---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: John Ashworth <[email protected]> Date: Sun, Jul 29, 2012 at 6:51 PM Subject: [sudan-john-ashworth] Bleak prospects for Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile To: Group <[email protected]>
1. Bleak prospects for Sudan’s talks on S. Kordofan and blue Nile July 29, 2012 (KHARTOUM) — Indirect negotiations between Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement –North (SPLM-N) might fail at any time as the two parties continue to trade accusations over their commitment to end the one-year political and humanitarian crisis. In implementation of an African Union road map and a UN resolution 2046, the mediators convened delegations from the government and the SPLM-N rebels to engage indirect talks over humanitarian access and political talks in Addis Ababa. The SPLM-N rebels who keep sending reassuring signs to their allies of Darfur rebel groups denied political negotiations with Khartoum saying they are in Addis Ababa for consultations with the mediators. On the humanitarian track, the government delegation rejected SPLM-N’s demand to be involved in the humanitarian operation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile even, if it is conducted in the rebel held areas. The government accuses the rebel group of being interested in the food to feed its fighters. Speaking to Sudan Tribune from Addis Ababa, a Sudanese government official who declined to be identified said the indirect talks between the two delegation might collapse at any time due to the wide divergence in view and continued accusations between the two sides. The head of Sudanese government delegation Kamal Obeid released Saturday a strong statement criticising press statements by the SPLM-N secretary general Yasir Arman who denied the existence of political talks. Kamal also refuted a statement by Arman who said that the government is not serious to end the humanitarian crisis because it wants to links the two tracks. The SPLM-N said Khartoum refuses the implementation of the tripartite operation because it wants a political agreement before. The head of the Sudanese delegation in his long communiqué said Arman’s statements are "full of fallacies, contradictions and misrepresentation of information aiming only to mislead domestic and global public opinion." The Sudanese delegation told the rebels it refuses they participation in the humanitarian operation because they are in a state of war with the sovereign government. Kamal said the rebel group want to get the humanitarian aid to feed its troops who are no longer receive any provisions and supplies. He added that it is the SPLM-N which is not serious about peace and safety of civilians. UN Secretary General special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, Haile Menkerios, stated two day that the humanitarian talks are suspended by the mediators as there is strong difference between the two parties. Menkerios added they prefer for the moment to focus of the political track and then resume the humanitarian talks when some progress are achieved. The sources said the Sudanese negotiating team which submitted its proposals to the mediation on Saturday, refused any discussion over power sharing or wealth sharing. Khartoum position paper also demanded the rebel group to disarm its fighters and to compete through an electoral process for any political participation. Sudanese president Omer al-Bashir relieved Malik Agar, SPLM-N chairman, from his position as governor of Blue Nile state. He was the only governor, not affiliated to the ruling National Congress Party to be elected during April 2010 elections. SPLM-N says he should be reinstated in his position. Arab League representative in the humanitarian talks Sudan Salah Halimah underscored the need for a speedy agreement on the implementation of the tripartite initiative stressing that the situation on the ground does not permit further delay. In Khartoum, a group of Sudanese clerics denounced, during the sermon of last Friday prayer the government for negotiating with the SPLM-N, terming the talks as "humiliation". They also described the SPLM-N leader as "traitors and agents". The preachers pointed out that SPLM-N leaders are hostile to Islamic Sharia law, and want to spread the secularism in the country. The Clerics further said the government has completely surrendered to the USA whenit accepted the resolution 2046 which "considers 11 Sudanese locations as deputed areas". They further said the government is negotiating with a foreign political party implementing South Sudan’s agenda and takes instructions from President Salva Kiir, US administration and Israel. The radical Islamist groups who demand the government to adopt an Islamic constitution, consider any rapprochement with the SPLM-N as setback in their efforts for the Islamic state. They supported the separation of South Sudan because it was seen as obstacle to their project. (ST) http://www.sudantribune.com/Bleak-prospects-for-Sudan-s-talks,43390 