Comprehensive Outlook On War and Peace In South Sudan
"Chances of President Kiir and Riek Machar ever facing the wrath of
the law are very slim in South Sudan. Given the experiences of
international community (the ICC) in Kenya and the Sudan, it may as
well be plausible to bet that the perpetrators of violence crimes in
South Sudan may never be..."
06 January 2015
By PaanLuel Wël, Juba
A Comprehensive Outlook on War and Peace in the Republic of South
Sudan in the Context of the Present Civil War
On the 18th of December 2014, the warring South Sudanese factions
resumed the stalled peace talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This was
after IGAD mediators had given them 15-day ultimatum to consult and to
reach a political compromise over the outstanding issues within the
parameters of the proposed power sharing arrangements leading to the
formation of the transitional government of national unity, comprising
of all the stakeholders in the conflict pitting the government of
President Kiir and the rebels of Dr. Riek Machar.
The recommencement of the peace talks, however, born little fruits in
insofar as furthering the pace of the peace talks is concerned.
Apparently, the consultative conferences have hardened positions on
both sides, leading to some reneging on previously agreed clauses of
the IGAD-brokered power sharing accord. Hence, the talks were abruptly
adjourned on December 21st, allegedly for Christmas break. The New
Year 2015 has seen the renewal of fighting in and around Nasir and
Bentiu, and palpable fear for more violence in and around Ayod in
Jonglei and Renk in Upper Nile state.
How did it all come to this quagmire? This is a briefing on the
outlook for how the current conflict between government forces and the
SPLM-IO led by former vice president, Dr. Riek Machar, has so far
developed and how it might progress in the next months or years,
including the existing hurting stalemate on the ongoing South Sudan’s
peace talks in the Ethiopian capital city of Addis Ababa.
II
Currently, most of the major towns in the conflict-affected states of
Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states—Bor, Gadiang, Ayod, Malakal,
Nasir, Mayom, Bentiu etc.—that were once captured by the rebels are
under government control. The government has considerable present in
all the counties of Upper Nile state, and all the counties of Unity
state except Leer County (the birthplace of Riek Machar).
In Jonglei state, however, majorities of the counties are still under
formidable control of the rebels. This could be due to the fact that
the Lou Nuer white army is from Jonglei, mostly from the three
counties—Akobo, Nyirol and Uror—of Lou Nuer community. These are the
remaining strongholds of Riek Machar’s rebels.
The Lou Nuer pride themselves of having fought off the British in the
19th century under the leadership of Guek Ngundeng, the son of the
famed Lou Nuer prophet, Ngundeng Bong. Guek was captured and killed by
the British and the resistance was crushed.
However, the legacy of that resistance inspires and sustains the war
spirit of the Lou Nuer white army today against the government of
President Kiir.
While Ayod town is under the government control, the rebels control
the county itself (inhabited by the Gawaar Nuer). That is also true of
other Nuer counties in Jonglei such as Fangak and Waat, even though
the headquarters of Fangak County was said to have been captured and
still being maintained by government forces.
Even if the government were to take all the major towns in Jonglei and
Upper Nile states, and Leer County in Unity state, the rebels would
still have considerable control over the countryside. This was the
case during the war between the SPLM/A and Khartoum. The Khartoum
government used to control the major towns in Southern Sudan while the
SPLM/A controlled the entire countryside. Khartoum was compelled to
seek political settlement resulting in the CPA. The same could be the
case with the Machar’s rebels and the government of President Kiir.
Riek Machar is not oblivious to this glaring fact. This is the basis
of his negotiation in Addis Ababa.
While there is palpable military stalemate in the battlefields across
the country, the fact that the rebels have lost significant ground to
the government is a cause for consternation among the rebel delegates
to the IGAD-led South Sudan’s peace talks in Ethiopia. The rebels
appear to be under the impression that the more towns the government
takes from them, the more reluctant the government would pursue
peaceful means to the conflict through a political
compromise/settlement (i.e. endorsement and implementation of the
proposed transitional government) under the mediation of the IGAD
countries.
