If the SPLA Collapse, South Sudan Will Go Down With It
"The viability and survival of South Sudan as an independent nation depends
on the strength of the SPLA. If the SPLA'S integrity is affected by
politics or the SPLA divides along tribal line, as is now the case; then
South Sudan, as nation, is weaken and would not, surely, withstand."
 09 March 2014
  By

 Morris Kuol Yoll

(Gurtong Edited/published)-If you have seen the Sudan People Liberation
Army's forces running in disarray, in an ambush while matching to retake
Town of Bor from rebel, your question would have been: what has happened to
the mighty SPLA forces that defeated the Sudanese Army, the SPLA which
forced the regime of Omar Hassan el Bashir to accept peaceful solution to
the Sudan's civil war, and the SPLA that did not waver in confronting odds
in pursuit of South Sudan's freedom from vicious Sudanese armed forces?
 Twice, the SPLA lost Bor town to combinations of defected army and
ill-trained White Army civilians coerced into fighting government troops.

In Malakal, the story is even the same or worst.  The Sudan People
Liberation Army's troops were forced to retreat from the city, three times,
by the White Army militias, leaving civilians to be slaughtered in
Hospitals and properties, both government and private, looted and
destroyed.  Subsequently, various rebels' victories over the SPLA forces
are unrelenting in Jonglei and Upper Nile states.

Several opinions indicate that the Sudan People Liberation Army, the SPLA,
has been weakened.  It is heartbreaking to see an army once known for its
gallantry and decisive fearsome victories, during liberation struggle,
falling apart.  It is obvious; the SPLA has failed to protect civilians and
properties especially in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity State, making many
people to question the strength of the SPLA and its capability in defending
a nation's sovereignty and interest or whether it is strong enough to
defeat current rebellion that emanated from failed coup attempt.  Clearly,
lacks of training, discipline, tribalism, corruption and politics have
affected the SPLA.

After civil war, it was expected that the SPLA would be well trained,
equipped with modern weaponry to meet challenges and duties of a national
army to make it ready to defend nation's sovereignty, territorial
integrity, interest, public and national security.  Sadly, after December 15
th coup attempt, the SPLA appeared weaker than when it was a rebellion
army.  It is troublesome to fathom weak national army in time of needs.
The unfortunate event of December 15th has unveiled weakness about the SPLA
that is bothersome since security of the country defends purely on the
competence of the SPLA forces that brought sovereignty to South Sudan
nation.

With Abyei issue unsettled, various territories in dispute with the Sudan
and boundary demarcation yet to be settle between two Sudans, it is obvious
that the Sudanese regime would never agree to peaceful settlement of
anything knowing that South Sudan is a weak state, militarily.  Indeed, the
Sudan will sooner or later support *missiyieria* tribes to attack or grab
more South Sudan's land along its border or support rebellion in South
Sudan to impede peaceful settlement of outstanding issues between it and
South Sudan. Unquestionably, South Sudan would collapse if the SPLA is weak
to battle both internal and external aggression.

Seriously, military leaders of the SPLA should use December 15th incident
to immediately address the SPLA'S deficiencies.  The Sudan People
Liberation Army (the SPLA) is the army of South Sudan as stipulated by the
Constitution.  The SPLM Constitution envisaged the post-war SPLA to be
a *non-partisan,
patriotic, nationalistic, professional, disciplined, and productive and
subordinated to the political wing; destined as principal military
instrument of the New Sudan liberation.* These characteristics of the SPLA,
as a national army, were [are] clearly jeopardized and discredited by
December 15th failed coup attempt.

The Sudan People Liberation Army (the SPLA) did not exhibit
professionalism, patriotism, no-partisan and nationalism it started with
and of which it was destined to prefect.  If anything, the SPLA inclined to
division along tribal loyalty and affiliation, which weakened its stand to
fight as a conventional army disciplined and trained to protect nation's
sovereignty against current rebellion and future foreign aggression.

