---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, Nov 12, 2011 at 2:04 AM
Subject: "Full-scale War Looms as Khartoum Bombs Civilians in South Sudan"
To: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
"Full-scale War Looms as Khartoum Bombs Civilians in South Sudan"
Eric Reeves
November 11, 2011
During the past 48 hours multiple reports from the ground have
confirmed that aircraft of Khartoum's Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) have
bombed targets in South Sudan. Amidst rapidly escalating tensions in
Sudan, the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP)
regime has twice ordered its aircraft to engage in aerial bombardment
of areas in South Sudan with substantial civilian populations. Yida
in Unity State, which is currently the site of a large refugee
population (more than 23,000 are registered), narrowly escaped
catastrophe. And in the remote area of Guffa (north of Bunj in the
Mabaan region of Upper Nile State) the only medical aid organization
in the region is now evacuating its personnel from nearby Doro (even
further inside Upper Nile). The November 8 bombing of Guffa
reportedly killed 7 people and wounded many others. John Ashworth
(Sudan Ecumenical Forum) reports that a church source in the area
described the bombing of Guffa as "serious and deliberate," and also
reports that, "Many Southern Sudanese have been wounded as a result of
the bombing" (email received November 10, 2011).
These attacks are a deliberate, calculated provocation by the
increasingly militarized regime in Khartoum, with the ultimate goal of
creating a new North/South border, bringing Southern oil fields into
the North. This reckless move toward war is evidently dictated in
large part by the desperate state of the grossly mismanaged Northern
economy; there is also great bitterness within the senior ranks of the
military and the most brutal hardliners in the regime, men who feel
that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement gave away too much (many
generals clearly did not think that Southern secession would actually
occur).
The move toward war is confirmed by a report today from the Satellite
Sentinel Project (SSP) that details preparations in Kurmuk (Blue Nile)
that will greatly enhance the offensive range of Khartoum's military
aircraft ("Radius of Operations: Sudan Increases Air Attack
Capacity"). Antonov-26 "bombers," which have an operating radius of
approximately 1,100 kilometers, will be able to reach Juba from
Kurmuk. SSP also notes that the "SAF appears to be rapidly building
helipads in Kurmuk," suitable for helicopter gunships. These aerial
weapons were used to devastating effect in the oil regions during the
last years of the civil war, particularly in Unity State, one of the
regions targeted on November 10. The report concludes by noting that
satellite photography---
" ... shows the presence of three attack helicopters and one Antonov
at the SAF-controlled Damazin airstrip [further north in Blue Nile].
The presence of air assets and expansion of the airstrip affirms SAF's
growing air capacity in Blue Nile enabling a projection of force
throughout Blue Nile, Upper Nile, and southern Sudan."
There have also been credible reports from the SPLA that Khartoum's
militia forces engaged in a cross-border attack on Kuek (November 10,
2011), with many casualties on both sides. Kuek is in the
oil-producing southern state of Upper Nile, very near the border with
the northern state of White Nile. All of this is consistent with the
increasingly bellicose language from nominal head of the regime, Omar
al-Bashir. His remarks last Sunday (November 6) were the most
strident since the secession of South Sudan on July 9, warning that
his regime:
" … was running out of patience in the face of 'continued
provocations' by South Sudan, saying that Khartoum is ready to return
to war .... Addressing a rally on Sunday in Al-Damazin town, the state
capital of the Blue Nile State, president Al-Bashir declared that
Khartoum was ready to go to war with the south should the latter fire
the first shot. The Sudanese president also claimed that his country
was in possession of evidences indicating that the south was preparing
to launch a war against the Sudanese Army (SAF), threatening that his
country would respond in kind. He further said that Khartoum had
observed 'too much patience and self-restraint' in the face of
'continued provocations' by the southern army in Abyei and elsewhere."
(Sudan Tribune, November 7, 2011)
Of course this is utterly absurd: the "provocations" have been those
of Khartoum's ground and air military forces, going back over a year
(see below). And the restraint by Juba has been remarkable during
this time. But the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, while
repeatedly and unambiguously stressing his country's desire for peace,
also declared that "despite our commitment to peaceful coexistence, we
never allow someone to violate our sovereignty, whatever the
conditions" (Agence France-Presse [dateline: Juba], November 10,
2011).
But for all the earnestness of Salva's words, he well knows that
mendacity is the way of the regime, and that the response of the chief
SAF military spokesman to confirmed reports of bombing attacks on the
territory of South Sudan was entirely predictable:
"Sudan Armed Forces spokesman Sawarmi Khaled Saad vehemently denied
any links to the raid. 'This information is completely false. We
didn't bomb any camps or any areas inside the borders of South Sudan,'
he told the AFP news agency. 'What is going on in South Sudan belongs
to the southerners. We don't have any links to this.'" (Agence
France-Presse, November 10, 2011)
Khartoum's ambassador to the UN was today equally mendacious:
"Sudanese Ambassador Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman told journalists after
a Security Council meeting on the matter Friday that the reports were
'fabrications' and 'there was no aerial bombardment.'" (Associated
Press [dateline: UN/New York], November 11, 2011)
Many might find such patent lies breath-taking in light of the fully
confirmed details of the bombing attack at Yida. There were several
journalists present in Yida, including those of the BBC and Reuters,
as well as the nongovernmental humanitarian organization Samaritan's
Purse, with a long history in Sudan. All confirm that the refugee
camp was hit by four bombs, one of which did not detonate: that bomb
landed just outside a school where some 200 students were present; if
it had detonated, casualties among the children would have been
horrific. The UN High Commission for Refugees also condemned the
bombing attack on Yida in unequivocal terms today (November 11, 2011).
