The Launch of Voluntary Return to Abyei: But why Abyei Plebiscite will be a difficult task to achieve in October 2013? Jul. 17 National, Uncategorized 1 comment
BY: Jacob Dut Chol, JUBA, JUL/17/2013, SSN; On 13th July 2013, Abyei Community in Juba launched a voluntary return home of its people of so that they register and participate in the forth coming referendum scheduled in October 2013. This launch attended by Abyei politicians, intellectuals, CSO leaders and students to mention but a few, was conducted under the auspices of Hon. Deng Alor Kuol. Many speeches were delivered encouraging Abyei people to return to home. The preparation of mobilization will be done through the committees and should involve representatives of the Nine Ngok Chiefdoms so that the task is completed in the next three months. But the author who also attended the launch is pessimistic on the conduct of Abyei Referendum in October 2013 and hereby provides an in-depth independent expert argument that wide range deep-seated political mistrust between Sudan and South Sudan shall continue to cause debacle in the conduct of Abyei referendum. To start with, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that embodies the Abyei protocol, a brainchild of American government would not make Abyei Referendum a reality, as was the case of South Sudan plebiscite. The pitfall in Abyei referendum emanates from the engineering of the protocol as a readymade, “one-size-fits-all blue print”. The American government had exerted too much pressure at the time of inking of Abyei protocol, under which the Sudan government conditionally accepted the Abyei agreement, something a peace expert would call “duress from a hurry guarantor” and a common attitude of the U.S in Palestine-Israel conflict resolution. The outcome of un-implementation of Abyei Protocol resulted so far in many intermittent conflicts and insurgencies including the killing of Abyei Paramount Chief Kuol Deng Kuol (KuolAdol) on 4th May 2013. Numerous insurgencies have been levelled on Misseriya Arabs because the government of Sudan hoodwinked them that they will receive protection over their grazing rights in exchange of their service in the militia activities. In making such a gambit a reality, the Sudanese government has been misinterpreting the Abyei protocol that it has infringed on the rights of Misseriyas. Yet, the accord provides social and cultural rights of the Missiriya Arabs through seasonal movement of their animals in search of pastures and water points in Ngok Dinka areas. The parallel alignment of two ethnic groups in Abyei is embedded in socio-cultural ties. The Ngok Dinka align themselves to South Sudan government while Misseriya Arabs align themselves to government of Sudan. The deepening of ethnic allegiance and the loyalty of the two groups towards the two governments resembles the adherence of residents of Kashmiri contested land by the Indian government and Pakistan and I agreed with Sumantra Bose analysis “to the citizen of Jammu and Kashmir whose fundamental allegiance lies with India, the only legitimate unit of governance is India-including Kashmir and to the citizen whose basic identity is with Pakistan, the only legitimate unit of governance is Pakistan-including Kashmir” (Bose, 1999: 155). Apart from two fundamental allegiances, the third allegiance of the independence mindset hangs between the two shifted poles, making the Kashmir stalemate difficult to resolve. The Abyei protocol stipulated that the people of Abyei would have conducted the referendum concurrently with the people of South Sudan but this did not happen because the exercise surfaced as a game of political mistrust played outside the protocol. The bickering has focused on the eligibility of the voters. The SPLM maintains that it is the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms that are eligible to vote since they are the permanent residents of the area, while the NCP refutes this and argues that the Misseriya Arabs, who are temporary residents, are supposed to vote in the Abyei referendum. Though the protocol specifies Abyei residents as the eligible voters, it remains unclear who are really the legal denizens since the Ngok Dinka is prescribed its own territory while the Missiriya Arabs and other nomads have been acknowledged as having traditional grazing rights for moving animals across Abyei. But, notably, the Venice Commission Guideline on the Holding of Referendums defines resident requirements to mean those with “habitual residence” This tends to exclude seasonal migrants, as in the case of the Misseriya Arabs. But the conundrum has been that each party takes a zero-sum line jeopardizing the level playing ground. The SPLM’s claim that the Ngok Dinka should exercise their right of self-determination as spelt in the agreement is premised on the historical and cultural relations of Ngok with other large section of Dinka in the South, whom the SPLM dominate. On the