END1 2. Jeffrey Gettleman's "War Against the Nuba": What does not appear Eric Reeves, July 28, 2012 New York Times East Africa correspondent Jeffrey Gettleman recently published in the New York Review of Books an essay that attempts to give an overview of the crises in the Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan) and elsewhere in Sudan and South Sudan ("War Against the Nuba," The New York Review of Books, August 16, 2012). Gettleman's account of the Nuba has much to commend it, and his reporting on greater Sudan has frequently been distinguished by courage and resourcefulness; here he helps create a vivid picture of the Khartoum regime's particularly vicious campaign of human destruction. Even so, there are serious errors and shortcomings in his present account. First, the degree to which South Sudan is providing material support to the rebels in the Nuba is a matter of much dispute. Accounts of what has moved north vary but they do not include the "rockets and tanks" that Gettleman refers to (far and away the most authoritative source on this and other arms-related issue in South Sudan and the Nuba Mountains is Small Arms Survey [Geneva]). The rebels, formerly part of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, already had very substantial arms and heavy weapons of their own following the civil war (1983-2005); and the rebels' relentless mauling of Khartoum's regular forces over the past year has produced an abundance of captured weapons and ammunition. Moreover, Gettleman's suggestion that war in the Nuba may be directed from Juba (capital of South Sudan) is preposterous: anyone who knows Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, former governor of the Nuba and a superbly skilled military leader, understands that he needs no guidance from Juba. And anyone who has traveled among the Nuba people can be in no doubt about the ferocity of their determination to defend their lands and escape Khartoum's tyranny. Gettleman suggests that Khartoum's bombing of South Sudan began in June 2011; in fact, the regime has bombed the territory of South Sudan continuously since November 2010, and has targeted all five border states in the South (altogether there have been some 70 confirmed attacks on civilians since November 2010—along more than 1,300 miles of international border). This is important because Gettleman also suggests that the South attacked the Heglig oilfield in a disputed border region in response to the "start" of Khartoum's bombings in spring 2012. No doubt these bombings—again mainly targeting civilians—were a factor, but the real reason for the attack was that Southern forces, in a Southern base (Tishwin, Unity State), had twice been assaulted by Khartoum's ground forces based near Heglig. The attack was meant to forestall further military incursions from Heglig—a response, not an offensive, a fact established authoritatively by UN observers on the ground in the region. What has also been established definitively by Small Arms Survey is that Khartoum arms and supports renegade militia groups in the South, military forces with no meaningful political agenda but rather a mandate to create civilian chaos and destruction, tasks which have been undertaken with brutal determination and success. And yet when Gettleman briefly mentions these proxy forces serving Khartoum, his account is peculiarly partial: "the south has its hands full with ethnic militias that have killed thousands of people in the past couple of years, laying bare the weakness of its ethnically divided security forces." But perhaps Gettleman is referring not to Khartoum's militia proxies but rather the ethnic violence in Jonglei State of this past year, which indeed involved the "White Army" of the Nuer ethnic group in attacks on the Murle ethnic group. Either way, it's dismaying that his account is so incomplete. In speaking about U.S. policy toward Khartoum Gettleman says that most "Western experts on Sudan" think that lifting sanctions is long overdue. We evidently speak to different experts, because my experience is quite the opposite, especially among Sudanese themselves. Moreover, Khartoum's cooperation on counter-terrorism—the ostensible reason for lifting sanctions—is a matter of considerable controversy. Gettleman claims that "Sudanese security forces [have] cooperated closely with the U.S. after the September 11 attacks." Many dispute this, including Russ Feingold, former chair of the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who offered a frank, highly informed insider's view: "I take serious issue with the way the report [on international terrorism by the U.S. State Department] overstates the level of cooperation in our counterterrorism relationship with Sudan, a nation which the US classifies as a state sponsor of terrorism. A more accurate assessment is important not only for effectively countering terrorism in the region, but as part of a review of our overall policy toward