But we must remember that such conspicuous, outrageous lies---even
when directly refuted by all available evidence---are standard
operating procedure for the SAF, especially when fighting is
intensifying (the pattern has been in evidence in Darfur for many
years, and was also present in the weeks before the invasion of
Abyei). And in the absence of any meaningful international pressure
to date, Khartoum now appears fully prepared to extend its military
campaigns from Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan into South Sudan
itself. These bombing attacks, particularly the attack on Yida, are
designed to put the Government of South Sudan in an untenable
position: for if there is no military response from Juba, Khartoum
will continue to press forward and continue its bombing of Southern
territory. If the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) does respond
militarily, Khartoum will deny any provocation on its part and use
this SPLA response as a basis for declaring war.
The generals who now dominate the regime have decided that they will
"recover" at least some what was "lost" in the way of oil reserves in
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. Although 75 percent
of oil reserves lie in South Sudan, the vast majority are perilously
close to the North/South border, and Khartoum is evidently calculating
that they will be able to seize, and militarily seal off, valuable oil
concessions areas and infrastructure. Besides being a blatant
violation of the CPA and international law, the effect of such a
seizure would have a devastating impact on the civilians in the
adjoining regions.
As an SPLM/A spokesman in Juba declared yesterday:
"South Sudan's army said 18 people died when a Sudan-backed militia
attacked one of its military bases in Upper Nile state and warned that
the insurgents are planning assaults on oil-producing areas. 'The
attackers were mercenaries heavily armed by Khartoum,' Colonel Philip
Aguer said today in an interview in Juba, South Sudan's capital. Five
South Sudanese soldiers and 13 rebels died in the fighting yesterday,
he said. Aguer said the militia is massing forces along the border in
preparation for attacks on oil-producing areas in Upper Nile. 'They
want to occupy it and use it as oil that is under the north,' he said.
'This is an oil war now.'" (Bloomberg, November 11, 2011)
Certainly the evidence is now overwhelmingly clear that Khartoum is
arming and supporting rebel militias operating in South Sudan, but
with sanctuary provided in the North, including Khartoum. Of
particular concern are the forces of Bapiny Monytuil, who succeed
Peter Gadet as leader of the SSLA militia force, and George Athor.
The former has been highly active in Unity State, especially Mayom
County (in the very center of the oil region); George Athor is
reported by one source to have been involved in the seizure of Kurmuk,
and has for many months been wreaking havoc among civilians in Jonglei
State. The most recent evidence of Khartoum's support for these
immensely destructive and destabilizing militias comes from the Small
Arms Survey (SAS), which found that the forces of both men have been
heavily armed with weapons of Chinese manufacture that are factory-new
(the weapons were captured by the SPLA in February and March 2011, and
analyzed by SAS; the October 20 results are now available). These
weapons could only have come from Khartoum.
The road to war has had many conspicuous sign-posts:
•November 2010: Khartoum begins a highly provocative campaign of
bombings in South Sudan near the North/South border, attacking more
than 10 targets in Western and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal from November
11, 2010 through March 23, 2011. No effective or significant protest
of these actions is heard from the international community, a fact not
lost on the Khartoum regime.
•2010 - 2011: Khartoum accelerates its military assistance to rebel
militia forces in South Sudan, in a bid to destabilize the region
prior to and after both the January 2011 referendum and July 9
independence. By late summer 2011 the forces of George Athor and
Bapiny Monytuil are beings exhorted by Khartoum to be more aggressive
and military assistance is increased.
•January 11, 2011: having denied Abyei the self-determination
referendum to which it is entitled by the CPA, Khartoum slowly moves
to take de facto military control of the region.
•March 2011: the military build-up in and around Abyei makes clear
that the region will fall quickly to the SAF whenever it chooses to
attack.
•May 20, 2011: on the basis of a contrived pretext, the SAF and its
Arab Misseriya militia allies invade Abyei, seizing control within two
days and sending some 120,000 Dinka Ngok, the indigenous population,
fleeing to South Sudan.
•June 5, 2011: The SAF and a range of militia forces launch a
well-planned assault on South Kordofan, with the Nuba people as the
primary target. Bombing of the Nuba Mountains is constant and gravely
threatens the agricultural cycle in the region; starvation looms but
Khartoum adamantly refuses all international humanitarian access.
•June 12, 2011: Khartoum agrees to withdraw from Abyei with the
deployment of a UN peacekeeping force comprising an Ethiopian brigade.
Predictably, there has been no withdrawal by the SAF, and no chance
for the Ngok to return to their lands.
•June 28, 2011: Khartoum, represented by senior presidential advisor
Nafi'e Ali Nafi'e, signs a framework agreement with the SPLM-North,
committing the two parties to: (1) negotiate a political settlement to
differences on governance in the regions, (2) negotiate the future of
SPLA-N soldiers, and (3) negotiate a cease-fire.
