The selective implementation of the Sudan CPA and today’s crisis along
the North/South border
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By Benedetta De Alessi
Sudan and South Sudan today are at war, and so is Sudan with its own
peripheries in Darfur, East, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States
while insecurity never stopped in some areas of South Sudan since
2005. To call it otherwise is political blindness or else convenience.
What is happening today in Sudan is no mystery, but the direct result
of the selective implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) by the Parties and accepted by the International community (the
signatories and observers of the Naivasha peace process) in the past
six years of interim period for the sake of ‘peace’ and ‘stability’ in
the region.
The parenthesis of relative peace that the CPA brought for the six
years of interim period – in its narrow sense of cessation of direct
hostilities between the North and the South – allowed for the
self-determination option for Southern Sudanese to be exerted, and
resulted in the independence of South Sudan. That was only one of the
objectives of the SPLM/A struggle enshrined in the CPA; the other one,
the New Sudan, for a ‘united, democratic, secular’ country, just and
equal for all, was abandoned in the first years of implementation (and
some would say already in Machakos in 2002 when negotiations begun).
The CPA, a liberal peace agreement, provided for peace to realise as a
result of democracy and development in Sudan; however given the lack
of transformation of both the NCP and the SPLM into sound national
political parties, and the consequent lack of democratisation of Sudan
as a whole (North and South) the CPA implementation was controlled by
the Presidency, through a plethora of commissions and committees, at
the exclusion of the other political forces in Sudan and in most cases
of the international community. The CPA drafters did not foresee any
provision about breaches of the Agreement. The CPA implementation
became a technical matter, while the implementation of crucial
political points was delayed and at times renegotiated such as the
legislative transformation of Sudan, the process of National healing
and Reconciliation, the protocol of Abyei and the conflict of Southern
Kordofan and Blue Nile States. The ‘peace’ and ‘stability’ expected by
the technical – rather than political - implementation of peace,
through the Referendum and the separation of Southern Sudan, were by
no means sustainable. In the aftermath of the independence of South
Sudan, the effect of the non-resolution of key CPA provisions emerged;
in particular, today’s crisis along the North/South border and in the
Three Areas, is the result of the lack of implementation of the
protocol of Abyei, the lack of determination (let alone the
demarcation), of the North/South border, and the lack of resolution of
the conflict of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States. A solution
should start from understanding the dynamics of the past six years,
accept mutual mistakes and act upon those.
The Area of Abyei was contested between the North and the South. The
CPA provided for an Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to define its
territory for a joint administration to be established in the interim
period and a Referendum of self-determination to take place
simultaneously to that of the people of Southern Sudan. When the ABC
report was published in September 2005, the Presidency rejected it,
irrespective of the CPA that called it ‘final and binding’. The NCP
had the majority in the Presidency and could enforce that decision
whereas neither the SPLM nor the international community had enough
political power to impose the CPA. The Parties decided to ask for a
third party arbitration to solve the impasse i.e. to decide whether
the ABC had exceeded its mandate. When the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague issued its award in 2009, the territory
of Abyei was reduced, including in its eastern border: the area of
Heglig fell off the Abyei area and in a limbo. No evidence (i.e. maps)
was brought to sustain the claim that Heglig was part of the North on
1 January 1956, or of the South; had that evidence existed, neither
Party would have accepted to include Heglig in the Abyei protocol in
the first place. The PCA ruling was accepted by the Parties but its
implementation was hampered by a security stand off when SAF occupied
the northern area of Abyei and the oilfield of Difra, and the area
became no-go for the civil Abyei administration. The SPLM reacted by
increasing the police forces in the southern area. As a result of the
instable political and security situation, and a major disagreement on
the residents of Abyei hence the voters, the Referendum for
self-determination of Abyei could not take place on 9 January 2011.
Today few people live in Abyei, caught in between the North and the
South’s enduring struggle, and without any administration. In the
aftermath of the independence of South Sudan and in response to an
advance of southern police, SAF occupied the town of Abyei provoking
thousands of displaced to the southern part of the area at the border
with South Sudan, in Agok mainly. The Abyei protocol was drafted by
the US administration and the Parties accepted it at the last moment
in Naivasha; in 2010 the US proposed a division of the area between
North and South that the SPLM refused. The solution of the Abyei
crisis was brought to the post-Referendum negotiations in Addis Ababa
under the AU without success triggering the lack of resolution of the
other outstanding CPA issues. As all attention was devoted in
resolving the crisis of Abyei, other crises were emerging along the
North/South border, including the real Badme between North and South
Sudan, Heglig. The problem of Abyei reveals a different understanding
of the CPA by the side of the NCP and the SPLM, which needs a
political, not a technical solution, on the expectations of Sudan and
South Sudan on the future of their countries.
