Lessons to draw from the SPLM’s internal wrangles
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By Brian Adeba
December 31, 2013 - In denouncing the “coup” in December, President
Salva Kiir said he would not allow the incidents of 1991 to be
repeated. He called former vice president Riek Machar a “prophet of
doom” and accused him and his “disgruntled group” of being bent on
pursuing the actions of the past, meaning the Machar-led August 1991
split in the SPLM/A.
Aside from labeling Machar and his group as unhappy rent-seekers (most
of them were fired from cabinet in July), Kiir’s statement is
significant for drawing parallels to the August 1991 split.
However, there are some slight differences worth noting when the two
incidents are compared. In 1991, the Nassir putschists openly declared
they wanted to see John Garang removed from the leadership of the
SPLA/M. “Why Garang Must Go Now,” was a famous leaflet issued by
Machar and his comrades in the splinter faction of the SPLM. The
subsequent use of force to reinforce their quest to remove Garang,
gave credence to their coup attempt.
Fast forward to December 2013. Currently, there is much debate on
whether the December 15 incident in the barracks near the University
of Juba constitutes a coup.
While the government calls it a coup, Machar and his comrades deny the
allegation. And as Philip Knightley reminds us in the classic The
First Casualty: From the Crimea to Vietnam: The Correspondent as Hero,
Propagandist, and Myth Maker, truth is always the first casualty of
war.
However, the debate on whether it was a coup or not, (including the
ethnic-laced violence in its wake), obscures focus on the fundamental
fault lines and simmering tensions in the SPLM.
But in essence, Kiir is largely correct in comparing the incidents of
1991 and December 15, 2013. However, to get a contextual understanding
of Kiir’s likening of the current crisis to the 1991 incident, it is
crucial to revisit the fault lines articulated by the Nassir
putschists back then and examine if there are parallels in the
present. The literature penned by South Sudanese politicians, some of
whom were key players in both sides of the strife in 1991, offers
ample room for introspection and understanding of the grievances
outlined.
As Lam Akol tells us in SPLM/SPLA: The Nassir Declaration, the main
contentious issues were Garang’s one-man rule of the SPLM and the
constricting democratic space in the movement, including intolerance
for free speech. Akol argues that on paper, the SPLA embraced
collective decision-making through its High Command. In reality, he
asserts, the “movement was being run by one man making nonsense of the
Political-Military High Command which never ever held a single meeting
since it was formed.” Vice President James Wani Igga, in his book,
Southern Sudan: Battles Fought and the Secrecy of Diplomacy, has tried
to counter this argument by saying the High Command couldn’t meet
because of logistical issues tied to travel. Due to this, Igga asserts
that assembling members of the High Command stationed at various
locations under SPLA control was practically difficult. As an example,
he cites the case of Daniel Awet, who was based in Bahr El Ghazel.
Igga argues that it would practically take two to three months for
someone in that location, including Equatoria, to travel to the
Ethiopian border for a meeting of the High Command. The veracity of
this assertion is of course debatable.
Revisiting events prior to December 15, 2013, it would be fair to note
that there seems to be a replay of some of the grievances articulated
in August 1991, not withstanding the personal political ambitions of
the perpetrators of the violence, on both sides of the SPLM political
divide. Observers have noted that since March 2013, the top organ of
the SPLM, the Politburo, has not met, despite repeated calls for the
chair to convene a meeting to address some fundamental issues on
leadership and the general direction of the party. The fate of the
SPLM convention is up in the air as it has been called off on a number
of occasions. Within the party itself, a section feels that its right
to free expression is being curtailed. Most disturbing is the
assertion that there is a slide toward authoritarianism manifested in
disregard for the rules and regulations of the party, including the
country’s interim constitution.
Elsewhere, Reporters Without Borders has noted that there is
increasing intolerance for free speech in South Sudan. Human rights
organizations have fingered the government for abuses in conflict
zones in the country.
Going forward, (and given that there are parallels between August 1991
and December 2013) the impetus is upon the leaders of South Sudan to
draw lessons from their own recent history in order to rectify the
current political impasse in the country. In doing so, the resort to
violence to attain political ends must be condemned and abandoned in
favor of peaceful democratic procedures.
Brian Adeba is an Associate of the Security Governance Group in Canada
and producer of the documentary Waiting for Statehood.
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