Darfur Armed Opposition Groups and Coalitions
At the military level in the field, all the Darfur rebel factions are
currently cooperating, exhibiting a pragmatic survival instinct that
is rallying the disparate militias against their common enemies. The
Sudanese government has stepped up hostilities since early 2011,
focusing on the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) stronghold
of Jebel Marra and then the Zaghawa-held areas of North and South
Darfur such as Shangal Tobaiya, where SLA-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) draws
strength.
Minawi's about-face and rejection of the Abuja Agreement in December
2010 pushed him back into rebellion, instigating a new cycle of
violence as the government pursued his forces and their affiliated
ethnic populations. Beginning in December, North Darfur Governor Osman
Kibbir launched an offensive against towns where SLA-MM had a
presence. First the rebels were targeted, but then the focus shifted
to the Zaghawa population. The Government of Sudan (GoS) armed and
encouraged non-Zaghawa ethnic groups living with the Zaghawa to expel
them, with exhortations to reclaim their land from 'the new settlers'.
Much of the new displacement in Darfur in March–June 2011 was a result
of this purge and the indiscriminate aerial bombardment of Jebel
Marra. A particularly egregious case of anti-Zaghawa killing occurred
in Abu Zerega, close to the North Darfur capital of al Fasher. The
perpetrators, as in other attacks on Zaghawa, were non-Arab militias,
specifically Tunjur and some Birgid. These fighters even attacked
Zaghawa members of a government investigative committee on a
fact-finding mission to the area.
Both SLA-MM and SLA-AW fought against government forces around these
towns and fared well, capturing vehicles, arms, and ammunition. Among
the displaced, many of those of fighting age joined the ranks of
SLA-MM rather than move to the IDP camps.
SLA-AW has settled in Kampala, Uganda, after being all but expelled
from its longtime base in Paris. Ugandan officials argue that support
for SLA-AW is motivated by ideology (Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur was
formerly a Sudan Communist Party adherent), but confidentially they
state that it is a tit-for-tat response to the GoS's perceived support
for the Ugandan rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). GoS sources firmly
deny government support for the LRA and argue that Uganda's real goal
in aiding SLA-AW is a dominant relationship with the new Republic of
South Sudan. Ugandan assistance to SLA-AW is in any case extremely
limited, mainly confined to hosting the rebel group in Kampala.
SLA-AW continues to refuse to participate in the Doha peace process,
but has in recent weeks indicated that it agrees in principle with the
final communiqué issued by the All Darfur Stakeholders' Conference in
Doha on 31 May 2011.
SLA has announced a form of rapprochement, if not unity, that brings
its former secretary-general (Minni Minawi) and its chairman (Abdul
Wahid) closer than they have been in the years since the split.
SLA-Mother (also known as SLA-Abu Gasim), led by Abu al Gasim Imam al
Haj, a signatory to the Abuja Agreement, has also entered into
alliance with SLA-AW. A former governor of West Darfur and state
minister, Abu al Gasim defected from the government to rejoin his
former comrades.
On 3 October 2011, the Sudanese Bloc to Liberate the Republic (SBLR)
announced it was joining the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). SBLR
leader Magoub Hussein, formerly a member of the Liberation and Justice
Movement (LJM), was relieved of his post on 14 July 2011 after he was
accused of negotiating a separate track with the GoS in Doha.
On 13 November 2011, SLA-MM, SLA-AW, JEM, and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) agreed to form a coalition named
the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). While aspiring to a single,
unified political structure, the SRF is at this stage more a coalition
of military forces with broad agreement on a political vision. Whether
it becomes more than just a loose political and military affiliation
remains to be seen. The need for a geographically comprehensive peace
process and the further unification of all Sudanese opposition forces
form the SRF’s main platform.
The Darfurian components of the SRF have pledged not to enter into
armed hostilities with the LJM, a signatory of the Doha Document for
Peace in Darfur, allaying fears of a repeat of the intra-Darfurian
fighting that characterized the period following the partial signing
of the Abuja Agreement&emdash;the Darfur Peace Agreement&emdash;in
2006.
The SRF alliance held after the killing of JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim
around 22-24 December 2011. SRF continues its activities but is in
something of a holding pattern until JEM regroups and announces its
new permanent leader. Some forecast JEM will draw closer to other SRF
members and also adopt a more flexible position on negotiations with
the GoS in the wake of Khalil Ibrahim’s passing. This analysis derives
from JEM being weaker now, and also because Khalil Ibrahim was a
controversial figure for South Sudanese members of the SRF due to his
“mujahid” past in South Sudan. Khalil Ibrahim also regularly took
strong positions against negotiating with the GoS, and his attitude
was not shared by the whole of JEM. One JEM faction, known to be more
Darfur-centric, saw the Doha negotiations as a missed opportunity for
the movement. This view may become more ascendant within JEM now.
Click here for information on the 2011 turmoil in Libya and the Darfur conflict.
Updated 18 January 2012
Click here for information on the following specific groups and coalitions:
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and splinters
* Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
* Democratic JEM
* United Resistance Front (URF)
* SLM-General Leadership
Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) and splinters
* Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW)
* SLA-Historical Leadership/Command
* SLA-Khamis Abaker (SLA-KA)
* SLA-Juba
* SLA-Mainstream ('General Line')
Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) and splinters
* SLA-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM)
* Democratic Sudan Liberation Movement (DSLM) ('SLA-Carabino')
* SLA-Unity
Other
* Freedom and Reform Movement (FRM)
* Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM)
Click here for information on Chadian armed opposition groups
operating in Darfur and Eastern Chad.
Relevant Tables, Maps, and Summaries
* Map of Armed Groups in Darfur, May 2010 (from UNAMID)
Table showing areas of control of Darfur armed opposition groups
* Darfur-based Chadian Groups, September 2009 (from HSBA Issue Brief 15)
Table of Chadian armed opposition groups operating in Darfur
* Refugee and IDP Camps in Darfur and Eastern Chad (from HSBA
Working Paper 15)
Map of camps circa 2008
* Chadian Armed Groups, February 2008 (from HSBA Issue Brief 9)
Table of Chadian armed opposition groups as of February 2008 and
their recent histories
* Darfur-based Militia-Rebel Agreements, 2005-07 (from HSBA
Working Paper 17)
Summary of peacemaking attempts by militias and rebels outside
the official peace process
* Hamdan's Areas of Control, Darfur, 2007-08 (from HSBA Working Paper 17)
Map showing Mohamed Hamdan's ('Hemeti') areas of control in Darfur
* Darfurian Rebel Groups, December 2006 (from HSBA Issue Brief 4)
Table of SLA and JEM factions
Relevant HSBA Publications
* Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur
Conflict, by Julie Flint, January 2010 (in Arabic)
* Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur, by
Julie Flint, June 2009 (in Arabic)
* Conflict, Arms, and Militarization: The Dynamics of Darfur's IDP
Camps, by Clea Khan, September 2008 (in Arabic)
* The Chad-Sudan Proxy War and the 'Darfurization' of Chad: Myths
and Reality, by Jérôme Tubiana, April 2008 (in Arabic; in French)
* Echo Effects: Chadian Instability and the Darfur Conflict, HSBA
Issue Brief, February 2008 (in Arabic; in French)
* Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups,
by Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, July 2007 (in Arabic)
* Arms, Oil, and Darfur: The Evolution of Relations between China
and Sudan, HSBA Issue Brief, July 2007 (in Arabic)
* No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy for
Darfur, HSBA Issue Brief, December 2006 (in Arabic)
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"South Sudan Info - The Kob" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/SouthSudanKob?hl=en.