•July 1, 2011: President Omar al-Bashir, on returning from China, is
ordered by the newly empowered generals within the regime to renounce
the agreement signed by Nafi'e; al-Bashir does so in a highly
inflammatory declaration, promising to continue the campaign of
"cleansing" in South Kordofan.
•September 1, 2011: The SAF and a range of militia forces launch yet
another military assault, this time on Blue Nile. The same
indiscriminate targeting of civilians with artillery and bombing
attacks is the centerpiece of the campaign. Again all humanitarian
access to civilian populations has been denied by Khartoum.
•November 3: The SPLA/M-N stronghold of Kurmuk falls, and the SAF
immediately begins to augment the aerial capacity of the airstrip near
Kurmuk, and moves quickly to create landing pads for helicopter
gunships. The capital city of Juba is now in range of SAF Antonov
"bombers" (retrofitted cargo planes with no militarily useful
accuracy, only an extraordinary capacity for civilian terror and
destruction).
•November 8: Khartoum bombs Guffa in Upper Nile State, South Sudan;
seven people are reported killed, and many wounded. The only medical
relief organization in the area has been forced to withdraw,
describing the bombing as "serious and deliberate."
•November 9: Khartoum bombs Yida, a refugee camp with more than 23,000
registered civilians who have fled previous violence by Khartoum. One
bomb, which does not detonate, falls immediately adjacent to a school
where 200 students are present. The attack is confirmed by
journalists present and by a major aid organization.
•November 9: The SPLA in Juba reports that Khartoum-backed militia
forces ("mercenaries") attacked the South on the ground, specifically
the SPLA military base at Kuek, Upper Nile (very near the border with
White Nile state in the North) on November 9.
What has been clear, but the Obama administration refuses to see
I have argued for a number of years that events of the sort we have
seen over the past five months, and the ruthlessness of NIF/NCP
tyranny, would define any resumption of war in Sudan.
I argued in August 23, 2004 (Washington Post, "Regime Change in Sudan") that:
"The challenges adumbrated here [about the imperative of regime change
in Sudan] are daunting and politically risky. The consequences of
failing to accept these challenges are continuation of genocidal rule
and additional hundreds of thousands of deaths."
This is demonstrably the case, even as we have no idea how many
hundreds of thousands have died in Darfur and elsewhere in the past
seven years---or how many are poised for destruction in the midst of
current fighting, denial of humanitarian access, and the concerted
destruction of agricultural production.
Even earlier, during the first year of the Darfur genocide, I argued
in The Washington Post (February 25, 2004) that:
"Khartoum has so far refused to rein in its Arab militias; has refused
to enter into meaningful peace talks with the insurgency groups; and
most disturbingly, refuses to grant unfettered humanitarian access.
The international community has been slow to react to Darfur's
catastrophe and has yet to move with sufficient urgency and
commitment. A credible peace forum must rapidly be created. Immediate
plans for humanitarian intervention should begin. The alternative is
to allow tens of thousands of civilians to die in the weeks and months
ahead in what will be continuing genocidal destruction."
Again, all this is demonstrably true.
In March 2011, I argued in several analyses that the military seizure
of Abyei was impending, and that it was only a matter of time before
the massive disposition of forces would enable a rapid seizure of the
region. Two months later this is exactly what happened.
On June 9, 2011 I argued ("Khartoum Dramatically Escalates War in
Sudan") that the linchpin Machakos Protocol (July 2002), guaranteeing
the South the right to a self-determination referendum, was deeply
undermined by Khartoum's actions in Abyei and South Kordofan, and that
this made war much more likely:
"The case of the people of the Nuba Mountains may be special in a
sense, but it all too aptly crystallizes the essential challenge of
Machakos. Either Khartoum is confronted forcefully, consistently, and
with the sharpest moral focus, or the regime will delay, obfuscate,
promise and renege, and delay further---continuing negotiations only
in bad faith, calculating merely what best serves their survivalist
desires. And if military victory should seem within reach---if
resistance in the Nuba Mountains, Southern Sudan and other
marginalized areas comes to be regarded as militarily
vulnerable---then Machakos may overnight become irrelevant. The
massive redeployments of offensive military power that have marked
Khartoum’s activities since the cease-fire was agreed to on October
15, 2002 are a clear sign of this possibility."
I also cited a prescient January 2011 report from Julie Flint for Pax
Christi, which in detailed fashion made clear the risk of resumed war
all along the North/South border:
"Today senior SPLA officers in Southern Kordofan claim that SAF is
'preparing for war all the way along the border.' They claim SAF
divisions recast as brigades in 2009 remain at division strength; four
separate brigades that arrived in 2008-09 constitute another,
unacknowledged division; and 40-barrel Katyusha rocket launchers, B-10
anti-tank guns and 120 mm mortars have been moved to the border area.
Deputy governor al-Hilu says that despite agreement that SAF would
move into 15 assembly points, it now has 55,000 troops in more than
100 garrisons---'more than needed to control Southern Kordofan; more
even than at the height of the jihad.'"