Sudan." (May 2009) Notably, Khartoum continues to support Hamas and regularly receives senior Hamas officials (Hamas remains on the U.S list of terrorist organizations). Moreover, Osama bin Laden was not "briefly in Sudan": he was there from 1992 (not 1993 as Gettleman reports) to 1996, and had invested a great deal of money in the Sudanese economy, especially construction and banking, before he moved to Afghanistan. He and al-Qaeda subsequently retained close ties with the regime. His years in Khartoum are those in which many students of al-Qaeda believe the organization came to fruition. Just as troublingly, Gettleman recapitulates in his account the error of U.S. diplomacy in late 2010 and 2011: he downplays—indeed, incredibly, does not even mention—the significance of the Abyei "self-determination referendum," guaranteed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and deliberately aborted by Khartoum. This was the episode that set the stage for the violence Gettleman chronicles. Given the importance of Abyei for the people of the South, its deep cultural and historical significance, it was a disastrous decision by the Obama administration to marginalize the self-determination referendum. At the behest of former special envoy for Sudan (Major-General) Scott Gration, senior Obama administration officials expediently urged the South to accept a further "compromise" on Abyei's borders when in fact the South had already compromised twice, once in a "final and binding" ruling by Permanent Court of Arbitration (2009). The refusal to push for fulfillment of the terms of the CPA and its Abyei Protocol was a formula for renewed border conflict. This much was clear long before Gettleman was handed a document in May 2011 about the plans for an attack on the Nuba. But the largest point about lifting sanctions, whatever the original reason for their imposition, is that such action would be morally and diplomatically myopic while the targeted regime continues an extermination campaign in both the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. Moreover, a relentless "genocide by attrition" continues in Darfur, where Darfuris on the ground convey a grim picture of widespread insecurity, ethnically-targeted rape, murder, land appropriation, and the steady attenuation of humanitarian reach and capacity—all at the behest of Khartoum. Responsibility for the crises in the Nuba and elsewhere in Sudan cannot be equally apportioned to Juba and Khartoum in some perverse sort of "moral equivalence"—the default position of the Obama administration. Only one party is guilty of serial and ongoing genocide, and that party must be held accountable. Reading Gettleman's account, I come away with the disturbing conclusion that he believes—with current special envoy Princeton Lyman—that the brutal men who dominate the Khartoum regime can be reasonable diplomatic actors, and that Sudan advocacy efforts, especially in the U.S., have got in the way of diplomatic progress toward peace. Exactly the opposite is true: Khartoum has engaged as much as it has only because of pressure that prevents a total capitulation to expediency on the part of the Obama administration. Gettleman is explicit in his claim that advocacy is part of the problem rather than the solution when it comes to dealing with Khartoum: "[The U.S. Congress and Sudan advocacy efforts] have succeeded in so thoroughly vilifying the Khartoum government for its atrocities in Darfur and now in the Nuba Mountains that the Obama administration’s hands are essentially tied. But if some way had been found to work around Congress and give some reward to the Sudanese government for its acceptance of South Sudan after the referendum, perhaps Bashir and those close to him would have been more willing to compromise." This is simply astonishing. Evidently Gettleman believes that a robust civil society response to Khartoum's penchant for genocidal counter-insurgency campaigns "ties the hands of the Obama administration." A response other than "vilification" is judged appropriate even when many hundreds of thousands of people have been killed and displaced by recent, deliberate policies on the part of Khartoum—and that we can compromise with a regime that at this very moment is denying all humanitarian access to many more hundreds of thousands of starving people in the Nuba and Blue Nile. Moreover, in the last past fourteen months Khartoum's military actions have forced more than 200,000 civilians to flee to South Sudan (Upper Nile and Unity State)—this in addition to the more than 100,000 Dinka Ngok of Abyei who were forced to flee before Khartoum's military seizure of the region in May 2011. It was the expedient, one might say "compromising" response to this last assault that gave Khartoum the signal that it could proceed with plans for the Nuba and Blue Nile. If dealing with Khartoum means ignoring all this, if securing "compromise" from al-Bashir and the military hardliners who now are clearly in charge