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------Original message------ From: John Ashworth <[email protected]> To: "Group" <[email protected]> Date: Sunday, April 29, 2012 9:33:19 PM GMT+0300 Subject: [sudan-john-ashworth] Sudan / South Sudan: various analyses 1. South Sudan: All or Nothing 27 APRIL 2012 Africa Confidential posted on allAfrica.com When President Omer Hassan Ahmed el Beshir told the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), 'Either we end up in Juba and take everything or you end up in Khartoum and take everything,' he was acknowledging that the stakes could hardly be higher. What he didn't say, in his 19 April speech at the National Congress Party headquarters, was that the Southern armed forces have proved a match for those of the ruling NCP. The 10 April takeover of Heglig by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) - and withdrawal under international pressure - were a significant show of power. On paper, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) are far more powerful than the SPLA - in materiel, training and, most obviously, airpower. Yet several Western military sources told us they thought the military balance fairly even on the ground. Tactically, the SPLA should have stayed in Heglig, said one. Militarily, it certainly could have done. NCP protestations seemed aimed at disguising the extent of the SAF defeat. The SPLA Spokesperson, Colonel Philip Aguer Panyang, said the SPLA had killed some 500 SAF men, in the town Southerners call Pan Thou. Other sources say around 3,500 troops died, of about 6,000. Enter the Sudan Revolutionary Front, which, we understand, first drove the SAF out of Heglig the week before the SPLA took it (AC Vol 53 No 8, War drums sound as the South takes Heglig). These were mainly Darfur fighters from the Justice and Equality Movement, with some from the Liberation and Justice Movement who had refused to join Khartoum in 2010 with LJM head El Tigani Seisi Mohamed Ateem (AC Vol 51 No 19, A new strategy for Darfur). The SRF pursued the SAF to Khorasana, where fighting continued as Africa Confidential went to press. A key reason why both SPLA-N and SPLA have been able to defeat the SAF so readily is morale. The SAF never 'won' the war in the South and are even less likely to defeat the SPLA now it is better equipped and fired with the Independence spirit. The SRF, meanwhile, is fighting for its people, the marginalised of the 'New South', and a secular state, and against a regime it believes it can overthrow. It knows it has the support of many oppositionists and potentially, of millions, as it builds its own structures and its relations with Sudan's wide range of established parties. Low morale and desertions SRF confronts a once proud army of which the officer corps was systematically purged after the National Islamic Front coup of June 1989. Hundreds of officers were killed, gaoled, tortured or dismissed, the most famous case being that of the 28 officers shot in Ramadan (April) 1990. Ideological qualifications matter more than military ones and the SAF declined, leaving the field to the even more 'Islamised' security forces and the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), many of which fought at Heglig. Meanwhile, the army has lost its old recruiting grounds in the South, Nuba Mountains and Darfur. It now fights those who would once have fought in its ranks. Morale is so low that prisons are packed with deserters, we hear. One result is that the SPLA is better placed to defend the 1,800-kilometre, still undelimited border (much of which, including by Heglig, the late President Ja'afar Mohamed Nimeiri's regime moved southwards). Expecting, correctly, the NCP to pursue its destabilisation policy, the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) has been rearming since 2005 and much hardware is deployed near the border. 'They're good at moving stuff around the country undetected', observed one Western former official, 'and they're ready to fight across the entire border'. This leaves the SAF sandwiched between the SRF and SPLA. Its response is long-range and aerial bombardment, at Heglig and into the South. Satellite photographs show craters that only SAF can have produced but they don't prove who completely destroyed the adjoining collection manifold on which nearly half of Sudan's oil supply depended. A source close to the GOSS says it sent in engineers to shut down the plant safely and that if it had wanted to destroy the facility, it could easily have done so in ten days' occupation. Khartoum still demands compensation. SRF strategy is to target oil installations. Khartoum has continued the sporadic aerial bombardment of the South it launched weeks ago, targeting the tens of thousands of Sudanese refugees in camps there. That is why the GOSS, and Southerners in general, were outraged that the United Nations and friendly governments condemned the SPLA's entry into Heglig when they had been silent over the bombing, the earlier attacks on Abyei and other NCP abuses, North and South. Having gained a sliver of international acknowledgement, though, Khartoum promptly accused Juba of implementing 'Zionist' and 'crusader' programmes and on 23 April, bombed Bentiu and Rub Kona, once Chevron's oil headquarters. The SPLA had blocked Heglig-bound journalists in Bentiu, so several filmed and reported on air raids which the SAF denied making. The UN, which confirmed the raids, warned aid staff to store supplies, be ready to 'self-relocate', take shelter and 'kindly note that shrapnel can not only travel downwards from the sky, but can also travel horizontally from the side'. Omer's slavery threat Omer threatened to attack Juba, too, and in terms that would only stiffen South Sudanese resolve. Addressing PDF mujahideen in El Obeid, he shouted, 'Despite our attempts to make them aware so that they understand and know where their interests are, they do not understand. God has created them like that. That is why the best thing to do with them is to pick a stick and make them behave well'. This refers to a well known poem by Abu el Tayeb el Mutanabi: 'You shall not buy a slave without a stick with him' (to beat him with). The 'rope of unity' came in another reference to the master-slave relationship: 'We will throw this rope around their necks once again, God willing'. Khartoum also responded by arresting SRF activists, including Deputy Secretary General Ezdihar Juma (house arrest) and the SRF representative on the National Consensus Forces, Alawiya Kibeida. Yet the protest contagion has spread: youth movements Girifna and Shebaab min agle el Taghir (Youth for Change) have joined the SRF, with Girifna rallying Muslim support for Christians when a Presbyterian church was burnt down in Khartoum this week. Even the cautious Umma Party leader, El Sadig Sideeg el Mahdi, ventured early this month that change was 'inevitable'. This, the bombing and seizures of churches across the country may help to cure what one Western former official called the 'international community's endemic wilful blindness'. So may the pressure of some African governments. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda have held a series of urgent meetings and Kampala's Chief of Defence Forces, General Aronda Nyakairima, warned on 19 April, 'We cannot sit and watch. As a member of this region, Uganda will intervene'. After Khartoum rejected more talks, Juba is trying to regain the international high ground. Senior officials went to Ethiopia on 24 April to tell the African Union, we hear, that the GOSS was willing to talk to the NCP but with a broader mediation team than that led by South African ex-President Thabo Mbeki. This means the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and possibly more, on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement model. Juba is also taking this message to Europe, New York and Washington. http://allafrica.com/stories/201204270620.html END1 2. How to Defuse Sudan Conflict Interviewee: Jendayi Frazer, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Studies Interviewer: Christopher Alessi, Associate Staff Writer April 26, 2012 Council for Foreign Relations Tensions along the oil-rich border that divides Sudan and recently independent South Sudan have escalated in recent weeks, raising the prospect of a full-scale war between the longtime foes. China, which maintains considerable oil interests in both countries, has called for restraint (Reuters) and vowed to work with the United States to bring both sides back to the negotiating table. Jendayi Frazer, the former U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, says while the role of mediation should remain with the African Union, the United States and China are vital players in this conflict that can bring pressure to bear on both parties. However, Frazer says it is "a strategic mistake and it has never worked" for the international community to treat both sides equally, since the northern Sudan is clearly the aggressor in this latest conflict as well as many of those in the past. "The international community should be united against northern aggression," she says. Can you give an overview of the history of the sectarian conflict between the people who live in what is now the South Sudan and those in the northern state of Sudan, and how that led ultimately to the South's secession from Sudan in July 2011? The conflict goes back to more than fifty years, but the last twenty years has been the war between the north and the south--the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Khartoum government of President Bashir. That conflict over the last twenty years has led to the deaths of more than two million people, and wasn't ended really until the comprehensive peace agreement of 2005, which allowed for the South to go to secession. The roots of the conflict over the past fifty years and the intensification over the last twenty years was very much about how the north marginalizes the other regions, whether it is the south, whether it is east, or Darfur in the west. There's a small group in the center, who are a part of the government, who have marginalized the other regions and basically used them for resource extraction--that led to several rebellions. Is there an ethnic component to that? It's ethnic, it's racial, it's religious. There's a religious difference between the north, which is largely Muslim, and the South, which is largely Christian. And then between the north and South, there is a view that there is an Arab north and a black African South. If you go to the north, and you find Arabs, you wouldn't know that that they weren't Africans. So that sort of racial difference is really quite mixed. In terms of the conflict right now that has pushed Sudan and South Sudan to the brink of war, can you sum up the main issues and what is at stake? The primary issue is about oil, and then about the demarcation of the border between north and South--and the oil fields are located along that border area. As long as that border has not been demarcated, then there are claims on both sides that the oil fields belong to them. This is particularly intense around the town of Abyei, which it's not clear whether that belongs to the north or whether that belongs to the South. Then there has been recent fighting in the town of Heglig [which the South occupied for ten days until reportedly withdrawing last week], which is a part of South Kordofan [a state in Sudan] and appears to be in the north, but the South claims that it is actually a part of the southern state of Warrap. Is there an "aggressor," or are both parties equally culpable in this conflict? I don't think both parties are culpable, and that's where the international community got it wrong last week when they universally condemned South Sudan for going into Heglig. This dispute is really over borders, over oil, over many of the issues that were not finalized before secession. The tension has been rising since the beginning of the year, in which you would have had the north bombing areas in South Kordofan, in Blue Nile--basically bombing the SPLA North [South Sudanese-affiliated rebel forces operating in Sudan]--and continuing to fight with rebels in Darfur. The north has continued to be an aggressor for months before this particular conflict over Heglig came up. Yet the international community's condemnation of the north couldn't be heard at all. And so this heavy unified condemnation of the South for going into Heglig seemed to me to be overkill, and in fact, it created a cover for further northern aggression--which is what we are seeing right now with the bombing into Unity state. These aerial bombardments and killing