Tsvangirai must form a coalition to have any chance in upcoming
elections – By Simukai Tinhu
June 3, 2013
Morgan Tsvangirai must show humility and form a coalition if he wants
to stand any chance of beating Robert Mugabe.
On Friday the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe ruled that the upcoming
elections must be held by the 31st of July. This development confirms
the suspicions of many that ZANU-PF intends to hold elections
immediately after the expiry of the coalition government (29th June).
This then leaves just a few weeks to carry out political and security
sector reforms necessary for a free and fair election.
Triggered by an application challenging President Mugabe to announce
an election date, the Constitutional Court’s ruling has been
interpreted by opposition groups as yet another trick from the ZANU–PF
political playbook. The allegation is that through this ruling (by a
partisan court) ZANU–PF has effectively declared an election date.
According to the Global Political Agreement (GPA), the election date
should be set by the executive in consultation with coalition
partners. In other words, this development effectively circumvents the
consultative process and gives Mugabe the authority to go ahead and
set a date under the pretext that his choices are constricted by the
court’s ruling.
This development should have come as no surprise to the opposition.
The writing has been on the wall for a while – ZANU–PF has always
insisted that it wants elections sooner rather that later, and those
who follow Zimbabwean politics must have predicted that it was only a
matter of time before President Mugabe’s party found a clandestine way
to achieve that objective. Caught off guard, this ruling should act as
a warning to the opposition that it is wise to plan for elections as
if political reforms are not going to happen, and this means changing
the campaign strategy.
Why Political Reforms are unlikely
Misplaced optimism that political reforms will be instituted before
the elections has been fuelled by the peaceful referendum on the new
constitution held in March this year, and also by a fundamental
misunderstanding of ZANU–PF’s behaviour. By insisting on political
reforms, the opposition and local democracy promotion groups are
seriously misreading what has been President Mugabe’s political plan
since 1980; an unequal level playing field having formed the steel
frame of ZANU–PF’s political strategy since independence.
In its current coalition ZANU–PF, which occupies the executive, has
stalled political reforms over the last four years by successfully
limiting discourse and diverting discussion towards sanctions removal.
It is now inconceivable that reforms will be instituted in the next
few weeks, and for the MDC–T and MDC–N to devise campaign strategies
based on the premise that President Mugabe’s party will acquiesce to
their demands is bad planning.
Moreover, those that have been tasked with ensuring that reforms are
carried out; the regional body of Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and the South African government, do not have the
motivation or a strategy to coerce ZANU–PF into implementing reforms.
For example, SADC is almost always preoccupied with trade and economic
issues, and appears to have little time and inclination for reform nor
does it have a standing army or a sanctions regime that can act as a
coercive threat.
The South African government itself does not have the courage to
confront ZANU–PF. For example, recently, the South African delegation
sent by President Jacob Zuma to monitor the progress of the reforms
was chased out of the country by President Mugabe. It appears that
without pressure from the EU and US, Zimbabwean elections are of
little interest to South Africa, and President Zuma sees no incentive
in pulling opposition and democracy groups out of the fire.
Another cause for concern is that whilst the West was a vocal critic
of President Mugabe’s regime in the last decade, the EU and US in
particular appear to have retreated. It seems the international
community is attempting to avoid playing a heavy–handed role as in the
previous elections where it was seen as overtly promoting opposition
forces and demonising the ZANU-PF.
It is apparent that this time the international community has taken a
hands–off approach on Zimbabwe’s internal politics, allowing the
political process to drift. This policy of rapprochement from the
international community (for example, the lifting of sanctions against
ZANU–PF officials with virtually no political reforms having been
made) has negatively impacted the pressure they can place on ZANU-PF
to make reforms.
How to Defeat ZANU–PF
Populism
Political party strategists should demonstrate an interest in
underlying transitions at a wider level and perhaps more crucially,
how those fundamental undercurrents are affecting political attitudes
in their country. One of them is the increasing nationalistic
attitudes of the young and educated urban populations in Africa.
Buoyed by the ‘Africa rising’ narrative, nationalism is on the rise,
and Zimbabwe is no exception. In the continent’s most recent elections
in Zambia and Kenya, the victors – Michael Sata and Uhuru Kenyatta –
ran sustained anti–western campaigns that drew the support of the
young and educated.
If the opposition wants to succeed, they might as well embrace
nationalism and adopt a position where they argue that they are the
best guarantor of the independence legacy that has been betrayed by
ZANU–PF. In other words, this time around Tsvangirai might need to
wage a more populist, more aggressive campaign that might even be
reminiscent of Mugabe’s tone (though moderated).
Tsvangirai should also attempt to convince some of Mugabe’s softer
supporters that he can secure the gains of the current regime, such as
land reform. This will put ZANU–PF in a defensive mode, and deprive
them of ammunition to attack Tsvangirai as a neo–imperialist agent.
However, the trouble with adopting such a strategy is that it needs
time, and there is precious little of that if elections are indeed to
be held by the 31st July.