Moreover, there is a reason to believe that the government may
backtrack from the peace talks were they to capture more towns from
the rebels.
That would be a blunder because the rebels would still control the
countryside and they would continue to press on and attack the major
towns. A back and forth capture and recapturing of the towns witnessed
in earlier 2014 may resumed, once more.
It was dangerously expensive and pointlessly imprudent. A military
stalemate would be the most likely military outcome, not a win-win
best-case scenario for any of the warring camps.
There is likely to be more fighting in and around major towns such as
Mayom, Bentiu, Nasir, Renk, Ayod and Malakal in this dry season,
conceivably before the resumption of the next round of peace talks.
Reportedly, there is fighting already around Nasir and Bentiu. A fall
of towns such as Renk (Upper Nile) and/or Bentiu (Unity state) to the
rebels would definitely extend the conflict to the oilfields—that is
Paloch oilfields in Upper Nile state if Renk and/or Malakal were to
fall to the rebels; and Panrieng and Tharjath oilfields in Unity state
if Bentiu and Mayom were to fall to the rebels.
If Ayod falls to the rebels, the fighting would spread to Gadiang and
Bortown would be threatened if not attacked/taken by the rebels. That
would bring the war to the gravity witnessed in late December 2013 and
earlier January 2014 when the fighting almost came to Juba city.
It was expected that the dawn of the last year rainy season would
greatly inhibit the movement of government heavy war equipment and
weapons, that the rebels would be on the offensive and would possibly
retake some towns from the government. That has not materialized,
however, because the white army seems to have lost much of their
earlier war morale and numbers.
The white army numbers, which can’t be readily replenished, have
substantially dwindled with time. (It appears most the Nuer youth were
mobilized in the first assaults in December 2013 through much of the
early part of 2014 and few were left for further recruitment).
Furthermore, the fact that the government had successfully thwarted
their attempt to take Juba in late December 2013 and earlier January
2014 had a profound impact on the fighting momentum of the white army
who were made to believe that it would be a matter of few battles
before Juba would fall and President Kiir depose.
With the rebels having made no military gains in the rainy season (the
government forces have actually extended their hold on Nasir and areas
around it), it is highly likely that the military stalemate as it is
now would continue to be the case in the forthcoming dry season. The
government has no compelling incentive to go into the
countryside/villages/counties were rebels mobilize to attack major
towns such as Nasir, Bentiu, Renk, Ayod and Malakal. This is mainly
because the government forces would be outnumbered and defeated were
they to venture outside the major towns within the Nuer territory.
Therefore, it is likely to be the case that the fighting would take
the form of rebels mobilizing in the countryside—and across the border
in the neighboring Sudan—and then launch combination of sporadic and
sustained military attacks on the government garrison towns. Some of
these towns such as Bentiu and Nasir could fall to the rebels, though
it is unlikely that the rebels would successfully defend and maintain
them for long (as have been shown to be the case in Nasir and Bentiu
which have, mid last year, been temporarily taken over by the rebels
but then retaken by the government forces).
There are valid indications therefore to think that, at the moment,
the government is simply happy and somehow prepared to defend major
towns—Nasir, Ayod, Renk, Malakal, Bentiu, Mayom and Gadiang—from rebel
attacks; on the other hand, the rebels would continue to launch a
blend of sustained and sporadic attacks on these vulnerable towns in
spite of their supposedly commitment to the cessation of hostility
(CoH) agreement. Much of these military manoeuvres by the warring
parties is, and will continue to be, done with the conviction that it
would strengthen government’/rebels’ hands at the negotiating table in
Addis Ababa.
After all, Riek Machar, the rebel leader, is on record that it is the
government that has been taking rebel held-towns even after the
signing of the CoH. In other words, the rebels perceive their
continued offensive attacks (presented as counter-offensive response
to government aggression) as righting the wrong done to them, which
they argue the IGAD has not done (that is, forcing the government to
withdraw from towns (Bentiu and Nasir) taken from the rebels after the
signing of the CoH.