of policy means acquiescing in such ghastly realities, then our Sudan policy will have become fully bankrupt. Gettleman's suggests at one point that with many international eyes focused on one of various Sudan's crises, war along the border can be forestalled ("Rarely does a problem become a crisis when there are so many eyes on it."). This seems historically naïve in the extreme, given not only recent events in the Nuba and Blue Nile but this regime's relentless militarism over the past 23 years. As has long been clear for those who would only look honestly, until there is regime change in Khartoum, the agony of greater Sudan will continue. [Eric Reeves is author of the forthcoming Compromising with Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 – 2012] http://www.sudanreeves.org/?p=3359 END2 3. Security: UNHCR moves 4,000 refugees away from South Sudanese camp Pana 28/07/2012 The UN refugee agency has moved some 4,000 refugees from the waterlogged and overcrowded Jammam refugee camp in South Sudan's Upper Nile state to a site some 50 kilometres away. The new site is already nearing its maximum capacity, the UN refugee agency said in a news dispatch Thursday. Aid agencies decided it was best to move most refugees from Jammam because of fears for their welfare amid worsening living conditions and a lack of potable water. Torrential rain and several massive influxes had exacerbated the dire situation. The agency is also set to transport a further 15,000 refugees from Jammam this week to the newly-established Gendrassa camp, some 50kms away. More contingency sites have been identified in Maban County. Several thousand people are believed to be on their way to the border from Sudan's Blue Nile state. Meanwhile, with Yusuf Batil reaching its maximum capacity of 34,500 refugees, water supply and hygiene promotion need to be stepped up. More water distribution points are being established to increase daily water supply, which currently stands at about 13 litres per person per day. In the new Gendrassa camp, two boreholes have been sunk and will initially be able to provide enough water for up to 10,000 people at 15 litres per day, per person. A third borehole is being sunk. Health is also a big issue. 'We are continually concerned about the incidence of diseases, particularly bloody diarrhoea, but also malaria and respiratory tract infections in the camps,' UNHCR's chief spokesperson, Melissa Fleming, said. Aid agencies are now expanding medical services as well as public health campaigns to ensure improved hygienic standards and early detection of disease in camps. Most of the recent arrivals reach the camps exhausted and weak. Malnutrition and mortality rates among children are cause for concern. Wider nutrition programmes are being set up in all camps and more oral rehydration points are being established. Cases of diarrhoea are also being closely monitored with samples regularly sent for laboratory testing. So far in July, some 400 cases of malaria have been reported in health centres in Doro and Yusuf Batil camps. UNHCR and others are renewing the distribution of insecticide-treated nets and key public areas are being sprayed. Meanwhile, the number of refugees arriving in the nearby Unity state has dropped from 800 refugees per day in June to 250 people per day in July. Some 55,000 refugees still in Yida camp – close to the border – will remain there for the coming months as the area has been cut off by flooding. Airlifts have now become the only viable means of access to the refugee site. 'The hygiene and health situation in Yida remain of serious concern and humanitarian partners are deploying teams around the camp to disseminate hygiene and health messages and identify cases for immediate medical attention,' Fleming said, adding that a mortality survey was being conducted. Upper Nile state is currently home to more than 100,000 refugees while Unity hosts nearly 60,000. A verification exercise to ascertain the number of refugees is underway and will likely lead to adjustments to the estimates of the refugee population in the area. http://www.afriquejet.com/security-unhcr-moves-4000-refugees-away-from-south-sudanese-camp-2012072842411.html END3 ______________________ John Ashworth Sudan, South Sudan Advisor [email protected] +254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile) +211 919 695 362 (South Sudan mobile) +27 82 050 1235 (South Africa mobile) +44 750 304 1790 (UK/international) +88 216 4334 0735 (Thuraya satphone) PO Box 52002 - 00200, Nairobi, Kenya This is a personal e-mail address and the contents do not necessarily reflect the views of any organisation -- -- The content of this message does not necessarily reflect John Ashworth's views. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, John Ashworth is not the author of the content and the source is always cited. You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "sudan-john-ashworth" group. 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