Attraction, he springs back with gusto 
just as you think he’s finally done for. Like with Count Dracula (or like with 
the presumably late Charles Haughey, as per Connor Cruise O’Brian) you need to 
look over your shoulder even if you find him lying, at midnight, with a stake 
driven through his heart.
The facts of the case add up to a perverse and troubling story. Most 
Americans—or at least those who try to think about such things— implicitly 
assume that the U.S. foreign policy (whether they agree with its conduct or 
not) is coherent in its assumptions and rational in its execution. Wolfowitz’s 
various inputs into the “decision-making community” over the decades, however, 
have been neither coherent nor rational by any conventional standard. His 
personal and professional credibility in the world is non-existant. He has been 
wrong on so many issues, and so spectacularly and visibly wrong, that his 
return into the fold marks an apt finale for this deeply flawed administration.
THE MAKING OF AN INSIDER—Wolfowitz’s intellectual maturing, when he was a 
doctoral student at the University of Chicago in the late 1960’s, proceeded 
under the tutelage of the late RAND guru Albert Wohlstetter. The latter was 
famous for his view that mere nuclear deterrence was not a satisfactory basis 
for strategic doctrine: the United States had to plan to fight and win a 
nuclear war in order to deter the enemy. Richard Perle was another promising 
protégé of Wohlstetter’s. He and Wolfowitz got to know each other through their 
ageing mentor, and became life-long political and personal associates.
Perle was the first to go to Washington, in 1969, when Wohlstetter secured his 
appointment as executive director of the Committee to Maintain a Prudent 
Defense Policy, founded primarily to defeat President Richard Nixon’s 
arms-control negotiations with Moscow. Three years later Perle was 
active—together with Midge Decter, Norman Podhoretz, and Irving Kristol—in the 
establishment of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), founded to 
promote the bid for presidency by Senator Henry (“Scoop”) Jackson. At that time 
they were all Democrats. When they revamped the Committee on the Present Danger 
(CPD) in 1976, however, they were “Republicans, Democrats, and Independents.” 
Yet when exactly the same crew created the Committee for the Free World (CFW) 
in 1981, Reagan was in the White House—and Perle & Co. had become Republicans 
and “conservatives.” To keep all bases covered, a link with the old Trotskyite 
base was maintained through
 Joshua Muravchik and the Social Democrats-USA. SDUSA chairman Penn Kemble was 
the Executive Director of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority in 1972, 
until he brought in Richard Perle’s aide Stephen Bryen to take his place.
By that time Wolfowitz had left a teaching position at Yale and moved to 
Washington, he could rely on a well developed support network His first 
appointment was to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Wohlstetter’s 
two prodigies soon became a strong tandem clamoring for confrontation with 
Moscow. From there Wolfowitz went to the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Regional Programs, then to the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Office, and spent three-and-a-half years as Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before being sent to Indonesia as the 
U.S. Ambassador. He returned from Jakarta to serve under President George H.W. 
Bush as Under Secretary for Policy at the Pentagon (the post subsequently held 
by his friend and protégé Douglas Feith).
IDEOLOGUE OF GLOBAL HEGEMONY—Wolfowitz’s rise to national prominence (notoriety 
is a more apt term) came at that post in early 1992, when he authored a secret 
46-page Pentagon memorandum, the Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994-99 
fiscal years. That remarkable document was soon leaked to the New York 
Times—and it shook the world.
The Cold War was over, the USSR had disintegrated, Russian soldiers were back 
home from Central Europe, but to Wolfowitz that was not enough. America had to 
keep arming herself in order to ensure that no rival power is allowed to 
emerge, anywhere, ever. The United States had to convince “potential 
competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role” and Washington’s task 
was to promote “the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the 
U.S.” The quest for hegemony was to be open-ended: “We must maintain the 
mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger 
regional or global role.” Wolfowitz accordingly asserted the right of the 
United States to intervene when and where it believed necessary:
While the U.S. cannot become the world’s policeman, by assuming responsibility 
for righting every wrong, we’ll retain the preeminent responsibility for 
addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but 
those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international 
relations.
This “responsibility” was to be discharged especially in the area of the former 
Soviet Union. Wolfowitz’s doctrine was formulated at a time of Russia’s abject 
weakness and pathetic attempts by Yeltsin and Kozyrev to prove her 
“cooperativeness” through an endless string of concessions and capitulations; 
yet Wolfowitz—an instinctive Russophobe—was unimpressed:
We do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash 
in Russia or efforts to reincorporate into Russia the newly independent 
republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly others . . . We must, however, be 
mindful that democratic change in Russia is not irreversible, and that despite 
its current travails, Russia will remain the strongest military power in 
Eurasia and the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the 
United States.