of civilians have been going on constantly. This is the north killing [its] own people--the Southerners of the northern state--and now going into South Sudan and bombing. So there's a very clear aggressor here and it is northern Sudan, continuing to do what it's always done, which is bomb and kill civilians. The international community--the position of the United States--is going to try to be the arbitrator and treat each one equally; it is a strategic mistake, and it has never worked. In the past, the United States has been very clear that the north has been the aggressor, and the South has been our ally and our partner--and we need to treat them as such. It's all well and good for the African Union to come in as a neutral arbitrator. In the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement, Kenya was a neutral mediator; the United States was not the mediator and should never be the mediator because we are clearly on one side of the conflict. What's China's role in all of this? As a long-time ally of Khartoum, but also a large purchaser of oil from South Sudan, can it play a mediating role? No, it shouldn't be a mediator--no more than the United States should. The mediation should stay within the African Union. But China and the United States are two of the most important players here, from the point of view that they can bring pressure to bear on both parties. They can bring coercive pressure--i.e, sticks, sanctions--and they can also bring incentives to bear. They could bring the goods that would actually deliver parties to the mediator. So China has an essential role to play, as does the United States. And the United States and China working hand in hand is even better. What's the role of the larger international community, including the United Nations? The UN is involved from the point of view of having peacekeepers on the ground. The UN's role is very important. But it was a mistake for Ban Ki-moon, the United States, and the AU to come out so hard against South Sudan for just an incursion into Heglig. It just created the context in which the Sudanese are now bombing Unity state. The UN role is primarily to protect the civilian population--from the point of view of keeping their peacekeepers there, as well as providing humanitarian assistance to those people that are now displaced and fleeing from these bombing attacks from the north. The international community should be united against northern aggression. How has South Sudan's decision to shut down oil production in January affected the economies of both South Sudan and Sudan? It's probably hurting South Sudan more than it is hurting the north, but it's hurting both of them. The South is playing a very high-stakes brinksmanship type of policy vis-a-vis the north to try to force decisions. The South is trying to force the issue [of being able to reap the rewards of its own oil production, which must be transported through Sudan's infrastructure to be exported] by shutting off the oil, but it's a high-stakes game, and that has probably led even more to this type of armed conflict, these incursions. The environment is that much more tense because of that decision and because of the economic impact. It's not just hurting the north and the South, it's also hurting China. It's hurting the countries that have oil concessions there and have been pumping oil out of Sudan. So China has a lot at stake in trying to resolve this. What are some of the plausible outcomes to this conflict? Do you think both parties will get back to the negotiating table? The fights on the ground are part of the negotiation that's taking place. Sometimes when you can't get a decision at the negotiating table, you go back to some incursions, some fighting to shore up your position. Basically, if you can take some advances on the ground, you can shore up your position at the negotiating table. So I think this is all part of negotiating. The problem is it can get out of hand and create its own dynamic, which leads back to full-scale war. But I don't expect full-scale war. I do believe that the negotiations will continue. The ultimate goal here--the South needs to take a strategic pause in terms of fighting the north on the ground. They need to focus on a future that's more eastern looking, i.e., connect themselves to the East African Community. Most of the traders who are in South Sudan right now are coming from east Africa. So their economic future and political future should be looking south and east, rather than looking north. So they need to, over time, disentangle themselves from the north. In order to do that, they need to not be in a full-scale war or these types of episodic conflicts or fights with the north. It's not that they acquiesce to the northern decisions, but they need to look beyond the day-to-day and look toward the future. The only way to disentangle themselves from the north is at the negotiating table, and on the ground have that strategic pause, and do the compromises necessary to get out of the relationship. But also as part of that, the United States needs to provide aerial defense for the South. The north is constantly bombing civilians, and the South cannot defend itself. We need to adopt a posture that says to the north, "If you mess with the South, you mess with the United States." We need to give them a security blanket, and a part of that would be helping them with an air defense system. http://www.cfr.org/africa/defuse-sudan-conflict/p28072?cid=rss-fullfeed-how_to_defuse_sudan_conflict-042612&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cfr_main+%28CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed%29 END2 3. Sudan, the UN and the concept of "Illegality" By Anne Bartlett April 24, 2012 — A curious thing has happened on the diplomatic road to resolving the crisis over Heglig: the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, finally discovered his voice and declared the occupation of the border zone by the South Sudan as “illegal” and an infringement of sovereignty. I say “curious” because Mr. Ban has been rather less forthcoming about all manner of other “illegalities” the length and breadth of Sudan: bombing; extra-judicial killing; torture; mass graves; the displacement of people from their land; the movement of illegal populations from other countries onto land owned by Sudanese citizens; election