---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: John Ashworth <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 8:22 AM
Subject: [sudans-john-ashworth] Andrew Natsios: A New Approach for South
Sudan
To: Group <[email protected]>


Two important points are made by Natsios: (1) "Senior military
commanders from the two sides should be included in the negotiations.
In fact, they must be"; (2) " local Christian churches and local civil
society groups should be encouraged to start grassroots reconciliation
initiatives".

While South Sudanese church leaders would agree with Natsios that an
immediate cease-fire is the first priority (their message has
consistently been to stop the killing immediately), it is by no means
clear that his "new approach" will actually achieve this worthy goal.

John

BEGIN

A New Approach for South Sudan

By ANDREW S. NATSIOS
JULY 28, 2015  |   NYT

For a year and a half South Sudan has been torn apart by a civil war.
The multitribal coalition that ruled the country after it gained
independence from Sudan in 2011 — and that had governed the area for
some years before then — has collapsed. The conflict was triggered by
the competing personal ambitions of the leaders of various factions
within the ruling party, as well as a dispute over whether the
government of South Sudan should cooperate with, or try to unseat, the
Sudanese government in Khartoum. Although the conflict did not start
as a tribal war, President Salva Kiir, who is Dinka, and his rival
Riek Machar, the former vice president, who is Nuer, have both
appealed to clan loyalties to rally supporters and recruit soldiers,
giving the conflict a poisonous tribal dimension.

Since the war broke out in December 2013, several tens of thousands of
South Sudanese have been killed and more than 2.2 million people have
been displaced. A famine is ravaging parts of the country, especially
the states of Unity and Upper Nile. Unicef warns that 50,000 children
may die. U.S.A.I.D. said last month that up to 4.6 million people
would face life-threatening hunger within weeks.

Several rounds of peace talks have been held in Ethiopia since 2014,
mediated by the bloc of East African countries known as IGAD, as well
as the United States and several European countries, among others. But
the negotiations have repeatedly failed, and so earlier this month the
United Nations Security Council blacklisted six rival South Sudanese
generals (though neither Mr. Kiir nor Mr. Machar), freezing their
assets and restricting their right to travel. Current talks are
stalling, stymied in part by disputes over power sharing. While in
Addis Ababa on Monday, President Obama pressed all parties to produce
a peace deal by Aug. 17, or face more sanctions.

But such measures will not change the warring factions’ basic calculus
— not when the parties are fighting for their very survival. On the
other hand, sanctions have angered and alienated the military and
political elites on both sides in South Sudan, reducing the leverage
of Western governments over them.

The so-called IGAD-Plus talks have failed to bring about a viable
peace agreement because some of the mediators are not impartial
brokers. Khartoum reportedly has been pouring weapons into South
Sudan, to keep the country mired in turmoil. The most effective
military troops there now are the Ugandan People’s Defense Force,
which President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda sent in to help Mr. Kiir,
who is a friend and ally, stay in power. Ethiopia, which has a
significant Nuer population, can press only gingerly the Nuer rebel
leaders and commanders in South Sudan.

An entirely new approach is needed if the current negotiations fail,
as seems likely. The United States government and European countries
should initiate new talks with new sponsors. And the immediate
priority of those discussions should be to weaken the military
capacity of the warring parties while urgently brokering a
humanitarian cease-fire.

The United States and European governments should start a high-level
diplomatic effort, particularly with the heads of state of Sudan,
Eritrea and Uganda to try to neutralize those countries’ involvement
in the conflict. The talks should be moved out of the region to more
neutral ground, perhaps somewhere in West Africa. Washington, in
particular, should press Uganda to withdraw the military forces it
sent to South Sudan to assist Mr. Kiir. (Washington has a military
assistance program with Uganda, and thus leverage over the Ugandan
government.) A weapons ban should be imposed to prevent weapons,
equipment and ammunition from flowing into South Sudan, particularly
from Sudan to Mr. Machar’s rebel forces. The ban could be monitored by
some of the roughly 12,000 United Nations peacekeepers who are already
on the ground.

At the same time, mediators should broker a humanitarian cease-fire in
the famine-affected areas. With technical assistance from the United
Nations, corridors should be established so that food and health
programs can urgently be delivered to the populations most at risk.
Implementation could be overseen by a neutral international party,
such as Norway, which has successfully performed that function in the
past.

Senior military commanders from the two sides should be included in
the negotiations. In fact, they must be: When in the past the
government in Juba has issued humanitarian access permits to United
Nations relief agencies, commanders in the field have ignored them and
stopped aid shipments. If the commanders themselves participate in the
talks, they will be more likely to enforce what they have negotiated.
In exchange for their cooperation on a humanitarian cease-fire,
existing sanctions could be lifted.

There is a promising precedent for such a proposal. In 2001-2002,
after many years of war between northern Sudan and southern Sudan (at
the time South Sudan was still part of Sudan) and many rounds of
failed peace talks, the United States, British and Norwegian
governments convinced the Sudanese government in Khartoum to agree to
a humanitarian cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains, a region of northern
Sudan allied with southern Sudan and where civilian casualties were
especially severe. This modest effort restored enough trust between
the warring sides that wider-ranging issues could then be broached —
ultimately leading to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the end
of the 22-year-long conflict and later independence for the South.

As soon as a workable peace agreement is in place, local Christian
churches and local civil society groups should be encouraged to start
grassroots reconciliation initiatives, especially to ease tensions
between the Nuer and the Dinka. The churches in particular, which
claim the loyalty of 60 percent of the population, are a rare
indigenous actor with both moral authority and a reach that transcends
tribe and region. Before independence in 2011, they provided a modicum
of public services in disaffected areas and acted as mediators in
local disputes over, among other things, cattle rustling and grazing
rights. International aid agencies should fund the training of church
leaders in mediation techniques and set up a pilot program to create
local dispute-resolution committees using church leaders, with a view
to eventually extending it across the country.

Urgently putting in place a humanitarian cease-fire could help not
only avert a catastrophe, but also build confidence between the
parties. This in turn would set the stage for broader negotiations on
political issues: widespread corruption, the distribution of oil
wealth, a new constitution — all matters that must be resolved if
peace and political stability are ever to return to this
long-suffering region.

Andrew S. Natsios is director of the Scowcroft Institute of
International Affairs at the George H.W. Bush School of Government and
Public Service at Texas A&M University, and a former United States
envoy to Sudan.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/opinion/a-new-approach-for-south-sudan.html

END
______________________
John Ashworth

Sudan, South Sudan Advisor

[email protected]

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