other hand, the government of Sudan sees a big disaster; it has already lost South Sudan, which has become an independent sovereign state with potential resources, so it has to fill the gap; thus, the threat of losing another region makes it grind its teeth. The prospects of Abyei joining South Sudan are very high. It is revealed that if the plebiscite were conducted today, then 80.6% voters would vote for the annexation of Abyei to the South Sudan (Chol, 2010: 95). This, however, causes yet more anxiety amongst the Missiriya Arabs, who suspect that they will be sent packing from the would-be annexed Abyei area to the South. The prescription of Abyei as the homogeneous home of the Ngok Dinka creates a “plebiscitary-majoritarian” scheme that excludes other members of ethnic groups, particularly the Misseriya Arabs, which the SPLM sees as a political victory, although it is a compromise of minority rights. This oversight in the Abyei protocol surfaced during the negotiation of the accord where Western countries proffered sticks and carrots and pressured the government of Sudan. For example, the lifting of sanctions was still dependent on the improvement of Sudan relations with the West, in particular great powers like the U.S and European Union, on issues of human rights in the western Sudanese regions of Darfur and the resolution of conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. However, it would have been fair if the agreement had considered the right of the Misseriya Arabs, who have perhaps lived in Abyei permanently for the last fifty years, to vote in the referendum, rather than only the Ngok Dinka ethnic group. However, the concern that might have disturbed the mediators and guarantors in compromising the eligibility of the Misseriya Arabs could have been the determination of the numerical size of the members of the ethnic group, and whether they maintain the same population when they come to graze their animals during the dry seasons or not. Another reason perhaps could have been related to fear of gerrymandering of the registration of voters by the government of Sudan, possibly through systematic relocation of Misseriya Arabs bit by bit from Muglad and Babanusa towns to settle them in Abyei areas. Though such trepidations existed, they would have been tackled to eschew the “plebiscitary-majoritarian” situation that has brought the Kashmir right of self-determination to a cul-de-sac. In Kashmir, as in Bosnia for example, recourse to the plebiscitary-majoritarian method is simply a disastrous option, aside from the fact that India will never allow such an exercise and Pakistan will not agree to it either, unless a “third option” of independence is excluded (Bose, 1999: 155). Pakistan’s view has been that the right to implement a referendum must rely on the options of India and itself. The hysteria over the independence option from Pakistan relates to its fears that any new neighbouring sovereign state would perhaps weaken its militia group establishments, such as Hiz-ul-Mujahideen. The most constructive approach in this situation is the exercise of genuine engagement and the building of trust in implementing the Abyei protocol. There should be mutual pursuit of tolerance, accommodation and coexistence between the two belligerents’ governments. Both parties should restrain from the “maximalist approach” but instead adopt a “moderate style”. There is no readymade “one-size-fits-all blue print” for resolving the Abyei debacle but each stalemate requires a unique treatment for the realization of legitimate peace. Though Abyei remains a disastrous and highly contested spot amongst the contested lands in the world, contested lands do not have to remain contested (Bose, 2007: 3). Chronic confrontation is not inevitable or immutable, and compromise and coexistence remain eminently feasible objectives. The challenge is immense, but the dividends are so great, and the alternatives so grim, that the struggle for peace is worth every ounce of sweat and toil. References Chol, J (2010) ‘Politics of Full Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),’ BA Research Project: Catholic University of Eastern Africa-Nairobi. Sumantra, B (2007) ‘Contested Lands, Paths to Progress,’ Open Democracy Sumantra, B (1999) ‘Kashmir: Sources of Conflict, Dimension of Peace,’ Survival: Global politics and Strategy 41(3): 149-171 Mr. Jacob Dut Chol is the founder and Executive Director of Centre for Democracy and International Analysis (CDIA), a research and academic think-tank in Juba. He can be reached at [email protected]. << Older 1 Comment aweil Boy July 17, 2013 at 7:44 pm All Abyei people are looking after the FOOD in juba,These idiots are very stupid and must remain slaves of Arabs like Nuer of Ethioipia.They are experinced thieves as stated by many South Sudanese. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "South Sudan Info - The Kob" group. 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