("The Nuba Mountains: Central to Sudan's Security," January 2011
http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=24931 )
Five months later, the SPLA claim---the SAF is "preparing for war all
the way along the border"---has become proved all too true.
On July 3, 2011 I argued that there was an inherent logic to
Khartoum's resumption of war, given the highly distressed state of the
Northern economy: "The Logic of War: Khartoum's Economy After Southern
Secession." What we are seeing now are the most ruthless entailments
of this grim "logic."
On September 4, 2011 I argued that we were witnessing in "Blue Nile
State ... the Resumption of Country-wide War” (The Sudan Tribune,
September 4, 2011). Malik Agar had predicted in July that if war were
not halted soon in South Kordofan, it would inevitably spread to Blue
Nile. Once this prediction was borne out, it has become a great deal
more difficult to resist the conclusion that Khartoum intends to
resolve all issues in the southern border regions, and outstanding
issues with Juba, in military fashion.
The Obama administration: myopia, or cynicism?
At each step of the way, the Obama administration---first under the
hopelessly incompetent special envoy Scott Gration, and now under the
cynical and expedient Princeton Lyman---has refused to see what is at
stake, refused to understand the regime in Khartoum for what it is,
and refused to fashion policies that take into account the terrible
risk of renewed war (and an interminably destructive military
stalemate in Darfur). Given what has been widely reported over many
months, and Khartoum's patterns over many years, this amounts to a
perverse myopia.
Most recently Lyman has declared that the U.S. can do nothing but
"encourage negotiations"; privately, he declares the U.S. has no cards
to play, no leverage to wield, no means of pressuring the regime. This
is cynical nonsense (see my November 7 assessment of Lyman's claim).
Moreover, the negotiations that Lyman declares are his sole mandate to
encourage have been repeatedly rejected by the regime; indeed,
Khartoum has emphatically declared that it will not negotiate,
especially with the presence of any third party, and has renounced the
only agreement negotiated with the Sudan People's Liberation
Army/Movement-North (SPLA/M-N), the Framework Agreement of June 28,
2011. In late September al-Bashir declared:
"Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir claimed on Wednesday [September 28]
that the army would soon capture the rebel stronghold of Kurmuk, in
Blue Nile state, insisting there would be no UN-supervised
negotiations. 'The armed forces will be saying prayers of thanksgiving
soon in Kurmuk,' he was quoted as saying by the official SUNA news
agency, during a speech in eastern Sudan. 'The rebellion will be put
down and the country's outlaws defeated .... Sudan will not repeat the
experience of being obliged to negotiate and sign protocols under UN
supervision,' he said." (Agence France-Presse [dateline: Khartoum]
September 28, 2011)
"Sudan will not repeat the experience of being obliged to negotiate
and sign protocols under UN supervision .... "
The Obama White House gives no sign of understanding the extent of
current dangers, how deeply obdurate Khartoum has become, and how
acute the risk of renewed war is without forceful, concerted
international action. On Thursday (November 10) a White House
statement described the bombings as "outrageous," and that "those
responsible must be held accountable." "Held accountable"? Given the
Obama administration's feckless record? This is pure expedience.
Indeed, it is worth noting here that implicit within the White House
statement is the preposterous suggestion that this phrase---"those
responsible"---might attach to some agent other than the Khartoum
regime. Ironically, this very refusal to name Khartoum as the
responsible party only makes clearer that the Obama administration is
unwilling to hold the perpetrators responsible.
Moreover, the administration's record on speaking out decisively about
such brutal acts is skimpy, bordering on non-existent. The State
Department also issued a statement on Thursday, declaring that the
"indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilian targets always is
unacceptable and unjustified." This of course a simple statement of
fact, a straightforward matter of international human rights and
humanitarian law. To restate the obvious in such fashion is simply a
way of appearing to say something without really doing so. So what we
have are two Obama administration statements that neither name the
Khartoum regime nor specify consequences for further aerial attacks on
civilians. The statements are utterly vacuous---this at a time of
supreme peril for Sudan.
Indeed, the only thing striking about these statements is their
rarity: since President Obama took office in January 2009, there have
been over 400 confirmed, deliberate aerial attacks on civilians in
Darfur, South Sudan, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan (over the past
twelve years there have more than 1,700 confirmed attacks, and likely
several times as many that have gone unreported). But the Obama
administration record on speaking out about these cruel and barbarous
actions is painfully inconsequential; and such declarations as have
been made are almost always qualified or framed by some cynical moral
equivocating on the issue of responsibility. The truth that needs to
be declared, without equivocation, is that these ongoing attacks by
the NIF/NCP regime are war crimes, and in aggregate constitute crimes
against humanity (Rome Statute, 7.1 [k]). They should be referred to
the International Criminal Court as such.
But despite the failure of the Obama administration to speak out in
any meaningful way about the hundreds of attacks on civilians during
their time in office, such attacks cannot be ignored or elided from
the historical record, or absented from policy deliberations. For if
war resumes, we may be sure that such attacks will increase
dramatically and without any restraint.
