China’s Non-Interference Policy and Growing African Concerns – By Alula A. Iyasu

July 18, 2013

In October 2012, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS)
held a China-Africa Forum in Bishoftu, Ethiopia.  The event was
perhaps the first of its kind held in Ethiopia with academics, policy
makers and other stakeholders from the two regions participating in an
open discussion about the economic, political and social relations
between Africa and China.  Most of the discussions focused on the
economic relationships between China and Africa.  Both China and
Africa are developing regions albeit at different stages of
development.  China’s focus on infrastructure building as a key engine
of development is a model emulated by many African countries.  The two
regions have increasingly strengthened their economic and trade
relations which many see as complementary:  Africa needs access to
capital, foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfers
while China needs raw materials, resources and access to markets for
its goods and services.  To date, China has invested over $178 billion
dollars in Africa while direct investment by African companies in
China has reached over $9 billion.   No matter how skewed the trade
balance or how small Chinese investment compared to the last 30 years
of investment in Africa by the West, China’s investment in Africa is
not only much needed, but is welcomed by African governments.  One
reason for this is the appeal China’s non-interference policy has on
many African governments which guides China’s economic relations with
Africa.  The non-interference policy states that China does not meddle
in the internal affairs of nations.  As Professor Lututala Mumpasi
Bernard, Deputy Executive Secretary at the Council for the Development
of Social Science Research in Africa put it, it is “devoid of
political conditionality”[1].  However, many African scholars and
policy makers are increasingly of the opinion that China’s policy of
non-interference is “both deceptive and divisive, and could have the
effect of preventing amicable resolution of conflicts” in Africa.
(Sesay, A. and Odeh, L.)[2] They blame China’s indiscriminate
investments in good and bad governments alike, with its particular
affinity for corrupt and dictatorial governments, for undermining
peace and security in the region such as seen in North and South Sudan
and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Non-interference policy has been serving China well since 1954.  The
policy derives from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual
non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.  The policy was
designed to reach out to non-communist countries in Asia as well as
reflect solidarity with newly independent post-colonial states in
Africa, with an emphasis on territorial sovereignty defined in the
most rigid and traditional Westphalian terms.  Although
non-interference applies to military interventions and regime change,
the principle has been China’s modus-operandi in its investment and
economic interactions with Africa and the rest of the world.

It is worth remembering that the policy was embraced by many African
nations as it came to represent, particularly from the early 1990s
onward, an alternative to the American conception of a new kind of
world order — one in which smaller and “third-world” countries, found
it increasingly difficult to manage their own political and economic
affairs.  Non-interference was viewed as a refreshing departure from
the prescriptive policy of the West which forced African governments
into the straitjacket of the so-called “Washington consensus” with its
structural adjustment policies designed to mold Africa in the  image
of the West.[3] Structural adjustment and other Western driven
economic prescriptions for Africa have proved detrimental to African
countries, at worst, and unfit to African political, social and
economic realities, at best.  By contrast, the hallmark of China’s
economic relations with Africa, in line with its non-interference
policy and its non-prescriptive nature was received enthusiastically
by many African governments.  The policy’s emphasis on the state as
the principle actor for economic development, contrary to the West’s
vilification of the state and emphasis on the private-sector, also
meant that African nations with a yet to mature private-sector fully
embraced China as their economic partner and source of capital for
development.  That said, the policy has been applied selectively to
suit China’s interest at various times, beginning in its earliest days
of implementation, circa 1960s and 70s when China supported
revolutionary movements in Africa and Asia.  Even today, at the U.N.
Security Council, China often abstains or refrains from voting on
resolutions that mandate sanctions or interventions to reverse
invasions, end civil wars, or stop terrorism, instead of voting “no”
and vetoing such interventions.  This allows several interventions to
go ahead without China having to reverse its commitment to
non-intervention.

The narrative of those calling for China to revise its
non-interference policy claim that in its thirst for resources and raw
materials, China is propping up bad governments through investments
and access to cheap capital worth billions of dollars.  For example,
China has invested close to $30 billion dollars in the oil rich Sudan
and served as Sudan’s primary trading partner when the rest of the
world shunned it for the atrocities it committed in Darfur.
Furthermore, from 1999 to 2005, a period that includes the start of
the Darfur crisis, Sudan’s imports of small arms increased by 680
percent, to $55 million worth, with China making up 90 percent of
those sales.[4] China has also invested over $4 billion dollars in the
Democratic Republic of Congo dating back to 2001, the height of the
conflict in the DRC.[5] These and other examples, continues this
narrative, show that China’s investment practices under the auspices
of the non-interference policy, are exacerbating violence, conflict
and instability in Africa with detrimental spill-over effects in
neighboring countries.  Opponents of the view that China is a spoiler
of peace, on the other hand, insist that non-interference does not
equal indifference.  They argue that African peace and security is
first and foremost, the responsibility of Africans.  China supports
African states in maintaining peace and stability by enhancing
diplomatic relations and providing the space for dialogue and peaceful
resolution of conflicts.  They also point out Chinese contribution to
UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, both military and civilian
personnel.  Further, China’s economic support of African nations is
designed to eradicate conflict by addressing the root cause of
conflict: poverty.  According to Professor Hongsheng Sheng, of the
Law School of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, “Peace should parallel
development and the key method to eliminating war is to eliminate the
causes from which wars arise.”

