---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, Nov 21, 2015 at 11:09 PM
Subject: Madeleine Albright, Rwanda, and Darfur: How Genocides Happen |
Updated November 21, 2015 (originally published June 12, 2014)
To: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>


*Madeleine Albright, Rwanda, and Darfur: How Genocides Happen | Updated
November 21, 2015 (originally published June 12, 2014)*

Eric Reeves

A policy response to this analysis is increasingly urgent, given the
growing intensity of slaughter and violent farm land expropriations by
Khartoum's regular Sudan Armed Forces and its militia allies, the Rapid
Response Forces.  This is particularly true given what we learn from an
extraordinary report from Human Rights Watch:

“Men With No Mercy”: Rapid Support Forces Attacks Against Civilians in
Darfur, Sudan,” Human Rights Watch | September 9, 2015 |
https://www.hrw.org/node/280756

One highlight, revealed by a militia (Border Guards) defector:

Ahmed, a 35-year-old officer in the Border Guards, spent two weeks at a
military base in Guba [North Darfur] in *December 2014* before being sent
to fight rebels around Fanga. Two senior RSF officials, the commanding
officer, Alnour Guba, and Col. Badre ab-Creash were present on the *Guba
base*.

*Ahmed said that a few days prior to leaving for East Jebel Marra,** Sudanese
Vice President Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman directly addressed several
hundred army and RSF soldiers:*

*“Hassabo told us to clear the area east of Jebel Marra. To kill any male.
He said we want to clear the area of insects… He said East Jebel Marra is
the kingdom of the rebels. We don’t want anyone there to be alive.”*

For "insect" substitute "cockroach"...

Eric Reeves, 21 November 2015

***************************

Eric Reeves, 12 June 2014

Last week the *New York Times reported (June 3, 2014
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/world/africa/un-cables-reveal-a-turning-point-in-rwanda-crisis.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As&_r=0>*)
on a significant trove of UN diplomatic cables sent before and during the
Rwandan genocide of 1994, and recently declassified. All are marked
"confidential" and are extraordinarily revealing of the thinking at the
time by many Security Council members, and particularly the Clinton
administration's Permanent Representative to the UN, Madeleine Albright.
Ambassador Albright's role in pushing to authorize an early withdrawal of
UN peacekeepers in Rwanda has long been known in general terms. But for the
first time we see her language, her initiative, and her pushing
specifically for her view of events in the recently released "confidential"
cable of April 12, 1994. Albright has suggested to the *New York Times *for
its reporting on the publication of these cables that she was merely
following orders: "I was an instructed ambassador, not the secretary of
state." But implying that she was not instrumental in shaping the Clinton
administration's policies on Rwanda, at the crucial moment, is shamelessly
disingenuous. Her belated "wish that I had done more" is wholly after the
fact, and does nothing to mitigate her responsibility for compelling the
withdrawal of the last chance to avert the genocidal destruction in Rwanda,
well underway by the time of her April 12 cable and long predicted by the
UN force commander, Major-General Roméo Dallaire.

The entirety of her cable is, with its clear intent to influence the
Clinton administration team working on Rwanda, utterly chilling (the
transcribed text below eliminates the gratuitous mechanical apparatus that
accompanies all cables, and unpacks some of the acronyms; otherwise, it is
verbatim):

"*The Future of UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and French Roles
in Rwanda"*

[Sent to the *Rwanda working group in the Clinton administration*; the *entire
text of cable—April 12, 1994—is marked as "confidential."*]

• The UN Mission at the United Nations foresees two issues that demand
Washington's immediate consideration. First, there are rumors that the
French are considering staying in Rwanda after they complete the
humanitarian mission of evacuating foreign nationals.

• The other immediate issue is UNAMIR's future. At present the airport is
still open and under French-Belgian control. However, there is no signal
that the UN is nearing a decision because relative calm has descended on
Kigali [capital of Rwanda] and UNAMIR troops are not presently the target
of hostilities. Yet this might be a window of relative opportunity to
evacuate UNAMIR forces: there is a real possibility that it might become
more difficult to evacuate once the French and Belgians leave.

*In this respect it is worth considering taking the lead in the Security
Council to authorize the evacuation of the bulk of UNAMIR, while leaving
behind a skeletal staff that might be able to facilitate a cease-fire and
any future political negotiations.* (all emphases in all quotations have
been added)

• Bujumbura [capital of Burundi] minimize considered.

[signed] Albright

[links for all cables are contained within a compendium
<http://rwandafile.com/table/table.html> assembled by the US
Holocaust Memorial Museum and the National Security Archive at George
Washington University]

This is not the cable of someone asking for instructions; it is the
language of a powerful woman who wished for yet greater power (which she
would subsequently have as Secretary of State), and who in particular
wanted to play a dominant role in the key decision that faced the Security
Council throughout April and May 1994: "Yet this might be a window of
relative opportunity to evacuate UNAMIR forces: there is a real possibility
that it might become more difficult to evacuate once the French and
Belgians leave." Albright would have known that as a result of the
intelligence she gained from her position as U.S. ambassador to the UN, her
assessment would be regarded as having particular authority.

