New Nationalism and Nation healing – the case of South Sudan by John Ashworth
 April 20th, 2012

Based on a public lecture presented on 30th March 2012 at Home and
Away, Juba, South Sudan, by John Ashworth, under the auspices of
Justice Africa in partnership with Centre for Peace and Development
Studies, University of Juba, the South Sudan Human Rights Commission
and the Civil Society[i]



Introduction

My main claim to fame is that I have been in Sudan and South Sudan a
long time – 29 years, working with churches. For most of that time, my
line managers have been South Sudanese. I have worked as part of local
organisations, not worked with them as partners. This has given me
some fairly unique insights. I will probably apply for South Sudanese
citizenship when the time is ripe, so I have a personal interest in
the topic assigned to me.

Nationalism is connected with nation-building, not simply state
building. I will concentrate on the former and will not be looking at
good governance, development, infrastructure, and many of the other
important issues which are essential for forming a new state.



National identity, not ethnic identity

A new state needs a national identity. At one level, the Constitution
sets the national identity. New constitutions often come out of
particular historical and political circumstances, and the nation they
define is based on that context. Our new Permanent Constitution will
probably define South Sudan as a decentralised state, for example. It
will also have a strong human rights component, in response to decades
of oppression.

But it is not only what is contained in the Constitution which defines
a nation; it is also the manner in which the Constitution is produced.
If the nation is going to be one in which people participate in
governance, then it is essential that they are able to participate
fully in the development of their Constitution. Most constitutions
begin with the words, “We, the people…” Such a Constitution must be
owned by the people.

South Sudan must find its national identity, and this should be an
identity based on citizenship, not ethnicity. President Salva Kiir has
said, “You have no tribe or home; your tribe and home are South
Sudan”. The Catholic bishops of South Sudan have called for “One
nation out of every tribe, tongue and people”. Of course there is
nothing wrong with tribes. We all need to be rooted somewhere, proud
of our language, culture, heritage and traditions. But at a national
level there must be a sense of “I am South Sudanese” before “I am
Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Zande or whatever”. Tanzania would appear to be a
good example of this, where national identity was stressed over and
above tribal identity from the very beginning of its existence as an
independent nation.

For many decades, the identity of South Sudanese has been a negative
one: “not-northerner”, “not-Arab”. This may well have been a useful
uniting factor in a long liberation struggle, but for a newly
independent nation it is inadequate and even dangerous.

Another danger is that the hostility will be transferred, from the
“Arab” to other outsiders, notably people from Kenya, Uganda and other
neighbouring states. Xenophobia appears to have raised its ugly head
earlier in South Sudan than it did in South Africa. Both nations seem
to have forgotten all the assistance they received from their
neighbours during the liberation struggle, and are now targeting their
former friends. Security and immigration officials in South Sudan are
harassing and intimidating aliens; even the word “alien” is a negative
one. We know that these officials are poorly trained and are
themselves traumatised after years of war, but they must be reined in,
and quickly. South Sudan used to have a reputation for hospitality,
openness and friendliness. Is the image of the new nation going to be
one of hostility, xenophobia and isolationism? Just as the new
national identity must move on from “not-Arab”, it must not be allowed
to become “not-East African” (which raises another contradiction, as
South Sudan is applying to join the East African Community and indeed
become East African).

South Sudanese are not “not-anything”; they must articulate a new and
positive identity.



Root causes of conflicts

It may be useful to look at the root causes of the conflicts in the old Sudan.

The first is identity. Sudan was a multi-cultural, multi-religious,
multi-lingual, multi-ethnic country – multi-everything, in fact. But
over a long period one identity grouping, which happened to be “Arab”
and Islamic, dominated. It defined itself as the Sudanese identity,
and at various times oppressed, assimilated, disenfranchised,
marginalised and tried to destroy other identities.

The second is the centre-periphery dynamic. Power, resources and
development were concentrated in a small geographical area and amongst
a small number of ethnic groups in the centre of Sudan. All peripheral
areas were marginalised.

These dynamics led to the wars in Sudan, not only in the South but
also Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and the Eastern Front, and
to tensions even in the far north amongst Nubians. It created
second-class citizens (and some would say third and fourth class too).

The danger of the same dynamics in South Sudan cannot be ruled out. If
there is a perception that any one group, whether ethnic,
geographical, political or whatever, is appropriating to itself not
only power and resources but the very concept of national identity,
then there is a potential for conflict. National identity must be
built on the primacy of citizenship, not any other criteria.



National unity and symbols

The new nation clearly needs unity, and national symbols are one way
to promote this.

We already have some very obvious ones. Dr John Garang de Mabior is
the founding father of the nation, and everybody can unite behind him.
The referendum was also a uniting factor. Even the active rebel groups
who are opposed to the government in Juba agreed to a cease-fire
during the referendum; their desire for a successful referendum
leading to independence was greater than their hatred of the ruling
SPLM. Ironically the act of cutting off the oil supply through the
Republic of Sudan has also proved to be a uniting factor. Throughout
South Sudan it has proved a very popular move, despite the potential
economic hardship. It was a declaration of national sovereignty at a
moment when many felt that Khartoum was still trying to treat the new
nation as if it were a recalcitrant province of Sudan. More universal
symbols such as the flag and national anthem seem to be slower to
really grab the attention of the nation.

