---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: John Ashworth <[email protected]> Date: Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 8:09 PM Subject: [sudan-john-ashworth] Sudan and South Sudan: Independence and Insecurity To: Group <[email protected]>
Sudan and South Sudan: Independence and Insecurity Testimony before the [US] Senate Foreign Relations Committee Congressional Testimony by Jonathan Temin March 14, 2012 Drawing on the expertise of USIP’s Jon Temin, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee invited him to testify on “Sudan and South Sudan: Independence and Insecurity” on Wednesday, March 14, 2012. The hearing focused on unresolved issues following South Sudan’s secession last July, including humanitarian access and an impasse over oil transit. The hearing also examined violence and division in South Sudan, the state of democracy on both sides of the border, and prospects for progress in Darfur. The first panel featured Special Envoy Princeton Lyman and USAID Assistant Administrator Nancy Lindborg. Temin, Sudan activist George Clooney, and John Prendergast, the co-founder of the Enough Project, appeared on the second panel. The Institute has been working on the conflict in Sudan for 18 years, training peacebuilders and assisting the U.S. government in resolving the dangerous and deadly conflict. ----- Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to present my views on Sudan and South Sudan. Thank you for this opportunity. Let me also express my condolences to the family and colleagues of Congressman Donald Payne, who was a great champion for the people of Sudan and South Sudan. The views I express today are my own and not necessarily those of the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), which does not take policy positions. I currently direct USIP’s programs on Sudan and South Sudan. My views are informed by my work at USIP, which conducts training and field operations and provides tools to help prevent, manage and end violent international conflicts. USIP has been working on the ground in Sudan (and now South Sudan) for over a decade, in the capital cities and in remote, conflict prone areas, trying to build capacity to prevent and manage conflict. We also work to increase understanding of critical issues affecting Sudan and South Sudan and to identify innovative solutions. I travel frequently to Sudan and South Sudan and have a broad network of contacts across both countries. Mr. Chairman, I intend to focus my remarks today on two broad issues that I believe are critical to the future of these two countries: governance and economic viability. Let me emphasize that the issues addressed by the other panelists, especially immediate humanitarian access to Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, are vitally important and should be priorities for the international community. But I want to take this opportunity to address several bigger picture issues that are sometimes set aside due to the urgency of addressing more pressing demands. I will conclude with brief comments on current relations between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. Governance in the Two Sudans For decades, Sudan (and with it the international community) has lurched from one crisis to another, from the two north-south civil wars to the violence in Darfur to the recent fighting in Abyei to the current conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Also for decades, Sudan’s leaders have employed a model of governance that is ultimately unsustainable. This is not a coincidence. Rather, the model of governance employed by the current Government of Sudan – and several governments before it – is a central cause of Sudan’s continuous instability. This model concentrates wealth, power and resources at the center of the country, meaning in and around Khartoum, to the detriment of populous peripheral areas. It is exclusionary and riddled with corruption. Since the beginning of Sudan’s oil production, Khartoum has been a boomtown, while the peripheral areas have remained generally poor and underdeveloped. The rich and some of the middle class prosper, while many more suffer. Under the current government, this model has been accompanied by an effort to impose an Arab, Islamic identity throughout Sudan. The result has been a series of rebellions from peripheral areas seeking more equitable sharing of resources and resisting the imposition of identity or religion. The government has often responded to these rebellions with brutal and disproportionate military force. The government has learned that it benefits from promoting instability and division in peripheral areas, as it weakens the ability of opposition forces based in the periphery to challenge the center. The international community has spent decades working to end these conflicts on Sudan’s periphery, with some success, such as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). But the international community continues to chase these conflicts around the periphery while rarely making concerted efforts to help Sudanese reform the flawed governance model that is a root cause of instability. It is time for that approach to change. It is time for a more comprehensive strategy for addressing Sudan’s challenges, rather than the piecemeal approach too often adopted. This will not be easy. Since the secession of South Sudan in July 2011, the Government of Sudan has shown little appetite for self-reflection or reform, and the more they feel backed into a corner the less likely they are to engage in any meaningful reform. But given the dire economic situation, mounting internal resistance and climate of change throughout the Arab world, they may ultimately have little choice. It is important to keep in mind that Sudan’s leaders value self-preservation above all else. One opportunity for reform lies in the process of developing a new constitution. With the conclusion of the CPA and secession of South Sudan, Sudan is required to develop a new permanent constitution. That process is a natural venue for dialogue about