This is the context in which to understand her proposal: "In this respect
it is worth considering *taking the lead in the Security Council to
authorize the evacuation of the bulk of UNAMIR*…." Here again, Albright
clearly expects that any "consideration" of options by the Clinton
administration with respect to Rwanda will be guided by her more intimate
access to UN intelligence and to the thinking of other Security Council
diplomats. If not openly hortatory, this is far more than mere suggestion;
the *New York Times *did not hesitate to use the word "advocate" in
describing her language and actions.

It is hardly surprising, then, that the Clinton administration followed her
advice and made a decision that even President Clinton would later describe
as "one of the greatest regrets" of his administration. But there can be no
shying away now from responsibility, as Albright has tried to do with her
deeply disingenuous claim: "I was an instructed ambassador, not the
secretary of state." True in a narrow sense, but deeply misleading. The *New
York Times* also reports Albright's claim that, "she did not recall the
specific cable pushing for a withdrawal." Even with so many cables, and so
many crises, it is exceedingly difficult to credit this claim of
forgetfulness.

But of course there are good reasons for selective amnesia. The *Times *also
reports the view of Tom Blanton, director of the National Security Archive
at George Washington University (one of two sources for the cables, the
other being the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum): "It's clear, in hindsight,
that the pullout of peacekeeping was the green light for genocide." And it
was a decision that was irreversible once made: "On April 21, after a week
in which 10,000 Rwandans were killed in Kigali alone, the Security Council
voted to reduce the size of the force to 270 troops from 2,100" (*New York
Times*, June 3, 2014). These few remaining peacekeepers were hardly the
"skeletal staff" that Albright suggested might be "in a position to
facilitate a cease-fire and any future political negotiations." Rather,
what remained of UNAMIR, led by the courageous, resourceful, and meticulous
General Dallaire, found itself "standing knee-deep in mutilated bodies."

Reading the newly released cables as a group reveals that there was much
confusion, ignorance—and completely ineffective leadership on the part of
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Geopolitical rivalries complicated
matters, and sometimes produced deadline diplomacy. Thus we learn in one
cable that New Zealand's Permanent Representative, for the month of April
1994 President of the Security Council, was forced on one critical occasion
to set a deadline of one minute before midnight on April 30, since the
following morning Nigeria would take over the rotating Council presidency.
Decisions were clearly being made on the basis of inadequate intelligence
and reporting from the ground. But any serious effort at ascertaining what
was happening could have been and in many cases was provided by General
Dallaire. And anyone reasonably attentive in reading his extraordinary
memoir (*Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, *2003)
will certainly understand how much we knew, when we knew it—and when the UN
might well have known if it wished. This is in addition to many academics
and regional specialists who also had real-time information of significant
value about developments on the ground. Rwanda expert Alison Des Forges of
Human Rights Watch, for example, met with an apparently bored National
Security Advisor Anthony Lake in April 1994. His only advice to Des Forges
and her fellow experts on Rwanda? "Make more noise."

By the time of Albright's April 12 memorandum—six days after well-prepared
ethnic violence exploded following the plane crash that killed Rwanda
President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira—a
great deal was known. Albright herself in a cable of January 24, 1994 had
already declared that one "pressing issue" emerging in Rwanda was the
growing power of the militia we would come to know as the Interahamwe: "The
[Hutu-led] government is actively involved in distributing arms and
training its militia; these covert activities are particularly disturbing
given the presence of a RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] battalion in Kigali."

But within hours of the plane crash, what we see in Albright's cables is a
concern not for the people of Rwanda but for the difficulties of evacuating
foreign nationals and ultimately UNAMIR itself. And in a cable the day
following her telling April 12 memorandum, Albright had already created at
least a putative "consensus" about what Tom Blanton calls "giving the green
light to genocide" (see above):

There was considerable consensus that UNAMIR should be substantially
reduced because the security of UNAMIR troops are *[sic]* at risk, and
UNAMIR can no longer fulfill its mandate given the present circumstances.
[signed April 13, 1994] Albright

Clearly Rwandan civilians were not her primary concern, and we may
reasonably speculate whether Albright thought that by making the safety of
UNAMIR troops paramount, this ensured that the mission would be withdrawn
rather than augmented in an effort to stop the bloodbath that was well
underway. Albright claims that others argued a token force should be left
because "a total UN departure would hurt the UN's credibility." There could
hardly be a grimmer irony, given the legacy Rwanda has created for the UN.
Notably, Nigeria, Brazil, and Djibouti are reported by Albright as
"favoring the idea of tasking UNAMIR with protecting Rwandan civilians."
Others, including Albright, "noted the near impossibility of this task,
even if resources and armament for UNAMIR were vastly increased."