In assessing future threats, the document repeatedly stressed this alleged 
danger of Moscow’s ambition to re-incorporate the newly independent republics 
of the USSR. Incredibly, Wolfowitz advocated an all-out, U.S.-led NATO war 
against Russia if Moscow threatened their security—and that of 
newly-independent Baltic republics in particular. He boldly asserted that 
Russia would be unlikely to respond with nuclear weapons, but with no clear 
basis for that assessment.
That, in a nutshell, was the Wolfowitz Doctrine. That America should fight an 
all-out war and risk nuclear annihilation in order to maintain the independence 
of former Soviet republic was utterly insane, of course, but instead of being 
taken to a safe, quiet place where he could do no harm to himself or to others, 
Wolfowitz became a neocon hero and embarked on a decade of activism that in 
2001 brought him to the Pentagon as Rumsfeld’s No. 2.
JIHAD’S ENABLER—Paul Wolfowitz enthusiastically supported Bill Clinton’s 
pro-Muslim interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. He joined a long 
line of American officials, starting with Lawrence Eagleburger in 1992 and 
culminating with Tom Lantos last spring, who approved of “cracking some Serbian 
skulls” (Bill Kristol) in order to score a few points in the Muslim world— 
especially if this is done on the cheap. He looked then, and still looks now, 
upon Serbia as Russia’s potential asset that can and should be brutalized and 
fragmented. Finally, Wolfowitz saw in the U.S. intervention in Europe’s Balkan 
backyard an opportunity for Washington to disabuse its European partners of any 
misguided notion that they can resolve that crisis—or for that matter any 
crisis —without America’s tutelage.
To that end, in the mid-1990s Wolfowitz worked with Morton Abramowitz in 
setting up the Balkan Action Council, a rabidly anti-Serb quasi-think tank 
bankrolled by George Soros. He criticized the Clinton administration for not 
being belligerent enough: for not arming the Muslims and striking the Serbs in 
Bosnia, for not bombing Serbia already in 1998 (which he demanded, with others, 
in a full-page ad in the New York Times), and for not pursuing a clear military 
victory in Kosovo once the bombing had started.
Wolfowitz is known to have been equally supportive of the insanely Russophobic 
American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (which has changed the last word of 
its name to “Caucasus” while keeping the same acronym, ACPC), although he could 
not join due to his Pentagon appointment. Chaired by the ubiquitous Dr. 
Brzezinski, this pro-Jihadist organization included many of his close friends 
and associates (Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams, Kenneth Adelman, Joshua 
Muravchik, Morton Abramowitz and William Kristol among them). They jointly 
promoted the theory that the Chechen rebellion was a movement of national 
liberation worthy of support, not terrorist in nature, not Islamist in 
character, devoid of links with foreign Jihadist groups, and justly aggrieved 
by Russian intransigence. They were spectacularly wrong, of course, just as 
they had been spectacularly wrong on the Balkans.
It is noteworthy that Wolfowitz and his partner Richard Perle, enthusiastically 
pro-Muslim in the Balkans and the Caucasus, have the reputation of being 
Israel’s dedicated and reliable friends. (In 1996, for instance, Perle gained 
the distinction of simultaneously advising both Bob Dole’s presidential 
campaign and Benjamin Netanyahu’s election campaign.) Yet their strange 
conviction that some Jihadists must be fought while others may be wooed as 
geopolitical allies is deservedly derided in Israel herself. Wolfowitz has yet 
to grasp that, just as the Palestinian cause is inseparable from the Muslim 
ideology, the blending of the Caucasian or Balkan Muslims’ brand of nationalism 
with Islamism has already taken place—and the bond can no longer be broken.
ARCHITECT OF IRAQI WAR—Wolfowitz and Perle had advocated the war on Iraq for 
years before they got it. They were founding members of the Project for a New 
American century (PNAC) established on principles that included “American 
global leadership.” PNAC began advocating the overthrow of Saddam Hussein 
almost immediately. Its open January 26, 1998 letter to President Clinton 
demanding war against Iraq was said to have been drafted by Wolfowitz. 
Testifying to the House National Security Committee eight months later he 
declared that Saddam Hussein was reconstituting his prohibited weapons 
capabilities and suggested “a serious policy in Iraq” that would “free Iraq’s 
neighbors from Saddam’s murderous threats”:
The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq 
will be able to use, or threaten to use, weapons of mass destruction. In the 
near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy 
is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his 
regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.
Testifying to the House National Security Committee eight months later 
(September 17, 1998) Wolfowitz declared that Saddam Hussein “now finds himself 
free to reconstitute his prohibited weapons capabilities without fear of 
intrusive inspections.” He suggested “a serious policy in Iraq” that would 
“free Iraq’s neighbors from Saddam’s murderous threats.”
Just nine days after the 9/11 attacks, PNAC sent another letter, this time to 
President George W. Bush, stating that “even if evidence does not link Iraq 
directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and 
its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from 
power in Iraq.” Wolfowitz did not sign the letter as he was a government 
official, but according to the final report of the 9/11 Commission, he was 
doing his bit for the cause by trying to insert the war against Iraq into the 
package of anti-terrorist options.
Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Commission that, within days of 9/11, 
Wolfowitz had argued that Iraq should be attacked, although he had no rational 
basis for the demand:
Powell said that Wolfowitz was not able to justify his belief that Iraq was 
behind 9/11. ‘Paul [Wolfowitz] was always of the view that Iraq was a problem 
that had to be dealt with,’ Powell told us. ‘And he saw this as one way of 
using this event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem’.
LIES, DAMN LIES, AND WOLFOWITZ’S WMDS—In the end, as we know, the Commission 
concluded that there was “no credible evidence” of a terrorist link. Its 
findings were openly supported by CIA and FBI officials who had been under 
intense political pressure before the war to establish such link, notably by 
the “Office of Special Plans” at the Pentagon that was busy crafting WMD 
“intelligence” out of Dr. Feith’s whole cloth.
As soon as the war was over, however, Wolfowitz calmly changed his tune and 
took to calling the WMDs a “secondary issue.” Soon thereafter came his now 
famous admission (Vanity Fair, July 2003) that “for bureaucratic reasons we 
settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one 
reason everyone could agree on.” His audacity reached a new height on April 20, 
2004, when he told the Armed Services Committee that the war in Iraq was fought 
to remove a “brutal dictator”—and failed to even mention any WMDs—his main 
justification for war in previous years:
On February 17, 2002, Wolfowitz told Fox News Sunday that WMDs were not merely 
a threat to Iraq’s neighbors: they posed “a real threat to the world.” He 
criticized some European leaders trying to separate the war against terrorism 
to include Iraq. 
On February 17, 2003, he told London’s ITN that Saddam was “more dangerous now 
than he was five years ago, and he’ll be even more dangerous if we leave him.” 
In an ABC television interview (February 28, 2003) he said, “We’re dealing with 
a dictator who had weapons of mass terror, who continues to hold on to them at 
great cost to his country and to his own regime . . . [The danger] only grows 
the longer we wait.” 
Once the war was over and it became evident that U.S. troops occupying Iraq 
were unlikely to find any banned weapons, Wolfowitz calmly changed his tune and 
took to calling the WMDs a “secondary issue.” Returning from a visit to Iraq 
(July 2003) he thus said “I’m not concerned about weapons of mass destruction, 
I’m concerned about getting Iraq on its feet.” He further claimed that Iraqis 
themselves had little concern about the “historical” issue of weapons, which 
was no longer an issue worthy of discussion.
A MENDACIOUS SERVANT—Wolfowitz’s modus operandi in pushing his agenda from 
within the government structure is well illustrated by a sequence of events in 
one week in late 1993. On December 6, according to an AP report, “President 
Bush and his top aides were cajoling, imploring and even sweet-talking allies” 
into sharing the burden of Iraq with America. When Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld met NATO defense ministers in Brussels that week, he declared that 
Washington “welcomes more help in Iraq. Only days later, addressing American 
allies in Europe, Secretary of State Colin Powell urged them to help rebuild 
Iraq.
In apparent contradiction to such statements by his boss Rumsfeld and Secretary 
Powell, on December 9 Wolfowitz—as Assistant Secretary of Defense—declared that 
countries that had opposed the Iraq war would be barred by the U.S. from 
bidding for billions of dollars of reconstruction contracts. Those contracts 
would only be given to companies from the United States, its coalition partners 
and “force-contributing nations,” Wolfowitz said. In a sentence deeply Marxian 
in its dialectics he declared that “limiting competition for prime contracts 
will encourage the expansion of international cooperation in Iraq and in future 
efforts.”
Wolfowitz’s statement came as a bombshell. “We noted this news with amazement,” 
German foreign minister said. Prime Minister Paul Martin found it “very 
difficult to understand.” France thought it violated U.S. commitments to the 
World Trade Organization. “This is a gratuitous and extremely unhelpful 
decision,” said the EU commissioner for international relations Chris Patten. 
The New York Times declared that “President Bush has reversed field again and 
left the European allies angry, the secretary of state looking out of step, and 
the rest of us wondering exactly what his policy really is.” Wolfowitz himself 
was not reproached at first, but within days the Times revealed that “White 
House officials were fuming about the timing and the tone” of Wolfowitz’s 
statement. A State Department source called it “a train wreck.”
REAL MOTIVES?—In this long-forgotten episode Wolfowitz was guilty neither of 
ineptitude nor of incoherence. His every statement and every move prove that he 
is rational and coherent in pursuit of his defined objectives. The key problem 
with him is that those objectives are not necessarily identical with the stated 
goals of the U.S. foreign policy: his behavior is personally functional but 
systemically dysfunctional. In this instance, far from seeking “partnership” 
with “our allies,” Wolfowitz and other neocons want either an utterly 
subservient, or else an alienated and utterly alien Europe.