III
However, whether the fighting between the rebels and the government
would be sporadic clashes, big escalation or successful retake of the
above cited towns (by the rebels) will most likely be determined by
the degree of military and logistics support Khartoum will continued
to extend to the rebels of Dr. Riek Machar. It would also depend on
how much President Museveni of Uganda would be prepared to support
President Kiir of South Sudan.
It is not a secret that Khartoum is not amused by the continued
military and logistics support provided to the government of President
Kiir by President Museveni of Uganda whose troops (UPDF) had fought
alongside the SPLA in late December 2013 and earlier January 2014
along the Juba-Bor highway.
Most of the UPDF are now stationed in strategic places around Juba and
Bortown and there are some reports that some were temporarily taken to
Malakal when it was under attack from the rebels earlier last year.
Intriguingly, the rebels and the government of Uganda recently signed
a memorandum of understanding (after much feuding and glitches) in
which the rebels have agreed to the continued presence of UPDF in
South Sudan, allegedly to protect civilians caught up in the
crossfire.
It is possible that President Museveni might have traded off something
to get such concession from the rebels who have all along been adamant
that the continued presence of UPDF on the South Sudanese soil is a
grave violation of not just the CoH but also of South Sudan’s national
integrity and territorial sovereignty.
Perhaps, Museveni has extended his recognition of the rebels under
Riek Machar in exchange for that concession—allowing the UPDF to
remain in South Sudan until the conflict is over. After all, Museveni
have already come out disputing Juba’s version of the alleged failed
coup attempt (in a meeting in Addis Ababa after meeting Riek Machar
for the first time since the December 15th mutiny). The outspoken
spokesperson of the UPDF in South Sudan is on record declaring that
they would not hesitate to defend Bortown if it were to come under
attack from the rebels.
With the recent memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Kampala and
the rebels, it is not clear what would happen should the fighting
reach Bortown where the UPDF is stationed. Will Ugandan troops stay
neutral as per the MOU or take the government side, as has been the
case since they arrived in South Sudan in late December 2013?
There is reason to suppose that the UPDF would stick with supporting
the government against the rebels in spite of MOU. Museveni might have
warmed up to the rebels in order to regain his challenged legitimacy
at the negotiating table in Addis Ababa where Uganda is a leading
member of the IGAD. It was unsustainable for President Museveni to be
considered as an honest peace broker while publicly backing the side
of the government. The MOU with the rebel allowed him to navigate his
way while still executing his will—talking of killing two birds with
one stone.
As for the Sudan, much would depend on how much continued Ugandan
support would threaten the rebels (like what the Sri Lankan government
did to the Tamil Tigers). Khartoum has been supplying military
hardware, safe passage to Renk and Bentiu, some training and logistics
support, to the rebels. Khartoum is interested to see a long-drawn out
fight between the government and the rebels so as to weaken the whole
country. A weakened South Sudan would not be able to stand up to
Khartoum in so far as Abyei area, border demarcation, disputed
oilfields and towns and other outstanding issues such as the pipeline
and transit fees etc. are concerned.
Khartoum is also aware of the alleged presence of Darfur rebels in
South Sudan. Darfur rebels and soldiers of the SPLM-North are reported
to have fought alongside the SPLA in Bentiu. Thus, Khartoum support
for the rebels and the Juba courting of the Darfur rebels and
SPLM-North soldiers tantamount to a proxy war between Juba and
Khartoum. Darfuri rebels and the SPLM-North discern that a defeat of
President Kiir by the rebels of Riek Machar would be a disaster to
their military campaign against Khartoum.
Given the substantial support given to the rebels so far by Khartoum,
it is conceivable that Khartoum may not be that unsettled were the
rebels to take (and successfully defend) the oilfields from the
government. If at all, it could be that Khartoum would double their
support for the rebels so as to defend and maintain their control of
the oilfields. Riek Machar is reportedly on record that were the
rebels to take the oilfields, then he would share the oil revenue
50-50 with the government of Khartoum. Khartoum would certainly be
comfortable with that tentative offer.