the nature of the Sudanese state and how it should be governed. But the process must be genuine, meaning it must be inclusive, participatory, transparent and consensus-based. USIP has been working with Sudanese civil society organizations to help them promote these principles. Recent events and statements suggest that genuine constitutional reform is a tall order. But sooner or later, the people of Sudan must have a dialogue among themselves about the nature of the Sudanese state and how it should be governed. The role of the international community is to help them enter into that dialogue. The international community should draw attention to the importance of that dialogue and work to convince the wide array of political entities in Sudan of its value. A second area of international focus should be the next elections in Sudan, scheduled for 2015. The substantial flaws of the 2010 elections were largely overlooked because they were viewed as little more than a box to be checked before the referendum. In hindsight, those elections were a missed opportunity to promote democratization. President Bashir has repeatedly promised that he will not run in the next election, which may create space for a more open contest. If the 2015 elections are to be better than previous elections, technical and political preparations cannot begin soon enough. Turning to governance in South Sudan, it should be noted that the South Sudanese leadership did an impressive job navigating their country to independence. The peaceful and orderly referendum and secession process was an important success for South Sudan and the world. But since independence, there has been growing concern about the Government of South Sudan’s commitment to good governance and their ability to stabilize the fledgling nation. There are worrying reports of large-scale corruption in South Sudan and little progress in prosecuting offenders so far. Journalists have been harassed and detained on multiple occasions, defying explanations that they are isolated incidents. There is widespread indiscipline and sometimes little cohesion within the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), hindering its efforts to respond to large-scale violence, as witnessed recently in Jonglei state. There are major ethnic divides within government and society as a whole. The government has so far failed to accelerate service delivery to a needy and expectant population following secession. All these challenges will be magnified by the revenue lost as a result of the shutdown in South Sudanese oil production – one of many reasons it is critical that an agreement between Sudan and South Sudan on oil sector management is reached soon. The United States has an important role to play in helping to arrest and reverse these trends before they are fully ingrained. The United States has been a friend of South Sudan for years, and that should continue. But it is now time for South Sudan to be held to the same basic standards of governance and transparency as any other independent nation – they should not receive special treatment based on past relations. While recognizing the limited capacity within the Government of South Sudan, the United States should be clear in articulating these standards and accompanying expectations. As with other nations, there should be consequences when these standards are not met. South Sudan also requires a new permanent constitution, and as in Sudan, the process for developing it will be a unique opportunity to convene a national dialogue about fundamental governance issues. It will be a test of the Government of South Sudan’s commitment to good governance and genuine democracy. The recent appointment of a commission to lead the process is a positive step. The international community should provide South Sudan with the assistance it needs to ensure that the constitutional development process embraces the principles of inclusivity, participation, transparency and consensus. Also similar to Sudan, it is not too early to begin preparations for South Sudan’s first elections as an independent country, scheduled for 2015. This will be another test and opportunity. There is much work to be done on both technical preparations and political party development. South Sudan’s opposition parties are weak and require capacity building assistance, which the Government of South Sudan should welcome. The single greatest challenge facing South Sudan is not one of governance or economics, however, but a challenge faced by many African countries: rising above tribal identities and embracing a national identity. For many years, two forces have loosely unified South Sudanese: the common enemy they perceived in the north and the shared goal of achieving independence. Those forces are now diminished, and left in their wake is the paramount question of what it means to be South Sudanese. The process of developing a shared national identify will be painstaking and require decades, but it should begin now. As witnessed in various parts of South Sudan, most recently and tragically in Jonglei state, tribal rivalries can take a brutal toll and escalate out of control. South Sudan’s tribal identifies are deeply engrained and not easily overcome, but they should at least be accompanied by a stronger sense of South Sudanese identity. Economic Viability of the Two Sudans As the shutdown of South Sudanese oil productions continues and negotiations drag on, the economies of both countries are under considerable strain. The Government of Sudan is opaque in its economic management, but is clearly struggling. The lost revenue from South Sudanese oil cannot easily be replaced. There are efforts to increase domestic oil production and gold exploration, but that will take time and returns are uncertain. Meanwhile, the government is due to make significant investments in Darfur as called for by the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). But at the same time it has been forced to implement some austerity measures, with the possibility of more in the future, and the massive debt burden