Wolfowitz’s statement in December 2003 and his famous Vanity Fair admission 
quoted above were equally at odds with the Administration’s stated policy. They 
made sense, however, if his true objective was to make sure that the U.S. 
remained the only outside power that matters, in the Middle East and everywhere 
else. Since Paul Wolfowitz is neither mad nor stupid, his actions indicate that 
he is loath to see any foreign involvement anywhere, except on his, and his 
like-minded cohorts’ terms, and under their control. The doctrine behind this 
policy was stated frankly in Wolfowitz’s famous 1992 Pentagon memorandum:
Like the coalition that opposed Iraqi aggression [in 1991], we should expect 
future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis 
being confronted, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the 
objectives to be accomplished. Nevertheless, the sense that the world order is 
ultimately backed by the U.S. will be an important stabilizing factor.
Wolfowitz is who he is and what he is, true to his vocation and his 
convictions; Er kann nicht anders. As head of the ISAB—formerly known as the 
Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board— he will advocate war against 
Iran, of course. He will produce information and analysis making an attack 
mandatory As for George W. Bush, his enabler, this appointment in the final 
year of his tenure is the seal of proofs that he learns nothing and forgets 
nothing.
UNDERSTANDING A BAD MAN—Dr. Paul Dundes Wolfowitz is the upholder of a peculiar 
set of ideological convictions. His mindset, Manichean, paranoid and hubristic, 
combines elements of all major 20th century brands of totalitarianism, and 
notably an instinctive preference for geopolitical imperialism, militarism, and 
statism. His core beliefs are equally at odds with any recognizably 
conservative outlook and with the preferences of the non-Stalinist Left. In 
this respect Wolfowitz is closer to Stalinism and National Socialism, than to 
the Trotskyist roots of some of his best friends. Far from identifying himself 
with the real and historic America, he treats the United States merely as a 
tool for the exercise of his Will to Power.
Wolfowitz’s driving force is his psychotic quest for power and dominance, and 
the exceptionalist discourse its justification. His advocacy of uninhibited 
American control of far-away lands bears resemblance both to the New European 
Order of 65 years ago and to the “Socialist Community” that succeeded it in 
Eastern Europe. His abiding disdain for Russia and other Orthodox Slavs 
(notably Serbs) is positively Hitlerian. His visceral Russophobia is 
reminiscent of Hitler’s obsession with Russia, an animosity that was as 
unrelated to the nature of its regime in 1941 as it is today. Wolfowitz’s 
advocacy of a new Drang nach Osten in 1992 was insane but logical.
The brazen mendacity apparent in Wolfowitz’s misrepresentation of the reasons 
for the Iraqi war to the American people recalls Goebbels’s “hypodermic needle 
approach” to propaganda. Hitler’s propaganda minister was a forerunner of 
Strauss and his dictum that perpetual deception of hoi polloi by those in power 
is necessary because they need to be led and told what is good for them. On 
this, at least, Wolfowitz, Trotsky, Stalin, and Hitler would all agree: those 
who are fit to rule are those who realize there is no morality and that might 
is right.
Wolfowitz has devoted his life to the relentless pursuit of power and to its 
use in promoting his ideological obsessions. Those obsessions are not only 
separate from, they are contrary to American interests and American tradition. 
In his words, actions, and ambitions Paul Wolfowitz has sinned against God and 
man, and specifically against his fellow countrymen. His morbid quest for 
unrestrained global dominance is devoid of any moral or legal justification.
It is regrettable and scandalous that his quest is still allowed to continue by 
George W. Bush. It must be checked. If continued unhindered, the end result of 
Wolfowitz’s life’s work will be similar to that we have witnessed in Berlin on 
two occasions in the 20th century, in November 1989 and in May 1945.
*********************************


Dr. S. Trifkovic, Foreign Affairs Editor
CHRONICLES: A Magazine of American Culture
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?cat=4 
www.trifkovic.mysite.com 


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Wolfowitz the Undead
by Srdja Trifkovic
Former World Bank chief Paul Wolfowitz will head a high-level advisory panel on 
arms control and disarmament, the State Department announced on January 24. He 
is returning to government as chairman of the International Security Advisory 
Board (ISAB). This is appalling news. It is deplorable that this devious and 
tainted man, who has been wrong—spectacularly, damagingly and provenly wrong—on 
every issue of substance in the post-Cold War era, is to get any government 
post ever again. It defies belief that he is getting the one that entrusts him 
with “supplying independent advice on arms control, disarmament, 
nonproliferation and related subjects,” which means that he will be able to 
have an impact on the U.S. Iran policy.
Almost three years ago, upon learning of President Bush’s nomination of 
then-Deputy Defense Secretary to become the new president of the World Bank, I 
expressed relief (Chronicles, May 2005) that “at his new post Wolfowitz will 
not be able to do nearly as much damage as he has done at the Pentagon.”