fraud and demographic re-engineering; the cutting off of humanitarian aid and starvation of whole sectors of the population. The list is of course endless, but I think this shortened version makes the point. Mr. Ban is, of course, not alone in his moral indignation over the occupation of the border zone: the rest of the international community has also had rather a lot to say over the “illegal” actions of South Sudan, the “rebels” of the SRF, and the rest of the marginalized populations of Sudan who have had enough of the predatory actions of the NCP. The strong rebukes of the South have however not been matched by the diplomatic speak used to deal with the ongoing and substantial human rights abuses in Darfur, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. In these cases, little more has occurred than a slap on the wrist for the Sudanese Government in Khartoum. Even more worrying is the deafening silence over the racist, inflammatory discourse of the NCP in recent days, where they have referred to the people of the South as “hasharat” (literally insects, but a more apt translation would be bugs or pests). The failure of the international community to deal with such incendiary language is deeply problematic, especially when one considers that the word “cockroach” was often used as a justification for murder in the early days of the Rwandan genocide. Language matters. It can destabilize a situation very quickly and can form part of the rationale for descent into what Kofi Annan once described as “an alternative moral universe” of discrimination and slaughter. Even a cursory look at the newspapers over recent days shows that the propaganda of the NCP has travelled far down the road of degrading insults and actual violence. Yet the diplomatic push has been to remonstrate with the South Sudan government and to blame the victims of NCP aggression, rather than dealing with the larger picture of systematic violence and abuse of many oppressed groups in Sudan. The big question here is why so much attention has been focused on the border situation, while so little has been focused on aerial bombardments, food insecurity, lack of humanitarian access and generalized violence against the population. Most obviously, there is a need to restore peace and to step back from the brink of a dangerous and costly war which is clearly not in anyone’s interest. However, there is something else going on which speaks to a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation and a naïve attempt on the part of Mr. Ban to bury his head in the sand. As a start, one of the mistakes is the framework of analysis used by the UN and the international community. This framework centers the analysis at the level of the State, rather than at the level of group rights and marginalized peoples. The state - which in this case is the Sudanese government in the North - is treated as having the right to exercise control over its own territory and to monopolize the use of violence to put down “rebel” elements within its borders, even if those “rebels” have good reasons for seeking self-determination. Yet as many now recognize, the difficulty with this state-centric approach to sovereignty is that there are a myriad of problems facing such an idea. Consider the fact that in the case of Sudan, its people are constantly on the move due to economic realities brought about by state irresponsibility and the ongoing threat of violence emanating from the cabal in Khartoum. Territorial integrity and neat lines on the map are almost beside the point when neighboring countries are faced with having to deal with the overspill of such problems. Second, since international human rights norms and obligations largely operate at the supra-national level (above the level of the State) and, given the fact that in Sudan the volume of human rights violations are enormous, it becomes a little difficult to understand how we can talk about the exclusive authority of the Sudanese state to exercise its will. This is especially the case when the same state treats its citizens, (and neighboring citizens), so atrociously. Consequently, the real issue is not sovereignty per se, but rather a matter of security, the right to secure vital resources from neighboring predators, and the right to live in peace. To talk about “illegality” and “sovereignty” as if territory is fixed and unmoving is to ignore the fact that the Government of Sudan is its own worst enemy in this regard, and would do well to put its own house in order first, by not using border zones to attack others. All of these problems are allied to a second concern: the growing popularity of the SRF and the swelling of its numbers by inclusion of a variety of marginalized groups from all over Sudan. For the international community this situation is deeply worrying, since it brings together a variety of “rebel” groups about whom the foreign governments have a number of concerns. For a start, there is the worry that these groups might just get enough traction to threaten the government in Khartoum. With the Arab Spring, al-Turabi’s follower in Tunisia, uncertainty in Libya, the rise of the Brotherhood and the Salafis in Egypt, there are serious concerns about the destabilization of North Africa with all that entails for the West. The coming together of a set of “rebel” groups that may remove a 23 year long dictatorship in Sudan and replace it with something unknown and uncontrollable is enough to make diplomats break out in a cold sweat. President Obama’s plea to the government of South Sudan that it “must end its support for armed groups inside Sudan and it must cease its military actions across the border” is a case in point and certainly not ambiguous in the message it makes. However, what the US, UN and others do not understand is that the picture being painted by Khartoum is far from the truth. What is at stake here is not the threat of fundamentalist Islam or “rebel” groups, but rather the disappointment of people who expected more from the West. I have said it before and I’ll say it again: for those who have faced the extermination of the people they love in front of their eyes, the only goal is to get rid of this threat. These people are not rebels: they simply want what most people in the world already enjoy — peace and security. Never before does the West have a set of