Force commander General Dallaire had a very different view of the situation
from his position in Kigali (see below). And in an April 18 cable, Albright
herself notes that "ethnic killings continue, particularly behind
government-held lines," something that Dallaire had long predicted. By
April 21, Albright reports that New Zealand's Permanent Representative to
the UN, and Security Council president for April 1994, was "encountering a
number of countries not Council members who could not understand why the
Council was not saying anything on 'this horrific killing.'" On April 21
Albright reports in a cable that Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
was hesitant to pull out UNAMIR entirely, because then he would have to
take the responsibility for fifty thousand additional deaths in Rwanda."
Clearly the thinking in the Security Council and the Secretariat was
painfully limited in contemplating the consequences of full-scale ethnic
violence.

Perhaps as damning as any cable besides that of April 12 is Albright's
reasoning in a document from April 26, worth considering carefully and in
the context of former Secretary of State Colin Powell's finding (September
2004) that genocide was occurring in Darfur, but this finding dictated no
new actions on the part of the U.S. At the very least, we may say that
Albright had a better understanding of the legal entailments of the 1948 UN
Genocide Convention:

The Czechs and Argentines are working on a draft statement about genocide.
COMMENT: The events in Rwanda clearly seem to meet the definition of
genocide in Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. *However*, if the Council acknowledges
that, it may be forced to "take such action under the [UN] Charter as they
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of
genocide" as provided for in Article VIII. END

It may be genocide, Albright is saying—Rwandans are already being killed on
the basis of their ethnicity on a tremendous scale—but if we use the word
"genocide" then we may be obliged to do something other than withdraw
UNAMIR. Such thinking reflects perfectly the attitudes that informed
Albright's decision-making and her tragically persuasive advice to the
Clinton administration.

The *New York Times* also reports on Albright's supposed change of heart as
the bodies piled up.  According to the *Times, *Albright claims that the
May1994 arguments of the Nigerian Permanent Representative,

…persuaded her that the United States risked being on the wrong side of
history. At one point, she left a Security Council meeting and placed a
heated call to Washington to resist its demands for a complete withdrawal.
"I wanted to have more flexibility,” she said, “but the options for having
a large operation were so difficult."

The veracity of this account is certainly open to challenge, the more so
since it is "history" that Albright is thinking about, not the present
moment in which hundreds of thousands of people were being slaughtered on
the basis of ethnicity and political sympathies. But it was on the basis of
her recommendation that UNAMIR had been essentially gutted, and there was
no conceivable way to put together a new force so late in the period of 100
days when most of the slaughter occurred. A "heated call"? To what purpose
in May of 1994, after you had successfully pushed for the withdrawal of
UNAMIR, Ms. Albright? "More flexibility"… to do what?

For despite the fact that the word "genocide" proved so embarrassingly
difficult for the Clinton administration—to use, or not use, or use with
qualification—what was unfolding could not have been more clearly genocide.
Extraordinarily, the typically scrupulously neutral medical relief
organization Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
declared to the UN that evidence gathered by its humanitarian presence on
the ground made clear that the world was witnessing genocide—the word used
explicitly by MSF. The Czech and Argentine Permanent Representatives were
clearly prepared to use the word genocide to describe realities in Rwanda.
But Albright worried about entailments of any such use of the word.

*Dallaire's Incomprehension*

To be sure, there were many complexities in the situation as Dallaire
surveyed it, many things he did not understand fully at the time. But he is
unquestionably our most important witness to the most "efficient" genocide
in human history, and one that Dallaire had tried mightily to prevent. When
he flew to Arusha, Tanzania to testify before the International Tribunal
for Rwanda in February 1998, he broke down after managing to declare:

"It seems ... inconceivable that one can watch ... thousands of people
being ... massacred ... every day in the media ... and remain passive," the
former United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) commander said
as his voice broke and tears fell from his eyes.

He had flown from Canada to Arusha, Tanzania, to become the first senior UN
official to tell a UN tribunal that "with a well-armed force of 5,000 men"
and the proper mandate, "the UN could have stopped the slaughter of
hundreds of thousands of Rwandans." (*Christian Science Monitor *[Arusha],
February 27,1998)

*Two Moments*

My intention in this brief overview is not to attempt a revision of
received historical accounts of the Rwandan genocide; there can be little
addition to the magisterial work of Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch
(*Leave None to Tell the Story* (HRW, 1999), or the searing accounts
offered by Philip Gourevitch in *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We
Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories From Rwanda* (Farrar Straus
Giroux, 1998).Rather, I want to emphasize two moments in the history of the
Rwandan genocide by way of suggesting parallels with the genocide in
Darfur. As many have insisted, "Darfur is not Rwanda," and this is of
course true for many reasons. There is, however, too much grim truth in the
frequent description of Darfur as "Rwanda in slow motion" not to ask about
moral parallels.