In a lengthy analysis and data spreadsheet (www.sudanbombing.org), I
have collated all reports from all sources and organizations in the
region from 1999 - 2011. The report and spreadsheet represent all
confirmed bombing attacks during this period. In Darfur alone there
have been more than 200 aerial attacks during the Obama
administration, all confirmed by sources on the ground; these barely
receive notice from the Obama State Department---certainly nothing has
been said that deters Khartoum from bombing where it wishes. And in
fact, the Obama Sudan policy-makers have "de-coupled Darfur" from the
bilateral discussions with Khartoum as to whether or not the regime
should remain on the State Department list of terrorism-sponsoring
nations---as if such status were not a matter for rigorous research,
but dubious "negotiations."
[I believe that the relationship between Khartoum and Washington is
now dominated by this administration's concerns for counter-terrorism
intelligence. The most critical policy decisions about Sudan are made
within the National Security Agency and the broader intelligence
community (see especially revealing reporting by the Los Angeles Times
(2005) and The Washington Post (2010).]
War in Sudan appears imminent and the Obama administration is assuming
only the role of spectator, or cheerleader for pointless declarations
with no entailments. There is exceedingly little time to avert
full-scale conflict, and yet Obama's people are dithering.
************************************
What do aerial attacks on civilian attacks look like?
There is an inevitable abstraction to the phrase "aerial attacks on
civilian and humanitarian targets," even as the realities consequent
upon such attacks are obscenely brutal and cruel and destructive. In
my analysis of such bombing attacks over the past twelve years
(www.sudanbombing.org), I organize all extant data from credible
sources that allow for confirmation of specific attacks. There are
now over 1,700 such confirmed attacks, and very likely many times that
number that have never been reported or confirmed. Obviously with a
figure as great as 1,700 attacks there can be no fully representative
examples. But I believe the examples I offer here---all drawn from my
May 6 report "They Bombed Everything that Moved"---are fully relevant
to understanding the military and moral character animating these
attacks as a whole, particularly given the extreme limitations on
Antonov bombing accuracy. Indeed, these attacks are sufficiently
incapable of militarily useful accuracy that we are warranted in
assuming that all Antonov bombing attacks are ipso facto
indiscriminate, and thus war crimes. For as the long and grim history
of these attacks makes clear, during every one of the following
accounts of aerial attacks, civilians were much more likely than
combatants to be killed or injured:
•November 9, 2011: the attack on Yida camp, with more than 23,000
registered refugees, came very close to inflicting terrible human
casualties. The attack came as the UN was in the midst of providing
food relief via helicopter, and one helicopter was on the ground at
the time of the bombing. One eyewitness reports:
"There was a 10-meter circumference around the crater where all the
grass had been stripped and another 50 meters past was totally burned.
Some trees were cut in half or mangled, but no people live in that
area. The other location was in the middle of the camp where all the
primary school students live and study. The bomb came down through a
tree and knocked a big limb to the ground, hitting the back of a
house. It sank into the ground, but did not explode." (confidential
email received November 10, 2011)
This is a terrible reminder of earlier episodes:
•On May 22, 2002 Khartoum's bombers struck Rier town in Mayom County
in what was then Western Upper Nile, now Unity State. Reports by the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) were quickly
confirmed in wire reports as well as in a report from the ground by an
operational humanitarian organization at Rier (Norwegian People's
Aid). This attack is particularly notable, both for its date in
relation to the Danforth proposal and for what it shows of Khartoum's
contempt for international opinion; it also illustrates the nature and
consequences of aerial assaults on civilians. The attack on Rier
occurred at 2am in the morning:
"People were sleeping and therefore taken unawares. The Antonov
dropped sixteen bombs in total---eight in one location and eight
nearby. Eleven people were killed on the spot and 35 seriously
wounded. The situation is described as carnage, with bodies lying
everywhere---legs and arms blown off. Most of those wounded were young
boys aged 10 and 11 years. The number of those killed is
rising---reported now to be 15 killed. NPA [Norwegian People's Aid]
was there eleven hours after the attack to treat and evacuate the
wounded. 24 people were evacuated yesterday. More wounded (79) have
been evacuated today. The most serious cases have been taken to NPA in
Equatoria. The extent of the carnage has made it difficult to cope.
Even the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] hospital in
Lokichoggio has been overwhelmed by the number of casualties."
"Independent witnesses around the spot to verify the accuracy of the
report are two journalists; one French photographer and an East
African reporter were there after the attack. A senior U.S. aid
official witnessed the evacuation and has seen for the first time the
extent of the damage. It is important to note that these attacks were
behind the frontlines and also the timings were particularly brutal,
catching people (unawares) while they were sleeping. NPA staff on
ground described (the bombing) as brutal with bodies littered
everywhere. Staff and journalists were totally shocked at what they
saw. Reports and pictures will follow." (Report by Norwegian People's
Aid, May 23, 2002)
And the same tactics continue to be used in Darfur, though with no
international attention---this because Khartoum denies all human
rights monitors, journalists, and has eviscerated the UN Panel of
Experts on Sudan that was to have monitored such aerial attacks:
•18 women and 9 children killed in air strike in Jebel Marra, Darfur
(Radio Dabanga, JEBEL MARRA, 28 April 2011)
"Twenty-seven people were killed, including 18 women and 9 children,
when an Antonov plane dropped several bombs on the areas of Koloberi
and Gurlengbang in the southern part of the Jebel Marra region. Six
women were also injured in the air attack. A witness told Radio
Dabanga that the airstrikes led to the burning of 27 houses and also
the death of sheep and cattle. He stated that the bombed areas had
been free of any rebel presence. Radio Dabanga could not contact the
army for comments."