allies who subscribe to democracy and the values of the West like the people who have been subjected to this treatment. For those who have witnessed the unraveling of everything they hoped for, the dynamics propelling them towards peace are extremely strong as long as they can survive and provide for their families. The responsibility of the West is therefore to provide for infrastructure and development, rather than empty rhetoric about “sovereignty” and “illegality” that does nothing to describe the reality of the circumstances that people face. To President Obama I say the following: In what way would you interpret the civil rights movement and the righteous cause of African Americans to secure their rights as terrorism, insurgency or rebellion? How could one ever explain away the pain, violence, discrimination and lynching that African Americans suffered as a necessary evil in the building of the American nation? When does racism and murder ever have a place in any society? If any of these ideas are not part of the fabric of the United States or the framework of rights by which the United Nations operates, then what right does the West have to choose them for the citizens of Sudan and South Sudan? These are questions that require serious reflection before the next round of disingenuous diplomatic remarks are made. Dr. Anne Bartlett is Professor of Sociology and Director of the International Studies program at the University of San Francisco. She is also a Director of the Darfur Reconciliation and Development Organization (www.drdoafrica.org). She may be reached at: [email protected] http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-the-UN-and-the-concept-of,42368 END3 4. Sudan-South Sudan conflict "only a side-show", blame lies elsewhere - report [The colleague who sent this to me, a long-term Sudan analyst, commented: "Full of little errors and no mention of Islamism but an interesting overview"] Text of report by Andrew M. Mwenda entitled "Sudan conflict a series of internal divisions complicated by oil riches" published by Kenyan newspaper The EastAfrican website on 23 April 2012; subheadings inserted editorially: Last week, the low intensity conflict between the new state of South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan escalated into a near full-scale war. On Monday 10 April, the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) took control of the strategic town of Heglig [Hijlij] from troops loyal to Khartoum. That same day, Khartoum launched a series of air rides, bombing the towns of Jonglei and Heglig. In the ensuing fight, SPLA shot down two of Khartoum's MIG 29 jets. On Wednesday 11 April, the united nations secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, called the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, saying "I am ordering you to pull your troops out of Heglig." On Thursday morning, Kiir addressed parliament in Juba where he told a cheering crowd that he had told Mr Ban on the phone, "I am not under your command." The US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, called on both parties to cease hostilities. As the week ended, South Sudan was in full military mobilization. The war between North and South Sudan is swiftly becoming a complex international issue; Khartoum accuses the SPLA of launching aggression on its territory and supporting rebels in Blue Nile and South Kurdufan [both states located along the disputed border]; that is why it has retaliated by bombing South Sudan's positions. Technically, Khartoum is right, for the troops fighting it are SPLA soldiers - to be precise, soldiers of the SPLA North, which fought alongside the southern army between 1983 and 2005. But Juba denies involvement in the war in North Sudan, as the SPLA North soldiers are actually not from South Sudan. It is this part of the jigsaw puzzle that has to be understood if international efforts to end the conflict are to bear fruit. Khartoum has a reputation for exclusion, marginalization and oppression of many communities in its territory. The civil war in Sudan that led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement [CPA] in 2005 pitted ! many of these marginalized communities against Khartoum. Given its oppressive ways, one could even say that most of Sudan has been marginalized by the Khartoum regime. However, the more distinctly marginalized groups included people in the territory currently known as South Sudan, South Kurdufan (where most of the intense fighting has been taking place) and eastern Sudan, especially the areas around the Red Sea Mountains. This region is occupied by different communities close to the Ethiopians and Eritreans. In fact, eastern Sudan is the poorest and most marginalized region of the Republic of Sudan. And finally, there is Darfur, the best known conflict in Sudan. The territory currently known as the Republic of South Sudan was a separate entity from the rest of modern day Sudan until 1947, when the British colonial government integrated it into Sudan. Although this is the region where the SPLA was born, it was not the only region with grievances against Khartoum. Thus, when SPLA was formed, communities from South Kurdufan, Nuba [So! uthern Kurdufan is in the same Nuba mountains] and the Blue Nile region that had grievances against Khartoum joined the SPLA. Even marginalized groups from Darfur who did not form part of the SPLA received inspiration and training from it. Therefore, by the time the CPA was signed in 2005, communities from these regions other than Darfur formed two divisions of the SPLA. These divisions of the SPLA remained inside North Sudan. When Khartoum failed to meet their demands, they launched a war of liberation too. Khartoum has used this to claim that it is under attack from South Sudan and has won sufficient international support with this claim. Secondly, it has also used it as an excuse to attack South Sudan, now an independent state, thereby triggering off an international war. Knowledgeable sources say that many of these communities felt betrayed by the SPLA when it signed the CPA, which paved way for the independence of the South from the rest of Su! dan. They had fought alongside the SPLA for more than two decades and felt that the Independence of South Sudan would leave them in a relatively weaker position. However, sources say, the main faction