The first of these two moments comes on January 11, 1994 when Roméo
Dallaire sent his now infamous "Genocide Fax" to UN headquarters and head
of peacekeeping at the time, Kofi Annan. Much has been written about this
fax which came anonymously to Philip Gourevitch and served as the
centerpiece for his devastating article in *The New Yorker *(May 11, 1998
<http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/philip-gourevitchs-the-genocide-fax.html>).
Coded "most immediate," Dallaire's fax contained a chilling warning on its
first (of two) pages:

[1] Force Commander put in contact with informant by very very important
government politician. Informant is a top level trainer in the cadre of
Interahamwe-armed militia of *MRNQ* [National Republican Movement for
Democracy and Development; French: Mouvement républicain national pour la
démocratie et le development—the Hutu-dominated party of President Juvénal
Habyarimana—ER]

[2] He informed us he was in charge of last Saturdays demonstrations which
aims were to target deputies of opposition parties coming to the ceremonies
and Belgian soldiers. They hope to provoke the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic
Front—ER] to engage (being fired upon) the demonstrators and provoke a
civil war. Deputies were to be assassinated upon entry or exit from
Parliament. Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgian soldiers
resorted to force a number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee
Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda. (Image of page one of this fax may be found
at http://wp.me/p45rOG-1kF.)

Three months before the beginning of civil war, and the mad onslaught
against all Tutsis and moderate Hutus by the Interahamwe militia, three
months after stores of machetes were discovered and reported, three months
before ten Belgian soldiers were in fact killed to provoke—successfully—the
withdrawal of all Belgian forces, three months during which an effective
peacekeeping force could have been assembled, the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations did nothing. Not all credit Dallaire's assessment
that "with a well-armed force of 5,000 men" and the proper mandate, "the UN
could have stopped the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans." But
those who gainsay this assessment are too often those who would deny their
own culpability in responding to genocidal destruction that would claim
some 800,000 lives. Too often those who gainsay Dallaire's assessment are
judging without anything like Dallaire's understanding of the circumstances
on the ground.

The truth is that Kofi Annan and the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations he headed, encouraged by the Clinton administration and others,
wished to see no augmentation of the force of 2,100 personnel to the 5,000
Dallaire wanted. And when the force was precipitously eviscerated, leaving
only 270 personnel, it was in no position to do anything but observe. But
observe Dallaire did, and *Shake Hands with the Devil* was written with
soul-destroying detail and a growing comprehension of what he had seen.

*Albright's Moment*

This is the context for the second moment, what I have summarized above as
Madeleine Albright's deeply expedient role in ensuring that the U.S. would
not have to face the prospect of Americans coming home in body bags as a
result of fighting in Africa, as they had from Somalia. She hardly needed
"instruction" to understand that the Clinton administration wanted neither
a U.S. role nor indeed a UN role in any mission amidst the unfolding
carnage in Rwanda. She and the U.S.—in the midst of rapidly unfolding
genocide—wished mainly to see a reduction in the size of UNAMIR. And as
expedient as Albright was in the moment, she is commensurately disingenuous
in claiming now that she was simply following orders. Such shameless
self-exculpation is evidently a priority for Albright, who continues to win
awards and honorary degrees (most recently from Princeton University). Kofi
Annan, who would go on to become Secretary-General of the UN and be awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize, has been similarly disingenuous in his comments
following the 100 days of horror in which the vast majority of the killings
took place (hardly a period of time in which National Security Adviser
Lake's advice for advocates—"make more noise"—could have had any effect on
the formulating of policies affecting events). It was Annan's office, as
head of UN Peacekeeping, to which Dallaire sent his "MOST IMMEDIATE" fax.

*Rwanda and Darfur*

In her expediency and disingenuousness, Albright offers us precisely what
we need to understand why genocide in Darfur continues more than a decade
after conflict began in early 2003. The degree of violence has ebbed and
flowed, to be sure; but human suffering and destruction have been
unrelenting. And conditions now are horrific, perhaps worse than at any
time during the genocidal counter-insurgency orchestrated by Khartoum's
National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime. Certainly the
prospects for a peaceful settlement are nowhere in sight, nor is there any
evidence that security will not continue its relentless decline—limiting,
and further diminishing the quality, of humanitarian assistance, even as
more than 2 million needy people are internally displaced and another
340,000 are refugees in eastern Chad—overwhelmingly from the non-Arab or
African tribal groups, preeminently the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa. A great
many will not survive the current rainy season or the predations of
Khartoum's militia forces.

But again and again we have seen expediency and disingenuousness driving,
in particular, UN and U.S. policy. For President Obama, these tendencies
are all too conspicuous if we look at the rhetoric of his campaign.

