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From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, Jul 29, 2012 at 2:37 AM
Subject: Jeffrey Gettleman's "War Against the Nuba": What does not appear
To: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>


Jeffrey Gettleman's "War Against the Nuba": What does not appear



Eric Reeves, July 28, 2012

http://www.sudanreeves.org/?p=3359



New York Times East Africa correspondent Jeffrey Gettleman recently
published in the New York Review of Books an essay that attempts to
give an overview of the crises in the Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan)
and elsewhere in Sudan and South Sudan ("War Against the Nuba," The
New York Review of Books, August 16, 2012).  Gettleman's account of
the Nuba has much to commend it, and his reporting on greater Sudan
has frequently been distinguished by courage and resourcefulness; here
he helps create a vivid picture of the Khartoum regime's particularly
vicious campaign of human destruction.  Even so, there are serious
errors and shortcomings in his present account.



First, the degree to which South Sudan is providing material support
to the rebels in the Nuba is a matter of much dispute.  Accounts of
what has moved north vary but they do not include the "rockets and
tanks" that Gettleman refers to (far and away the most authoritative
source on this and other arms-related issue in South Sudan and the
Nuba Mountains is Small Arms Survey [Geneva]). The rebels, formerly
part of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, already had very
substantial arms and heavy weapons of their own following the civil
war (1983-2005); and the rebels' relentless mauling of Khartoum's
regular forces over the past year has produced an abundance of
captured weapons and ammunition.  Moreover, Gettleman's suggestion
that war in the Nuba may be directed from Juba (capital of South
Sudan) is preposterous: anyone who knows Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, former
governor of the Nuba and a superbly skilled military leader,
understands that he needs no guidance from Juba.  And anyone who has
traveled among the Nuba people can be in no doubt about the ferocity
of their determination to defend their lands and escape Khartoum's
tyranny.



Gettleman suggests that Khartoum's bombing of South Sudan began in
June 2011; in fact, the regime has bombed the territory of South Sudan
continuously since November 2010, and has targeted all five border
states in the South (altogether there have been some 70 confirmed
attacks on civilians since November 2010—along more than 1,300 miles
of international border).  This is important because Gettleman also
suggests that the South attacked the Heglig oilfield in a disputed
border region in response to the "start" of Khartoum's bombings in
spring 2012.  No doubt these bombings—again mainly targeting
civilians—were a factor, but the real reason for the attack was that
Southern forces, in a Southern base (Tishwin, Unity State), had twice
been assaulted by Khartoum's ground forces based near Heglig. The
attack was meant to forestall further military incursions from
Heglig—a response, not an offensive, a fact established
authoritatively by UN observers on the ground in the region.



What has also been established definitively by Small Arms Survey is
that Khartoum arms and supports renegade militia groups in the South,
military forces with no meaningful political agenda but rather a
mandate to create civilian chaos and destruction, tasks which have
been undertaken with brutal determination and success.  And yet when
Gettleman briefly mentions these proxy forces serving Khartoum, his
account is peculiarly partial: "the south has its hands full with
ethnic militias that have killed thousands of people in the past
couple of years, laying bare the weakness of its ethnically divided
security forces."  But perhaps Gettleman is referring not to
Khartoum's militia proxies but rather the ethnic violence in Jonglei
State of this past year, which indeed involved the "White Army" of the
Nuer ethnic group in attacks on the Murle ethnic group.  Either way,
it's dismaying that his account is so incomplete.



In speaking about U.S. policy toward Khartoum Gettleman says that most
"Western experts on Sudan" think that lifting sanctions is long
overdue.  We evidently speak to different experts, because my
experience is quite the opposite, especially among Sudanese
themselves.  Moreover, Khartoum's cooperation on counter-terrorism—the
ostensible reason for lifting sanctions—is a matter of considerable
controversy.  Gettleman claims that "Sudanese security forces [have]
cooperated closely with the U.S. after the September 11 attacks." Many
dispute this, including Russ Feingold, former chair of the Africa
Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a member of
the Senate Intelligence Committee, who offered a frank, highly
informed insider's view:



"I take serious issue with the way the report [on international
terrorism by the U.S. State Department] overstates the level of
cooperation in our counterterrorism relationship with Sudan, a nation
which the US classifies as a state sponsor of terrorism. A more
accurate assessment is important not only for effectively countering
terrorism in the region, but as part of a review of our overall policy
toward Sudan." (May 2009)



Notably, Khartoum continues to support Hamas and regularly receives
senior Hamas officials (Hamas remains on the U.S list of terrorist
organizations).  Moreover, Osama bin Laden was not "briefly in Sudan":
he was there from 1992 (not 1993 as Gettleman reports) to 1996, and
had invested a great deal of money in the Sudanese economy, especially
construction and banking, before he moved to Afghanistan. He and
al-Qaeda subsequently retained close ties with the regime. His years
in Khartoum are those in which many students of al-Qaeda believe the
organization came to fruition.