of the SPLA that formed the new South Sudan promised to pressure Khartoum to reach an agreement with its former allies in these marginalized regions. It also promised them support if Khartoum failed to accommodate their concerns. But Khartoum seems to have had little interest in addressing the grievances of these communities. The question is why? Southern independence Contrary to what people think, Khartoum had a strong interest in the secession of South Sudan. This seems contradictory because most states prefer to hold onto territory even at extremely high cost. This is especially so for Khartoum because most of the oil (80 per cent) is in South Sudan; so one would expect it to fight tooth and nail to keep the South. Yet there were many more complex factors that seem to have driven the National Congress Party [NCP] of Umar al-Bashir, the current President of the Republic of Sudan, to want to shed South Sudan. The reality for him was either to lose power altogether or lose the South. However, this interest was not one way. There were people in the SPLA from South Sudan who wanted to leave the union. But the SPLA was never united on this issue and in a series of internal debates, the movement accepted a compromise that created an opportunity for unity and if that did not work, to go for I! ndependence. Therefore, there was a convergence of different but compatible interests between Khartoum and the South Sudan faction of the SPLA/M for separation. By the time the CPA was signed, the only marginalized part of the wider Sudan that had developed both the military and political capacity to effectively challenge Khartoum was South Sudan. To put it the other way, the most militarily and politically strong faction of the SPLA/M was the one largely drawn from the South. Khartoum seems to have calculated that if it got rid of South Sudan, it would effectively break the SPLA/M down the middle, separating the strong part from the weaker one. In Khartoum's calculus, this would mean that the most effective fighting machine of the SPLA would have little interest in helping the other marginalized regions to fight the NCP regime. The remaining rump of the SPLA/M inside the older Sudan would now be weak and easy to crush. It is this calculation that drove B! ashir to sign the CPA, seeing it as an opportunity to rid himself of a major threat, weaken internal resistance and open the way for him to subdue what remained of that resistance. Meanwhile, within South Sudan, there were differences too on how to deal with their allies from the other regions of Sudan. Some people in the SPLA/M felt that they should not abandon them. But doing this would undermine progress towards independence and perhaps drag the war on for many more decades. In fact, sources say, former SPLA leader John Garang wanted to keep a unified Sudan. He only signed the CPA, which recommended independence for the South, because it had a clause clearly stating that both the North and the South should work for unity. Admirers and enemies in the South and North say Garang was ambitious and wanted to be president of a bigger entity than a small "fiefdom" called South Sudan. However, there were other voices led by Kiir, Garang's deputy and current president of South Sudan. These felt that unity was an unrealistic ideal and separation a more realistic objective. The clause that both sides should work for unity and separate if that ideal failed to work was the key compromise between the Garang and the Kiir camps of the SPLA/M that made the CPA possible. Although the NCP under Bashir wanted separation, many people in Khartoum did not support this objective. While the regime extremists wanted a forcibly united country, the common people wanted separation to end the war. Thus, many political forces opposed to Bashir saw in Garang a patriot willing to keep the country united. They wanted an inclusive democratic government, which they hoped Garang would provide as he forged alliances with the West and the East. These opposition forces now became internal surrogates of Garang in Khartoum. Thus when he went to the capital to be sworn in as vice president under the CPA in May 2005, Garang was welcomed as a hero by both the "African" and "Arab" elite and rank and file. One million people turne! d up in Khartoum to give him a heroes' welcome, a factor that was not missed by the Bashir regime and some forces inside the SPLA/M who preferred secession. When Garang died two months later, it was the final nail in the coffin of a united Sudan under Khartoum. The new SPLA/M leader, Salva Kiir, was deeply committed to separation. In an ironic twist, Kiir's greatest ally was Bashir and his apparatchiks inside the NCP. Kiir wanted secession not only because he did not think unity was a viable option but also because he did not want the South to share its oil wealth with people who had suppressed them for years. Bashir wanted secession because it would help him get rid of his strongest enemy from the union. But this path did not resolve the problem of the other marginalized groups that formed a weak but significant portion of the SPLA. Southern Kurdufan is populated by Nubians, whose freedom fighters are led by Abd-al-AzizaAl-Hilu. In Blue Nile, the fighters are largely from the Funj tribe, and are led by the former gov! ernor of the state, Malik Agar. How were those SPLA divisions drawn from South Kurdufan, Nuba and Blue Nile going to be handled? Would it be up to South Sudan to disarm them? Would they become an independent entity with whom Khartoum could negotiate? But before all these issues could be digested, there was an issue to deal with first. In 2011, there was a general election in the whole of Sudan. SPLA had promised to contest the elections and actually fielded a candidate, but an unknown entity called Yasir Arman. Salva Kiir himself kept out of the election in order, many observers now say, to ensure that Bashir won - because he wanted a separate South and going for the seat in Khartoum would be too risky, given the likelihood that the election would be rigged. Second, even if he won, he was only be in the seat for about seven months. Then he would have to go home to his village after secession since there would be a different president in the South. Many people s! ay that if Garang were still alive he would have contested the election. If he did, it