Some critical reflections on activism and Sudan: a reply to Monim
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By Alex DeWaal
Dear Monim,
June 20, 2013 - I have long argued that humanitarians and human rights
activists should embrace critical self-reflection including
acknowledging their mistakes (see my piece, originally entitled
"Writing rights and getting it wrong". So I welcome the change to
debate–though not, of necessity, on everything. Monim puts his finger
on two closely-related key issues, which are (1) the tension between
transparency and confidentiality in conflict mediation, and (2) the
associated tension between securing an end to a war and promoting a
democratic transformation.
Let me make four points. First: my record as an activist and academic
from the 1980s until 2005 included considerable critique of
international humanitarian and advocacy efforts. I came to Sudan in
the early 1980s precisely because Sudanese academics were leading the
way in developing a critique of international humanitarian action. I
resigned from Human Rights Watch in 1992 rather than support the U.S.
military intervention in Somalia. The African Rights project to gain
access to the SPLA-held areas of the Nuba Mountains in 1994-95 was
intended to give a high profile to the Nuba’s own efforts at survival
and socio-political renewal, and a low profile to external players. We
did not trumpet our role in that effort but put Yousif Kuwa and the
Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organisation in the
spotlight. I was a strong critic of what I saw as an opportunistic
approach to the question of slavery by foreign advocacy organizations.
So you should not be surprised to see me mounting a critique of those
who advocate solutions from outside.
Second, I believed that progressives in Sudan, especially those
elements of civil society that had earlier been sympathetic to the
Sudan Communist Party, were making a strategic error in aligning
themselves with the SPLA. Much as I liked the rhetoric of the New
Sudan, the actual record of the SPLA suggested something rather
different. In fact part of the rationale for the “human rights in the
transition” project was in order to strengthen progressive forces,
both those inside the SPLA and those who shared its stated aims. The
issue of the political organization of progressive elements in Sudan
demands serious reflection and debate, similar to that initiated by
the late Khatim Adlan with his famous tract, "It’s Time for Change."
The question of the political organization of progressives in Sudan is
unresolved.
My third point is the most important: the record of the outcomes of
international-led mediation activities, including the AU-led efforts
of the last nine years has been mixed. There’s no question: I have
been involved with them, beginning with the Abuja negotiations, and so
I am associated with their outcomes, which have mostly been
disappointing. But that’s not the whole story.
Of necessity, most negotiations takes place out of the public gaze.
And in most cases of mediation, the record then remains locked away,
except what participants later want to talk about. When there’s a
successful outcome, mediators and their friends write glowing memoirs.
When there isn’t, no-one wants to accept the blame. But either way,
because the records aren’t available for independent scrutiny, it
isn’t possible to make an objective assessment. With the partnership
of the World Peace Foundation, the African Union will be making an
archive of these materials available, so that Sudanese and others can
assess them and make an objective assessment.
For example, there is no comprehensive analysis of the effort that led
to Darfur Peace Agreement. Critics of the DPA write as though the
intent was to create a partial agreement with Minni Minawi, or to
abandon democratization and justice. I can assure you that those were
not the aims. When the DPA was signed and the entire mediation team
left, I stayed behind for another week in an effort to bring Abdel
Wahid on board–and in fact reached an agreement on a supplementary
document to the DPA that would have brought him on board. The U.S.
insisted that not a word could be changed in the DPA however, and the
AU fell in line with that.
When I wrote about the lack of justice in the DPA, it was an exercise
in public education, not endorsement, and an attempt to remedy that
fault next time round. But you should also recall the words of John
Garang, speaking to the UN Security Council on February 8, 2005, who
referred to Darfur, saying:
“the conflict there was an old one that had begun in the 1980s, rather
than in 2003, as commonly reported. It had existed even before the
present Government of the Sudan had taken power…. The SPLM, having
concluded its own accord with the Government of the Sudan, was
confident that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement enhanced the chances
for a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Darfur conflict.
However, the Janjaweed militia must be reined in and eventually
brought to justice after the achievement of a solution – otherwise the
cart would be placed before the horse, in which case neither would
move. The SPLM stood ready to offer assistance.”
The CPA was not as inclusive as I would have liked, and did not
prioritize democracy in the way I would have liked. But in 2005/06 it
was a reality and the task was to make it work. The vision that most
of us in the mediation had for the DPA was as a buttress to the CPA,
to bring in the Darfurians to bolster the democratization of Sudan. It
didn’t work, but we tried.
As for the International Criminal Court, the prosecutor’s public
application for an arrest warrant against President Bashir was so
incompetent that, if the case had come to court on that basis, I have
no doubt that it would have been thrown out. It was irresponsible not
to criticize that.
Turning to the AU High Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD): it is clear, the
process of consultation that produced the report, and the report
itself, were a model of participatory analysis and democratic
recommendation. The substance of the report was that the conflict in
Darfur was properly defined as the Sudanese conflict in Darfur, and it
could only be settled by a comprehensive approach that involved all
Darfurians addressing the challenges of peace, justice, reconciliation
and Darfur’s place in Sudan, in an inclusive way. The AUPD spent forty
days in town-hall style meetings listening to the views of Darfurians,
and having formulated its recommendations, went back to discuss them
with Darfurian stakeholders to make sure that they were endorsed by
the people. Only with popular support would such recommendations be
meaningful.
As for the late Ahmed Maher, former Egyptian Foreign Minister, he came
to Sudan just once or twice and did not participate in any of Darfur
consultations and was expressing a personal view.
It is deeply unfortunate that the AUPD recommendations have not been
implemented. My colleague Abdul Mohammed does not consider them in any
way irrelevant or superseded. But it is a simple political reality
that the international community, led by the UN and Qatar, chose a
different path, leading to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. That
is a reality that Darfurians must deal with. And it is also true that
the AU Panel simply does not possess the power to enforce its own
resolutions. How would it force the Sudanese government or rebels to
follow a particular course of action that they did not want to follow?
The AU Panel does not have the authority to write and adopt Chapter
VII resolutions at the UN Security Council, and does not possess an
army.
My last point concerns the lull in my writing on Sudan since I scaled
back on writing for my “Making Sense of Sudan” blog in September 2010.
The last two postings were: “Sudan: On Mistrust and Defamation,”
(September 13, 2010). And “Sudan:Time to Begin a National
Constitutional Review,” (September 19, 2010). For the following ten
months I was wholly taken up with work for President Mbeki and the AU
High Level Implementation Panel, particularly on the Two Areas. For
obvious if regrettable reasons, the records of that period are still
confidential.President Mbeki has been adamant that he will not
negotiate through the press, and correctly so. But, given that the
negotiations constitute an important part of Sudan’s modern history, I
have also initiated a project whereby the process will be properly
documented and the archive will be made available to researchers. Then
it will be possible to have an objective and properly informed debate
about what was done and not done, what mistakes were made, what crises
were averted or not averted.
* Alex de Waal is Executive Director of a program at the Fletcher
School at Tufts University established by the World Peace Foundation
aiming to provide intellectual leadership on issues of peace, justice
and security.
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