• In 2007 he chided the Bush administration for its accommodation of
Khartoum. Invoking Rwanda and Bosnia as justification for humanitarian
intervention in Darfur, Obama said,

"The United States has a moral obligation anytime you see humanitarian
catastrophes… "When you see a genocide in Rwanda, Bosnia or in Darfur, that
is a stain on all of us, a stain on our souls .... We can't say 'never
again' and then allow it to happen again, and *as a president of the United
States I don’'t intend to abandon people or turn a blind eye to
slaughter." *(Video recording available at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEd583-fA8M#t=15)

• As President, Obama again characterized Darfur as the site of "genocide,"
but there has been no response commensurate with the magnitude of the
crisis, whatever we may decide to call it. On the contrary, repaying a
campaign debt, Obama appointed former Air Force Major-General Scott Gration
as his special envoy for Sudan (Gration's real goal was to gain sufficient
regional experience to become ambassador to Nairobi, a position to which he
was soon appointed, only to be fired by the State Department for
incompetence in less than a year). His disastrous performance as special
envoy, as judged by all relevant constituencies, was entirely predictable,
given his total lack of diplomatic experience, his extremely shallow
knowledge of Sudan, and his lack of facility in any relevant language, at
times including English.

• Shortly after Obama appointed Gration the President enlisted the support
of Senator John Kerry, perhaps sensing that Gration was completely out of
his depth. Certainly the crisis created by Khartoum's March 2009 expulsion
of thirteen if the world's finest international aid organizations—roughly
half the humanitarian capacity in Darfur at the time—was of the most urgent
sort. But instead of making demands of Khartoum and enlisting European
allies to add pressure to reverse this immensely destructive action, Kerry
simply created a fantasy solution to the problem, declaring in April 2009
that the capacity represented by the expelled organizations would be
replaced in "a few weeks." Cynically, he declared that he had Khartoum’s
promise on the matter, as if the regime's promises have somehow meant
something in the past. Kerry's disingenuousness undoubtedly set back
efforts to re-start humanitarian efforts in many regions within Darfur. In
short, Darfuri lives were sacrificed in the name of a wholly specious
diplomatic "success" by the ambitious Kerry.

• Despite Obama's decisive campaign rhetoric of 2007, in November 2010—not
two years in office—his administration "de-coupled" Darfur from the key
bilateral issue between Washington and Khartoum:

"… the U.S. [is] prepared to accelerate the removal of Sudan from the state
sponsor of terrorism list if the Government of Sudan did two things. One is
to fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and two, to live up
to all of the legal conditions required under law for Sudan to be taken off
the state sponsors list. *By doing this, we would also be de-coupling the
state sponsor of terrorism from Darfur and from the Darfur issue."* (State
Department transcript of November 9, 2010 background briefing by senior
administration officials)

Of course, as was soon obvious, Darfur had been "de-coupled" much more
fully than suggested by this unnamed "senior administration official"; "we"
were a long, long way from the morally flatulent and expedient rhetoric
Obama used in 2007.

• This expediency has translated into various forms in Obama's Sudan
policy, including what has been largely silence on the outrageous, immoral,
and grossly illegal bombings of civilians in Jebel Marra and other
locations in Darfur, as well as elsewhere in greater Sudan, particularly
the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. What is said by the Obama administration,
very occasionally, is perfunctory and utterly inconsequential. Here the UN,
the Europeans, and the African Union are equally to blame.

• The Obama administration speaks rarely if at all about the extremely dire
humanitarian situation in Darfur: silence here is again expediency. (See
Sudan assessment by UN OCHA in next paragraph as well as paragraph below
that notes the FEWSNet assessment of food insecurity in South Kordofan.)

• Of Khartoum's relentless obstruction of humanitarian assistance, the U.S.
has had nothing of consequence to say, even as Radio Dabanga reports (see
below): "The UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan has
expressed deep concern with the marked increase in humanitarian needs in
Sudan which are not met with sufficient aid." He is speaking primarily of
Darfur, but also eastern Sudan and other areas which receive so little from
Khartoum and to which the regime frequently denies access.

• The Obama administration refuses to characterize UNAMID as the failure it
is, preserving the grim status quo for civilian protection and preventing
real debate about what must be done to address the extreme security crisis
(see Radio Dabanga dispatches below).

• The Obama administration pretends that there is life left in the Doha
Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), now almost three years into
conspicuous irrelevance (it was signed in July 2011 by non-representative
rebel groups cobbled together by Gration and Muamar Gadhafi). This is
absurd and merely an expedient way of refusing to confront diplomatic
realities and the need for auspices more effective than those that can be
provided by Qatar. By continuing to flog the dead horse that is the DDPD,
the Obama administration is dodging the real work of helping to bring peace
to Darfur.