was very likely that he would have won as he would have attracted the votes of all the marginalized communities and the votes of many Khartoum Arabs who preferred a united Sudan. Indeed, this was evident in the fact that the SPLA candidate Arman turned out to be a strong contender in the election for president. Realizing that he was likely to win, the SPLA pulled him out of the race three weeks to the election. Yet in spite of this, Arman got 21 per cent of the vote. One can only speculate how much Garang would have got had he been alive and decided to run in that election. This also means that had Kiir run, he would most likely have beaten Bashir hands down. However, critics of Kiir say he lacked the high ambition and self-confidence to aspire to rule the whole of Sudan. They accuse him of securing a deal with Bashir that allowed both of them to capture their own fiefdoms. However, supporters of Kiir say he was much more fore! sighted and realistic than Garang. They argue that sections of the North that hated Bashir wanted to keep the South not because they love unity but because of its oil. They had been unable to unseat Bashir and saw in Garang an instrument they could use to get rid of their rival. According to this view, the army, police and all security agencies of the old Sudan are controlled by the northern "Arabs" as are the bureaucracy, judiciary, diplomatic service, education, and health care. Had a southerner been elected president, he would have been unable to change the entire system overnight. So he would become a hostage of these deeply entrenched interests, who would be strong enough to sabotage his plans or even kill him. Kiir's supporters further argue that in his big vision of a united Sudan and his ambition to lead it, Garang was blind to this fundamental reality that would have made him an ineffective president unable to serve the interests of the South. The best way to! serve the people of the South was Independence, as this would give them an independent nation with oil revenues to sort out many of the issues dear to their people. It is this argument that tilted the dice in favour of Kiir and his supporters. But how would the South handle those in its ranks who came from the other marginalized regions? SPLA promised to urge Khartoum to negotiate with them. Although South Sudan has asked Khartoum to find accommodation with these SPLA fighters, Khartoum has consistently dodged the issue. Thus, when these rumps of the SPLA decided to renew the civil war against the regime in Khartoum, the reason why Bashir was dodging negotiations with them became apparent. Rather than accept responsibility for the war or see it as an internal rebellion against the policies of his government, he accused Juba of launching an aggressive war against his government - a perfect excuse. Khartoum propaganda The situation in Sudan is exactly like the one that Uganda faced in October 1990 when remnants of the Ugandan army crossed the border and attacked Rwanda. Then, former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana argued that the Ugandan army had invaded his country. Technically he was right. But in fact, the soldiers were Rwandan refugees who had been living in Uganda and had joined the Uganda army. They had decamped from it without permission to launch their own war against his regime. But Habyarimana was able to use this "evidence" to convince the world that his country was under attack from Ugandan troops. Using highly skilful media propaganda, Khartoum has been able to effectively convince the international community that it is South Sudan that has invaded northern Sudan. It is in this context that Mr Ban called President Kiir to demand that South Sudan troops withdraw from Northern territory. This is the more intriguing given! that up till now, Khartoum has resisted all attempts to clearly demarcate the border between the two countries, making it difficult to establish whether the positions that the SPLA troops under the command of Juba have entered are in the North's territory or not. But most critically, Khartoum has been able to hide the fact that it is not South Sudan but its own people who have taken up arms against it. But how will pressure on South Sudan by the international community solve the internal problem of the demands by groups in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Nuba regions for equitable treatment and inclusion? Thus, as things stand, the conflict between Juba and Khartoum is only a side-show, a smoke screen to hide the more fundamental issue of the demands of other marginalized regions inside the old Sudan. Source: The EastAfrican website, Nairobi, in English 23 Apr 12 END4 5. Sudan-South Sudan: The Heart of the Matter in the Worsening Relations between the Sudans Thursday, April 26, 2012 Source: ISS Andrews Atta-Asamoah, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division, ISS Pretoria As Antonovs from bases in Sudan continue to miss their targets amidst the ear-splitting sounds of AK47s in parts of the disputed border areas between Sudan and South Sudan, it is perhaps only the careful choice of words that prevents this from being called a new war between the two Sudans. And as the clashes between the two sides continue, Sudan is on the one hand profusely blaming its southern neighbour for having started this latest confrontation over the oil-rich Heglig, while South Sudan insists that it is a case of self-defense and the defense of the territorial integrity of the new state. South Sudan also argues strongly that it could not be occupying Sudanese territory since the history of the disputed areas, as per the 1956 border, places Heglig and its surrounding areas in South Sudan. The situation has clearly faulted international early response and preventive diplomacy mechanisms and has once again put the structures at the continental and global levels to the test. Meanwhile, the arguments put forward by both sides are not enough to explain why a military confrontation broke out now, despite the on-going political process in Addis Ababa – a process that has, admittedly, been perceived as unsuccessful. There is indeed the tendency to blame the current worsening of relations on the lack of progress at these on-going negotiations. However, whilst that is partly the case, there are three important issues that inform the