Heglig: the unity of corpses




By Magdi El Gizoul

April 17, 2012 — Khartoum and Juba have only adrenaline to compensate
for their loss of oil. In their frenzied attempt to secure the highest
returns conceivable from the unsustainable resource, their joint
placenta as it were, the governments of Sudan and South Sudan are now
effectively plunging into its flames. The allegory of burning moths
would have been suitable were it not for the profuse blood been shed
at the altar of oil.

To the empiricist the current war between the two countries flakes
layers of ideological camouflage from an essential dispute over oil.
Through this prism a retrospective investigation of the 1983
insurgency led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement
(SPLA/M), the ruling power in the independent South Sudan today, could
come to the conclusion that Bentiu was responsible. The capital of
‘Unity state’, a name cynically conferred on the region by President
Nimaryi, was expected to host Sudan’s first refinery and enrich the
coffers of the regional government of southern Sudan in Juba through
corporation and export tax. Nimayri, however, chose to enstrange his
southern Sudanese allies, his partners in the 1972 Addis Ababa peace
agreement, and accommodate the Khartoum establishment bosses with whom
he had reconciled in 1977 after years of confrontation that peaked
with the 1976 trans-Saharan coup attempt orchestrated by the Umma
Party, Hassan al-Turabi’s Islamic Movement and the Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP) figure, Hussein al-Hindi, under Qaddafi’s patronage. In
1980 the rayes ordered the construction of the promised refinery in
Kosti on the White Nile, but the promise remained just that. He was
deposed by a popular uprising in 1985 before he could reap the profits
of Chevron’s 1978 discoveries near Bentiu and Heglig. The next rayes,
President Bashir, built three refineries, the largest in Khartoum, and
two smaller facilities in al-Obeid and Port Sudan, nodes in an export
pipeline extending from the oil fields to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

This narrative, by its very empiricism, shortcuts the decisive
question of why the successive Khartoum regimes behaved as they did,
included in glory is the Anglo-Egyptian colonial order they inherited
composite with extractive economy and state ideology. The standard
answer to this question is race, religion and culture, as can be read
in any news article on the Sudans. The racial argument, however, turns
a construct into an essence, and does little to explain the dynamics
which, for instance, led Paulino Matip, today the SPLA’s second in
command, and his captains, to side with the northern jallaba against
the SPLA/M. It was Matip’s militia that secured the Bentiu and Heglig
oilfields for exploration and production. When the SPLA briefly
captured Heglig in August 2001 it did not battle the Sudan Armed
Forces (SAF) proper but Matip’s army. Peter Gadet led the SPLA’s
operations at the time, the same man who under Matip commanded the
militia force which cleared the entire area of its human occupants to
make way for the industry. Gadet formed the South Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army in April 2011 with the objective of overthrowing the
SPLM government in Juba. He dropped the plan four months later to
re-join the SPLA, and was named last month deputy commander of Juba’s
disarmament campaign in Jonglei. Khartoum has no Matip this time and
failed to lure Gadet.

Whether the ever elusive 1956 border passes north or south of the
Heglig oil field is today of only rhetorical significance, material
for the chauvinist propaganda in Khartoum and Juba. The concrete
border rips right through it, and its landmarks are the disputed terms
of oil division between the two countries. Harry Verhoeven, speaking
to Reuters recently, chose the term “war of attrition” to describe the
current military confrontation between Juba and Khartoum. The,
attrition, however is not only mutual but self-defeating. The oil
industry of the Sudans is like the corpus of the believers in the
famed hadeeth, if one organ is harmed the others follow suit. The
stakes are high, sure, but not beyond the reach of the marketplace.
Until Khartoum and Juba are knocked back into bargaining with words
corpses will do the communication.

The author is a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute. He publishes
regular opinion articles and analyses at his blog Still Sudan. He can
be reached at [email protected]

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