The other party to this conflict is Ethiopia, which has been presented
by Juba as favoring the rebel side, at least politically. While there
is no concrete evidence to back up this view, it should be noted that
unlike Uganda or Sudan, Ethiopia is the one hosting the IGAD-led peace
talks in Addis Ababa between the rebels and the government. Moreover,
there is a large population of Jikany Nuer citizens in the Gambella
region of southwestern Ethiopia. There has been pronounced conflict
between the Ethiopian Nuer and the Anyuak in the Gambella region. The
Ethiopian Nuers, like their cousins in South Sudan, wholeheartedly
support Riek Machar to take the leadership of South Sudan in whatever
means possible.
Ethiopia worried that the fighting in South Sudan, if not handled well
and arrested in time, may spill over into Ethiopia. Already, there are
tens of thousands of Nuer refugees in Ethiopia and they have settled
in the Gambella region among their Nuer cousins. They are armed and
could foment trouble in Ethiopia.
The significance of Gambella region to problems in South Sudan has
some historical precedence too. For example, when the SPLM/A was
founded in 1983, it was mostly in Gambela region because of the
Ethiopian Nuers who were then wholeheartedly backing South Sudanese
revolutionary struggle against Khartoum.
What is felt (projected/presented) in Juba as an apparent Ethiopian
support to the rebels (Nuer) is possibly the calculated attempt by
Ethiopia to strike the right balance in resolving the conflict in
South Sudan. Therefore, in contrast against the backdrop of Uganda
continued support to Juba, Ethiopia, to the government in Juba, is
seen to be backing the rebels.
IV
The fighting between the rebels and the government will also depend on
whether or not the IGAD countries would be ready, willing and able to
levy heavy punishment on the violators of the signed (but largely
neglected) Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement between the
government and the rebels. Both sides have been violating the CoH
agreement with impunity, prompting the IGAD nations to threaten stiff
sanction on the top leaders of the warring factions. In spite of the
continued violation of the CoH in and around Bentiu and Nasir and
Renk, and despite the fact that the two warring camps have failed to
agree to the formation of the IGAD-proposed interim government within
60 days, IGAD has not been brave enough to effect their threat of
levying sanction on the said leaders.
The reading on the wall appears to be that any sanction—think of the
EU and the US sanctions on Gen. Peter Gadet Yak (former head of SPLA
Division Eight in Bor and now a prominent military on the rebel side)
and Gen. Marial Chanour (head of the presidential guards (Tigers)
among whom the fighting began on December 15th, 2013), —has been
largely ineffective as far as ending the fighting and agreeing to a
timely peaceful settlement of the conflict is concerned. The IGAD
seems to prefer carrots to stick, at least for now. Perhaps, IGAD
preference for carrot to stick could be an attempt to keep the two
warring parties engaged at the negotiating table in Addis Ababa.
Besides, IGAD countries do not have the wherewithal to execute their
demands on the warring parties. That is a prerogative of the big boys
at the UN Security Council.
Nevertheless, the continued military stalemate/fatigue on the
battlefield across South Sudan could be a sign of hope for the
beleaguered nation of South Sudan. With no pretence on the side of
either the government or the rebel to achieve an outright military
victory over one another, it is possible that the two warring camps
would (sooner than later) certainly reach a mutually acceptable
compromise on the formation (and particularly the constitution) of the
proposed interim government. Both President Kiir and Riek Machar have,
on principle, agreed to the proposed interim power sharing
arrangement.
President Kiir has signed the document while the rebels’ new position
resolved in Pagak, which is contrary to the signed document, is more
on the question of the details rather than out of principle. More
specifically, the document has earlier (to the dismay of the rebels)
stipulated that the holder of the proposed office of the prime
minister would be barred from running for the office of the president
after the end of the transitioning government.
Presently, the lingering, seemingly unresolvable quagmire, is rebels
insistence that the proposed prime minister, likely to be Riek Machar,
should be an executive one while the president (rebels’ have Salva
Kiir in mind) would merely be a ceremonial one. However, that
contention by the rebels, couple with the utter rejection by the
government, to have an executive prime minister (Riek Machar) with a
ceremonial president (Salva Kiir) have complicated the talks in Addis
Ababa.