• Ultimately, the most disgraceful part of the Obama administration's Sudan
policy is that is driven by a lust for the putative counter-terrorism
intelligence that Khartoum can provide, no matter what the human
consequences of accepting this partnership with a genocidal regime.
Moreover, this is so despite Khartoum's continuing inclusion on the most
recent (2013) State Department list of state sponsors of international
terrorism (see my lengthy review of the regime's record of support for
terrorism, "The Obama Administration, Terrorism, and Hypocrisy" [with
Appendices], at *Sudan Tribune*, May 6, 2014:
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50897/).

Nothing else can explain the preposterous view toward the regime in
Khartoum articulated by another former Obama special envoy for Sudan,
Princeton Lyman. In an interview with the important Arab news outlet, Lyman
declared:

"Frankly, we do not want to see the ouster of the [Sudanese] regime, nor
regime change. We want to see the regime carrying out reform via
constitutional democratic measures." (*Asharq Al-Awsat
<http://www.aawsat.net/author/theaawsat>*, 3 December 2011)

It is simply absurd to think that the current regime can oversee "reform
via constitutional democratic measures." Every event in Sudan since this
outrageously expedient and deeply misleading statement belies Lyman's
premises. The crackdown on the press has been more repressive than ever.
Demonstrations last September/October in a range of Sudanese cities and
towns were met with extreme violence by security forces, including what Amnesty
International described as "shoot to kill" orders in Khartoum and Omdurman
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/sudan-security-forces-fatally-shoot-dozens-protesters-demonstrations-grow-2013-09-26>.
There is an increase in the number of political jailings. And perhaps most
consequentially, the Sudanese economy is imploding and there is nothing the
current regime can do to reverse the decline; to remain in power these
ruthless men will have to use ever more repressive and violent means. The
last thing on their minds is "carrying out reform via constitution
democratic measures." To suggest otherwise is not merely disingenuous, it
is mendacious.

• Readers may draw their own conclusions about parallels between the
decisions, judgments, and actions of the United States in 1994 and those of
the current U.S. administration in response not only to Darfur, but to the
genocidal realities of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which are—in
rebel-controlled areas—subject to a total humanitarian embargo. The UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports in its most
recent Sudan Bulletin (Issue 22, 1 June 2014): "The Famine Early Warning
Networks (FEWS Net) forecasts that *40 per cent of IDPs and host
communities in SPLM-N areas of South Kordofan will face emergency levels of
food insecurity through September 2014."* This implies an extremely large
mortality total, especially among children under five.

And yet the Obama administration has done nothing of consequence to help
create humanitarian access or corridors, whether from Ethiopia or South
Sudan. Again, this is expedient, and deadly, in a variety of ways—and there
are far too many other examples. Darfur many not be Rwanda, but the
expediency and disingenuousness that guide U.S. policy are all too similar.

*Darfur—Endless human suffering and destruction*

I have been driven by necessity to chronicling events in Darfur via Radio
Dabanga and the occasionally useful UN report (although notably, the UN has
not for years released figures for Global Acute Malnutrition for the
region, for Severe Acute Malnutrition—typically fatal if untreated in
children under five—or for global "excess mortality"). I have recently
offered a compendium of briefs on policy responses as we know them—"Darfur:
A Bibliography of Violence and International Indifference," *Sudan Tribune*,
13 April 2014 (http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article5063) as well as
“Pretending Darfur Isn’t: the world continues to avert its eyes from
accelerating human suffering and destruction,” *Sudan Tribune*, 2 June
2014, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51213. And on this
occasion I can do no more than highlight what has been authoritatively
reported by Radio Dabanga, using as a symbolic time-frame the ten days
since the *New York Times* reported on various UN cables, highlighting the
disgraceful response of international actors to genocide in Rwanda.

Such disgrace finds its ample complement this very day in the inaction of
those with the power to pressure the Khartoum regime to end its
increasingly violent "genocide by attrition." The dispatches here concern
the usual subjects of Radio Dabanga (the source for all unless otherwise
indicated; not all dispatches are included): murder, rape, indiscriminate
aerial bombardment (in violation of international law and UN Security
Council Resolution 1591, March 2005), village torching and looting by
regime-allied Arab militias (most commonly now the Rapid Support Forces,
another recycling of the *Janjaweed*), extortion, torture, appropriation of
African farmland, and robbery. The victims of course are all new—or have
suffered a terrible repetition of these brutalities:

   - *Scorched earth in South Darfur: Pictures*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74572>

UM GUNJA (8 June 2014) - On 28 February 2014, Radio Dabanga reported that
more than 35 villages burned to ashes, and dozens of civilians were killed
in attacks by troops of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74572>*

   - *UN Coordinator in Sudan warns of crisis*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74199>

KHARTOUM (2 June 2014) - The UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in
Sudan has expressed deep concern with the marked increase in humanitarian
needs in Sudan which are not met with sufficient aid. The... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74199>*

   - *Children drink poisoned water in West Darfur camp*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74685>