There are other symbols which need careful management. As has been
mentioned above, the “common enemy” may have been a useful uniting
factor during wartime, but has now served its purpose. The symbolism
of remembrance of the SPLA, its martyrs and its heroes will remain
with us as their sacrifice must be honoured, but it must be balanced
with remembering all the others who struggled for liberation. The
danger of creating a militaristic and/or a one-party state are real.

And finally, all the victims must be remembered… which leads us to healing.



Healing

So how do we begin to bring healing?

The constitutional review can be a healing process if done properly.
That must include popular participation, dealing with issues which
concern the people. National healing is already in the preamble of the
Transitional Constitution:

We, the People of South Sudan… Dedicated to a genuine national healing
process and the building of trust and confidence in our society
through dialogue…

Terrible things have been done in South Sudan, by South Sudanese to
South Sudanese, during the war. There has been no closure for many
people. They see the perpetrators still benefiting; there is impunity.
There is no sense of justice (or, since the word “justice” is
perceived as somewhat devalued in Africa recently due to the
International Criminal Court, perhaps “fairness” is a better term.).
There has been no compensation for people who have suffered.

Nevertheless, we need to recognise the need for transition. The
concepts of transitional justice and transitional democracy are
gaining acceptance in the world. Kenya and Zimbabwe are both examples
of the latter. Their makeshift coalitions are not perfect by any
means, but they stopped the killing and provided a space for attempts
to resolve the issues peacefully. It will not serve any purpose simply
to start arresting people in South Sudan for their part in the
atrocities. Indeed you could end up arresting most of the adult male
population, including virtually the whole government, as almost nobody
has clean hands in decades of bloody wars. Clumsy premature attempts
could cause a government collapse, which would certainly not bring
peace and stability, nor healing. Indeed old wounds could be reopened
and new ones started in a further cycle of violence.

So we might ask what level of reconciliation do we want? Full-scale
reconciliation, with the implication that all issues have been
satisfactorily resolved? That is certainly an ideal to work towards.
But in the short term, we might need to look at a more limited goal.
Perhaps “the least we can live with without killing each other” would
be worthwhile? If we could stop the hate speech and stereotyping, stop
the cycle of revenge, it could at least present a window of
opportunity for the new nation to begin healing itself. I call it
“transitional reconciliation”. I don’t know if that term has been used
elsewhere; maybe I have just invented it!

Let us look briefly at a false dichotomy which is often presented
between peace and justice. There is a perception that justice is
sometimes being sacrificed in order to bring about peace. But this is
based on a consideration of only one model of justice: retributive
justice. There are also others, including restorative justice.

Retributive justice recognises that a crime has been committed and
concentrates on finding and punishing the guilty party. It is done by
state actors (particularly the police and the courts) and in many ways
it marginalises and disempowers the victims. Restorative justice, on
the other hand, recognises that something has gone wrong and needs to
be put right in a way that benefits the most people and rights the
wrong that was done. It might involve punishment but not necessarily.
Both victim and perpetrator are involved in the process. Relationships
are important in Africa and restorative justice appears to fit well
with African tradition: restoring the relationships which were broken
by the wrong actions.

Let us then look at two different models of reconciliation[ii]: South
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and South Sudan’s People
to People Peace and Reconciliation Process.



Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The first thing my South African friends always tell me is that nobody
should simply copy their TRC. Rather every state should look for its
own model. Timing is very important. Opening old wounds too quickly in
a fragile state may not be helpful. The new South Africa inherited a
well-developed infrastructure, government, civil service, judiciary,
security organs, economy and civil society which formed a good
background to reconciliation; the new South Sudan does not have these.

Participation was one of the keys to the TRC. Those who were voiceless
found a voice, and were listened to. Both victims and perpetrators
told their stories. Truth is important. As well as giving some degree
of closure to those who have suffered and lost relatives, it also
reshapes the old narrative into something new and liberating. The
perpetrators must acknowledge their responsibility, not only as
individuals; institutions also have to admit their culpability. It is
then possible to grant amnesty to those criminals who have cooperated
with the Commission; punishment is not always necessary. However there
are sanctions against those who refuse to cooperate, and some went to
prison.

The TRC process envisaged reparations (a form of compensation) to
those who had suffered, and it is one of the great failures of the
process that reparations never materialised.

Psychological support for the victims also appeared to be lacking.
Although in some cases it was cathartic to speak publicly about the
hidden events of the past, it was also very traumatic, and some of
those who testified had problems afterwards.



People to People Peace and Reconciliation Process

This process, spearheaded by the churches of South Sudan in the late
1990s, used traditional reconciliation mechanisms. The peoples of
South Sudan all have their own traditional mechanisms. They are
widespread, different, eroded by war and guns, but they still exist.

