REVIEW: The Hard Road to Reform: the Politics of Zimbabwe’s Global
Political Agreement — reviewed by Timothy Scarnecchia
July 15, 2013
Brian Raftopoulos (editor), The Hard Road to Reform: the Politics of
Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement (Harare: Weaver Press in
association with Solidarity Peace Trust, 2013)
As Zimbabwe’s first post-GPA harmonised elections fast approach (July
31st), informed and not so well informed commentators will be giving
their views of the campaigns, the elections, and the results. If the
international coverage of the Kenyan 2013 election is any indication,
the room for hyperbolic claims and dubious background coverage will
once again be larger than the square footage of Robert Mugabe’s
mansions (and now even Morgan Tsvangirai’s home). In order to avoid
such mistakes, I highly recommend a collection edited by Professor
Brian Raftopoulos, who is Director of Research and Advocacy in the
Solidarity Peace Trust, an NGO dealing with human rights issues in
Zimbabwe.
For those unfamiliar with the Zimbabwean political landscape, Brian
Raftopoulos is one of the most insightful commentators on the
Zimbabwean political situation. His current writings do not avoid
harsh criticisms of the MDC’s performance following the 2008 elections
and the formation of the GPA in February 2009. That is why this book
is so valuable. Raftopoulos, along with an A-list of Zimbabwean
scholars (with a healthy preponderance of historians), have examined
the past 4 years through diverse critical lenses. There is no sugar
coating here. If anything, the overall impression is that Robert
Mugabe’s ZANU-PF, while being given a life-line by the GPA brokered by
then South African President Thabo Mbeki, were forced to deal with the
two MDCs in a Government of National Unity and they have done so in
characteristically ZANU-PF fashion. The MDCs, while faced with major
obstacles but also some great opportunities, may have done themselves
more harm than good based on their own actions more than those of
ZANU-PF. It is not an assessment that the MDC insiders will like to
hear but the criticisms are to be expected particularly as they come
from those who participated in, or witnessed, the formation of the MDC
from the grassroots constituencies of Zimbabwe labor unions and civic
organizations. These individual chapters help to put into much better
focus why Zimbabwe in 2013 is not the same as it was in 2008. I
therefore highly recommend this book to anyone wanting to know why
this is the case. That the book is available electronically for Kindle
makes it that much easier to get reading.
Rather than write a formal review, I have included the titles of the
individual chapters and some passages or brief summaries of themes I
see as useful for thinking about the GPA years (2009-2013) with an eye
towards the upcoming elections.
Chapter 1: Brian Raftopoulos: “An Overview of the GPA: National
Conflict, Regional Agony and International Dilemma”
Here is Raftopoulos’ helpful summary of the GPA period:
“The GPA and its many challenges was the product of a convergence
of factors, namely: the unwillingness of a party of liberation to
accept electoral defeat; the inability of the opposition to claim
state power due to the militarisation of the ruling party’s response
to defeat a clash of different notions of state sovereignty in which
the electoral wishes of the Zimbabwean citizenry were subordinated to
selective nationalist claims of the ruling party; and the role of SADC
in facilitating an agreement that attempted to balance the need for
regional sovereignty against outside interference with the legitimate
electoral demands of the Zimbabwean electorate. The results of this
complex mix of ingredients was a brew that placed a short term halt on
the rapid political and economic decline in the country and opened up
some space for new political arrangements, while also providing an
authoritarian regime with opportunities to regain lost ground. The
period of the Inclusive Government generated a new set of dynamics
that made it impossible for ZANU-PF to return to the status quo ante,
while also exposing the strengths and weaknesses of the former
opposition parties as they took part in unequally shared state power.”
[28]
As Raftopoulos states in the introduction, it is important to focus
not only on the MDCs’ ability to maneuver in the GPA years, but also
to focus on how ZANU-PF has managed to use these 4 years to regroup.
He writes: “The politics of ZANU-PF is not only one of destruction and
obstruction; it is also constitutive of the new social and economic
forces that have emerged in the last 10-15 years.” (xv). While the
issue of ZANU-PF political violence is raised in the introduction and
elsewhere in the collection, it is noticeably absent given the amount
of emphasis the Solidarity Peace Trust’s Reports have previously given
to this element of Zimbabwean politics. It is perhaps one of the
book’s strengths, however, to focus on the shifting political
landscape, especially the changing constituencies and interests
represented by ZANU-PF and the opposition, rather than continue to
focus solely on the repressive actions of the past 13 years.