MURNEI (10 June 2014) - Six basic school students of camp Murnei for
internally displaced people in Kereinik locality, West Darfur, have become
ill on Sunday as a result of drinking water believed to be... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74685>*

   - *North Darfur’s newly displaced denied water*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74393>

EL FASHER (5 June 2014) - Sudanese government authorities have refused to
provide access to water and sanitation for newly displaced people in Zamzam
camp near El Fasher, capital of North Darfur. A... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74393>*

*• Thousands face starvation in Otash camp, South Darfur*
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74347>

OTASH CAMP (4 June 2014) - Thousands of the displaced inhabitants of Otash
camp in Nyala, face a bleak humanitarian and health situation as no food
rations have been received. Those affected include the... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74347>*

   - *Life-threatening situation in Mellit – aid agencies in Sudan alarmed*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74397>

KHARTOUM (5 June 2014) - The health situation of thousands of new arrivals
at the UNAMID site at Mellit in North Darfur is life threatening. Today UN
agencies embarked on a mission to Mellit to try to... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74397>*

   - *Bomb kills three children in Darfur's Jebel Marra*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74465>

EAST JEBEL MARRA (6 June 2014) - Three children died in a bomb explosion
caused by remnants of war on Thursday in Korofala area in East Jebel Marra,
Darfur. A relative of the dead told Radio Dabanga that the... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74465>*

   - *Three North Darfur children maimed by grenade*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74217>

BA'ASHIM (2 June 2014) - Three boys were maimed when a grenade they found
and played with detonated in the area of Ba’ashim in North Darfur on
Sunday. Zubeir Suleiman Ibrahim (13), Bush Hamid Sandal (13... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74217>*

   - *39 rape victims in two months at South Darfur’s Kalma camp*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74402>

KALMA CAMP (5 June 2014) - *A total of 39 displaced women and girls from
Kalma camp in South Darfur, were the victims of rape during April and May
2014. *Almost all of the rapes occurred while the women were... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74402>*

   - *Chadian refugee raped, kidnaps in Central Darfur*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74288>

AZUM LOCALITY (3 June 2014) - *Militiamen raped a nursing mother of Um
Shalaya camp for Chadian refugees in Azum locality, Central Darfur on
Tuesday. “This morning three government-backed militiamen assaulted*... *FULL
STORY <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74288>*

   - *Village pillaged, torched in South Darfur*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74292>

MERSHING LOCALITY (3 June 2014) - Militiamen attacked the village of Awlad
Amin in Mershing locality, South Darfur, on Tuesday. “Government-backed
Janjaweed on camels stormed Awlad Amin village in the area of Abu... *FULL
STORY <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74292>*

   - *Militia loots South Darfur market, citizens*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74684>

EL RADOOM LOCALITY (10 June 2014) - Pro-government militiamen robbed the
market in Alaiba area, El Radoom locality in South Darfur, on Friday. One
of the victims of the looting told Radio Dabanga that the militiamen... *FULL
STORY <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74684>*

   - *Militiamen kill 11, loot towns in North Darfur's Korma*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74467>

KORMA/EL FASHER (6 June 2014) - Militia elements killed at least eleven
citizens during attacks on rural villages in Korma area in El Fasher
locality, North Darfur, on Wednesday. They have also wounded five... *FULL
STORY <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74467>*

   - *Threat to torch South Darfur village, two die in firefight*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74219>

KASS (2 June 2014) - Militiamen threatened to set the village of Doura in
South Darfur on fire on Sunday, if the villagers do not pay compensation
for two cows. On the same day, two people were... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74219>*

   - *Militiamen torture firewood collectors in North Darfur*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74464>

KUTUM (6 June 2014) - Pro-government militiamen ambushed and injured a
number of displaced people from Kassab camp in North Darfur's Kutum
locality, on Wednesday. One of the victims told Radio Dabanga... *FULL
STORY <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74464>*

   - *Abbala detain four in Birkat Seira, North Darfur*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74289>

BIRKAT SEIRA (3 June 2014) - Abbala tribesmen detained four people in
Birkat Seira in North Darfur on Monday. “The four men from Birkat Seira in
Saraf Umra locality were detained by the Abbala on charges of... *FULL
STORY <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74289>*

[The *Abbala* (camel-herding) nomadic Arab tribal groups of northern Darfur
have contributed disproportionately to the *Janjaweed*, currently
incarnated as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—ER]

   - *Two North Darfur women held hostage for stolen camels*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74263>

EL SAREIF BENI HUSSEIN (3 June 2014) - Abbala tribesmen abducted two women
in the area of Um Jarwa in El Sareif Beni Hussein locality, North Darfur,
on Saturday. A relative of the abductees told Radio Dabanga that... *FULL
STORY <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74263>*

   - *Camel herders beat couple near South Darfur camp*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74463>