Last May came Wolfowitz’s resignation and departure in disgrace from the World 
Bank. Ostensibly his ouster was the result of a sordid corruption scandal 
involving his role in securing improper salary raises for his mistress, and 
trying to cover it all up. According to the Bank insiders, however, her 
employment contract was used as the handy pretext to get rid of Wolfowitz, the 
true reasons being gross mismanagement, utter misunderstanding the Bank’s role 
in the world, and an extreme of arrogance. Either way, however, I assumed that 
his public service career was finally over:
Wolfowitz is no longer able to engineer doomed foreign adventures that cost 
thousands of American lives and hundreds of billions of our dollars. The fruits 
of his past labors are still with us, but at least he is no longer directly 
involved in foreign policy making. Other officials also make mistakes and 
blunders; but he is unique in being certain to make them all the time, and on a 
grand scale.
I was wrong. Like Glenn Close in Fatal Attraction, he springs back with gusto 
just as you think he’s finally done for. Like with Count Dracula (or like with 
the presumably late Charles Haughey, as per Connor Cruise O’Brian) you need to 
look over your shoulder even if you find him lying, at midnight, with a stake 
driven through his heart.
The facts of the case add up to a perverse and troubling story. Most 
Americans—or at least those who try to think about such things— implicitly 
assume that the U.S. foreign policy (whether they agree with its conduct or 
not) is coherent in its assumptions and rational in its execution. Wolfowitz’s 
various inputs into the “decision-making community” over the decades, however, 
have been neither coherent nor rational by any conventional standard. His 
personal and professional credibility in the world is non-existant. He has been 
wrong on so many issues, and so spectacularly and visibly wrong, that his 
return into the fold marks an apt finale for this deeply flawed administration.
THE MAKING OF AN INSIDER—Wolfowitz’s intellectual maturing, when he was a 
doctoral student at the University of Chicago in the late 1960’s, proceeded 
under the tutelage of the late RAND guru Albert Wohlstetter. The latter was 
famous for his view that mere nuclear deterrence was not a satisfactory basis 
for strategic doctrine: the United States had to plan to fight and win a 
nuclear war in order to deter the enemy. Richard Perle was another promising 
protégé of Wohlstetter’s. He and Wolfowitz got to know each other through their 
ageing mentor, and became life-long political and personal associates.
Perle was the first to go to Washington, in 1969, when Wohlstetter secured his 
appointment as executive director of the Committee to Maintain a Prudent 
Defense Policy, founded primarily to defeat President Richard Nixon’s 
arms-control negotiations with Moscow. Three years later Perle was 
active—together with Midge Decter, Norman Podhoretz, and Irving Kristol—in the 
establishment of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), founded to 
promote the bid for presidency by Senator Henry (“Scoop”) Jackson. At that time 
they were all Democrats. When they revamped the Committee on the Present Danger 
(CPD) in 1976, however, they were “Republicans, Democrats, and Independents.” 
Yet when exactly the same crew created the Committee for the Free World (CFW) 
in 1981, Reagan was in the White House—and Perle & Co. had become Republicans 
and “conservatives.” To keep all bases covered, a link with the old Trotskyite 
base was maintained through
 Joshua Muravchik and the Social Democrats-USA. SDUSA chairman Penn Kemble was 
the Executive Director of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority in 1972, 
until he brought in Richard Perle’s aide Stephen Bryen to take his place.
By that time Wolfowitz had left a teaching position at Yale and moved to 
Washington, he could rely on a well developed support network His first 
appointment was to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Wohlstetter’s 
two prodigies soon became a strong tandem clamoring for confrontation with 
Moscow. From there Wolfowitz went to the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Regional Programs, then to the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Office, and spent three-and-a-half years as Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before being sent to Indonesia as the 
U.S. Ambassador. He returned from Jakarta to serve under President George H.W. 
Bush as Under Secretary for Policy at the Pentagon (the post subsequently held 
by his friend and protégé Douglas Feith).
IDEOLOGUE OF GLOBAL HEGEMONY—Wolfowitz’s rise to national prominence (notoriety 
is a more apt term) came at that post in early 1992, when he authored a secret 
46-page Pentagon memorandum, the Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994-99 
fiscal years. That remarkable document was soon leaked to the New York 
Times—and it shook the world.
The Cold War was over, the USSR had disintegrated, Russian soldiers were back 
home from Central Europe, but to Wolfowitz that was not enough. America had to 
keep arming herself in order to ensure that no rival power is allowed to 
emerge, anywhere, ever. The United States had to convince “potential 
competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role” and Washington’s task 
was to promote “the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the 
U.S.” The quest for hegemony was to be open-ended: “We must maintain the 
mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger 
regional or global role.” Wolfowitz accordingly asserted the right of the 
United States to intervene when and where it believed necessary:
While the U.S. cannot become the world’s policeman, by assuming responsibility 
for righting every wrong, we’ll retain the preeminent responsibility for 
addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but 
those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international 
relations.
