Reflections about AU recent decision on Abyei

By Tim Flatman

January 31, 2013 - In continuing to endorse Thabo Mbeki’s proposal to
resolve the status of Abyei, but deciding not to follow through on its
earlier commitment to refer it to the UN Security Council, the African
Union has effectively declared itself, at the Heads of State level,
competent to enforce the proposal and carry out a referendum itself
should the Government of Sudan continue to obfuscate and delay
implementation of its Agreements.

Already GoS’ chief negotiator Idris Abdel-Gadir has bragged about his
confidence that no disputed issues will be referred to the UN Security
Council even if no progress is made by July, claiming the African
Union Peace and Security Council meeting as a victory. The Communique
of the 353rd Peace and Security Council meeting at the level of Heads
of State and Government/Sudan-South Sudan has given Presidents Bashir
and Kiir until the Council meeting in March to continue negotiations.

A typical strategy by the Government of Sudan would be to avoid a
meeting between the Presidents until the deadline is looming, then
raise a new demand which they know will be unacceptable to the Ngok
and/or South Sudan and present the impasse to the international
community as a “neutral” sticking-point requiring further talks. An
alternative strategy would be to link progress on Abyei to progress on
another issue which cannot immediately be resolved.

If this seems a jaundiced view of Sudanese diplomatic strategy, it
should be recalled that this is exactly how GoS behaved in the run-up
to the Council meeting itself. With Prime Minister Meles Zenawi dead
and unable to verify the Ngok claim GoS promised to nominate a Ngok to
the position of speaker in Abyei Legislative Council, and the Mbeki
proposal having depoliticised the issue by giving a final judgement on
the issue of voter eligibility in an upcoming referendum, the South
Sudanese agreed to allow a Misseriya to take the role, in the
interests of pragmatism and demonstrating to Misseriya that their
rights will be respected should the referendum proceed with the
expected result. With this issue resolved, there were no barriers to
confirming Abyei Area Administration immediately. Formal recognition
of Abyei Area Administration would have been a boon to those
organising support for the >20,000 who have already returned to Abyei
town or their villages north of the river Kiir, and to the thousands
in camps in Wau and elsewhere who are waiting for transport to return
immediately. However, the Sudanese Government chalked the concession
up as a victory, and proceeded to make a further demand (of further
Misseriya representation) that had no basis in any agreement
previously signed, in order to prevent Abyei Area Administration from
being confirmed and hold the entire process up.

The Communique of the 353rd Council meeting stops short of calling
Sudan out by name, but it does condemn this kind of behaviour. It
emphasises its disappointment at the failure to implement fully the 20
June 2011 Temporary Arrangements Agreement in all its aspects. This is
significant because South Sudan has, with the acceptance of an NCP
nominee to the position of Speaker on Abyei Legislative Council,
fulfilled all its commitments under that agreement. Sudan has not, the
two most significant aspects being the failure to confirm Abyei Area
Administration and the failure to remove its troops entirely from
Abyei Area. South Sudan is therefore in the admirable and convenient
position of having fulfilled all its commitments and being able to
insist that the other partner does likewise. South Sudanese
negotiators should not sign further agreements on Abyei that impose
further demands on them, or they will lose their high ground and allow
Sudanese negotiators to assert moral equivalence and claim there are
obstacles on both sides once more. Indeed, the Communique of the 353rd
Council meeting reflects this logic, repeatedly stressing the
importance of unconditionally implementing all Agreements signed in
their entirety rather than making new Agreements. In this, the African
Heads of State have clearly sided with South Sudan. The Communique
also, helpfully, condemns the linking of implementation of agreements
already signed to resolving issues of dispute, implicitly calling out
another favourite NCP strategy.

However, the most encouraging aspect of the Communique was the demand
that the Presidents negotiate over the formation of the Abyei Area
Referendum Commission on the basis of the AUHIP 21 September 2012
proposal, a proposal which GoS has of course rejected! This indicates
an assumption, at the Heads of State level that the path set out in
the Mbeki proposal must be followed regardless of the protestations of
the Sudanese Government, and a close eye must be kept on timescales.
The Sudanese Government has two months to find a way of proceeding on
the basis of the Mbeki proposal that is acceptable to them. If they do
not, the African Union must put a Referendum Commission in place
themselves and conduct a referendum. That this is a realistic
possibility is confirmed by informal reports by those present in
Addis. Lest it seems fanciful, we should remember that the proposal
itself contains mechanisms for proceeding if there are seemingly
impassable disputes between the parties, through an Abyei Referendum
Facilitation Panel set up not by the Presidents of Sudan and South
Sudan but by the African Union, and by the African Union reserving the
power to choose the Chair of the Abyei Area Referendum Commission,
with the casting vote on matters of dispute, itself. The Referendum
Commission should start its work with enough time to carry out its
work even if the Government of Sudan decides not to exercise its right
to appoint Commissioners to it.

GoS will, of course, try to paint such a course of action as
“unilateral”. The response will point out that it is simply an attempt
to implement, in the light of GoS’ failings, Agreements which have
already been made in line with the Communique of the 353rd Council
meeting, and invite the Sudanese Government to participate in doing
so.

For its part, the Government of South Sudan must insist that the
October deadline for a referendum is non-negotiable. If the African
Union does not discharge its responsibilities as outlined above, the
community in Abyei is capable of conducting its own referendum and
inviting observers from around the world to monitor it and ensure it
is free and fair. Allies, both state and non-state actors (including
faith-based organisations) should already be considering how they
could respond to such a call, and mobilising training to cover the
eventuality that the “experts” (Carter Centre, etc) do not, in the
light of political pressure, respond to such a call.

In the meantime, the primary duty of Ngok community leadership and
international NGOs is to facilitate the return of those still waiting
for transport back to Abyei, and to support those returnees already
there in rebuilding their community. There have been fine words from
the international community to this end, but in practice the vast
majority of useful work has been done by the community (and especially
the local church) and not by INGOs, an ideal in theory but in practice
hamstrung by lack of resources and co-operation from those in a
position to come alongside and assist.

Tim Flatman can be contacted on his twitter account: @Tim_Flatman


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