remains. It has been said that it is the price of sugar that will ultimately bring Sudanese to the streets, and this may be true. Part of what has kept the current government in place for so long has been significant investment and development in the center (Khartoum) and extensive patronage networks. But without funds to continue growth in the center and maintain the patronage networks – as well as to pay generous military and security salaries – the government may be increasingly vulnerable. This is part of the reason Sudanese negotiators are striking such a hard bargain in the ongoing negotiations with South Sudan. The two greatest economic uncertainties for Sudan are the outcome of those negotiations and whether Sudan will receive economic assistance from friendly nations (such as fellow Arab states or China). Some short-term economic assistance was received in recent months, but it will not last long. Whether longer-term assistance is forthcoming will be critical. This is a question on which the United States should be very much engaged. It will be the sovereign decision of other countries whether they provide economic assistance to Sudan, but the United States should encourage that any assistance provided be closely linked to progress on key priorities, such as the type of fundamental governance reform described earlier and implementation of the DDPD. In particular, any economic assistance from Qatar linked to DDPD implementation should only go to its intended destination, as described in the agreement, in order to directly help Darfuris. In South Sudan the economic outlook may be just as bleak. More than 90% of the Government of South Sudan’s revenue comes from oil production, which is currently suspended. There is no way to make up much of that revenue in the short term. Furthermore, talk of building a new oil pipeline through Kenya or Ethiopia and Djibouti in 18 months is exceedingly optimistic. By most estimates it will take several years to construct a new pipeline, and critical financing issues remain unresolved. There is discussion of austerity budgets, but it is difficult to see how the accounting will work given promises not to cut SPLA salaries and to give raises to the police. The decision to suspend oil production has been well-received in South Sudan so far, but one wonders how it will be viewed in six months or a year if there are substantial budget cuts that reduce already minimal service delivery. The Government of South Sudan should be straightforward and candid with the South Sudanese population about the implications of a continued shutdown in oil production. Popular expectations following independence were already well beyond what could have been delivered; with the temporary loss of oil revenue, the gap between expectations and reality will be even larger. The silver lining is that the difficult economic circumstances in both countries create leverage for the international community. Both countries desperately need outside assistance. International coordination of any economic assistance will be crucial, so that it is clear, for both countries, that assistance provided is contingent on certain steps each government must take. Absent those steps, neither country should be bailed out. Sudan-South Sudan Relations Beyond the domestic challenges faced by Sudan and South Sudan, relations between the two countries are deeply troubled. Despite heated rhetoric in both directions and little progress in the ongoing negotiations, I do not believe either country wants a return to full-scale war. It would be economically disastrous on both sides of the border. But the international community must be concerned that events may escalate beyond control and pull the two countries back to war. Each blames the other for instability that has much more to do with internal factors than external interference. There is little, if any, trust between Juba and Khartoum. These forces further complicate already complex negotiations on post-referendum arrangements, most notably management of the oil sector. But there must be progress in those negotiations in order to deescalate tensions, especially around the border. The African leadership provided by President Thabo Mbeki and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) has been valuable, but it has to be backed-up by and coordinated with multilateral engagement. We know such coordination is possible because it happened in the run-up to the referendum, helping to make it a peaceful process despite predictions to the contrary. But we also know that the referendum and independence of South Sudan was not the end of instability in the two Sudans. In many ways, it marked the beginning of even greater challenges. I want to once again express my appreciation for the opportunity to address this committee. Thank you for holding this hearing today on such an important and timely topic. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author and not the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not take policy positions. http://www.usip.org/publications/sudan-and-south-sudan-independence-and-insecurity END ______________________ John Ashworth Sudan, South Sudan Advisor [email protected] +254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile) +211 919 695 362 (South Sudan mobile) +27 82 050 1235 (South Africa mobile) +44 750 304 1790 (UK/international) +88 216 4334 0735 (Thuraya satphone) PO Box 52002 - 00200, Nairobi, Kenya This is a personal e-mail address and the contents do not necessarily reflect the views of any organisation -- The content of this message does not necessarily reflect John Ashworth's views. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, John Ashworth is not the author of the content and the source is always cited. You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "sudan-john-ashworth" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.co.za/group/sudan-john-ashworth -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "South Sudan Info - The Kob" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/SouthSudanKob?hl=en.
