Museveni plays peacemaker by day and combatant by night in South Sudan - By
Lesley Anne Warner
Posted on January 31,
2014<http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/31/museveni-plays-peacemaker-by-day-and-combatant-by-night-in-south-sudan-by-lesley-anne-warner/>
 by 
AfricanArgumentsEditor<http://africanarguments.org/author/africanargumentseditor/>


Indeed, the UPDF's helicopter gunships, heavy artillery,
tanks<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49582>,
and approximately 1,600
soldiers<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25759650> have
been instrumental in helping the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
retake cities held by anti-government forces affiliated with former Vice
President Riek Machar. In a motion
passed<http://m.irinnews.org/Report/99494/Doubts-over-Uganda-s-military-intervention-in-South-Sudan>in
the Ugandan parliament to retroactively approve UPDF operations, the
UPDF's *raison
d'ĂȘtre *in South Sudan was couched in terms of protecting the Ugandan
expatriate community, ensuring Ugandan national security, and preventing
genocide and other atrocities against humanity.Within days of the outbreak
of the violence in mid-December, the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF)
deployed to South Sudan at the government's invitation. The UPDF's mission
at the outset was ostensibly to evacuate the over
200,000<http://www.irinnews.org/report/99494/doubts-over-uganda-s-military-intervention-in-south-sudan>stranded
Ugandan nationals and to secure strategic installations in Juba. However,
several weeks into the operation, President Yoweri Museveni
disclosed<http://www.africareview.com/News/Only-nine-Ugandan-soldiers-killed-in-South-Sudan/-/979180/2154464/-/anpkxwz/-/index.html>
that
the UPDF was also involved in combat operations alongside government forces.

Nevertheless, the manner in which Uganda is securing its interests
compromises concurrent efforts on the part of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), of which Uganda is a member, to mediate
the crisis.

Although one of Machar's
'red-lines<http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Machar-group-wants-UPDF-out-of-S--Sudan/-/688334/2136678/-/ur2t3n/-/index.html>'
prior to signing an IGAD-brokered Cessation of Hostilities had been the
presence of the UPDF in South Sudan, he quickly
exhausted<http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/How-the-South-Sudan-ceasefire-was-signed-/-/979182/2158506/-/10k0kloz/-/index.html>any
diplomatic or military leverage to strengthen his hand at the negotiating
table. The Cessation of Hostilities signed last week between the Government
of the Republic of South Sudan (represented by the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army) and the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement/Army-in-Opposition
stipulates<http://aidleap.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/south_sudan_coh_signed.pdf>that
"armed groups and allied forces invited by either side" should be
redeployed and/or progressively withdrawn. Yet, IGAD as a whole is yet to
pressure Uganda to cease playing the diametrically opposed roles of
combatant and peacemaker in South Sudan.

Museveni has long seen the stability of South Sudan as an important element
of Uganda's national security, and has demonstrated his willingness to
intervene in South Sudan's internal and external disputes. During a period
of particularly heightened tensions between Sudan and South Sudan in April
2012, Museveni announced
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article42330>Uganda's
willingness to intervene on the part of the latter in the event of
full-scale war. In addition, between 2010 and 2011, the late General George
Athor led the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A), which was one
of the strongest anti-government armed groups at the time. In December
2011, Museveni invited Athor to Uganda to participate in a confidential
discussion of a Ugandan initiative to sponsor peace talks between the
SSDM/A and the Government of South Sudan.

Days later, Athor was
killed<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16273758> in
an ambush with the SPLA in Central Equatoria, allegedly en route to recruit
additional fighters in a part of South Sudan that was well outside his
normal operating area of Jonglei. The SSDM/A and other anti-SPLA armed
groups subsequently
accused<http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/press-releases/south-sudans-rebel-groups-accuse-uganda-president-of-killing-george-athor-vow-new-offensive>
Museveni
of having Athor assassinated in Kampala and staging his death by ambush in
Equatoria. Coupled with his alleged complicity in Athor's death, Museveni's
December 2013 
threat<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/12/uganda-south-sudan-201312310424812733.html>
that
the nations of East Africa had agreed to go after Machar should he refuse
to accept a ceasefire with the Government of South Sudan, demonstrates that
Museveni's interests are more aligned with maintaining the pre-crisis
status quo than creating the space for a political settlement.

Museveni's relationship with the SPLA spans four decades. During the civil
war, Uganda not only provided financial and military assistance to the SPLA
to fight the Government of Sudan, but the UPDF was even involved in direct
combat operations in South Sudan. Museveni's wartime support for the SPLA
was especially critical between 1991 and 1993 - after the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) toppled the Derg regime,
severed Ethiopian support for the SPLA, and expelled them from their rear
bases. Furthermore, the additional setback posed by Machar's attempt to
unseat the late John Garang as head of the SPLA just months after the loss
of the SPLA's primary source of foreign support made Ugandan support during
this time period vital.

In retribution for Uganda's support for the SPLA, the Government of Sudan
funneled support to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) through Machar and
other anti-SPLA groups to destabilize South Sudan and Uganda. When the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between Sudan and South
Sudan, Machar, who had come back into the SPLA fold, was the lead
negotiator for unsuccessful peace talks with the LRA. Due to the collapse
of the peace talks in 2008 and Machar's history of shifting loyalties,
Museveni may be concerned that if Machar came to power in South Sudan, he
could 
reignite<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/08/south-sudan-peace-talks-falter>
his
civil war-era relationships with Khartoum and the LRA to destabilize
Uganda, despite the fact that the LRA is at its weakest point in years.

Aside from protecting Ugandans in South Sudan and ensuring Ugandan national
security, Uganda also framed its intervention in terms of a need to prevent
"genocidal and other atrocities against humanity." Minister of Defence
Crispus Kiyonga
stated<http://www.irinnews.org/report/99494/doubts-over-uganda-s-military-intervention-in-south-sudan>,
"Africa must learn to defend itself. We saw what happened in Rwanda.
Millions of people were killed as African states and [the] UN looked on. We
must not allow a repeat." As the international community prepares to
commemorate the 20thanniversary of the Rwandan genocide, such overt
references seek to cast Uganda's intervention in a moral, humanitarian
light so as not to reveal Museveni's actual*realpolitik* motivations. Yet,
actions speak louder than words. By acting as a pro-government combatant
rather than in a civilian protection capacity, Uganda has proved that its
rationale of preventing genocide in South Sudan had no real merit.

Considering Uganda's longstanding linkages to the current Government of
South Sudan and Museveni's professed anti-Machar sentiments, UPDF
operations should have occurred under the auspices of IGAD, and with an
African Union or United Nations mandate restricted to protecting civilians
and strategic installations once its mission surpassed the evacuation of
Ugandan nationals. Instead, Uganda's current roles as both combatant and
peace broker run the risk of damaging what is supposed to be a legitimate
and nonpartisan IGAD mediation process.

*Lesley Anne Warner is an Africa analyst at CNA's Center for Strategic
Studies and blogs on African politics and security at Lesley on Africa
<http://lesleyannewarner.wordpress.com/>. Follow her on twitter
 @lesley_warner <https://twitter.com/#%21/lesley_warner>*

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