Chapter 2: James Muzondidya, “The opposition dilemma in Zimbabwe: A
Critical Review of the Politics of the Movement for Democratic Change
Parties under the GPA Government Framework, 2009-2012.”
Historian James Muzondidya, a research manager at the Zimbabwe
Institute, a think tank well known for its links to the MDC, takes a
particularly critical look at the performance of the MDCs during the
GPA, but he first notes the limits on their actions:
“…the ability of the opposition parties to use their leverage
during this phase has been restricted because ZANU-PF is not
interested in any reforms that would loosen its hold on power. While
agreeing to some of the reforms negotiated in the GPA, ZANU-PF was
bent on using them and the new institutions to legitimise itself and
push its own agenda. The Zimbabwe electoral Commission (ZEC), for
instance, appeared to be broadly representative but was, in fact,
still dominated by ZANU-PF through their control of its secretariat
and support staff. In addition, ZEC was starved of both material
resources and manpower to carry out its tasks, and this has ensured
that the partisan Registrar General’s office remains in control of the
election processes, from voter registration in the counting of the
votes. “ [49]
The above observation about the ZEC seems to be playing out at the
moment, the lack of resources available to run this electoin is
particularly startling, and will likely become a major issue in
determining the outcome of the election.
Muzondidya explains just how stacked the GPA has been in ZANU-PF’s favor:
‘The ZANU-PF strategy, consistent with its hegemonic political
culture, has been to engage in cosmetic political and economic reforms
that will not result in further democracy or result in a loss of its
historic monopoly over power. …Indeed, over the last four years,
ZANU-PF has kept the strategic doors to its power, such as the
security sector and the mining and agricultural industries, firmly
closed.” [50]
Muzondidya does not hold back, however, in his criticisms of the MDCs’
performance. He gives a valuable analysis of the differences between
the MDC-Tsvangirai and the MDC (formerly the MDC-M for Arthur
Mutambara, then the MDC-N for Welshman Ncube, the current leader, and
now simply the “MDC” under Ncube’s leadership). Muzondidya outlines
the major differences between the two MDCs and most importantly
describes ethnic factionalism that has developed between the two MDCs
and within the MDC-T. Those familiar with the history of political
parties in Zimbabwe and in the African nationalist parties before
Independence will recognize a depressing pattern of divisions around
personalities, perceived “intelligence” differences within party
leadership, and the ever-present ethnic solidarities that at times
seem exaggerated yet over time become self-fulfilling. This chapter
will be very helpful to those new to Zimbabwean politics wanting to
make sense of the divisions between and within the MDCs.
Muzondidya also summarizes the corruption charges against MDC-T urban
councilors that have grown in number over the past few years, showing
the vulnerability of a group of leaders tasting power for the first
time. While subsequently censored by the party, these cases have
damaged the MDC-T’s image as a party of “Change”. Such cases included:
“the Chitungwiza land scandal which resulted in the party firing
all its 23 councilors in 2010; the mismanagement and looting of
Council land and resources by councilors in Bindura; the Kwekwe audit
report findings of 2012 which unearthed serious financial
irregularities involving the under-banking of collected revenue and
the Marondera corruption case which resulted in the suspension of the
mayor by his party in March 2012 for receiving kickbacks from
companies and individuals in return for tenders. The corruption among
the party’s representatives in local authorities, MDC parliamentarians
and government officials, as the MDC leadership itself has admitted,
has the potential to cost the party dearly during the next elections.”