Just as troublingly, Gettleman recapitulates in his account the error
of U.S. diplomacy in late 2010 and 2011: he downplays—indeed,
incredibly, does not even mention—the significance of the Abyei
"self-determination referendum," guaranteed by the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and deliberately aborted by Khartoum.  This was the episode
that set the stage for the violence Gettleman chronicles.  Given the
importance of Abyei for the people of the South, its deep cultural and
historical significance, it was a disastrous decision by the Obama
administration to marginalize the self-determination referendum.  At
the behest of former special envoy for Sudan (Major-General) Scott
Gration, senior Obama administration officials expediently urged the
South to accept a further "compromise" on Abyei's borders when in fact
the South had already compromised twice, once in a "final and binding"
ruling by Permanent Court of Arbitration (2009). The refusal to push
for fulfillment of the terms of the CPA and its Abyei Protocol was a
formula for renewed border conflict.  This much was clear long before
Gettleman was handed a document in May 2011 about the plans for an
attack on the Nuba.



But the largest point about lifting sanctions, whatever the original
reason for their imposition, is that such action would be morally and
diplomatically myopic while the targeted regime continues an
extermination campaign in both the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.
Moreover, a relentless "genocide by attrition" continues in Darfur,
where Darfuris on the ground convey a grim picture of widespread
insecurity, ethnically-targeted rape, murder, land appropriation, and
the steady attenuation of humanitarian reach and capacity—all at the
behest of Khartoum.



Responsibility for the crises in the Nuba and elsewhere in Sudan
cannot be equally apportioned to Juba and Khartoum in some perverse
sort of "moral equivalence"—the default position of the Obama
administration.  Only one party is guilty of serial and ongoing
genocide, and that party must be held accountable.  Reading
Gettleman's account, I come away with the disturbing conclusion that
he believes—with current special envoy Princeton Lyman—that the brutal
men who dominate the Khartoum regime can be reasonable diplomatic
actors, and that Sudan advocacy efforts, especially in the U.S., have
got in the way of diplomatic progress toward peace.  Exactly the
opposite is true: Khartoum has engaged as much as it has only because
of pressure that prevents a total capitulation to expediency on the
part of the Obama administration.  Gettleman is explicit in his claim
that advocacy is part of the problem rather than the solution when it
comes to dealing with Khartoum:



"[The U.S. Congress and Sudan advocacy efforts] have succeeded in so
thoroughly vilifying the Khartoum government for its atrocities in
Darfur and now in the Nuba Mountains that the Obama administration’s
hands are essentially tied. But if some way had been found to work
around Congress and give some reward to the Sudanese government for
its acceptance of South Sudan after the referendum, perhaps Bashir and
those close to him would have been more willing to compromise."



This is simply astonishing.  Evidently Gettleman believes that a
robust civil society response to Khartoum's penchant for genocidal
counter-insurgency campaigns "ties the hands of the Obama
administration."  A response other than "vilification" is judged
appropriate even when many hundreds of thousands of people have been
killed and displaced by recent, deliberate policies on the part of
Khartoum—and that we can compromise with a regime that at this very
moment is denying all humanitarian access to many more hundreds of
thousands of starving people in the Nuba and Blue Nile.  Moreover, in
the last past fourteen months Khartoum's military actions have forced
more than 200,000 civilians to flee to South Sudan (Upper Nile and
Unity State)—this in addition to the more than 100,000 Dinka Ngok of
Abyei who were forced to flee before Khartoum's military seizure of
the region in May 2011.  It was the expedient, one might say
"compromising" response to this last assault that gave Khartoum the
signal that it could proceed with plans for the Nuba and Blue Nile.



If dealing with Khartoum means ignoring all this, if securing
"compromise" from al-Bashir and the military hardliners who now are
clearly in charge of policy means acquiescing in such ghastly
realities, then our Sudan policy will have become fully bankrupt.



Gettleman's suggests at one point that with many international eyes
focused on one of various Sudan's crises, war along the border can be
forestalled ("Rarely does a problem become a crisis when there are so
many eyes on it.").  This seems historically naïve in the extreme,
given not only recent events in the Nuba and Blue Nile but this
regime's relentless militarism over the past 23 years.  As has long
been clear for those who would only look honestly, until there is
regime change in Khartoum, the agony of greater Sudan will continue.



[Eric Reeves is author of the forthcoming Compromising with Evil: An
archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 – 2012]



--

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA  01063

413-585-3326
[email protected]

Website: www.sudanreeves.org
Skype: ReevesSudan
Twitter: @SudanReeves



May 8, 2012  interview with General Abdel Aziz Adam Al-Hilu, chairman
of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-North),
discussing the ambitions of current rebellion in the Nuba Mountains
and elsewhere in Sudan:

How will this end?



"We are working for regime change, for complete transformation, for
writing a new constitution, a democratic constitution that recognizes
diversity, that accepts the liberal values of justice, equality,
individualism. We want to achieve lasting peace and justice in this
country. Some may say we are not qualified to reach this but I think
it is possible."

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