It is clear that the SPLA did not train as a conventional, non-partisan
army to meet requirements of being a national army poise to protect its
citizens, properties, territorial integrity, and national security:
Killing of unarmed civilians on December 15th and defection along tribal
line attest to undisciplined and untrained national army.

Irrefutably, South Sudan has, at its disposal, enough manpower to build a
strong, formidable army; when already, and in fact, the SPLA has enough men
& women to function effectively as a strong army.  Nevertheless, an army is
not about the number but training and discipline, it got, makes the army.
Though the Sudan People liberation Army (the SPLA) was a well-trained and
discipline guerrilla army, it should have been a MUST to convert former
guerrilla soldiers, through new training, to a conventional national army
with more discipline, responsibility, awareness, leadership, and allegiance
to commit to protecting constitution and to achieve a viable standard of
national army and security forces.

In fact, many factors necessary to retaining the Sudan People Liberation
Army (the SPLA) conspicuously presented themselves after the war was over.
 But surprisingly, these factors were not capitalized on or not taken
seriously by both the SPLM/A leadership to rejuvenate its ailing army.

The SPLA was over twenty years old when the peace agreement was brokered
with the Sudanese regime.  Logically, it should have been explicit that
much of the SPLA force was old or getting old and exhausted by war to
justify revitalization.  Hence, after peace agreement, a committed new
generation of military recruits should have been recommended to replace an
old army.  Most importantly, in leadership concern, retaining old SPLA
officers and commanders that would lead a retained SPLA conventional
national army should have been a *requisite*.  Indeed, a group of trained
officers with national objectives would set a course of rebuilding a
future, mechanized, well train national army.  Not the least, in a
tribalized, illiterate military setting, a few trained officers would cast
some wisdom and light on importance of committing to a military line of
duty regardless of tribal sentiments in the military.

Secondly, illiteracy was [is] very high in the SPLA.  Nearly 90% of the
SPLA men and women are illiterate.  An effective, modern army requires
education to make it more productive, practical and effective in realizing
its role and allegiance to the nation and in executing its missions and
objectives.

Educating the SPLA was not realized after peace agreement, but left to
naturally take its cause.  So, the national army remains with high
illiteracy rate to present day, which makes it susceptible to tribal
loyalty, an affiliation, judged by December 15th mutinies and defections
that proceeded.

Thirdly, the SPLA absorbed various, untrained and tribally oriented
militias, immediately, after peace agreement was signed.  Such absorption
alone should have made it necessary to retain the army to accomplish
national objectives.  But it was ignored and the result of that mistake was
also *pronounced* by December 15th mutinies and defections along tribal
line that ensues.

Fourthly, with war fatigue and exhaustion, it was comprehensible that a
sizeable portion of the SPLA force would resign from military into various
duties comprising retirement, civil servant, personal business, etc.  This
was later the case, and by 2009, it was apparent, and reported, that 75% of
the SPLA forces were combinations of incorporated militias and new recruits
that joined the SPLA after the peace agreement was signed.

Much of what was an OLD Sudan People Liberation Army (the SPLA) forces were
discouraged from continuing with military carrier, retired or resigned to
doing private business or had joined civil servant.  Even though the number
of the SPLA swelled, in total, to about 150,000 or more, it was evident
that lots of its original members left the military line of duty without
proper replacement that left national army to former militia forces
dominance and which in turn created disloyalty and vacuum that is now
haunting the SPLA as a national army.

As of recent, South Sudan Government official admitted huge number, about
[10,000-20,000], defection of former militia soldiers to fight for
opposition and 65-70% is feared to defect in total.

Tribal loyalty has cost the SPLA immensely.  It has coerced even most loyal
SPLA officers and commanders into joining their kin and kiths and sold the
SPLA'S tactics, military knowledge and experiences to disloyal, now tribal
oriented forces, fighting against the SPLA and the government after
December 15th.