•Almost daily Antonov flights in Khor Abeche region
(Radio Dabanga, KHOR ABECHE, January 22, 2011)
"Refugees in the area of Khor Abeche, South Darfur, said the region
has been relatively calm, but expressed fear of renewed fighting
cautious due to the almost daily flights of Antonov aircraft in the
region's skies. The displaced persons said they also fear the spread
of diseases due to lack of food rations and the deteriorating health
environment and crowding of 12,000 people. The refugees further said
that the recent events in the area led to the displacement of more
than 1,200 pupils from the basic school and the burning of at least 60
houses and property, which resulted in the destruction of all the
citizens' savings and food, in addition to 300 head of cattle."
•Air strikes west of Shangil Tobaya, Darfur cause thousands to flee
(Radio Dabanga, SHANGIL TOBAYA, February 24, 2011)
"Two attacking Antonov bombers and invading ground forces yesterday
caused thousands to flee to the hills and valleys around North Darfur
villages. More than 4 thousand people yesterday fled from the region
of Abu Hamra, west of Shangil Tobaya in North Darfur. The ground
forces consisted of more than 20 vehicles and local militias,
according to one villager who fled from the region. He told Radio
Dabanga that two Antonovs dropped a number of bombs on the region
before the entry of government forces and local militias from the area
Um Dereisaya. The source pointed out that a number of shells fell near
a school during school hours."
•Bombing east of Jebel Marra kills 3 women, 2 children
(Radio Dabanga, EAST JEBEL, February 18, 2011)
"Government warplanes killed three women and two children in central
Darfur yesterday and Wednesday, according to an official in a rebel
movement present in the area. A large number of cattle also perished
in the air strikes in the area of East Jebel. Mohamed Ahmed Yagub,
Secretary of Humanitarian Affairs of the Liberation and Justice
Movement, told Radio Dabanga that Antonov planes and helicopter
gunships bombarded areas of East Jebel including the villages of
Tokumarre, Massalit, Hashaba, Wadi Mora and Dali. The attacks killed
three women, two children and a large number of livestock and camels,
he said. The bombs also destroyed water sources and caused people in
these villages to flee. He added that bombardment is still going on
west of Shangil Tobaya and near Shaddad Camp."
•4 days of airstrikes causes at least 1 death and destruction of school
(Radio Dabanga, EL FASHER, April 4, 2011)
"In areas of North and West Darfur heavy airstrikes were witnessed on
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Saturday. Besides many injuries, one
woman was killed, and a school was destroyed. [ ] In different
airstrikes on Saturday a woman was killed and three others were
wounded, including a four-year-old female child when an Antonov
aircrafts dropped bombs that hit Sebit Market in Hashaba, North of
Kutum. Other eyewitnesses told Radio Dabanga that militias loyal to
the government backed by air support attacked areas in the vicinity of
Shangil Tobayi on Thursday. One of the witnesses confirmed to Radio
Dabanga that government forces clashed with the forces of Mini Minawi
near Abu Seyquit and that the sounds of heavy weapons and explosions
along with the continuing airstrikes caused panic amongst many
citizens."
•The deliberate use of Antonovs to target civilians is clear in a
Human Rights Watch account of the December 17, 2004 attack on the town
of Labado. Many thousands of civilians from surrounding villages had
fled to Labado in the belief that the town's connection to a
particular government official would prevent assault. They were wrong:
"By December 16, [2004] the brigade of the 16th Infantry Division
under the command of Brig. Gen. Ahmed Al Hajir Mohamed (the same
commander who led the attacks on Marla and Ishma the previous week)
had advanced to within eight kilometers of Labado. According to
credible sources, the December 17 attack began in a village west of
Labado in the early morning. At midday, an Antonov began circling
Labado and bombed south of the town, then dropped four bombs east and
then north. The bombing all around the town confused the residents,
who were uncertain which way to run. Then the Antonov bombed the
central marketplace. The government also reportedly used helicopter
gunships. According to an international observer who interviewed
displaced residents of Labado, there was a small contingent of SLA
[rebel] troops living in Labado, in one specific compound, but the SLA
troops fled as soon as the attack began." (emphasis added)
"Displaced people from Labado said that hundreds of Janjaweed
militiamen then attacked the town and killed, burned, and looted at
will. Government troops followed the militias, also killing civilians
and destroying parts of the town. Some families were reportedly locked
in their huts and burned to death. A large number of people were
gathered in the school and apparently executed there. At least sixty
civilians were reported to have been killed."
