Sudan: The Revolution Will not be Televised, It Will be Tweeted
  Posted by Enough Team <http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/enough-team> on
Nov 14, 2013


*Editor's Note: This op-ed written by Sudan and South Sudan analyst Akshaya
Kumar origanally appeared on Think Africa Press.
<http://thinkafricapress.com/sudan/21st-century-revolutionaries>*

In a recent African
Futures<http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2013/10/11/making-sense-of-the-protests-in-khartoum/>
article
about the 
protests<http://thinkafricapress.com/sudan/regime-doesnt-have-long-left>
that
erupted in Sudan this September, Alex de Waal concludes that the "immediate
challenge for the opposition is intellectual." In his piece, de Waal
contrasts the recent round of protests with the successful 1985 revolution.
That comparison of yesterday's revolutionaries with today's activists is
both unfair and incomplete.

First, by making no reference to the January 2013 New Dawn
Charter<http://www.sudanjem.com/2013/01/the-new-dawn-charter/> or
the September 2013 Sudan Change Forces
communiqué<http://twitter.com/asma_Ib/status/384359890556563457/photo/1>-
two documents that detail specific demands and principles for a
change,
as agreed to by a broad coalition of opposition forces - the pieces's
otherwise comprehensive analysis ignores a key dynamic. These documents are
not silver bullets, but they do demonstrate a commitment to forging a
unified vision for the proverbial "morning after."

Second, De Waal critiques the opposition’s “tendency to learn lessons from
abroad rather than analysing conditions at home.” He suggests they are
"borrowing and applying a script derived from a particular narrative of the
Arab Spring or even [my organisation] the Enough
Project<http://www.enoughproject.org/>."
Increasingly, Sudanese are also emphasising the similarities between the
struggle on the country's margins and the situation in the centre. For
example, through the work of citizen journalists like
3ayin<http://www.3ayin.com/> whose compelling
videos highlight violence in South Kordofan and Darfur, information about
government attacks on civilians in the periphery has begun to trickle into
Khartoum too. This is a huge intellectual victory, no matter whose "script"
it is.

In his piece, de Waal also questions the opposition's perceived proximity
to the country's armed groups. This, he says, undermines activists’
non-violent protests. But at the same time, de Waal warns that there us
"virtually no political coordination between the SRF and civic opposition
in Khartoum." Bringing an end to the wars inflaming the periphery through
dialogue will be a central element of any comprehensive solution. Through
the drafting of the New Dawn
Charter<http://www.sudanjem.com/2013/01/the-new-dawn-charter/>,
some in civil society have already come together with the Sudan
Revolutionary Front. Going forwards, facilitating more avenues for
discussing this document, which remains a work in progress, will be
critical.

 <http://thinkafricapress.com/sudan/21st-century-revolutionaries>

*Photo: Sudanese woman chants slogans against longtime President Omar
al-Bashir during a protest in front of the Sudanese embassy in Cairo,
Egypt. (AP)*
  <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<


Sudan: The Revolution Will not be Televised, It Will be Tweeted
  Online and diaspora activists should be recognised as the important early
stages of a revolutionary movement, not a distraction.
Article | 14 November 2013 - 2:50pm | By Akshaya
Kumar<http://thinkafricapress.com/author/akshaya-kumar>
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  Citizens of Abyei protesting in 2010. Photograph by the ENOUGH Project.

In a recent African
Futures<http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2013/10/11/making-sense-of-the-protests-in-khartoum/>article
about the
protests <http://thinkafricapress.com/sudan/regime-doesnt-have-long-left>that
erupted in Sudan this September, Alex de Waal concludes that the
"immediate challenge for the opposition is intellectual." In his piece, de
Waal contrasts the recent round of protests with the successful 1985
revolution. That comparison of yesterday's revolutionaries with today's
activists is both unfair and incomplete.

First, by making no reference to the January 2013 New Dawn
Charter<http://www.sudanjem.com/2013/01/the-new-dawn-charter/>or
theSudan Change
Forces<https://twitter.com/asma_Ib/status/384359890556563457/photo/1>September
2013 communiqué - two documents that detail specific demands and
principles for a change, as agreed to by a broad coalition of opposition
forces - the piece's otherwise comprehensive analysis ignores a key
dynamic. These documents are not silver bullets, but they do demonstrate a
commitment to forging a unified vision for the proverbial "morning after."

Second, De Waal critiques the opposition’s “tendency to learn lessons from
abroad rather than analysing conditions at home.” He suggests they are
"borrowing and applying a script derived from a particular narrative of the
Arab Spring or even [my organisation] the Enough
Project<http://www.enoughproject.org/>."
Increasingly, Sudanese are also emphasising the similarities between the
struggle on the country's margins and the situation in the centre. For
example, through the work of citizen journalists like
3ayin<http://www.3ayin.com/> whose compelling
videos highlight violence in South Kordofan and Darfur, information about
government attacks on civilians in the periphery has begun to trickle into
Khartoum too. This is a huge intellectual victory, no matter whose "script"
it is.

In his piece, de Waal also questions the opposition's perceived proximity
to the country's armed groups. This, he says, undermines activists’
non-violent protests. But at the same time, de Waal warns that there is
"virtually no political coordination between the SRF and civic opposition
in Khartoum." Bringing an end to the wars inflaming the periphery through
dialogue will be a central element of any comprehensive solution. Through
the drafting of the New Dawn
Charter<http://www.sudanjem.com/2013/01/the-new-dawn-charter/>,
some in civil society have already come together with the Sudan
Revolutionary Front. Going forward, facilitating more avenues for
discussing this document, which remains a work in progress, will be
critical.