The CPA pre-interim period (January-July 2005) was left to the Parties
to organise themselves into national political organisations and form
the New Sudan institutions, starting with the drafting of the Interim
National Constitution. Among the crucial provisions to be implemented
then, the delineation of the North/South border was one, considered
essential to define the territory governed by the Government of
Southern Sudan, for the redeployment of SAF and SPLA troops in their
respective territories, the sharing of oil revenues, and for census,
Elections and Referendum to take place. Despite its importance, the
committee tasked to make a recommendation to the Presidency on the
border line started working only in 2006 and submitted its report to
the Presidency only in 2010, for both technical and political reasons
to be imputed to both Parties. The major cause of the delay was a
substantial disagreement over the number of contested areas also
within the committee; while the NCP insisted on 4 areas, Kafia Kinji,
Kaka, Megenis mountains and Jodah, the SPLM wanted six, to include
Sahafa area and, after the PCA, also Heglig. The interim period ended
without an agreement on the contested areas along the North/South
border; the Parties agreed to disagree and to start the demarcation of
the non-contested areas (around 80% of the border). As the Parties
could not find any negotiated solution, the issue should be referred
to an international arbitration, and its decision final and binding.
The CPA protocol on the Resolution of the conflict in the states of
Southern Kordofan (SKS) and Blue Nile (BNS) established special power
sharing and security arrangements to the Two Areas in the North that
fought alongside the SPLM/A against Khartoum during the second civil
war. The NCP initially did not want to include it in the CPA, but
eventually agreed as the resolution of the conflict in the States
could become a model for peace and unity in diversity for the whole
Sudan. Unlike Abyei, people of the Two Areas were not granted the
right to self-determination, but the right to a popular consultation;
the process was meant to ascertain their view on the implementation of
the CPA in a mid interim period, after the National Elections. The
plan was for two ad hoc commissions within the newly elected State
Parliaments to run the consultations and produce a report to the same
Assembly and then eventually start consultation with the Government.
The late conduct of the Elections in April 2010 pushed that process
towards the end of the interim period in both States, missing its
essence and clashing with the result of the Referendum of
self-determination of Southern Sudan. Moreover, SKS rejected the
result of the National population census, which led to a recount and
the consequent rerun of the State Elections in April 2011. While the
consultation process started in BNS in autumn 2010 with a massive
response from the population, the popular consultation in SKS never
took off as the security situation worsened in the aftermath of the
contested electoral result. The CPA gave the Presidency the
responsibility to determine the number of troops of SAF and SPLA for
the interim period; Joint Integrated Units were formed but both
Parties maintained their separate camps, without providing their exact
sizes. With the independence of South Sudan approaching, SAF wanted
the SPLA troops in the Two Areas to withdraw in accordance with the
CPA; however the SPLM claimed that they were northern soldiers,
citizens of Sudan, and defended their right to be integrated into SAF.
Moreover, were the security aspects of the Protocol to be completed
before the political ones i.e. the popular consultations? No
negotiated solution was found and an attempt of SAF to forcibly disarm
SPLA in SKS in June 2011 triggered a conflict in the State, that
expanded to BNS in September 2011 (at that time SAF considered the
SPLA and SPLM in the North illegal and attacked also members’ houses
and offices in Damazin). The CPA protocol on the Two Areas became a
missed opportunity. Today the conflict (ground fighting and aerial
bombardments from the Government) has displaced an estimated number of
over 300,000 people in SKS (increased after March military offensives)
and of 300,000 in BNS (including over 100,000 refugees in South Sudan
and Ethiopia). The humanitarian situation is affected by the lack of
access of the international agencies from the North and their
unwillingness to operate from the South in order not to compromise
their political relations with Khartoum. With the rainy season
approaching and a missed farming season, the risk of starvation for
hundreds of thousands of citizens is real.
In the aftermath of the independence of South Sudan there is no peace
and no stability in Sudan and in South Sudan. Given the appalling
humanitarian situation of the people in the Three Areas, and the risk
of an escalation of conflict between the North and the South that
would provoke more suffering to all, the international community that
strongly advocated for the CPA and made it possible against all odds,
has the responsibility to bring the Parties to a negotiated solution
of the outstanding CPA issues. An immediate cessation of hostilities
should be signed between Sudan and South Sudan, starting with the full
withdrawal of SPLA and SAF from the contested areas along the
North/South border, including Heglig, and from Abyei. A UN
peacekeeping mission should be sent along the North/South border to
maintain security and to allow for the demarcation of the
non-contested areas while the determination of the contested areas is
deferred to an international arbitration final and binding.
Negotiations on the Resolution of the conflict of the Two Areas should
continue following the rejected Framework Agreement signed by the
Parties in June 2011, through the support of IGAD and the AU and the
other international guarantors of the CPA, to negotiate the political
and security aspects of the protocol, including the future of the
right to popular consultation of the people in the Two Areas and of
the SPLA-N soldiers. Negotiations should begin with a cessation of
hostilities between SAF and the SPLA-N that allows opening
humanitarian corridors ahead of the rainy season to support the
displaced Sudanese citizens in need. The Parties should then enforce
the PCA ruling they have already accepted, for the socio-economic
development of the area, while they enter negotiations on the future
relations between Sudan and South Sudan, in its economic and social
aspects and that should trigger a solution on Abyei. The CPA did not
solve some of the causes of the second civil war but provided a good
base to do so; the cost of peace is still cheaper than the cost of
war.
Benedetta De Alessi is a PhD candidate at the School for Oriental and
African Studies, London on the transformation of the SPLM/SPLA in the
context of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
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