•Extremely heavy bombing was reported north of El Geneina (in Kulbus
Locality) in February, and continued through April. The campaign was
of the same character as the worst atrocities from 2003 - 2004. Human
Rights Watch declared at the time:
"The government [of Sudan] and allied militias have responded [to JEM
control of these towns] by indiscriminately attacking villages without
distinguishing between the civilian population and rebel combatants,
in violation of international humanitarian law." [ ]
"The attacks were carried out by Janjaweed militia and Sudanese ground
troops, supported by attack helicopters and aerial bombardments. 'The
Sudanese government is once again showing its total disregard for the
safety of civilians,' said Georgette Gagnon, Africa director at Human
Rights Watch. 'This return to large-scale attacks on villages will be
catastrophic for Darfur’s civilians, because they’re completely
unprotected.'" (Human Rights Watch press release [New York], February
10, 2008; emphasis added)
•Consequences of extensive, deliberate, and indiscriminate aerial
assaults on Silea, Sirba, Abu Suruj, and other towns and villages
north of El Genenia. There was no evidence of rebel presence in these
towns at the time of attack, and the UN High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) reported (February 10, 2008):
"Up to 12,000 'terrified' refugees from Sudan's Darfur region have
fled across the border to neighboring Chad after the latest air
strikes by the Sudanese military and thousands more may be on their
way. [ ] Most of the refugees so far are men, [UNHCR spokeswoman
Helene Caux] said. But the arrivals are telling UNHCR that 'thousands
of women and children are on their way' to Chad, she added."
"Caux said UNHCR was looking at ways to assist people still trapped in
the three towns bombed by Sudan. 'Thousands of households have been
directly affected by the bombings and attacks,' she said." (Associated
Press [dateline: Geneva], February 10, 2008; emphasis added)
The extremely reliable Opheera McDoom of Reuters reported ([dateline:
El Fasher], February 10, 2008) that Khartoum’s attacks "forced an
estimated 200,000 from their homes." Humanitarian estimates
subsequently put the figure for newly displaced persons in the range
of 50,000-60,000, but this was a very conservative estimate.
•Eyewitness accounts by civilians are horrific:
"A refugee from Sileah told UNHCR that ground attacks by the Janjaweed
militia, allegedly supported by Sudanese Antonov aircraft, nearly
destroyed Abu Surouj and reportedly caused heavy damage to four camps
for internally displaced people. UNAMID received preliminary reports,
'confirming that an estimated 200 casualties have resulted from the
fighting, and the town of Abu Suruj, which is home to thousands of
civilians, has been burned to the ground.'" (Associated Press
[dateline: UN/New York], February 10, 2008)
•"On a map of Darfur, the [UN Panel of Experts for Darfur report]
showed over 100 black dots where it said incidents of 'aerial
bombardment' had taken place between October [2006] and January
[2007]. Asked who else but the government could be responsible for the
bombings, [Khartoum’s UN ambassador] Abdelhaleem said: 'These are big
lies, big lies.' He accused the [UN Panel of Experts for Darfur] of
including the map 'to make some people in this area happy.' 'They want
to hear this music---that Sudan did that, the government did that,
they bombed here, they killed there. This is the music that is very
much enjoyed by some people here,' Abdelhaleem said." (Associated
Press [dateline: UN/New York], April 20, 2007)
•"Aerial attacks by the Government of Sudan on civilians in Darfur
continue, with the UN reporting air attacks in North Darfur at the end
of June [2007]. Thousands of displaced villagers have fled the Jebel
Moon/Sirba area in West Darfur after renewed attacks on areas under
control of armed opposition groups by government of Sudan forces
supported by Janjawid. Local people said that helicopters brought in
arms to the government and Janjawid forces. In South Darfur a Sudanese
government Antonov aircraft carried out bombing raids following a 2
August [2007] attack by the opposition Justice and Equality Movement
on the town of Adila, targeting villages and water points (emphasis
added). Since then there have been a number of Sudanese government
Antonov bombing raids on Ta'alba, near the town of Adila, and on 13
August [2007] the villages of Habib Suleiman and Fataha were bombed.”
(Amnesty International, August 24, 2007, News Service No. 161)
•Human Rights Watch reports of the Mornei area of West Darfur:
"On February 6 [2004], the bombing started around Mornei. With the
arrival of the Janjaweed the burning started. By February 12, there
were forty-five thousand displaced and by February 25, there were
sixty thousand displaced [in Mornei]. At least one hundred wounded,
mainly from bullet wounds, and mainly women and children of varied
age, arrived in Mornei. The Sudanese government and Janjaweed militias
started in the north.... During one ten-day period there was bombing
every night. We could see the columns of smoke rising outside Mornei.
There were special army and police forces in Mornei, from Khartoum.
They would go out on mission every day and come back. Helicopters came
and took the wounded Janjaweed away from Mornei." (page 28; emphasis
added)
Returning to South Sudan:
•On February 20, 2002 the village of Bieh (in the middle of Concession
Block 5a, in what is now Unity State), just to the east of road
construction, endured an especially cruel and destructive aerial
attack. Two SAF Mi-24 helicopter gunships were deployed, both of which
had flown over Bieh twice earlier in the day. On the final pass, in
broad daylight, one gunship hovered overhead and conducted
precautionary reconnaissance. The other helicopter gunship moved to a
low hover position and then directed machine-gun fire and numerous
rockets into a crowd of mainly women and children who had gathered for
a UN World Food Program food distribution. Twenty-four civilians were
killed (including children), scores were injured, and many fled into
the bush without food. A former high-level Western official who was
camped near Bieh on an assessment mission at the time of the attack
reported that even more casualties were discovered burned to death in
the village tukuls that had been attacked with rockets.