[57]
For those who built the coalition of trade unions and civics in the
late 1990s that eventually created the National Constitutional
Assembly (NCA) and the MDCs, the last four years have more often been
a disappointment as the links between these formative groups and the
MDCs has been strained or broken by the MDCs’ participation in
government. Muzondidya concludes,
“ZANU-PF has, in fact, been more shrewd in its engagement with the
transitional process than its political opponents, including both
political parties and civics as well as international opponents such
as the US and EU countries. It has been effectively using the
transition arrangement to regroup and reorganise, and is now better
organised than it was in 2009. “ [59]
Chapter 3: Gerald Mazarire, “ZANU-PF and the Government of National Unity”
Historian Gerald Mazarire gives us a helpful contemporary history of
the splits both in the MDC and ZANU-PF that many people outside of
Zimbabwe may not fully understand. He starts by providing a summary of
the somewhat questionable MDC and ZANU-PF versions of the story. Based
on Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s own account of it in his
autobiography, Mazarire suggests that then South African President
Thabo Mbeki, along with “the support of some Western embassies in
Harare”, had been involved in splitting the MDC in favor of Welshman
Ncube’s faction and ZANU-PF in favor of Emmerson Mnangagwa. This
strategy ultimately failed in 2004 but it did lead to major conflicts
in both parties. Mazarire explains that Mbeki returned to intervene
in Zimbabwean politics during the violent crisis of 2008, and the
resulting Unity Accord was “hurriedly concluded” by Mbeki so that he
could “attend to a crisis at home that led, in September 2008, to his
own ouster from the leadership of the ANC and the South African
presidency.” [73]
Mazarire then outlines ZANU-PF’s version of the story, based mostly on
Jonathan Moyo’s writings, in which the GNU was carried out mostly to
stop ‘regime change’ orchestrated from Washington and London, as the
Security sector refused to go along with the MDC in declaring a
government based on the original presidential election results.
Mazarire then does an excellent job of showing how and why ZANU-PF
managed to continue to dominate the GNU with strategies to keep the
MDC out of key sectors of governance. In reference to ZANU-PF’s
“Pursuit of Hard Power”, Mazirire writes:
“ZANU-PF’s display of power is traceable to its ability to lose an
election and stay in power. Starting with the delays in announcing
the outcome of the March 2008 Presidential Election as opposed to the
efficiency and speed with which the winner of the 27 June Presidential
run-off was announced, ZANU was already at work to make sure that
whatever arrangement would obtain thereafter should find them securely
in position. Contrary to the view that ZANU-PF’s arbitrary exercise of
power and its assertiveness stem from increased confidence in the
political and economic situation obtaining since the formation of the
GNU, ZANU has always been determined to be a triumphant loser.” [88]
Mazarire explores some of the areas where ZANU-PF insiders have
excelled at enriching themselves at the expense of the state, and as
an historian he can’t help but point out the hypocrisy of this given
ZANU-PF’s earlier socialist rhetoric in a section labeled “ZANU-PF:
from Socialism to Capitalism.” Mazarire describes two main areas of
this transition, namely the indigenisation and mining sectors.
Pointing out as well that there were a key handful of white
businessmen who have helped ZANU-PF insiders along the way to
indigenization, he ends with respect for ZANU-OPF Minister of Mines,
Obert Mpufo, for his “almost single-handedly” wining the war against
the “blood diamonds” charges from the Kimberley Process system.
Mazirire’s final advice to readers is worth contemplating as elections
near. “Readers are starkly reminded that with ZANU-PF, literally
anything is possible.” [112]
Chapter 4: Bertha Chiroro, “Turning Confrontation into Critical
Engagement: the Challenge of the Inclusive Government to Zimbabwean
Civil Society”
This chapter by Betha Chiroro, a research specialist at the African
Institute of South Africa in Pretoria, is essential for understanding
the strained relations that have developed between the MDC parties and
the civic organizations and NGO’s that had been so supportive (and
instrumental in forming) the MDCs in the first place. Chiroro is also
the only contributor to address the fundamentally important role of
women’s organizations in the continued opposition to ZANU-PF
authoritarian rule.
“An equally important sector is the female voice: as expressed by
the Women’s Coalition, (a network of women’s rights activists with
chapters in Bulawayo, Masvingo, Beitbridge, Gweru, Gwanda, Bindura,
Marondera, and Mutare) and WOZA during the term of the IG. Although
some have expressed their frustration that their participation is no
more than ‘tokenism and deception’, Zimbabwean women have continued to
strive for a democratic political environment together with other CSOs
[Civil Society Organisations].” [128]
“Zimbabwean civil society’s response to the IG [Inclusive
Government] has continued to reveal ideological tensions between its
human rights obligations and its need to deal with broader
developmental requirements. Political advocacy around issues of human
rights and violence often takes centre stage at the expense of
developmental issues and issues of social and economic rights, rural
development, poverty and inequality. While public service delivery
remained very poor, with massive water and electricity shortages, poor
waste management and poor sanitation remaining the order of the day,
civil society has not made a clear and concerted effort to ensure that
these issues are addressed by the IG.” [136-137].
