China: A Strategic Partner of the New Nation of South Sudan. By Luka Biong Deng

The Republic of South Sudan, the newest member state of the UN, has
entered into a world that is stratified into the top billion people
who are prosperous, middle four billion of people who are developing
and on track to be prosperous and bottom billion of people who are
struck at the bottom with appalling living conditions.

Also the people living in the countries of the bottom billion have
been in one or another of the four traps: conflict trap, natural
resource trap, land-locked and bad neighbours trap and bad governance
in a small country trap. It would certainly not require much efforts
of where to position the newest member of the United Nation in the
current economic and political stratification of the world. South
Sudan falls not only in the bottom billion but it is at the bottom of
the bottom billion and is virtually exposed to all the four traps
experienced by the bottom billion. The real challenge for the
leadership of the newest nation is how to remove South Sudan from the
appalling conditions of the bottom billion and to put it on a path of
economic growth to realize the aspirations of its people who have been
deprived so long and suffered a great deal.

Certainly this task is to be championed by the people of South Sudan
but also to be complemented by the support of the international
community. In the light of global financial crisis that is threatening
the western economies, China is emerging as a real economic power and
a last resort to the countries of the bottom billion to put their
economy on growth path. Its economy is the fastest growing economy and
it has not only bypassed Japan but it is certain that it will soon
bypass the USA. Building good relation with China is becoming not only
economic necessity but it is also strategic national interest for most
of the developing countries and even the rest of the world.

My first personal experience of being wrongly identified as Chinese
was in the early 1980s, when I went for postgraduate studies in
Belgium. An official received me at the airport holding a paper with
my family name, ‘Deng’, written on it. He was shocked to see me, a
black African, approaching him, as he had assumed the name ‘Deng’
meant that I would be Chinese. Many years later, in 2007, during
President Salva Kiir’s first official visit to China as President of
South Sudan, we were touring Beijing with Ambassador Majok Guandong
and others from our delegation, and we were stunned to come across a
sign for ‘Guandong Bank’. Many South Sudanese ponder the significance
of these common names and what they may mean in terms of our cultural
and historic ties to China; what is certain is that China is a key
economic and political player in the drama currently unfolding between
Sudan and South Sudan.

President Kiir is scheduled to return to China in April for his first
visit since South Sudan declared independence in July 2011. For South
Sudan, building good relations with China is not only an economic
necessity, but also of strategic national interest. The success of the
visit will hinge on our government’s ability to diplomatically handle
the host of pressing issues that now confront South Sudan.

In the aftermath of its bold decision to stop oil production, South
Sudan is under considerable financial stress. It is struggling to find
funding for its huge deficit, meet the basic needs of its people, and
build an alternative pipeline for its crude oil. The situation is
further exacerbated by the fact that most of South Sudan’s traditional
allies have been reluctant to support the decision to stop oil
production, and may have difficulty convincing their taxpayers to
increase or maintain their level of assistance to South Sudan while it
is sitting on oil resources that it is unable to market.

Access to concessional loans is also limited, as South Sudan is not
yet a full member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even if
found, the loans would likely carry an exorbitant cost that would
create a huge debt overhang for future generations—a common burden for
other African countries but one to which South Sudan is not yet
subjected by virtue of its newfound independence.

This leaves South Sudan with few sources of funding other than
commercial loans or concessional loans from China. It is therefore a
matter of strategic national interest for South Sudan to strengthen
its diplomatic relations with China, and to push China to exert more
diplomatic pressure on Sudan to find rational solutions for the
post-secession issues that are currently pending between Sudan and
South Sudan.

To build a more positive relationship, South Sudan and China must
overcome a number of diplomatic hurdles. During the civil war, oil
development in South Sudan became associated with human suffering,
massive displacement, and gross human rights abuses carried out by the
Government of Sudan. Oil companies were perceived as culprits in these
atrocities, particularly those that took place in the areas around
oilfields. Given China’s role in the oil sector, most South Sudanese
believe that China not only sided with Khartoum during the civil war,
but that its oil companies aided and abetted the Government of Sudan
in committing human rights abuses. Certainly, these perceptions will
continue to affect future relations between China and South Sudan and
will pose a real diplomatic challenge in transforming the relationship
between the two states.

The recent wrangling between Khartoum and Juba over oil also affected
diplomatic relations between South Sudan and China. Shortly after the
oil shutdown, the PETRODAR operating company, particularly the Chinese
component, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), was accused of
complicity in the concealment of a number of oil wells. Although it is
impossible at this point to know conclusively the validity of the
information concerning the undeclared oil wells, the way that the
information was managed did not help in promoting South Sudan’s
relations with China. It also remains unclear how our government was
not aware about the number of oil wells in South Sudan, given that the
Ministry of Energy was established in 2005 with a considerable budget
to monitor oil production. We have cried out about how much we have
been cheated by

Sudan, but we have not yet answered why we were not capable of
counting our own oil wells.

Furthermore, although the Government of South Sudan might have had
compelling reasons to expel the President of PETRODAR, the way the
decision was taken and managed did not help in promoting our
diplomatic relations with China. Our local media’s portrayal of China
during the saga left out some of the facts and served to mobilize
public opinion against China. In fact, the companies that were
involved in marketing the stolen crude oil were not even Chinese
companies but were rather the very companies that have become so close
to our government during the interim period, despite their historical
record of working with the Government of Sudan in its oil sector.

Nonetheless, there is reason for optimism concerning the relationship
between South Sudan and China. Chinese foreign policy is based on
principles of non-interference, mutual interest and mutual benefits,
and China has no special interest in Sudan except for their national
strategic interest. South Sudan is in far better position to ensure
that strategic interest, given the fact that most oil and agricultural
potential is in the South. In fact, of the 5 percent of China’s oil
needs that are met by exports from Sudan and South Sudan, the crude
oil export of South Sudan alone meets about 4.5 percent of it.

There are five basic goals that the Government of South Sudan could
seek to accomplish during President Salva Kiir’s visit to China.
First, the visit could be used to reposition South Sudan as strategic
partner to China not only in terms of South Sudan’s economic
potentials, but also in terms of its position in the region. Second,
the visit could assure China of South Sudan’s commitment to
maintaining good relations with Sudan, including exporting its crude
oil through the pipelines in Sudan if Khartoum is willing to settle
for internationally accepted fees.

Third, the visit could serve to articulate the strategic importance
that South Sudan ascribes to the diversification of its pipelines and
the need for China to assist not only in the feasibility studies and
impact assessments associated with the alternative pipeline but also
in its funding.

Fourth, the visit could make it clear to China that if not resolved,
the unfinished business of the CPA in terms of popular consultation
for the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, the
referendum for the people of Abyei area, and demarcation of the
North-South border will continue to haunt the relationship between the
two states. China is uniquely positioned to exert diplomatic pressure
on Khartoum to resolve these pending issues.

Fifth, the visit could ensure access to concessional loans for
development of infrastructure (telecommunication, roads, power
generation and sports) and for agricultural ‘green revolution’.

China is a huge country and shifting its policy to include a focus on
an independent South Sudan is a mammoth task. But with hard work and
patience, our mutual interests align enough to remain hopeful for a
strong relationship in the years to come.

Luka Biong is a senior member of South Sudan’s ruling Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement (SPLM) and is currently the Co-Chair of the Abyei
Joint Oversight Committee.

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