http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2214
09.06.2009
Pyotr ISKENDEROV
UN Papers and the Gross Reality
(On the Tenth Anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution on Kosovo)
June 10 is a sad date in the history of the UN, the institution originally
meant to play the key role in ensuring peace, security, and the primacy of law
in the world. The decade since the passing of the June 10, 1999 UN Security
Council Resolution 1244 addressing the Kosovo problem – the document totally
ignored throughout the period - has shown that the UN is no longer playing the
role prescribed to it by the post-World War II system of the international law.
The Resolution the tenth anniversary of which nobody seems willing to celebrate
in the UN headquarters, Belgrade, or Pristina is usually attributed to an
intricate compromise. Ten years ago the Russian leadership managed to
incorporate into it several fundamental principles concerning the Kosovo
settlement. Most importantly, it was stressed in the document's preamble that
the Kosovo problem had to be solved on the basis “of the commitment of all
Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region”. Correspondingly,
the Resolution called for “substantial autonomy and meaningful
self-administration for Kosovo”. Besides, the UN Security Council reached
consensus that international discussions of specific parameters of Kosovo’s
future status would begin only after the implementation in the province of the
democratic standards guaranteeing the political, economic,
cultural, and national rights of the province's non-Albanian population.
Nothing of the above materialized. From the outset, the West pushed for Kosovo
independence, and only the requirements of Resolution 1244 which could be
interpreted so as to broaden the rights and authority of Albanian separatists
were actually met. As for Russia, its only accomplishments throughout the
period since the passing of the resolution till the opening of the negotiations
between Belgrade and Pristina on the status of Kosovo in February, 2006 were
the snap offensive which led to the seizure of the Slatina airport by Russian
peacekeepers and their quiet withdrawal in 2003 under the pretext that “it was
impossible to change anything”.
The subsequent talks under the auspices of the UN in which Russia took a
somewhat bigger role ended with a predictable failure which made it possible
for the Albanian separatists to declare the independence of Kosovo unilaterally
in February, 2008. The independence was momentarily recognized by the
Albanians' Western donors and ideological patrons.
The available information makes it possible to claim that both the passing of
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the diplomatic maneuvers around Kosovo
that ensued – those in which the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministries took
part in particular – were nothing but a show originally planned by the West. In
the process Moscow's role to which the Russian leadership somehow agreed was
that of a “good policeman”.
Obviously, Resolution 1244 was stillborn. The key problems were not the poor
compliance with its requirements and Russia's inability to make its partners
view the UN document with proper respect but the fact that the West had made
all the decisions on the status of Kosovo already in the late 1998. The
subsequent negotiation between Serbs and Albanians in Rambouillet, NATO
airstrikes, discussions in the UN Security Council, and the deployment of the
UN mission and NATO peacekeepers in the province were just steps in the
realization of the already existing plan.
The build-up of the NATO presence in Kosovo also commenced in the late 1998. In
the US the point of no return was reached when Michael Polt who coordinated the
military policy in the Clinton Administration and later became the US
Ambassador to Serbia convinced Secretary of State C. Powell to consent to the
intervention in the region. Polt argued that by intervening in Kosovo NATO
would send a clear message to all Eurasian countries, of course including
Russia.
Yugoslavian Vice President Momir Bulatovic said: “It already became clear in
October, 1998 that the decision on our future had been made. They started
talking about the “humanitarian disaster” in Kosovo and the so-called NATO
credibility. The latter meant that if NATO was unable to put an end to the
“humanitarian disaster”, then it simply had no right to exist. To avoid a
military strike we were ready to make concessions to the extent of retaining
only the minimal amount of state dignity and territorial integrity. They were
interested in Kosovo's natural resources - we offered US and British companies
to develop them at the token price of $1. They responded that the offer was
attractive but unacceptable. Then NATO wanted a base in Kosovo. We offered them
to have it for the same $1 token price. They were surprised but turned down the
offer nevertheless. Trying to avoid conflict we eventually suggested that
Yugoslavia should join NATO and thus
automatically generate a solution to the Kosovo problem. Again the answer was
No. Admitting us to NATO could resolve the dispute over Kosovo but could not
solve any of the problems due to which NATO decided to attack our small
country. NATO decided to move into Kosovo by forceavoiding any cooperation with
us. The point is that if NATO does not reckon with us it would also be free of
any obligations to other countries. They branded this the New World Order”.
The US still had to secure Europe's consent to launching the offensive.
Washington proposed “to give Serbs another chance” and to hold an international
conference on Kosovo in Rambouillet in February, 1999. Belgrade faced totally
unprecedented requirements deliberately formulated to make the aggression
against Yugoslavia inevitable. Momir Bulatovic recalled: “In Rambouillet we
were asked to agree to the deployment of NATO forces in Kosovo and to allow
them access to all of the Yugoslavian territory. According to a document which
looked like an ultimatum, all our expressways, railroads, air space, and
installations were to be used by NATO free of charge and without any
limitations. All NATO servicemen were to be exempt from our laws and or any
criminal responsibilities. All the decision-making was to be left to the
commander of the NATO contingent. The document was formulated so that no sane
individual could ever sign it”. As expected, Yugoslavia'
representatives did not agree to the de facto occupation of their country.
Russia actively took part in the Rambouillet “negotiations” though the Russian
leadership had to be aware that the West had already laid the finishing touches
on the scenario for Kosovo. Russia's involvement only helped to make the
enforced separation of Kosovo – the cradle of the Serbian national statehood –
from Serbia appear more peaceful and take somewhat longer to complete...
Viewing the situation now in 2009 one can only hope that Russia has learned the
lessons. Russian diplomats admit in private conversations that Moscow should
start cooperating more actively with the Balkan political forces which can be
regarded as its potential allies in future conflicts over Eurasian political
arrangements and energy security. Kosovo has been torn out of Serbia - this is
the gross reality, not a passage from some UN papers. Bringing it back would
take something other than voting in the UN Security Council, an institution
which has become nothing else than a decoration used by the global forces
acting behind the curtain.
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