Chapter 5: Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Politics behind Politics:
African Union, Southern African Development Community and the Global
Political Agreement in Zimbabwe.”
Historian Ndlovu-Gatsheni provides a very clear and useful
contemporary history of African Union and SADC attempts to mediate the
political crises in Zimbabwe since 2000. One is simultaneously
impressed by the number of these continental and regional
interventions as well as by the lack of substantive results. There is
a lot of value here for understanding the 2013 elections. In
particular, the current head of the AU, South African Dr. Nkosazana
Dlamini Zuma, has been outspokenly supportive of ZANU-PF’s drive for
elections in 2013, while South African President Jacob Zuma’s lead
SADC negotiator on Zimbabwe, Lindiwe Zulu, has recently come under
heavy criticisms from Mugabe for her own stance that further reforms
are necessary before elections could be held. Reading
Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s chapter will help make some of these differences
clearer.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s characterization of why GNU negotiations occurred
offers a particularly helpful and succinct view:
“What led the political formations to negotiate were the stark
political realities facing them: despite emerging victorious in the 29
March 2008 elections, the MDC political formations were prevented by
ZANU-PF from ascending to power and its support base was exposed to
unprecedented and unbearable violence. ZANU-PF clung to power by
violence but its legitimacy was completely eroded. Added to this, the
Zimbabwean economy continued to degenerate to its lowest ebb and
international, continental, and regional pressure together with
sanctions, contributed to ZANU-PF’s decision to accept negotiations as
the only game in town if it was to survive politically.” [160]
Ndlovu-Gatsheni concludes his discussion of AU and SADC interventions:
“After 2008, the problem shifted from pushing for credible
elections as a solution to the Zimbabwe problem to a search for a
power-sharing arrangement in a context where there was no legitimate
government in Harare. Currently, the Harare disputants have gone full
circle to the issue of elections as a resolution of the Zimbabwe
problem. This push for elections is taking place within a context in
which SADC mediation and facilitation has lost momentum. The key
facilitator is pre-occupied with local problems rocking the ANC, and
ZANU-PF is taking advantage of the situation to push for elections
before the completion of key reforms.”
Chapter 6: Munyaradzi Nyakudya. “Sanctioning the Government of
National Unity: A Review of Zimbabwe’s Relations with the West in the
Framework of the Global Political Agreement.”
Historian Munyaradzi Nyakudya’s chapter is an important one,
especially as the Zimbabwe sanctions debate has been so contentious
and often full of inaccuracies. Most importantly, Nyakudya details
how ZANU-PF has effectively used the continuation of Western sanctions
to its advantage during the GNU period. Nyakudya writes:
“The West has grappled with two scenarios: either to engage
Mugabe, lift sanctions, and support the GNU, or to shun him completely
and maintain, if not tighten the sanctions. The latter scenario has
largely prevailed. It must be conceded that the US, EU and their
allies’ various Sanctions Bills all stipulated the need for tangible
progress in terms of establishing democracy, respecting human rights
and upholding the rule of law before re-engaging. There has simply
been no such progress, with the reform deficit clearly still
outstanding. ZANU-PF has persistently and consistently refused to
implement critical electoral, judicial, media and security sector
reforms necessary before new elections can be held. “ [188]
Offering an insight into how determined ZANU-PF is to NOT carry out
any reforms in the security sector, Nyakudya states:
“…on the issue of the security sector, the ZANU-PF Congress of
December 2009 passed the following critical resolutions: ‘ZANU (PF) as
the party of revolution and the people’s vanguard shall not allow the
security forces to be the subject of any negotiation for a so-called
security sector reform,’ ostensibly because the ‘security forces are a
product of the liberation struggle’. The party thus argues that
‘calls for security sector reform violate Zimbabwean sovereignty.’