This “responsibility” was to be discharged especially in the area of the former 
Soviet Union. Wolfowitz’s doctrine was formulated at a time of Russia’s abject 
weakness and pathetic attempts by Yeltsin and Kozyrev to prove her 
“cooperativeness” through an endless string of concessions and capitulations; 
yet Wolfowitz—an instinctive Russophobe—was unimpressed:
We do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash 
in Russia or efforts to reincorporate into Russia the newly independent 
republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly others . . . We must, however, be 
mindful that democratic change in Russia is not irreversible, and that despite 
its current travails, Russia will remain the strongest military power in 
Eurasia and the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the 
United States.
In assessing future threats, the document repeatedly stressed this alleged 
danger of Moscow’s ambition to re-incorporate the newly independent republics 
of the USSR. Incredibly, Wolfowitz advocated an all-out, U.S.-led NATO war 
against Russia if Moscow threatened their security—and that of 
newly-independent Baltic republics in particular. He boldly asserted that 
Russia would be unlikely to respond with nuclear weapons, but with no clear 
basis for that assessment.
That, in a nutshell, was the Wolfowitz Doctrine. That America should fight an 
all-out war and risk nuclear annihilation in order to maintain the independence 
of former Soviet republic was utterly insane, of course, but instead of being 
taken to a safe, quiet place where he could do no harm to himself or to others, 
Wolfowitz became a neocon hero and embarked on a decade of activism that in 
2001 brought him to the Pentagon as Rumsfeld’s No. 2.
JIHAD’S ENABLER—Paul Wolfowitz enthusiastically supported Bill Clinton’s 
pro-Muslim interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. He joined a long 
line of American officials, starting with Lawrence Eagleburger in 1992 and 
culminating with Tom Lantos last spring, who approved of “cracking some Serbian 
skulls” (Bill Kristol) in order to score a few points in the Muslim world— 
especially if this is done on the cheap. He looked then, and still looks now, 
upon Serbia as Russia’s potential asset that can and should be brutalized and 
fragmented. Finally, Wolfowitz saw in the U.S. intervention in Europe’s Balkan 
backyard an opportunity for Washington to disabuse its European partners of any 
misguided notion that they can resolve that crisis—or for that matter any 
crisis —without America’s tutelage.
To that end, in the mid-1990s Wolfowitz worked with Morton Abramowitz in 
setting up the Balkan Action Council, a rabidly anti-Serb quasi-think tank 
bankrolled by George Soros. He criticized the Clinton administration for not 
being belligerent enough: for not arming the Muslims and striking the Serbs in 
Bosnia, for not bombing Serbia already in 1998 (which he demanded, with others, 
in a full-page ad in the New York Times), and for not pursuing a clear military 
victory in Kosovo once the bombing had started.
Wolfowitz is known to have been equally supportive of the insanely Russophobic 
American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (which has changed the last word of 
its name to “Caucasus” while keeping the same acronym, ACPC), although he could 
not join due to his Pentagon appointment. Chaired by the ubiquitous Dr. 
Brzezinski, this pro-Jihadist organization included many of his close friends 
and associates (Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams, Kenneth Adelman, Joshua 
Muravchik, Morton Abramowitz and William Kristol among them). They jointly 
promoted the theory that the Chechen rebellion was a movement of national 
liberation worthy of support, not terrorist in nature, not Islamist in 
character, devoid of links with foreign Jihadist groups, and justly aggrieved 
by Russian intransigence. They were spectacularly wrong, of course, just as 
they had been spectacularly wrong on the Balkans.
It is noteworthy that Wolfowitz and his partner Richard Perle, enthusiastically 
pro-Muslim in the Balkans and the Caucasus, have the reputation of being 
Israel’s dedicated and reliable friends. (In 1996, for instance, Perle gained 
the distinction of simultaneously advising both Bob Dole’s presidential 
campaign and Benjamin Netanyahu’s election campaign.) Yet their strange 
conviction that some Jihadists must be fought while others may be wooed as 
geopolitical allies is deservedly derided in Israel herself. Wolfowitz has yet 
to grasp that, just as the Palestinian cause is inseparable from the Muslim 
ideology, the blending of the Caucasian or Balkan Muslims’ brand of nationalism 
with Islamism has already taken place—and the bond can no longer be broken.
ARCHITECT OF IRAQI WAR—Wolfowitz and Perle had advocated the war on Iraq for 
years before they got it. They were founding members of the Project for a New 
American century (PNAC) established on principles that included “American 
global leadership.” PNAC began advocating the overthrow of Saddam Hussein 
almost immediately. Its open January 26, 1998 letter to President Clinton 
demanding war against Iraq was said to have been drafted by Wolfowitz. 
