The sheikh and the officer: a tale

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By Magdi El Gizouli

March 21, 2014 - Omer al-Bashir stood outside the presidential guest
house on 14 March to receive Hassan al-Turabi, the two men offered the
camera wide grins as they shook hands, and proceeded through the door
with guards on their sides to a wide hall where they were joined by
loyal captains, other men in jellabiyas with a common history and
shared memories. From President Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP)
there were Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, Nafie Ali Nafie, Ibrahim Ghandoor,
and the President's new deputy Bakri Hassan Salih, in addition to
Ibrahim Ahmed Omer, Awad al-Jaz and Mustafa Osman Ismail. Turabi was
accompanied by his deputy Abdalla Hassan Ahmed and his long-term
companion and trusted aide Ibrahim al-Sanosi, behind them a younger
crew of Turabists including Bashir Adam Rahama, Kamal Omer and Mohamed
al-Amin Khalifa.

The 'get together' was by all means an anti-climax, closer to a
mujamala (courtesy) drop by than a meeting of political giants as
popularised by the NCP's media machine, partially because the real
meetings, where the hard bargaining reportedly took place, had already
happened in the dark of night, much like the distraught prayers of
repenting sinners. On that assumption, the 14 March encounter was an
event for the cameras where the attendants simply played themselves.
Suitable armchairs were placed in a row at one end of the hall for the
men of calibre to occupy. The footage on Sudan TV showed Omer
al-Bashir sitting in the middle of the schoolboys' row, to his right
Hassan al-Turabi and then Abdalla Hassan Ahmed and to his left Bakri
Hassan Salih followed by Ibrahim Ghandoor. The five men were
positioned at the head of two arcs of armchairs where the delegates of
the two parties sat facing each other in the President's divan. Thanks
to the presence of two women, Samya Ahmed Mohamed from the NCP and
Thuraya Omer from the PCP, dirty jokes were out of question I suppose.
The delegates chatted the time away with the help of refreshing drinks
served by impeccably dressed catering staff, a good hour or so, before
spokesmen announced an agreement to agree on a timeline and agenda for
'national dialogue', the current buzzword in Sudan's political club.

The Bashir-Turabi meeting, conveniently held on a Friday, the Muslim
day of rest, was reported live on Sudan TV's evening news bulletin and
subsequently made the headlines of every printed newspaper in the
country on Saturday, but with almost no content to accompany the
announcement. Editors had only the past to fill the white of their
pages, profiles of the two men, the sheikh and the officer, and
summary re-runs of their dramatic divorce fifteen years ago. The
notion that a cordial encounter between competing lords would open a
new chapter in political life has deep roots in the imaginary of the
ruling elite. Indeed, commentators wishing to implant life into the
Bashir-Turabi mujamala drew a comparison with the historic 'meeting of
the two sayeds', the patron of the Khatmiyya Ali Mirghani and the
patron of the Ansar Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, on 3 December 1955 in the
run up to the declaration of Sudan's independence on 1 January 1956.

At the time, Sudan was poised for a self-determination referendum to
ascertain its political future, choice being between association with
Egypt, the declared objective of the National Unionist Party (NUP)
affiliated with the Khatmiyya, or complete independence, the rallying
cry of the Ansar's Umma Party. The self-rule elections of 1953 had
delivered government to the NUP with Ismail al-Azhari as prime
minister. By August 1955 discussions were underway about a
self-determination referendum under the supervision of an
international committee joining representatives of seven countries
chosen by parliament. The opposition Umma Party and the independent
press called for a 'national government' to lead the country through
self-determination but Azhari, the Prime Minister, balked arguing the
democratic credentials of his government. Azhari's position however
did not find favour with Ali al-Mirghani, who nursed suspicions of
Azhari's popularity and autonomous machinations. Division between Ali
al-Mirghani, the sheikh, and his officer Ismail al-Azhari led to the
collapse of the government. Under instructions of the sheikh, a
handful of NUP members of parliament joined the opposition in voting
down the government's budget proposal on 10 November 1955. A majority
of NUP parliamentarians, mostly Azhari loyalists, declared on 11
November their objection to the formation of a 'national government'.
On the next day, 12 November, delegates of Ali al-Mirghani met with
Azhari in Omdurman to negotiate a settlement. The Khatmiyya's
newspaper, Sawt al-Sudan, published on 14 November a statement issued
by Ali al-Mirghani advising all political forces in the county to
eschew partisan rivalry and commit to 'national' interests, phrasing
that translated into support for formation of a national government.
Azhari and his captains met with Ali al-Mirghani on 14 November to
sort out the situation. According to the reporting of al-Ray al-Aam,
Ali al-Mirghani said he did not specifically want a 'national
government' but a government of a national character. Accordingly, Ali
al-Mirghani instructed parliamentarians under his authority to vote
Azhari back as prime minister and indeed Azhari won confidence of the
house on 15 November with a margin of two votes. Hassan al-Tahir
Zaroug, the single communist member of parliament representing the
Anti-Imperialist Front, abstained.

Ali Mirghani still had a card to play against the stubborn Azhari
though. The Khatmiyya patron met on 3 December with his arch-rival,
Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi of the Ansar. A joint statement issued by the
two sayeds said they had reconciled and agreed to work together for
the good of the nation, and expressed their hope that the political
parties under their influence, the NUP and the Umma Party, would agree
to form a 'national government'. The message obviously targeted
Azhari's ambitions. Under pressure, Azhari's cabinet announced on 6
December 1955 an invitation to the political parties to negotiations
on formation of a 'national government'. The talks between the ruling
NUP and the Umma Party, while they did take place, proved a futile
exercise, since Azhari refused to surrender the premiership to a
consensual candidate. Faced with the impending possibility of a
Khatmiyya-Ansar alliance that would undercut his parliamentary support
and almost inevitably cost him his office, Azhari's stroke of genius
was a motion to parliament on 19 December to declare Sudan a sovereign
independent country. Nobody in the house could vote against him. To
discipline Azhari, Ali al-Mirghani had to form his own party, the
People's Democratic Party and capture government in alliance with the
Umma Party against Azhari's NUP. When all space for manoeuvring was
consumed, the two sayeds, Ali and Abd al-Rahman, agreed to invite the
army leadership to take over on 17 November 1958.

Now, Bashir and Turabi might imagine themselves two sayeds doing
business, but their prayers, unlike those of the baraka-laden Ali and
Abd al-Rahman, do not echo far beyond the presidential divan. In the
really existing 'New Sudan', even a Rizeigati chief like Musa Hilal
has a separate sheikhdom, protected by the steel baraka of guns
mounted on hijacked vehicles.

The author is a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute. He publishes
regular opinion articles and analyses at his blog Still Sudan. He can
be reached at [email protected]

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