Humanitarian sources confirmed that there was no military presence in
or near Bieh. Moreover, the faces of the pilot and gunner could be
clearly seen from the ground by WFP workers; the gunner and pilot, in
turn, could clearly see that they were firing on noncombatants. This
was made explicit at the time by Laura Melo, WFP spokeswoman in
Nairobi:
"'The helicopter was flying low enough that our staff could see inside
the helicopter and a man inside firing a machine gun. How could they
not see that there was food being distributed, that women and children
were receiving food?' Melo said." (Associated Press [dateline:
Nairobi], February 28, 2002)
•In its preface to a February 2000 study ("Living under aerial
bombardments: Report of an investigation in the Province of Equatoria,
Southern Sudan"), MSF-Switzerland reported that:
"Since the beginning of the year 1999 until this very moment, we have
been experiencing and witnessing direct aerial bombings of the
hospital, while full of patients, and of the living compound of our
medical team (10 bombings in 1999, a total of 66 bombs dropped, with
13 hitting the hospital premises) [emphasis in original]. Facing the
sharp increase of aerial bombardments in this region during 1999,
frequently aimed at civilian structures such as hospitals, in November
1999, we requested an investigation of these events and their
consequences for the civilian population in the area."
"The elements of this investigation, included in the report herewith,
tend to demonstrate that the strategy used by the Sudanese Air Force
in this region, is deliberately aimed at targeting civilian
structures, causing indiscriminate deaths and injuries, and
contributes to a climate of terror among the civilian population.
Furthermore, evidence has been found and serious allegations have been
made that weapons of internationally prohibited nature are regularly
employed against the civilian population such as cluster bombs and
bombs with 'chemical contents.'" (emphasis added)
•The quantitative scale of the bombings is reported in Section 4.1 of
the MSF report:
"According to a non-exhaustive list of bombings, more than sixty
bombings took place between January 1999 and January 2000 in town and
villages such as Narus, Chukudum, Labone, Kajo Keji, Maridi, Yei,
Ikotos, Loka, Lainya, Parajok, Tali Post and Morobo. During the same
period, a total of almost 400 bombs had been launched on the civilian
population and civilian targets, killing at least 22 persons and
wounding 51."
"The hospital of Kajo Keji in which MSF works has become a
particularly privileged target of the Sudanese Government. The year
1999 started and ended with a bombing of the hospital. On 13 January
1999, five bombs were dropped on the hospital. Three of them destroyed
the facilities used for the vaccination campaigns and seriously
damaged the operation room and the consultation units. Fortunately, no
casualties were reported. At the end of December 1999, another five
bombs were dropped on the hospital."
•On November 11, 2000 one of the most notorious bombing attacks of the
war occurred in Yei (Central Equatoria): 18 - 19 civilians were
killed, 53 were wounded (eleven critically), as six (of fourteen)
bombs hit the central market at the busiest time of day. Antonovs
would in subsequent days circle Yei without dropping bombs in a
concerted effort to terrorize residents. A videotape of the aftermath
of the Yei bombing, viewed by the author, is in the possession of U.S.
Congressman Frank Wolf. Significant bombing continued through the end
of 2000, and included a particularly large number of humanitarian
targets.
•Videotape was fortuitously made of another extraordinarily
destructive bombing, that of the Comboni School in Kauda (Nuba
Mountains) (also viewed by this writer). On February 8, as outdoor
classes were beginning at 9am in the morning, a bomb landed in the
middle of a group of students just beginning their English reading
text. Fourteen children and a teacher were killed, and seventeen were
wounded, many severely. There was no military presence anywhere near
the Comboni School; moreover, Khartoum had declared a cease-fire in
January. And yet when Dierdiri Ahmed---Khartoum's ambassador to Kenya
(and now a central figure in defining the regime's policies in
Abyei)---was shown the videotape of the carnage, he declared "the
bombs landed where they were supposed to land" (Reuters [dateline:
Nairobi], February 11, 2000).
•In June of 2000 the UN reported that 32 people had been killed during
the bombing of the Catholic mission in Kajo Keji. On August 7 and 8,
2000 a series of bombings in and near Akuem (Northern Bahr el Ghazal)
killed eight, wounded 200, and forced a suspension of Operation
Lifeline Sudan, the critical humanitarian lifeline to the
war-distressed populations of South Sudan.
•Other early bombing events were extraordinarily destructive.
Norwegian People's Aid reported on April 7, 1998 that:
"Yei Hospital was bombed this morning, between 10:50am and 11:10am, by
Government of Sudan airplanes. Thirteen bombs were directed at Yei
Hospital---which is supported by the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). So
far eleven (11) people have been found killed as a consequence of the
attack. One of the killed was a local employee of the NPA. The
recently rehabilitated surgical unit at the hospital was demolished by
one bomb. Just afterwards the bomb shelter, in which many had sought
shelter, received a direct hit by another bomb."
Again, there have been more than 1,700 such attacks confirmed since 1999.
_____________________________
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
[email protected]
413-585-3326
Skype: ReevesSudan
www.sudanreeves.org
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