Testifying to the House National Security Committee eight months later he 
declared that Saddam Hussein was reconstituting his prohibited weapons 
capabilities and suggested “a serious policy in Iraq” that would “free Iraq’s 
neighbors from Saddam’s murderous threats”:
The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq 
will be able to use, or threaten to use, weapons of mass destruction. In the 
near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy 
is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his 
regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.
Testifying to the House National Security Committee eight months later 
(September 17, 1998) Wolfowitz declared that Saddam Hussein “now finds himself 
free to reconstitute his prohibited weapons capabilities without fear of 
intrusive inspections.” He suggested “a serious policy in Iraq” that would 
“free Iraq’s neighbors from Saddam’s murderous threats.”
Just nine days after the 9/11 attacks, PNAC sent another letter, this time to 
President George W. Bush, stating that “even if evidence does not link Iraq 
directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and 
its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from 
power in Iraq.” Wolfowitz did not sign the letter as he was a government 
official, but according to the final report of the 9/11 Commission, he was 
doing his bit for the cause by trying to insert the war against Iraq into the 
package of anti-terrorist options.
Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Commission that, within days of 9/11, 
Wolfowitz had argued that Iraq should be attacked, although he had no rational 
basis for the demand:
Powell said that Wolfowitz was not able to justify his belief that Iraq was 
behind 9/11. ‘Paul [Wolfowitz] was always of the view that Iraq was a problem 
that had to be dealt with,’ Powell told us. ‘And he saw this as one way of 
using this event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem’.
LIES, DAMN LIES, AND WOLFOWITZ’S WMDS—In the end, as we know, the Commission 
concluded that there was “no credible evidence” of a terrorist link. Its 
findings were openly supported by CIA and FBI officials who had been under 
intense political pressure before the war to establish such link, notably by 
the “Office of Special Plans” at the Pentagon that was busy crafting WMD 
“intelligence” out of Dr. Feith’s whole cloth.
As soon as the war was over, however, Wolfowitz calmly changed his tune and 
took to calling the WMDs a “secondary issue.” Soon thereafter came his now 
famous admission (Vanity Fair, July 2003) that “for bureaucratic reasons we 
settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one 
reason everyone could agree on.” His audacity reached a new height on April 20, 
2004, when he told the Armed Services Committee that the war in Iraq was fought 
to remove a “brutal dictator”—and failed to even mention any WMDs—his main 
justification for war in previous years:
On February 17, 2002, Wolfowitz told Fox News Sunday that WMDs were not merely 
a threat to Iraq’s neighbors: they posed “a real threat to the world.” He 
criticized some European leaders trying to separate the war against terrorism 
to include Iraq. 
On February 17, 2003, he told London’s ITN that Saddam was “more dangerous now 
than he was five years ago, and he’ll be even more dangerous if we leave him.” 
In an ABC television interview (February 28, 2003) he said, “We’re dealing with 
a dictator who had weapons of mass terror, who continues to hold on to them at 
great cost to his country and to his own regime . . . [The danger] only grows 
the longer we wait.” 
Once the war was over and it became evident that U.S. troops occupying Iraq 
were unlikely to find any banned weapons, Wolfowitz calmly changed his tune and 
took to calling the WMDs a “secondary issue.” Returning from a visit to Iraq 
(July 2003) he thus said “I’m not concerned about weapons of mass destruction, 
I’m concerned about getting Iraq on its feet.” He further claimed that Iraqis 
themselves had little concern about the “historical” issue of weapons, which 
was no longer an issue worthy of discussion.
A MENDACIOUS SERVANT—Wolfowitz’s modus operandi in pushing his agenda from 
within the government structure is well illustrated by a sequence of events in 
one week in late 1993. On December 6, according to an AP report, “President 
Bush and his top aides were cajoling, imploring and even sweet-talking allies” 
into sharing the burden of Iraq with America. When Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld met NATO defense ministers in Brussels that week, he declared that 
Washington “welcomes more help in Iraq. Only days later, addressing American 
allies in Europe, Secretary of State Colin Powell urged them to help rebuild 
Iraq.
In apparent contradiction to such statements by his boss Rumsfeld and Secretary 
Powell, on December 9 Wolfowitz—as Assistant Secretary of Defense—declared that 
countries that had opposed the Iraq war would be barred by the U.S. from 
bidding for billions of dollars of reconstruction contracts. Those contracts 
would only be given to companies from the United States, its coalition partners 
and “force-contributing nations,” Wolfowitz said. In a sentence deeply Marxian 
in its dialectics he declared that “limiting competition for prime contracts 
will encourage the expansion of international cooperation in Iraq and in future 
efforts.”
Wolfowitz’s statement came as a bombshell. “We noted this news with amazement,” 
German foreign minister said. Prime Minister Paul Martin found it “very 
difficult to understand.” France thought it violated U.S. commitments to the 
World Trade Organization. “This is a gratuitous and extremely unhelpful 
decision,” said the EU commissioner for international relations Chris Patten. 