Thus, the government is looking for ways to convince the rebels to
accept a non-executive prime minister with an executive president.
Ostensibly, the problem is that IGAD got President Kiir to approve the
creation of the office of the prime minister on the condition that the
holder of that office would not exercise the powers of an executive
authority; surely it is hard to picture Michael Makwei Lueth endorsing
the creation of an executive prime minister.
Since it is unlikely that the government would agree to an interim
government with an executive prime minister, the best option for IGAD
is to go back to the rebels of Riek Machar and persuade them to remove
the controversial condition calling for an executive prime minister
with no deputies and a ceremonial president without the vice
presidency.
Persuading the rebels to waive that precondition (and allow President
Kiir to retain his executive powers, though much trimmed) would not be
easy since the rebels appear to have resolved during the Pagak
Consultative Conference that they would not tolerate a transitional
government headed by President Kiir. Interestingly, the rebels appear
to be negotiating, reasoning, against the backdrop of the 2005 CPA
negotiation. They see themselves as the SPLM/A and Juba as Khartoum.
In other words, they demand nothing less than a 50-50 sharing of
everything, crown with a two-person presidency. As glimpse-able from
Makwei Lueth’s press conference of December 24th, 2014, it is
something that the government just laugh at, taking it as a bad joke
on a serious situation. “They are criminals”, declare Minister Michael
Makwei.
However, persuading the rebels to give up their demand is the only
viable way forward. For one, it was wrong for the government to have
tried to bar (Prime Minister) Riek Machar from opposing President Kiir
in any future election. If indeed the government of Juba believes that
they have the support of the majority of the citizens, they should not
have worried about (Prime Minister) Riek Machar taking on President
Kiir in any future political contest. It was simply in bad faith and
could have poisoned future relationship between President Kiir and
Riek Machar in the proposed interim government. Besides, it was
undemocratic to bar someone on an account of having held a certain
political office.
Similarly, it is irrational for the rebels to expect the government to
give them executive powers on a silver plate. After all, they had the
chance to unseat the government militarily but they failed—miserably.
For them to demand executive powers at the negotiation table which
they have failed to secure in the battlefield is, to say the least,
outrageous. It is only meant to obstruct peaceful settlement of the
deadly conflict. If the government has compromised to accept Riek
Machar as a prime minister, especially given their earlier hostility
towards him, why can’t the rebels accept the reality of the
situation—their failure to remove President Kiir by force—and settle
for the position of the prime minister in a shared interim government?
V
This conflict will most likely end when both President Kiir and Riek
Machar are part of the interim government. For the government, the
redline is that President Kiir should be the one to head the
transitional government (and the rebels have conceded this, though not
explicitly so far). Interestingly, Juba has come out insisting that
they are not the one offering the post of PM to the rebels; it is
IGAD. Meanwhile, the rebels are not so oppose to the retention of
President Kiir in his position as much as they are oppose to that
contentious condition placed upon the office of the prime minister
(the clause that designate him a non-executive prime minister).
For the government, as far as the IGAD proposed interim arrangement is
concerned, it is to have President Kiir as an executive president and
to allow him to run for the office of the president in the next
presidential election. The rebels are yet to concede that condition
(waiving the condition of having an executive prime minster with a
ceremonial president with no deputy president) but they have no
choice, they would give in, sooner than later.
In the event that the two warring parties become more intransigence
and insist on taking on each other militarily, then it is definitely
the case that more and more civilians would be caught up in the
crossfire, once more. UNMISS peacekeepers, such as the pledge
contingent of 700 Chinese peacekeepers, would make a big difference in
so far as saving and protecting lives is concerned. UNMISS
peacekeepers may not be in a position to force the two warring parties
to observe and respect the CoH but they can be counted upon to protect
innocent civilians, women and children and the elderly that would be
taking refuge in the various UNMISS compounds across the nation.