This simply throws spanners in the GPA implementation process: the MDC
formations have vowed not to accept that general elections be held
before security sector reforms are instituted, maintaining that the
latter have been politicized, as revealed in their proclamations not
to accept any leader without liberation war credentials.” [190]
As elections approach and following the Constitutional referendum in
March this year, the EU, Australia, and the US have stepped down from
their hardline on targeted sanctions, removing many from the lists and
promising even further lifting should these elections be peaceful and
“credible”. On the one hand this can be seen as assisting the MDCs in
terms of letting them take credit for holding up their promise to work
towards the lifting of sanctions. On the other hand, it also would
appear to be a realpolitik hedging that ZANU-PF will win the elections
and that Western powers are preparing for a full rapprochement with
ZANU-PF in order to continue mining for platinum and dealing in
diamonds there. The competition with China, who is fully involved with
ZANU-PF on a number of economic and intelligence fronts, offers an
incentive to back off on sanctions before the elections. Former US
Ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, travelled to Harare on the
invitation of the State Department to visit Mugabe in April this year,
which was a real sign of this hedging by the Americans, and even
Reverend Jesse Jackson was in town on a “private” visit to meet with
Mugabe and Tsvangirai, although he was accompanied by US Ambassador
Bruce Wharton when meeting with Mugabe.
Chapter 7 Shari Eppel, “Repairing a Fractured Nation: Challenges and
Opportunities in Post-GPA Zimbabwe”
Shari Eppel is a leading authority on transitional justice issues in
Zimbabwe, particularly pertaining to the Gukurahundi period
(1983-1987) when thousands of Zimbabweans were killed as part of
ZANU’s consolidation of power and the crushing of former rival ZAPU’s
power. Eppel is therefore highly qualified to analyze the strengths
and weaknesses of truth and reconciliation efforts during the GPA, and
in the future.
Like the other contributors to this volume, Eppel does not refrain
from criticizing the opposition. In this case, she has in mind the
difficulty observers sympathetic to the MDCs have in criticizing
inter-party violence, as well as violence carried out by MDC
supporters against ZANU-PF supporters.
“While the existence and extent of political violence by MDC in
the last ten years remains an issue that civics in Zimbabwe is nervous
to explore, at some point in the future it will be necessary to
confront this issue if we are to avoid another cycle of impunity under
an MDC government. The MDCs have undoubtedly had the odds stacked
massively against them, with the police, army, and CIO all arresting,
torturing and assaulting MDC supporters with impunity, as have war
veteran groupings, you militia, Chipangano, and other informal arms of
ZANU-PF. But on the ground in some rural villages and urban suburbs,
inter-party violence has become much more evenly matched in recent
years, and this is seldom admitted to by civics on the argument that
the ZANU-PF elements of the state have dishonestly blamed much of
their own violence on the MDC, and to produce forensic proof of some
MDC violence would be to add credence to the patently false ZANU-PF
position that most of the violence is by MDC.” [234, emphasis in the
original]… “Clearly, there are some people in Zimbabwe who are
justified in seeing MDC supporters as perpetrators. Furthermore,
members of the MDC faction headed by Welshman Ncube would point to
internal violence in the MDC as a major contributor to the split in
the party: beatings and torture of MDC’s own activists have taken
place in their political headquarters and structures over the years,
as several—largely uncirculated—MDC commissions of inquiry reveal.”
[234].
Eppel also explores the roles of two new institutions developed by the
GPA . The first is the Organ of National Healing, Reconciliation and
Integration (ONHRI) and the second is the GPA Joint Monitoring
Committee (JOMIC), which is made up of representatives of all three
political parties, and tasked with “investigating violent incidents
together”. (238) Eppel analyzes the potential value of the ONHRI while
exploring some of the fundamental difficulties facing any institution
in Zimbabwe wanting to seriously deal with issues of transitional
justice. The ability of the JOMIC to not only monitor but prevent
future political violence is questioned, and although all three
political parties have been sanguine about JOMIC’s abilities to make
these upcoming elections “violence free”, questions remain over how a
JOMIC without enforceable powers will be able to act beyond making
public pronouncements.
+++++++++
The above is a cursory examination of an excellent book. One I
recommend highly to all those who will now turn their gaze toward
Zimbabwe in the upcoming weeks. The Zimbabwean online media is often
difficult to decipher given such strong polarization of views, as will
be Western media portrayals given usual editorial decisions to cut out
the background information. For those who want to make sense of the
political landscape leading up to the 2013 elections, Raftopoulos et
al’s The Hard Road to Reform is a great place to start. I would also
recommend Western journalists turn to these Zimbabwean scholars for
analysis and quotes, rather than turning to the usual pundits in
London or Washington DC. Their affiliations are listed in the book.
Timothy Scarnecchia is Associate Professor of History at Kent State
University and author of The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political
Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964 (University of
Rochester Press, 2008).
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