Understanding Musa Hilal and Mohamed Hamdan “Hametti” in Sudanese
politics – By Hamdan Goumaa
Posted on June 23, 2015 by AfricanArgumentsEditor       
MusaHilal

Musa Hilal of the Darfur Mahameed tribe. Formerly leader of the
government supported Janjaweed militia.

The current regime in Sudan under the National Congress Party (NCP)
has managed to survive, in part, by manipulating ethnic and other
interest groups to gain support. This remains an effective strategy
for countering armed insurgency and the opposition in general.   In
pursuing this strategy, the regime has framed conflict in Sudan as
being between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’. In doing this it has managed to
recruit and bring many Arab tribal leaders and adventurers to its
side.

Musa Hilal of the Mahameed is perhaps the most high profile of these
individuals. An infamous figure and leader of the government-backed
Janjaweed militias – made famous by their role in the
counter-insurgency against the rebels in Darfur – he retains the
ambition to be a leader for all Arab tribes in Darfur. Similarly,
Mohamed Hamdan (“Hametti”) from the Rizeigat tribe of East Darfur, has
also ventured to recruit his own militia and has received the support
of the regime in Khartoum.

However, both have showed ambition go beyond the roles assigned to
them by the government. Having acquired a major following and with it
political standing, Khartoum has been left with no option but to
provide them with greater rewards in the form of high political and
military positions.

Hilal is now a significant figure in both Darfuri and Sudanese
national politics. He was transported to Khartoum for the inauguration
of president Omar al-Bashir last month, reportedly in a plane with
National Intelligences and Security Services (NISS) chief Mohamed Atta
al-Moula. Hametti has become an indispensable military general for the
Khartoum regime; commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which
recently defeated the Darfuri Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in
South Darfur.

This article will examine whether it is correct to assert that the two
main powerbrokers in Darfur today are Musa Hilal and Hametti? If so,
what does this tell us about the relationship between the Darfurian
Arabs and the government, and with it the nature of military tribalism
in Darfur? These questions were posed to me by Professor Alex de Waal,
an old friend, whose expertise and concern for Sudan I value.

***

Hilal and Hametti each have a slightly different status and inhabit
different roles in the Darfuri military and political milieu.Hilal
should be seen as an agent or middle man, rather than a powerbroker,
while Hametti is a warlord incorporated into the state’s coercive
machine. Bashir, at his inauguration, praised the RSF as an important
operational arm of the National Intelligence and Security Service
(NISS) which has now attained equal status with the Sudanese armed
forces (SAF).

Previously, Hilal – through his involvement in military operations as
leader of the Janjaweed – had a role similar to the current one of
Hametti. But over time, Hilal found his own place in the civil
government apparatus, which paved the way for him to develop and
evolve, eventually being transformed into a politician, walking the
corridors of power.

Hilal cleverly exploited his tribal base and leadership heritage to
his advantage. A journalist, Shamail Alnur, who interviewed Hilal in
2015 (Arabic), described how although he grew up in a rough dessert
his appearance is now akin to that of a film star. Alnur described the
scene at her arrival as being both moving and hair-raising; there were
many land cruisers with fully armed fighters, surrounded by decorated
horses waiting to receive the chief.

Hametti largely lacks these advantages, himself hailing from a family
of average status in the large and well-established Rizeigat tribe,
which has a long history of its own traditional leaders drawn from the
Madibo house. He still has a role to play, but only as far as the
regime in Khartoum wants him to do so.

Hilal’s own power is derived from his leadership position both among
his tribe – the Mahameed – and latterly within government. This was
especially so during the period when he was leader of the Janjaweed;
and later when he became an advisor to president Bashir. Hilal is also
connected by marriage to President Idriss Deby of Chad, a powerful
regional power-broker, who became his son in law after marrying
Hilal’s daughter.

Despite his obvious advantages, Hilal has little influence over the
rest of the Rizeigat tribe in Darfur, or other Arab tribes in the
region. This is because of the Mahameed’s geographical location in
Northern Darfur and as a result of being camel herders; they rarely
come into contact with the rest of the Rizeigat and other Arab tribes
who are cattle herders.

This is evident in the recent bloody war between the Rizeigat and the
Maaliya, fought mainly by the youth of the two parties to the
conflict. The youth of the two tribes see no state or other external
power that can restrain or direct them in their pursuit of their own
narrow interests. Rizeigat and Maaliya fighters even managed to bring
the elites on the two sides to support their cause, thus showing how
limited the government’s power and influence has become.

Nonetheless, supported by the government, Hilal can still be part of
the solution to conflict in Darfur. One way he could play a role stems
from the existing gap in leadership due to the collapse of Native
Administration, which has received successive fatal blows since the
Nimeiri regime.

The potential role of Hilal is demonstrated through the memorandum of
understanding (MOU) signed between his recently formed party the
Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council (SARC) and the SPLM-N on 24
February 2015. In making this move he showed his capacity to act
independently from government. The extent of his disagreement with the
government was also shown through threats to boycott the recent
elections.

As the SARC moves into the national political arena it will have
access not only to its own Mahameed tribal base but also that of other
Arab tribes. Large numbers of people from these Arab tribes migrated
as IDPs to Sudan’s urban centers, including Khartoum, due to the wars
and instability in the region. These groups see themselves as
marginalized minorities residing in parts of the capital such as Haj
Yousif, Umbadda and various shanty dwellings on the peripheries, ready
for any call they feel could represent their interest and communicate
their grievances.

One could conceivably argue that Hamitti and Hilal complement each
other; both having a distinct role to play within the existing
political situation. However, Hilal clearly has the upper hand, and
has frequently made statements to the effect that Hemitti is “ours”.
Nonetheless, within the context of greater Darfur, although both of
them have potential to affect and alter events on the ground, both at
this moment have little influence on other Arab tribes in the region.

Hamdan Goumaa is a development practitioner, who worked for the UN and
International NGOs in Africa and South East Asia . He is currently a
development management and conflict resolution consultant. He can be
reached at: [email protected]
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