Finally, de Waal turns his attention to the Twitter and smartphone set. His
piece suggests that too much of the social media conversation about Sudan
has been in English or French or if in Arabic then "aimed at an external
audience." But, since many activists have benefited from a cosmopolitan
education, it is unsurprising that their commentary is multilingual. De
Waal’s reading, which skewers the languages in which social media activists
choose to express themselves, seems to imply that using English or French
makes someone less authentically embedded in Sudan. In our increasingly
interconnected world, it's short sighted to put up walls between
communities of engaged citizens. Sudanese activists who have been using
their social media presence to raise awareness and spur discussion, already
understand<http://www.dc4mf.org/en/content/sudan-activists-shape-new-media-landscape>this.
A revolution tailored to Sudan

De Waal's assessment that the opposition in Sudan suffers from a lack of
organisation and cohesion is a correct one. His piece offers important
insights into the role that Islamists play in the Sudanese polity. However,
in idealising Khatim Adlan and the National Alliance for National
Salvation, de Waal fails to recognise their 21st century reincarnations. A
quarter of a century after the 1985 revolution, dynamics have changed, as
have technologies. While social media and smartphones cannot
<http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/adrianhon/100006956/mud-huts-and-smartphones-how-mobile-internet-is-transforming-life-in-sudan/>reach
everyone in Sudan, it would be a mistake to play down their power. When the
Sudanese government shut
down<http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2013/09/26/sudan_shuts_down_internet_for_a_day_amid_deadly_fuel_riots_what_s_bashir.html>the
internet during the September demonstrations, for example, protesters
found ways
<http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/protesters-are-dodging-sudans-internet-shutdown-with-a-phone-powered-crowdmap>to
keep working using Ushahidi crisis mapping tools and other workarounds. The
five day hunger strike in late October, dubbed
#Strike4Sudan<http://strike4sudan.wordpress.com/>,
drew international attention to those in still in detention. Survivors such
as Rania Mamoun <http://www.girifna.com/8797> and Amjad
Farid<https://www.facebook.com/amjedfarid/posts/10153435421675595>have
become hubs of organisational energy. Now, instead of organising
around funerals of
martyrs<http://sudanspeaks.blogspot.com/2013/10/martyrs-families-plan-to-bring-charges.html>,
Sudanese activists are standing behind one another.

Observers waiting to see protesters dramatically steal CNN headlines with
an Egyptian style revolution are looking for the wrong thing. Sudanese live
in one of the most <http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/sudan>restricted
environments in the world. The government successfully controls the
narrative by targeting journalists <http://www.cpj.org/mideast/sudan/> and
shutting down newspapers and television stations with
impunity<http://www.dc4mf.org/en/content/sudanese-government-continues-target-media>.
In an amazing show of duplicity, after least 210
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/sudan-escalates-mass-arrests-activists-amid-protest-crackdown-2013-10-02>people
were killed in state security forces' violent suppression of the protests
following the government announcement that fuel subsidies would be cut on
22 September, the Sudanese government tried to
pin<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48271>the violence on
the country's armed opposition. Sudan is not going to have
a Tahrir Square moment where millions occupy Khartoum's city centre for
days. That does not mean a revolution is not brewing.
21st Century Tools

Notwithstanding de Waal’s assessment, Sudanese activists are doing much
more than just waiting for a "fortuitous alignment of the stars" to deliver
them to power. But they need international support to help pry open
political space for dialogue and discussion. The website Al
Rakoba<http://www.alrakoba.net/>already hosts vibrant debates and
Radio
Dabanga <https://www.radiodabanga.org/> offers unparalleled coverage of
Darfur. But in our consultations with Sudanese, one thing comes up
repeatedly: more independent media platforms are necessary.

Promoting increased access to innovative 21st century tools should be at
the centrepiece of our strategy. Google's new Project
Shield<https://projectshield.withgoogle.com/>,
which offers sites serving media, elections and human rights related
content sophisticated protection from cyber attack, could help Sudanese
NGOs and media houses maintain the integrity of their online platforms. Mobile
Martus <http://benetech.org/2013/10/02/introducing-mobile-martus-1-0/>gives
smartphone users the power to quickly send encrypted photos or videos
to a desktop anywhere in the world, immediately deleting all trace of the
material on their phones. By allowing advocates to avoid detection while
preserving and publishing their data securely, these types of technologies
could fundamentally alter the power imbalance in Sudan.

De Waal worries that the Sudanese government will "turn social media
against its practitioners." However, tools like Silent
Circle<https://silentcircle.com/>even allow the average person to
communicate securely using cryptography,
preventing others from intercepting communications for $10/month. Meanwhile
Google's new UProxy <https://uproxy.org/>system creates peer-to-peer
<http://mashable.com/2013/10/21/google-uproxy-internet-freedom/>gateways
for secure browsing, making it easier for those planning and coordinating
to organise themselves without infiltration. The Sudanese
diaspora<http://muftah.org/sudanrevolts-the-neo-opposition/>should be
encouraged to support the opposition too. With UProxy, someone in
London can lend their internet connection to a friend or loved one in
Sudan, adding an extra wall of protection.

While it may not be a perfect solution, increased training on and access to
21st century tools could offer desperately needed protection to Sudanese
activists. Many are now working online to raise awareness, spark debate and
build organisational capacity to confront the regime. Alex de Waal, and
others who care about Sudan, should see online activists for what they are
- a necessary first step for change - and get behind them.

*Think Africa Press welcomes inquiries regarding the republication of its
articles. If you would like to republish this or any other article for
re-print, syndication or educational purposes, please contact:
[email protected] <[email protected]>*

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