The People to People Process was based on building trust amongst
people, but it must also trust the people’s process. It involves a
great deal of preparation. The people must be ready for
reconciliation; it cannot be imposed from above. These meetings take
time, and may last for many days; many African traditions involve
consensus-building, where the same story is repeated again and again,
with minor changes, until it appears in a form which is agreed by all.
There must be time for everyone to tell truths to each other while the
others listen. Hatred and bitterness are “vomited out” as each side
tells what the other has done to “us”. Gradually it dawns on
participants that this cannot continue, and a peace agreement is
reached.

The follow-up is very important. There will be practical aspects to
the agreement – return of cattle and abductees, regularisation of
marriages, payment of compensation, agreements about borders and land.
Regular follow up meetings are important, to deal with breaches and to
defuse potential tensions.

One of the weaknesses of the People to People Process was that it
depended on the international aid community to provide a peace
dividend; boreholes, schools, clinics, some humanitarian aid,
communications equipment for community policing. Just like the
reparations in South Africa, this never materialised.

All these are national processes, albeit involving individual
citizens. What about something more personal?



Healing of Memories[iii]

Reconciliation implies that there are two parties. What if one of them
does not wish to reconcile, or is simply not around any more? In
European and north American news broadcasts, how often do we hear
victims saying, “I will never be at peace until the perpetrator of
this crime is brought to justice?” In other words, my future peace and
happiness are in the hands of others; I have no control over my life;
I am helpless and disempowered, a perpetual victim. And this form of
“justice” is often indistinguishable from revenge.

How can victims take control of their lives again, especially when
they have no control over states, courts, tribunals and leaders?
“Healing of memories” has been developed by, amongst others, Fr
Michael Lapsley, an Anglican priest who lost both his hands and one
eye in a bomb attack due to his part in the South African
anti-apartheid struggle. It’s about remembering, the suffering being
recognised, honouring the memory — and letting go. It doesn’t depend
on others, because it’s about “me dealing with my stuff, me dealing
with what I have in me because of the journey that I have travelled.”

It’s not always easy or comfortable. “God helped me,” said Fr Michael.
“The safe space was prayer, love and support that gave me the room to,
if you like, spiritually manoeuvre because I realised if I was full of
hatred, bitterness, self pity, desire for revenge, that I would be a
victim forever. They would have failed to kill the body, but they
would have killed the soul and I would be permanently their prisoner.”
Some victims spend their entire life in that prison, not realizing
that only they have the power to release themselves.

One of the great leaders of South Africa, Chief Albert Lutuli, once
said, “Those who think of themselves as victims eventually become the
victimisers of others.” The healing of memories breaks that chain of
violence and victimization.



Trauma healing

All of this is connected with trauma. After five decades of war and
oppression, we have traumatised individuals, traumatised communities
and indeed a traumatised nation. There is a culture of violence.
Behaviour which would be “normal” and even rewarded during war time
(eg a pre-emptive attack on another community) is totally
inappropriate during peace time, when there are other more appropriate
mechanisms, including recourse to the rule of law.

Thus there is a great urgency to begin healing both individuals and
communities. Much of the work on trauma healing has been done in
Europe and north America, where individualism is the norm, and is
based on individual therapy. In South Sudan, like most of Africa,
community is the norm, and trauma healing must take this into account.
Some innovative work has been done in Rwanda and elsewhere on healing
of communities, and of healing individuals in the context of
community.

The same might be said of healing of memories. Is it only an
individual approach, or can it also be done by and in communities?



Who are we as a nation?

Every nation has a national narrative, based on real and mythologised
history. It is expressed through symbols and, consciously or
unconsciously, is a factor in shaping the future.

What are the stories which are told around the camp fire and dining
table, in the cattle camps and farming settlements, in the hotels of
Juba and the tukuls all over South Sudan? What are the stories about
“who we are”? Is it still, “The gun is my mother, my father, my wife,
my food…” or has it changed to a narrative based on positive values,
both traditional and modern, encouraging peace, healing and
reconciliation in the African way? Do our stories promote tribalism
and division, or equal citizenship based on the dignity of every human
being? Which nation do you want to belong to?




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[i]    This paper was produced by the author on 10th April 2012 based
on notes used at the public lecture.


[ii]   At a public meeting in Bor on 3rd April 2012, the Governor of
Jonglei State, Kuol Manyang, appeared to condone impunity by
suggesting that reconciliation processes were a European imposition,
and that South Sudanese in his own state had already reconciled over
the atrocities which followed the 1991 split by simply letting time
take its course. The People to People Peace and Reconciliation Process
is one example that shows how South Sudanese do have indigenous
reconciliation mechanisms. These can be found all over Africa. Another
one which has received some attention due to the Lord’s Resistance
Army is the Acholi mato puti in neighbouring Uganda. These processes
involve active steps towards reconciliation and do not condone
impunity, although the measures which the perpetrators may be required
to take may be more symbolic than punitive.


[iii]   This section on Healing of Memories is a reworking of the
author’s contribution to the booklet 101 Days of Prayer towards a
peaceful referendum in Sudan published by the Sudan Catholic Bishops’
Conference in 2010.

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