Many within Africa, however, seem to think that non-interference is no
longer sustainable in light of China’s growing economic importance to
Africa and its emerging superpower status.    The policy has allowed
China to “stay silent” in times of crises in Africa,  or wait until
other nations interfere, prompting many African analysts to accuse
China of “reaping the benefits of peace and security underwritten” by
its co-members at the United Nations Security Council.[6] No doubt
non-interference was a workable model when China’s economic
interaction with the world in general and Africa in particularly was
at a minimal. With China’s status as a global power, however, many
argue that non-interference is not a policy befitting a global power
with growing international responsibilities and obligations.  Simply
put, with power comes responsibility!

Exactly what type of “interference” revisionists of non-interference
policy are advocating varies widely.  One thing is clear: no one is
calling for the kinds of interference the likes of which Africa
experienced and continues to experience from the West which drove
African governments towards China in the first place.  That is not a
desirable alternative neither for good or bad governments in Africa.
Revision of non-interference should mean a balanced act of investment
and conflict sensitivity by the Chinese and a more robust engagement
of African nations with China beyond the purely economic sphere.  For
starters, African governments may be served well by viewing China less
as a panacea for all the ills of their respective countries. African
governments bear the bulk of the responsibility in defining their
relations with China.  They also bear the primary responsibility in
strengthening their domestic as well as regional institutions of peace
and security.  They have the responsibility to invest in critical
areas of human development such as education, health and job creation
as well as strengthening institutions, combating corruption and crime.
 Chinese investments need to be seen as a means to an end and not an
end in itself and such investments earmarked for priority areas in
human development and security.  Africans also need to insist that
China support the national, regional (Regional Economic Communities or
RECs) and continental institutions for peace and security which lack
funding and technical support.  To this end, African governments need
to move from competition among themselves for Chinese investment and
work together to identify areas of critical technical and financial
support for a continental peace dividend.   The Chinese, for their
part, should make a concerted effort in abiding by the principles of
“Do No Harm” ensuring their investments are not fueling conflict and
undermining peace and security in the continent.  China should
consider conflict sensitivity analysis to play a central role in its
investment calculations, particularly in volatile regions of Africa.

Such a paradigm shift of relationship towards a more comprehensive
partnership beyond economics requires an increased cultural and social
understanding between the two regions.  Africa needs Chinese investors
just as much as it needs academicians and cultural experts.  China
needs to increase its efforts for cultural and social understanding of
African nations through encouraging and funding researches by Chinese
institutions and students and vice versa.  China lacks the expertise
in African peace building, an area which needs to be part and parcel
of Chinese investment policy in Africa.  African countries need to
find ways of linking their local peace building institutions with
Chinese institutions and funds for sharing and transferring of
knowledge and experiences which should serve as a springboard for
economic, social and political interactions between the two regions at
all levels.

Whether China likes it or not, it plays a significant role in peace
and security in Africa; negatively, through its absence, and
positively, through an increased partnership with African states and
institutions working for peace and security.  There are signs that
Beijing is pushing the boundaries of its non-interference policy
further into a sphere beyond the purely economic interaction with
African nations and perhaps into contributing positively to peace and
security in the continent.  The anti-piracy mission of the Chinese
navy off the coast of Somalia and the announcement by Beijing of the
launch of the “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for
Peace and Security” are good starts.

Alula A. Iyasu is the Managing Director of Bridge International,
Corp., an investment and trade advisory group with a focus in
Sub-Saharan Africa.

[1] Challenges and Opportunities for China-Africa Cooperation in
Developing Governance, Peace and Security in Africa in the New Global
Era.

[2] China’s Engagements with Africa: Implications for South-South Cooperation.

[3] Mohammed, Abdul, “China’s Rise and Africa’s Strategic Opportunity”.

[4] Human Rights First,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/crimes-against-humanity/stop-arms-to-sudan/investing-in-tragedy/

[5] Nathan, Andrew J., “The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s
Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007.

[6] Mariani, Bernardo, “Development through Peace: Practical Steps for
Deepening China-Africa Cooperation in the Field of Peace and
Security.”

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