Undermining Elite Cohesion
The other pillar that should undergird any opposition movement is
undermining ZANU-PF party unity. Currently, the ageing President
skilfully manages a brittle internal balance of power between various
factions. But maintaining such a balance is extremely difficult and a
great deal of it is done via patronage politics. Undermining elite
cohesion is likely to achieve two objectives. Targeting key
individuals is an effective tactic that not only brings patronage
networks, but the stalwart’s votes, and experience. Second, and at a
psychological level, drawing party stalwarts counters the narrative
that ZANU–PF’s unity is invincible.
Coalition of the Opposition
One realistic campaign strategy remains: a coalition of opposition
forces. The main opposition party (MDC–T) continues to be adamant that
it will win on its own. Tsvangirai’s party seems oblivious to a
mountain of complex of problems it faces; a dwindling support base,
unequal level playing field, circumscribed regional and international
support, a surge in ZANU–PF popularity and also a crowded opposition
space with reportedly 28 eight candidates vying for the Presidency.
MDC–T needs to rein in, be realistic and understand that joining a
coalition should not be considered discretionary.
There are three reasons why the MDC–T should not go it alone:
Historical precedent: the opposition has failed in the previous
elections to get into power despite odds being slightly better than
today. Also, those in favour of a one party strategy are blind to the
fact that no single political party has successfully challenged
ZANU–PF’s stranglehold on Zimbabwean politics since independence.
The coalition will not only change the fundamentals of Zimbabwean
opposition, but also the very terms in which the Zimbabweans think
about and define national politics.
Considering that there is unlikely to be political reform, this
strategy is logical. The greater chance to topple Mugabe is when the
opposition combines its efforts, resources and votes.
Who should join MDC–T?
MDC–T, despite its faults in coalition, remains the anchor of the
opposition and should therefore take a lead in any negotiations.
Building a strong coalition should be limited to MDC–N led by Welshman
Ncube to back Tsvangirai as the presidential candidate. Ncube is a
polarising figure and is perceived as being vocal on behalf of the
voters from Matabeleland and the Midlands regions. But it is
precisely because of this quality that he is in a unique position to
mobilise votes from these two regions.
Drawing Simba Makoni (Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn) and Dumiso Dabengwa (ZAPU –
PF) into an alliance might be problematic. Politically both men were
creations of ZANU–PF and still benefit materially from ancient ZANU–PF
patronage networks. It is not unreasonable that some see Dabengwa and
Makoni’s political parties as proxies created by ZANU–PF to disrupt
the strength of the opposition.
The differences between the MDC–T and MDC–N leaders are fundamental.
Ncube accuses Tsvangirai of being weak on democratic and leadership
credentials, while the MDC–T leader accuses Ncube of being provincial.
In addition, each man sees himself as best suited to stand as the
Presidential candidate.
How could it be done?
In order to create an environment for constructive dialogue, relations
between Tsvangirai and Ncube need to be reset. Tsvangirai must desist
from making statements that risk pushing Ncube’s party further away.
It is important to remind ourselves that Ncube is one of the
architects and ideologues of the original MDC. Instead of ridiculing
him, Tsvangirai must acknowledge his contribution and treat him as a
friend who must be embraced. He also needs to acknowledge Ncube’s
growing influence and support in the Matabeleland and Midland regions.
In extending an olive branch, MDC–T must attempt to address some of
Ncube’s legitimate grievances. Ncube remains convinced that Tsvangirai
and his inner circle worked to block his ascent to the top of the
party. Ncube also alleges that MDC–T has deliberately undermined his
party by labelling it as ‘tribal’ or provincial.
Whilst the above are manageable problems, more difficult is the
discussion of who is going to be offered what as part of the strategic
partnership. The onus of the main MDC is to be seen to be generous in
what it offers. Ncube’s party will seek assurances on key positions in
return for backing the coalition as they cannot be expected to
relinquish their independence without getting tangible offers in
return. Equally, the MDC–N leader will need to display humility and
self discipline.
Despite their differences, a coalition of the opposition is a possible
and viable strategy. The two parties have a convergent interest of
getting rid of President Mugabe. We also have to remind ourselves that
in the 2008 Presidential elections the MDC–N leader urged his
supporters to vote for Simba Makoni. Such an unprecedented overture
shows Ncube’s pragmatic side and that he is open to negotiations.
Not forming a coalition is not an option
Failure to form a united opposition is a prescription for defeat. The
MDC–T is trailing ZANU–PF in polls and no one who is seriously
concerned with political and electoral strategies can afford to ignore
these, no matter how flawed or old they are. Not only do the polls
show that ZANU–PF support has surged but most importantly, the party
may use these numbers to justify a rigged electoral ‘win’. Poor shows
at rallies, an unequal level playing field and circumscribed regional
and international support also counts against the MDC-T.
Politics needs ideals and policies, but most crucially a sense of
direction. Post-independence electoral history of Zimbabwe has two
important lessons: No political party has successfully challenged
President Mugabe on its own and preoccupation with legality and
political reforms in a ZANU–PF dominated Zimbabwe does not work. This
is a reality that is still to register with the opposition.
ZANU–PF is corrupt, ruthless and violent, but nobody can accuse
President Mugabe’s party of being directionless. They alone seem to
know how to get what they want in the next elections and they may well
be rewarded for that. Their adversaries should be wise enough to draw
together and substitute competition for political union. A coalition
coupled with an effective campaign strategy offers better chances.
Simukai Tinhu is a political analyst based in London.
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