Fifthly, from many fronts, and particularly tribalism in the military, the
SPLA appears belligerent and near annihilation.  Negatively, the SPLA is
profiled as a DINKA and NUER dominated army, which created negative
sentiments and fear that would make it difficult to adjust the army to meet
national objectives without triggering turbulence.

Though such prognosis has truth elements in it, the circumstance that led
to such imbalance and dominance were [are] not critically and objectively
looked at with intent to reform and modernize the SPLA to meet criterion of
an inclusive national army rather than negative propaganda to discredit and
destroy the military.

Initially, during liberation struggle, it was a known fact that the SPLA
formed on voluntary basis.  It occurred that DINKAS and NUERS turned out in
huge numbers and formed a core base for the Sudanese people Liberation Army
during the years of struggle.  Such dominance was not designed nor planned,
but a voluntary called that led into an imbalance that could not, at the
time, be rejected since a huge army, regardless of the tribe, was required
as an instrument to attain the liberation of people.

However, after liberation was achieved and nation building demands
necessary adjustment in the military to conform to the ruling system of the
country, such imbalance in the SPLA should have been corrected or stand to
be corrected to meet the objectives and demands for building an inclusive
national army without jeopardizing or stereotyping the integrity of the
army.  It requires studied policy and plan, both short and long term, to
both scale down and promote the army until the objective of forming an
inclusive national army is achieve to satisfaction of the system and all
[regions] in the country.

Sixthly, and which had equally impacted integrity of the SPLA forces,
incorporation of various tribal militias into the SPLA has been negatively
stereotyped.  It was a noble plan to make peace with militias to attain
harmony in the country.  The assimilation of tribally dominated militias
into national army should not be viewed as a bad idea than strategy
intended to achieve stability in the country.

Nevertheless, after these militia forces signed peace agreement with
government, training and securitizing them should have immediately
commenced to ensure reorientation in order to meet national army
requirements.  Failure in retaining and orienting militias, after they were
admitted into the national army, left militia forces in a tribal euphoria
still viewing their role as forces loyal to their respective tribes of
which its negative resultant disloyalty manifested itself in defection
after December 15th.

Yet, tribalism in the SPLA could potentially lead to the collapse of the
army and the nation if not decisively address because December
15thincident has alienated integrity of the military.

On one hand, Corruption in the SPLA is another culprit that had impacted
effectiveness and positive role of the army.  After peace agreement, the
SPLA men & women were put in military payroll.  But preposterously,
elements in the military deployed use of ghost names to swindle from
military budget.  This unpatriotic act allowed corruption to throttle
national army.  Many ghost names made it into military payroll, when over
ranking number of military officers and commanders increased as well.  The
ghost's names used become lucrative business as money goes directly to
networks of commanding officers and commanders.  Besides, high ranking
serves as means of doubling salaries.

In conjunction, these practices created corruption in the military that
deprive soldiers of receiving their salaries on time due to money shortage,
and as well had impeded developing professional military norms.  In fact,
some soldiers are said to have several times been out-rightly denied
receiving their salaries making some soldiers to quit service or do
military as part time work while engaged in doing personal businesses to
survive.

Moreover, politics have also affected the SPLA.  The SPLA affiliation to
the SPLM has adverse effect on the military since senior commanders are
presented as politicians than army commanders, when the SPLM constitution
declared the SPLA as a *subordinated* military wing to the SPLM political
leadership.

In the past eight (8) years, loyal SPLA military commanders turned
governors, ministers, and commissioners depriving the army of its needed
leadership when senior and experienced military commanders should have
stayed in the army to develop national army.  Indeed, after South Sudan
gained its independence, military colleges should have been opened and
senior military personnel, active and retired, made to teach and train the
army in military academies.

Since South Sudan is independent, the SPLA should be developed as an
independent institution, loyal to all political parties in the country.
Clearly, the SPLA is more inclined to the SPLM party and that connection
has deluded and endangered its role has a national army, which would
inevitably destroy it, if it hasn't done already, since the SPLM'S
political divide has manifested itself in the SPLA as mutinies, defection
in clear support of the SPLM political dissidents.