Nevertheless, the most apparent outcome is the formation of the
transitional government in which both Salva Kiir and Riek Machar
participate. While the government and the rebels have been hostile to
the presence of the other stakeholders to the peace talks in Addis
Ababa (because the warring groups prefer to share the carcass between
themselves only), it is going to be the case that the former political
detainees would have a share in the transitional government. How much
is anybody best guess but the formation of an all-inclusive interim
government has been the position of the IGAD leaders.
IGAD believes that the only way to solve the problem is to engage all
South Sudanese political and military leaders, not just the two
warring parties. Thus, the interim government may end up with members
of the current government under President Kiir, rebel members of Riek
Machar, former political detainees (SPLM Leaders as they called
themselves), members of the opposition political parties and the civil
society. In other words, the transitional government would be a
reconstitution of the old failed government of the last nine years
under the leadership of President Kiir, Dr. Riek Machar and the former
political detainees since the formation of the Government of Southern
Sudan (GoSS) in 2005 after the promulgation of the CPA.
Because the next presidential election would be hotly contested and a
close call, the government in Juba might eventually give in the
proposed federation of South Sudan as a way to cut into rebel support
among the Equatorians who have been at the forefront of federalism.
President Kiir has not come out openly against the proposal and most
of his supporters from Equatoria such as the current vice president,
James Wani Igga, would persuade the party bigwigs to implement the
federal system so as to deprive Riek Machar of vital political
recruitment tool.
VI
The most daunting task for the IGAD (but most importantly for the
warring parties) is striking the right balance (in term of ethnic and
politico-military support) in the formation of the interim government.
Many Nuers, for example, are holding very big positions in the
government of President Kiir and there are many soldiers of Nuer
ethnic group fighting on the government side. The same is not so true
of Dinkas and Equatorians with Riek Machar. This would complicate the
formation of the interim government because, for example, Nuer from
the rebel side and those from the government (combined) would
tantamount to Nuer dominating both the civilian government and the
national army.
The Nuer are approximately 19% of the nation population but (before
December 15th) made up about 70% of the nation army. The government
would be keen to prevent such scenario from occurring again, as it is
believe to have contributed to the outbreak of violence in December
2013. Because the Nuer dominated the army, the argument goes, they
were likely to rebel because they reason they could easily take over
the government by military means.
Yet the presence of the white army on the rebel side would confound
matters further because their full integration into the national army
would overwhelm the army in favor of the Nuer. The government has,
possibly in anticipation of such scenario, embarked on endorsing some
tribal militias (in Upper Nile and Equatoria). But the country can’t
sustain a bloated army in addition to a bloated government.
Solving that conundrum would require leadership on the part of
President Kiir and Riek Machar. It would not be easy but they have
little choice but to make some hard military and political
compromises, not just now in Addis Ababa for themselves as principals
but later in Juba for their diehard lieutenants—who are not that
understandable but see everything in terms of life and death.
It is crystal clear that the current IGAD-led peace talks would not
address the underlying causes of the conflict. It is simply a
long-term ceasefire to allow conducive environment to emerge under
which such deep rooted, contentious issues could be addressed. The
hope is that the interim government will embark on the necessary
political, military, social, economic and constitutional reforms that
would address the most underlying causes of the crisis in South Sudan.
For the “the long-term ceasefire” to endure though, blanket amnesty
may be necessary for all the parties to the conflict. While the call
to bring the perpetrators of violent crime to account for their crimes
is ideal, it might not be practical because the leaders who ignited
this crisis are the very ones who would be counted upon to observe
peace and order for the necessary reform to be formulated, passed and
enacted and implemented.
Besides, nothing less than taking President Kiir to the ICC would
count like true justice to the rebels whose relatives were killed in
juba. And nothing less than taking Riek Machar to the ICC would count
like justice to the people whose relatives were killed in the
fighting, say in Bor, in 1991 and 2013.
Chances of President Kiir and Riek Machar ever facing the wrath of the
law are very slim in South Sudan. Given the experiences of
international community (the ICC) in Kenya and the Sudan, it may as
well be plausible to bet that the perpetrators of violence crimes in
South Sudan may never be held accountable for the war crimes and
violations of human rights in South Sudan.
Posted in: Opinions
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