Africa and the Financial Crisis: insulated no longer – By Desné Masie


June 11, 2012





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Christine Lagarde cares about Niger, but solving the Eurozone crisis
would be more useful to Niger than such public displays of compassion.

The 2008 Financial crisis and the attendant Eurozone crisis are
reshaping the future of global finance. But what are the implications
of this for Africans?

Why have financial institutions rushed to the aid of Greece, yet
African countries such as Malawi been forced to plead for support from
the IMF, as Magnus Taylor here writes? Will African countries be
neglected and vulnerable now that the crisis turns global?

Insulated, at first

Initially, Africa suffered as a direct result of the 2008 crisis.
Sectors such as mining, tourism and manufacturing saw decline, as did
flows of foreign direct investment. However, the African Development
Bank (AFDB) argues that the continent’s banking sector was insulated
due to strict exchange control regulation and the existence of very
few of the off-balance-sheet assets that caused the crisis (more on
these later). There was though evidence of contagion in declining
stock values and capital outflows, and pricing and access problems for
international loans and sovereign debts. The AFDB recommended that
African countries pursue growth over crisis response strategies,
persevere with financial market reform, and rebalance sources of
global and domestic income in favour of disengaging from the global
economy.  Developed economies were asked to honour the pledges made to
assist Africa by mobilising capital and the purchase of its exports.

African economies rebounded in 2009 with the continent experiencing
some of the highest global growth and investment return rates, in part
due to the arrival of speculative capital in search of the next hot
destination. However, such statistics are controversial as data from
the continent is still uneven in quality (despite improvements).

Africa, however, remains a continent dependent on external players for
the source of its growth, and so remains increasingly vulnerable to
the vagaries of an interconnected global financial system. These are,
at present, characterised by falling commodity prices, slowing
capital, schizophrenic hot money flows, and exchange rate volatility.
Not a good mix.

The outlook for Africa has therefore worsened since the crisis spilled
over into EU Sovereign Debt Markets in 2011. Human development and
poverty reduction data show deterioration, as developed countries have
failed to come up with the amounts pledged at Gleneagles in 2005.
Though the World Bank committed $11.5bn in 2010 to help African
economies compensate for the effects of the crisis, economic growth
has generally slowed (on average from 5 to 3.4 percent.) Political and
environmental factors such as the Arab Spring in North Africa, and the
recent food insecurity in East Africa, may account for some of this
decline, but the standard macroeconomic pressures cited above remain
important.

Everything’s connected

So, how does global macroeconomics affect African countries in
practice? It is worth looking over the architecture of the financial
system and the origin of the crisis to understand how this contagion
works.

The modern financial system and its capital flows are interconnected
across geographical and temporal boundaries, and this means small,
open economies are particularly vulnerable. The crisis has therefore
affected African countries due to the symbiotic nature of global trade
and capital flows. Current account deficits in balance of payments can
result in full-scale currency crises such as those witnessed in Asia
in 1997-1998 and the Russian default of 1998. This poses a danger not
only for such troubled countries, but also for their creditors and
asset-owners.

The financial crisis of 2007 to 2012 therefore has the potential to
affect African countries, despite having originated in the sale of
complex financial assets called credit derivatives. These derivatives
were essentially low-quality mortgages dressed up as high-quality
assets that were sold on, promising regular and reasonable rates of
interests, whilst discharging the risk by spreading it between banks.
The troubles began when the risky consumers defaulted on their home
loans, the banks then had to write down the losses related to the
credit derivative structures they had bought from each other. The
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 proved to be the
precipitating event of the banking crisis. The financial system
depends on the health of the banking system, so the crisis soon became
a global economic one as the interconnectivity of the banking system
spread the contagion throughout the world.

As if the financial crisis was not painful enough, the related EU
sovereign-debt crisis is potentially even more dangerous. The
prospective outcomes of a full-blown Greek currency crisis are
frightening because it forms part of the political and monetary union
of the Eurozone.  This affects all countries in the global market in
unexpected and serious ways.

The Greek crisis has revealed the illusion of democracy in the
Eurozone, with major decisions of sovereign states being deferred to
Brussels and Germany. As South African commentator Barney Mthombothi
here notes, Africans should beware the perils of political and
economic union, and the impact of not living within one’s means.

Africans contemplating the Greek crisis should also resist the
temptation of schadenfreude as we see the Portuguese return, cap in
hand, to a blinged up Luanda, and postcolonial relations shift with
the resurgent role of China in Africa. Chinese and other BRICS’ growth
rates have also slowed, and rather problematically, the amount of
euros held in reserve by the Chinese remains undisclosed. Even though
Africa is relatively disembedded from global capital markets, with the
exception of Johannesburg’s powerful and sophisticated stock exchange,
Africa is particularly vulnerable to aberrations in the global capital
market. We may yet discover that a Rising Africa was dangerously
dependent on richer countries being able to afford our abundant raw
materials.

Bail me out?

Countries that need to can borrow money either by issuing sovereign
bonds in the market or, if they happen (like Malawi) to be broke, by
applying for direct aid from a financial institution such as the IMF
or World Bank. Either way, these loans need to be paid back, and often
with conditionalities. Greece has, to date, been assisted with two
bail-outs in order to avoid a formal default on its debts, with
austerity plans imposed as a condition. The austerity conditions have
been unpopular with its citizens. The wisdom of such bail-outs has
been questioned by Greece’s more economically robust neighbours
(required to foot the bill), and also by Africans who have wondered
why the IMF’s resources should be so readily deployed in a relatively
wealthy country. What about us?

While the situation in Malawi certainly deserves empathy and attention
it is not a comparable international problem with comparable
international consequences. If Lehman Brothers proved too big to fail,
an EU state also fits these criteria. The Malawian bailout at $157m is
 also pocket change in comparison to Greece’s aid of  over $200bn and
the several hundreds of billions of dollars that have been extended in
the US, UK and Eurozone.

IMF chief Christine Lagarde says she feels sorrier for poor Africans
in Niger, than for the Greeks who must now pay up. She will have to
think of a better justification than that for the road the fund has
set Europe on. The situation it is now in remains a lose-lose one for
Africans: austerity has, and will continue to, slow growth and
restrict capital. Yet, abandoning the medicine of austerity would not
provide a solution to the problems of European economies. It is
extraordinarily difficult to say which strategy African economies
should pursue in the current environment. The world waits on Europe
with baited breath, hoping other markets will not be taken down with
it, an event which could result in a global financial market meltdown.
Unfortunately for us, everything (including Africa) is now connected.

Desné Masie is a journalist and academic. She is a former senior
editor for the Financial Mail in South Africa, and is currently
studying towards a PhD in finance at the University of Edinburgh
Business School.

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