New Report - Warlord Business: CAR’s Violent Armed Groups and their
Criminal Operations for Profit and Power
Posted by Enough Team on Jun 16, 2015
In a new Enough Project report released today, Warlord Business: CAR’s
Violent Armed Groups and Their Criminal Operations for Profit and
Power, author Kasper Agger examines how the two main armed groups in
the Central African Republic (CAR) and their multiple factions make
millions of dollars in profits from illicit activities, such as the
illicit sale of natural resources, taxation, extortion and the
strategic use of killings and violence. Those funds support their
operations, and go directly to boost and create wealth for ruthless
warlords, senior commanders, and their trading partners.
"Leaders of armed groups that earn hundreds of thousands of
dollars and control large areas across CAR have little incentive to
lay down their weapons and halt violence. Such leaders must face
increased pressure from U.N. peacekeepers on the ground in CAR, and
the enablers that work closely with armed groups must face target
sanctions, travel bans and asset freezes."
-Kasper Agger, Central Africa-based Field Researcher
The ex-Séléka and Anti-Balaka groups profit from a large illicit
minerals trade. Killings, extortion, and other forms of violence are
used to control areas with gold and diamonds throughout CAR, and the
groups are deeply involved in this high-value trade in several ways.
Research presented in this report estimates the total current value of
the illegal diamond trade and taxation by armed groups in CAR to be
between $3.87 and $5.8 million dollars annually, a sufficient amount
in CAR to fund widespread military operations.
The two groups also generate income through illegal taxes and
“protection money” from civilians, road travelers, businesses, local
organizations, and state institutions. Ex-Séléka factions in
particular have set up efficient tax collection practices.
Conservative assessments estimate that different factions within the
ex-Séléka group, for example, collect $1.5 to $2 million annually from
illegal road taxation throughout the areas they control. Meanwhile,
Anti-Balaka groups that roam western CAR collect illegal road taxes,
extort money from rural villages, and demand sums that range from $600
to $1,000 as a one-time payment for “protection.”
Bringing an end to the crisis in CAR requires preventive strategies
that seek to disrupt the sources of finance, combined with punitive
measures and sanctions that target individual commanders and the
companies and other actors that facilitate the trade.
The report recommends the following five steps to help cut financing
for armed groups in CAR:
The United Nations and the United States should expand targeted
sanctions on the networks of actors that trade with and provide
finance for armed groups in CAR.
The United States and other donors such as France, Belgium, and
the EU should increase support for the new Special Criminal Court in
CAR.
Establish government control of gold and diamond mining sites
through deployment of Central African gendarmes and peacekeeping
troops from the UN mission in CAR.
The Kimberley Process should condition the lifting of restrictions
on CAR diamond exports on three commitments to safeguard against
conflict diamonds entering the Kimberley Process.
Counter parallel taxation and highway extortion by armed groups
through deployment of Central African gendarmes and peacekeeping
troops from the UN mission in CAR to relevant locations.
Read the Full Report.
Editor's Note: “Warlord Business” is the second in a new series of
in-depth, field research-driven reports on the dynamics of profit and
power fueling war in the Horn, East and Central Africa. Violent
kleptocracies dominate the political landscape of this region, leading
to protracted conflicts marked by the commission of mass atrocities by
state and non-state actors. Enough's Political Economy of African Wars
series will focus on the key players in these conflicts, their
motivations, how they benefit from the evolving war economies, and
what policies might be most effective in changing the calculations of
those orchestrating the violence–including both incentives and
pressures for peace.
Central African Republic
Political Economy of African Wars Series
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