http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=719#comments
A Major War: Not Just Rumors <http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=719>
*by Srdja Trifkovic*
The crisis in relations between the United States and Russia over
Georgia heralds a particularly dangerous period in world affairs: the
era of asymmetrical multipolarity. A major war between two or more major
powers is more likely in this configuration than in any other model of
global balance known to history.
The most stable system is /bipolarity/ based on the doctrine of Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD), which was prevalent from the 1950s until the
end of the Cold War. The awareness of both superpowers that they would
inflict severe and unavoidable reciprocal damage on each other or their
allies in a nuclear war was coupled with the acceptance that each had a
sphere of dominance or vital interest that should not be infringed upon.
With Brest-Litovsk and the Barbarossa in mind, Stalin "intended to turn
the countries conquered by Soviet armies into buffer zones to protect
Russia" (Kissinger). The Western equivalent, also essentially defensive,
was defined by the Truman Doctrine (1947) Proxy wars were fought in the
grey zone all over the Third World, most notably in the Middle East, but
they were kept localized even when a superpower was directly involved
(Vietnam, Afghanistan). This model was the product of unique
circumstances without an adequate historical precedent, however, which
are unlikely to be repeated in the foreseeable future.
The most stable model of international relations that is both
historically recurrent and structurally repeatable in the future is the
balance of power system in which no single great power is either
physically able or politically willing to seek hegemony. This model was
prevalent from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) until Napoleon, from
Waterloo until around 1900, and from Versailles until 1933. It demands a
relative equilibrium between the key powers (usually five to seven) that
hold each other in check and function within a recognized set of rules
that has come to be known as "international law." Wars between great
powers do occur, but they are limited in scope and intensity because the
warring parties tacitly accept the fundamental legitimacy and continued
existence of their opponent(s).
If one of the powers becomes markedly stronger than others /and/ if its
decision-making elite internalizes an ideology that demands or at least
justifies hegemony, the inherently unstable system of /asymmetrical
multipolarity/ will develop. In all three known instances—Napoleonic
France after 1799, the Kaiserreich from around 1900, and the Third Reich
after 1933—the challenge could not be resolved without a major war.
The government of the United States is now acting in a manner
structurally reminiscent of those three powers. Having proclaimed itself
the leader of an imaginary "international community," it goes further
than any previous would-be hegemon in treating the entire world as the
American sphere of interest. As I pointed out
<http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=712> two weeks ago, the formal
codification came in the National Security Strategy
<http://service.gmx.net/de/cgi/derefer?TYPE=3&DEST=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.whitehouse.gov%2Fnsc%2Fnss%2F2002%2Findex.html>
of September 2002, which presented the specter of open-ended political,
military, and economic domination of the world by the United States
acting unilaterally against "rogue states" and "potentially hostile
powers" and in pursuit of an end to "destructive national rivalries." To
that end, the administration pledged "to keep military strength beyond
challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras
pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace."
Any attempt by a single power to keep its military strength /beyond
challenge/ is inherently destabilizing, and results—sooner or later—in
the emergence of an effective counter-coalition. Napoleon finally faced
one at the /Völkerschlacht/ at Leipzig in 1813. "There is no balance of
power in Europe but me and my twenty-four army corps," the Kaiser
famously boasted in 1901. Within years he was also building a high seas
fleet. By 1907, Wilhelmine Germany engendered a counter-coalition that
prompted even traditional rivals like Britain and Russia to join forces
(the latter to be replaced by the United States in 1917). And as for the
most recent /Griff nach der Weltmacht/, by the second week of December
1941 Germany was irrevocably doomed to another defeat.
An early yet certain symptom of destabilizing asymmetry in action is the
would-be hegemon's tendency to claim an ever-widening sphere of
influence or interference at the expense of his rivals. In the run-up to
1914 this was heralded by the Kruger Telegram (1896) and exemplified by
the German bid to build the railway from Berlin to Baghdad (1903) and by
the First Moroccan Crisis (1905). Neither Napoleon nor Hitler knew any
«natural» limits, but their ambition was essentially confined to Europe.
With the United States today the novelty is that this ambition is
extended—literally—to the whole world. Not only the Western Hemisphere,
not just the «Old Europe,» Japan, or Israel, but also Taiwan, Korea, and
such unlikely places as Georgia, Estonia, Kosovo, or Bosnia, are
considered vitally important. The globe itself is now effectively
claimed as America's sphere of influence, Russia's Caucasian, European
and Central Asian back yards most emphatically included.
Four weeks ago the game itself became alarmingly asymmetrical. For
America it is still ideological, but for Russia it has become
existential. Russia is now acting as a conservative, pre-1914 European
power in seeking to protect its "near abroad." America is acting like a
global revolutionary power, whose "near abroad" is literally everywhere.
It is therefore futile for Russia to try to "manage" the crisis in a
pre-1914 manner and hope for some elusive softening on the other side,
because the calculus in Washington is not rational. The counter-strategy
of unpredictability, exemplified by Medvedev's recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, is an eminently rational response, however. It may
yet force the remnant of sanity inside the Beltway to try and exercise
some adult supervision over the bipartisan "foreign policy community" of
smokers in the arsenal.
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