positions and actions of the two countries. These are the issues at the heart of the matter and are capable of pushing them beyond the tipping point into full-blown war. First is the continued existence of a post-war and post-split bitterness that has lead to an atmosphere of intense mutual suspicion between the two capitals. The incessant exchange of accusations about the arming of rebels in one another’s territories and threats of economic sabotage are evidence of this – a situation that has persisted since the independence of South Sudan last year. Whilst this might be a natural consequence of the more than two decades of war between the North and South, this is be worsening by the day. This is due to strained relations between the two leaders in Khartoum and Juba, who are constantly attacking one another in the media, and the renewal of the activities of armed groups on both sides. Some of these groups have an historical affiliation with people of the other country. The preoccupation with access to the oil wealth is the second issue. Importantly, in the Sudans, deposits straddle the border between the two countries. Heglig, for example is an important oil-producing site for Sudan and loss of its revenue has dire implications for its economic stability. About half of Sudan’s remaining 115 000 barrels per day of oil production is produced from this region and explains why Khartoum will go to any length to maintain control over it. Finally these two issues inform the emergence of the third factor which has to do with the lack of appreciation by the political leadership in the two countries of the extent to which the economic, security and cultural destinies of the two countries are inextricably linked. This is, by extension in a security sense, a case of a mutually assured destabilisation (MAD) whereby the destabilisation of any of the two countries is an assurance that the other will be destabilised as well. Apart from proximity, the two countries have over the years borrowed heavily from one another’s culture and learned a great deal from one other’s choices. They can’t wish one another away. They have effectively become like separated Siamese twins whose identities cannot be defined without reference to one other and their history of once been joined together. Yet, despite the reality of their shared destiny, which has been acknowledged by the leaders of both countries, it is yet to reflect in mutual cooperation. The interplay of choices based on these three factors and the projection of the right of self-defense and preservation of territorial integrity are, in turn, informing unilateral and knee-jerk reactions in both capitals and souring relations between them. Despite signing a memorandum of non-aggression and two important framework agreements on borders and nationality, the resort to unilateral decisions and the flexing of military muscle around the border has effectively derailed progress at the negotiations and made the work of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) more difficult. Post-‘divorce’ rivalry and mutual suspicion over the possibility of destabilisation are the most deadly and damaging obstacles to progress at the negotiating table and a key determinant of the possibility of peace and the practice of good neighbourliness between the two Sudans. If the two countries do not temper their actions and resort to war it was be disastrous for people living on both sides. War is effectively a fast-forward button towards destruction and a reverse gear in the advance of countries towards development. A war will cause the two countries to concentrate their energies and resources on buying bullets and bombs instead of building bridges and infrastructure. Against the background of the sharp drop of revenue for both countries - in Khartoum after the split and Juba after shutting down oil production - a resumption of war would mean that both sides would empty their national kitties in waging an unjustified and unnecessary war. For Juba, the little progress that has been made towards development since the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) will be reversed quickly and a mass exodus of southerners into other countries in the region will be inevitable. At the moment, there is no assurance that the enthusiastic southern returnees are ready to be displaced again. There is a need for the international community to unequivocally condemn the use of force and seek to advance negotiations on the outstanding issues. As soon as possible the African Union and the United Nations should deploy an observer mission and prepare for the deployment of a possible force of peacekeepers, should the tensions and war rhetoric persist. The cost of renewed war will be far more difficult to handle than a preventive deployment at this stage. Progress at the negotiation table is also crucial. The AUHIP should build a strong leverage that is capable of forcing parties to respect the outcomes of deliberations. This can be achieved through the express support of the international community for the process, and the elimination of regional positioning and geopolitics that undermine commitments to the terms of the Addis Ababa negotiations. Lastly the two partners need to be made aware, once again, of their “mutually assured destabilisation”. This realization could, on the long run, lead to the resolution of the issues around borders and oil and also provide a framework for both parties to cautiously manage emerging issues and mutually support each other in the search for stability after the split. END5 ______________________ John Ashworth Sudan, South Sudan Advisor [email protected] +254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile) +211 919 695 362 (South Sudan mobile) +27 82 050 1235 (South Africa mobile) +44 750 304 1790 (UK/international) +88 216 4334 0735 (Thuraya satphone) PO Box 52002 - 00200, Nairobi, Kenya This is a personal e-mail address and the contents do not necessarily reflect the views of any organisation -- The content of this message does not necessarily reflect John Ashworth's views. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, John Ashworth is not the author of the content and the source is always cited. You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "sudan-john-ashworth" group. 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