Addis Ababa: New talks, old problems - By Stephen Arrno
Posted on February 13,
2014<http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/13/addis-ababa-new-talks-old-problems-by-stephen-arrno/>
 by 
AfricanArgumentsEditor<http://africanarguments.org/author/africanargumentseditor/>

Members of the South Sudanese delegation at the current negotitaions taking
place in Addis Ababa.

Whilst many people remain hopeful that the peace talks currently underway
in Addis Ababa will lead to a genuine resolution of the conflict in South
Sudan, we need to understand that both Sudan and South Sudan are currently
dealing with rebellions which came about as a result of a poorly managed
peace accord (the Comprehensive Peace Agreement). It is indeed ironic to
see both countries in a sub-regional forum trying to address internal
conflicts less than three years since they parted ways in a process
considered by mediators and international actors as fair, final and
comprehensive to the problems of the Sudans.

The irony is that the two states are facing very similar problems of
constitution, governance, political space and militarism. In Addis Ababa
each of the Sudans will be independently addressing unfinished CPA business
- both parties have previously worked tirelessly to delay solutions to
these admittedly difficult problems until it was too late and issues
materialised into fully blown violent conflicts returning each country to a
pre-2005 CPA state.

Nevertheless, the resurgence of violence is not a surprise to observers of
Sudanese politics, with many academics and political observers having
forewarned the fragility of an exclusive process with a hastily conducted
referendum that left many issues between and within the Sudans unresolved.

The new Republic of Sudan (North) was the first to become trapped in
conflict, barely a month after the departure of South Sudan, with the
rebellion in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. South Sudan actually averted any
large implosions through its first year of independence until its slide
into conflict last December.

With many blaming external actors (and each country's antagonistic
neighbour) for conflicts, few have defined the crisis of the Sudans as a
result of poor policy choices and priorities. Within the CPA framework
Sudan chose to split, rather than losing an Islamist hegemonic state, while
South Sudanese elites chose a sub-regional role rather than addressing
political aspirations within a broader and diverse Sudan.

Moreover, available CPA evaluation literature blamed Western actors -
notably 'The Troika' (Norway, UK and US) or the IGAD partners' forum-  in
pushing for quick results. Indeed, achieving peace for the Sudans was the
ultimate target of IGAD, but achieving peace at all cost was the desire of
the other international partners who pushed for expedient benchmarks that
yielded hollow results. Some of these results included a preference for a
procedural election without deepening democratic principles and ushering a
referendum without settling some serious concerns that are currently
trapping the two countries in conflict.  The guarantors of the CPA
sometimes behaved as if the accord's benchmarks were items in a cocktail
party list that required ticking off when successfully procured - thus not
giving critical consideration to the consequences of passing flawed
processes.

Sudan would have benefited most from a real democratic transition made by a
genuine election that was both procedural and substantive. In the same way,
South Sudan would have benefited from a post-referendum arrangement that
was accommodative and a transition that was all encompassing for political
actors.

However, despite blame for a 'western' push through a 'flawed process', a
great deal of blame can be left with both parties who set the wrong
priorities and the easiest goals to achieve - thus avoiding offering
permanent solutions to Sudan's perennial problems. The policy choices taken
by both parties during the CPA period shaped the current trends and led to
the explosions over identical issues of governance and management of
diversity.

The NCP was the first to adopt an exclusive policy banning its main
opponent, the SPLM, from political space in Sudan under the pretext that it
is a 'foreign' political party.  South Sudan on the other hand did little
to build its highly fractured society, instead ushering in restrictive
legislatures affecting political parties, civil society and the media.
Moreover, the SPLM as a ruling party has hardly demonstrated the ideals of
democracy within its rank and file either during its liberation years,
political partnership with the NCP or more recently in government. The same
leaders calling for democracy within the SPLM today are the ones who
designed the laws and legislation blocking democratic practices within the
newly-independent state and ruling party.

With the two parties independently grappling with issues that they could
have resolved jointly during the CPA period, there is an opportunity for
regional and international actors to avoid repeating past mistakes. IGAD
member states need to learn from past shortcomings - such as how the Somali
peace talks were complicated due to regional rivalries and disconcerted
efforts by members.

The current round of talks over the Sudans is an opportunity for
international actors to reflect on a solution that will not in the future
regenerate within a different context. It is time to realise that working
for the independence of South Sudan at the expense of a democratic
transition and deepening democratic principles has made it necessary for
the same actors to work tirelessly to re-unite the Sudans economically
within the cooperation agreement.

For success to be achieved in both Sudans it is high time for both parties
to pause and reflect on thirty years of militarism that has facilitated a
resurgence of conflicts and instability. Both IGAD and the AUHIP currently
mediating conflicts for the Sudans must realise that they are dealing with
the same problems and actors within different contexts, which means there
is need for the involvement of a third voice.

This could be the time for the Sudans to take Justice Africa's 'Civil
Project' <http://beta.justiceafrica.com/what-we-do/civil-project/> proposal
seriously and to usher in a transition for a permanent settlement of
conflicts and democratic principles. Without this, the two countries will
forever be trapped in a two country one system trajectory.

*Stephen Arrno is a Political Analyst working in South Sudan. These views
are his own.*

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"South Sudan Info - The Kob" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/SouthSudanKob.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/SouthSudanKob/CAJb14orAU5FCfGNM4Q90rO3n7Nvgt7w6ZGAo5C0sO%3DSKcEgyWw%40mail.gmail.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to