Today, the SPLA forces are battling enemy within its rank and file and
rebels in frontline fields, making it appallingly and apparently difficult
to fight rebellion in the country.  This should be a clear lesson to the
SPLA military, as an institution, to seriously take reforming itself as a
viable national army institution, independent of any political affiliation
in the country.

The viability and survival of South Sudan as an independent nation depends
on the strength of the SPLA.  If the SPLA'S integrity is affected by
politics or the SPLA divides along tribal line, as is now the case; then
South Sudan, as nation, is weaken and would not, surely, withstand.  So far
we have clearly seen Uganda's military playing critical role in defending
South Sudan's sovereignty.

Then ridiculously, the Sudan government has volunteered to send in its
military to help in protecting South Sudan's oil fields, a trick or pretext
that would possibly allow Bashir, in future, should things turn to worst
and South Sudan unable to protect its oil production, to occupy South Sudan
rich-oil land legitimately if allowed, because the Sudan has its interest
at stake.

And not the least, South Sudan government has revealed its weakness more by
asking for IGAD'S military backing to protect its oil fields and oil
installations; when the UN forces are invited into the country and *are
currently doing* *what only God knows*.

In fact, vulnerability exhibited by South Sudan, as a country with vast,
rich natural resources, has now prompted forces of doom and darkness to
orchestrate regional war in South Sudan to justify their selfish aim.

South Sudan government and the SPLA, as a defence force of our sovereignty,
have to wake up and reform to avert looming dooms that are threatening the
nation.  Allowing foreign forces, whether be it the UN forces or ally army,
in form of Uganda forces, to converge in the country is *NOT* to the best
interest of South Sudan and its people.

With the SPLA that liberated the country, South Sudan cannot be that weak
to protect its own citizens to merit calling in the UN forces to protect
them nor is the Sudan People Liberation Army (the SPLA) that weak to merit
Uganda or the Sudan's protection of its interest.

Unfortunately, foreign intervention to rescue the nation and the UN forces
present to protect citizens had already occurred in our watch.  This is
shameful!  The government of South Sudan and the SPLA should immediately
stop both external and internal fueling of South Sudan's conflict in
pretext that South Sudan is weak to protect its sovereignty, people or
interest.

Specifically, South Sudan government and the SPLA leadership should
consider building strong army, free of tribalism and political influences,
to decisively fight and defeat its rebellion without foreign assistance and
as well protect its oil production and any other interest with no foreign
help.

South Sudan government, its political leaders, and above all its national
army, the SPLA, should be conscious of invaluable resources that South
Sudan possesses.  From oil and gas, arable agricultural land, minerals,
water, etc., South Sudan is an envy of both friends and foes.  Our
limitless resources attract both foes and friends of depraved intention to
the country, but to satisfy their insatiable greed of acquiring wealth.

We live in the 21st century where the world population hit 7 billion but
needs resources to sustain, a 21st century where global warming threaten
lifestyle of people who have known nothing but exploitation of the weak.
Our vast resources are our problem that needs strong military to fence off
adversaries.

This says that we cannot afford depending on foreign forces nor afford
having tribalism, corruption and politics that would potentially destroy
our national army that is the *only* viable instrument and armour of our
defence.  Vehemently, I call for our leaderships, both the government and
the SPLA, to step up in reforming and rebuilding the army to safeguard our
sovereignty and interest.

To achieve this, requires both leaderships to get rid of tribalism,
corruption, politics and illiteracy in the military in order to build an
inclusive, effective, strong military force that will not waver in
defending country from internal or external aggression.  SPLA OYEE!



*Morris Kuol Yoll is a concerned South Sudanese Canadian residing in
Alberta Canada.  He could be reach at:  [email protected]
<[email protected]>.*
 Posted in: 
Opinions<http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/CategoryView/mid/519/categoryId/24/Opinions.aspx>

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