The New York Times declared that “President Bush has reversed field again and 
left the European allies angry, the secretary of state looking out of step, and 
the rest of us wondering exactly what his policy really is.” Wolfowitz himself 
was not reproached at first, but within days the Times revealed that “White 
House officials were fuming about the timing and the tone” of Wolfowitz’s 
statement. A State Department source called it “a train wreck.”
REAL MOTIVES?—In this long-forgotten episode Wolfowitz was guilty neither of 
ineptitude nor of incoherence. His every statement and every move prove that he 
is rational and coherent in pursuit of his defined objectives. The key problem 
with him is that those objectives are not necessarily identical with the stated 
goals of the U.S. foreign policy: his behavior is personally functional but 
systemically dysfunctional. In this instance, far from seeking “partnership” 
with “our allies,” Wolfowitz and other neocons want either an utterly 
subservient, or else an alienated and utterly alien Europe.
Wolfowitz’s statement in December 2003 and his famous Vanity Fair admission 
quoted above were equally at odds with the Administration’s stated policy. They 
made sense, however, if his true objective was to make sure that the U.S. 
remained the only outside power that matters, in the Middle East and everywhere 
else. Since Paul Wolfowitz is neither mad nor stupid, his actions indicate that 
he is loath to see any foreign involvement anywhere, except on his, and his 
like-minded cohorts’ terms, and under their control. The doctrine behind this 
policy was stated frankly in Wolfowitz’s famous 1992 Pentagon memorandum:
Like the coalition that opposed Iraqi aggression [in 1991], we should expect 
future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis 
being confronted, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the 
objectives to be accomplished. Nevertheless, the sense that the world order is 
ultimately backed by the U.S. will be an important stabilizing factor.
Wolfowitz is who he is and what he is, true to his vocation and his 
convictions; Er kann nicht anders. As head of the ISAB—formerly known as the 
Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board— he will advocate war against 
Iran, of course. He will produce information and analysis making an attack 
mandatory As for George W. Bush, his enabler, this appointment in the final 
year of his tenure is the seal of proofs that he learns nothing and forgets 
nothing.
UNDERSTANDING A BAD MAN—Dr. Paul Dundes Wolfowitz is the upholder of a peculiar 
set of ideological convictions. His mindset, Manichean, paranoid and hubristic, 
combines elements of all major 20th century brands of totalitarianism, and 
notably an instinctive preference for geopolitical imperialism, militarism, and 
statism. His core beliefs are equally at odds with any recognizably 
conservative outlook and with the preferences of the non-Stalinist Left. In 
this respect Wolfowitz is closer to Stalinism and National Socialism, than to 
the Trotskyist roots of some of his best friends. Far from identifying himself 
with the real and historic America, he treats the United States merely as a 
tool for the exercise of his Will to Power.
Wolfowitz’s driving force is his psychotic quest for power and dominance, and 
the exceptionalist discourse its justification. His advocacy of uninhibited 
American control of far-away lands bears resemblance both to the New European 
Order of 65 years ago and to the “Socialist Community” that succeeded it in 
Eastern Europe. His abiding disdain for Russia and other Orthodox Slavs 
(notably Serbs) is positively Hitlerian. His visceral Russophobia is 
reminiscent of Hitler’s obsession with Russia, an animosity that was as 
unrelated to the nature of its regime in 1941 as it is today. Wolfowitz’s 
advocacy of a new Drang nach Osten in 1992 was insane but logical.
The brazen mendacity apparent in Wolfowitz’s misrepresentation of the reasons 
for the Iraqi war to the American people recalls Goebbels’s “hypodermic needle 
approach” to propaganda. Hitler’s propaganda minister was a forerunner of 
Strauss and his dictum that perpetual deception of hoi polloi by those in power 
is necessary because they need to be led and told what is good for them. On 
this, at least, Wolfowitz, Trotsky, Stalin, and Hitler would all agree: those 
who are fit to rule are those who realize there is no morality and that might 
is right.
Wolfowitz has devoted his life to the relentless pursuit of power and to its 
use in promoting his ideological obsessions. Those obsessions are not only 
separate from, they are contrary to American interests and American tradition. 
In his words, actions, and ambitions Paul Wolfowitz has sinned against God and 
man, and specifically against his fellow countrymen. His morbid quest for 
unrestrained global dominance is devoid of any moral or legal justification.
It is regrettable and scandalous that his quest is still allowed to continue by 
George W. Bush. It must be checked. If continued unhindered, the end result of 
Wolfowitz’s life’s work will be similar to that we have witnessed in Berlin on 
two occasions in the 20th century, in November 1989 and in May 1945.
*********************************


Dr. S. Trifkovic, Foreign Affairs Editor
CHRONICLES: A Magazine of American Culture
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?cat=4 
www.trifkovic.mysite.com


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