Eritrea: Scenarios for Future Transition

Africa Report N°20028 Mar 2013

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Events in the last twelve months indicate growing discontent inside
Eritrea’s tightly controlled regime, as well as deepening political
and social divisions. While the mounting number of incidents suggests
that President Isaias Afwerki’s regime is vulnerable, with increasing
concerns over its ability to stay in power, the country would face
numerous institutional, socio-economic and geopolitical obstacles
during and after any transition. A careful assessment of these, as
well as the role neighbours and the wider international community
could play, is urgently needed to help avoid a violent power struggle
that could prove dangerous for the Horn of Africa and potentially – as
Eritrea is a littoral state – for the Red Sea region.

Isaias’s disappearance from public view for several weeks in April
2012 amid rumours of his illness and death made evident the lack of a
succession plan. In March and May 2012, the Ethiopian army made
incursions, revealing the Eritrean military’s disastrous state.
Subsequently, a number of defections reached media attention: pilots
flying the presidential plane absconded in October, the information
minister (a close ally of the president) vanished in November, and the
national football team requested asylum in December. Meanwhile several
thousand – predominantly young – Eritreans fled every month,
preferring the danger and uncertainty of refugee camps and illegal
migration routes to the hopeless stasis at home. Then, on 21 January
2013, approximately 100 soldiers rebelled in the capital, Asmara,
taking control of the information ministry for a day.

It is difficult to predict what an eventually post-Isaias Eritrea will
look like: after and in spite of 21 years of forceful nation-building,
fault lines, especially of ethnicity, region and religion (Christians
versus Muslims) are still there, some deeper than before. Since the
state lacks any institutional mechanisms for peaceful transition of
power or even a clearly anointed successor, instability is to be
expected, with the corrupt army the likely arbiter of who will rule
next. But even the generals appear split over loyalty toward the
president.

To reduce the risk of instability in Eritrea and its neighbourhood, a
broad coalition of international actors should take precautionary
moves, including immediate and decisive efforts to promote dialogue on
avoidance of internal power struggles and mediation of a peaceful
transition. This could lead to opening of political space and
normalisation, both domestically and internationally. Any opportunity
should be seized to bring Asmara in from the cold. UN-imposed
sanctions (imposed for support of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and other
destabilising activities) should be kept under active review. The
European Union (EU) and U.S. should work with others, such as Qatar
and South Africa, that have better relations with Eritrea’s ruling
elite and could facilitate constructive engagement. Member states of
the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) should
welcome Eritrea back and encourage normalisation of relations.

If, as many believe, formal diplomacy remains blocked, Ethiopia, Sudan
and Djibouti should engage with exiled opposition parties (including
armed ethnic fronts) to encourage proactive engagement with dissidents
in Asmara, promote dialogue and agreement by them not to use force
that could lead to a protracted conflict and have repercussions for
the entire region.

This report examines the regime’s vulnerabilities, maps out six
possible scenarios for a post-Isaias Eritrea and identifies the main
risks and opportunities the country and the region would face.
Concerned Western partners, neighbours and governments with special
relations with Asmara could play a vital role in preventing a major
humanitarian crisis or even the state’s collapse.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To avert chaos and further displacement of populations; bring Eritrea
in from the cold and promote talks with President Isaias Afwerki and
the current leadership

To regional and wider international partners:

1. Accept Eritrea’s request to rejoin the Intergovernmental Agency for
Development (IGAD), and so reactivate regional dialogue as per the
organisation’s mandate.

2. Re-evaluate UN Security Council sanctions on Eritrea in light of
the latest UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea report, so as to
incentivise improvements in Eritrean behaviour.

3. Enhance the European Union (EU) Horn of Africa strategy to promote
regional economic integration and dialogue through the mediation
capacities of the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa,
and include Red Sea security in his mandate.

In the event of a transition

To the U.S., EU and countries with special relations to Eritrea:

4. Coordinate U.S. and EU efforts with countries that have special
relations with Eritrea’s current leadership (Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, Uganda, South Sudan and China).

5. Support a frank assessment of the country’s socio-economic
situation and development needs, including disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration and security sector reform programs, as well as
projects for the reintegration of asylum seekers scattered around the
world.

6. Engage Eritrea’s direct neighbours, with African Union (AU)
leadership, regarding their strategic response if a transition occurs,
and seek to preserve Eritrean national unity.

7. Engage with the diaspora – including refugee youth and opposition
groups – and promote their proactive engagement with an eventual new
government.

8. Promote dialogue with the new leadership and encourage a national
conference to open space for inclusive political developments.

Nairobi/Brussels, 28 March 2013

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