BIELEL (6 June 2014) - Three camel herders tied down and severely beat a
married couple in Tebeldina area, south of El Salam camp in South Darfur on
Thursday. Mahjoub Adam Tabaldiya, a sheikh of El... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74463>*

   - *Six dead, 12 wounded in Central Darfur attacks*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74636>

ZALINGEI (9 Jun 2014) - Five people were seriously injured in an attack by
pro-government militiamen on Dereig market, west of Zalingei in Central
Darfur. Sheikh Matar Younis told Radio Dabanga that a... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74636>*

   - *Two men die in Central Darfur killings on Sunday*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74689>

ZALINGEI/NIERTETI (10 June 2014) - Two men were shot dead in two separate
cases in Central Darfur localities on Sunday. Idris Haroun Abdel Salam,
aged 22, was killed by unidentified gunmen in his house at El... *FULL
STORY <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74689>*

   - *Four dead, five wounded, 100 missing in North Darfur attacks*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74630>

TAWILA (9 June 2014) - Four people have died, five wounded, and 100 more
unaccounted for following consecutive militia attacks in the area of Kuru,
20km southwest of Tawila in North Darfur. A relative... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74630>*

   - *Two farmers wounded in South Darfur attack*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74574>

GIREIDA (8 June 2014) - Two South Darfur displaced farmers have been
transferred to Gireida hospital "in serious condition" following a militia
attack on Friday. A witness told Radio Dabanga that Yousif... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74574>*

   - *Robbery claims two lives in Nyala, South Darfur*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74688>

NYALA (10 June 2014) - Two people were killed and two others were injured
in an armed robbery at a house in Nyala city, South Darfur, on Sunday.
Witnesses in the South Darfur capital recounted that... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74688>*

   - *"Security very bad in South Darfur": Minister*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74403>

NYALA (5 June 2014) - The Minister of Urban Planning for South Darfur, Issa
Adam Abkar, says the security situation in the state and the capital city
of Nyala in particular “seems to be beyond the... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74403>*

   - *Death threats against outspoken North Darfur Omda*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74398>

TAWILA LOCALITY (5 June 2014) - Pro-government militias have publicly
threatened to kill Omda Musa Moktar of Rwanda camp for the displaced in
Tawila locality, North Darfur on Saturday if he does not leave the... *FULL
STORY <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74398>*

   - *South Darfur hospital strikes against militia attacks*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74686>

NYALA (10 June 2014) - The doctors and nurses of the Nyala Hospital have
entered into an open-ended strike from work since Sunday, protesting the
attack on a doctor by the paramilitary Rapid Support... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74686>*

   - *Road closure, tolls, squeeze prices in North Darfur*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74573>

EL FASHER (8 June 2014) - The flow of commercial trucks and passenger buses
between Kutum and El Fasher has stalled for the second week owing to the
security situation in North Darfur. The halt is a result... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74573>*

   - *Boy dies after police disperse water protest in Sudan’s capital*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74566>

KHARTOUM (8 June 2014) - A 14-year-old boy has died and an unknown number
of people detained by police after citizens of Sudan’s capital took to the
streets in protest against water cuts on Sunday. The... *FULL STORY*
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74566>

   - *Wounded displaced still detained "to press camp re-planning," Central
   Darfur* <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74458>

ZALINGEI (6 June 2014) - Eight wounded, internally displaced people from
Ronga Tas camp have been held in detention by security forces in Zalingei
locality, North Darfur, since Thursday without charge. “... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74458>*

   - *Sudan’s Defence Minister visits Zalingei, Central Darfur*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74404>

ZALINGEI (5 June 2014) - Sudan’s Defence Minister Abdel Rahim Mohammad
Hussein and leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces have arrived in Zalingei,
capital of Central Darfur, for a round of meetings with... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74404>*

   - *UNAMID sector head addresses North Darfur tribal conference*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74401>

KABKABIYA (5 June 2014) - UNAMID’s Head of Office, Sector North, Mohamed El
Amine Souef, has reaffirmed the Mission’s commitment to carry out its core
mandate of protecting civilians, supporting local-... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74401>*

   - *Tribal peace to be sealed in Darfur*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74350>

EL SAREIF BENI HUSSEIN (4 June 2014) - More than 250 leaders of the Abbala,
Beni Hussein and Mahamed tribes gathered in the Ashibeka area, northeast of
the gold mining area of Jebel ‘Amer in North Darfur on Wednesday,... *FULL
STORY <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74350>*

   - *"Funds for returning Sudanese refugees seized": MP*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74348>

SENNAR STATE (4 June 2014) - Brigadier Yousif Ahmed Yousif Aboroaf, MP for
the Rufaa tribe has accused the Governor of Sudan’s Sennar State, Ahmed
Abbas of seizing SDG 5 million ($878,000) allocated for the... *FULL STOR
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74348>Y*

   - *Concerns over school dropout rate in Darfur, incentives for medics*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74346>

EL FASHER (4 June 2014) - The members of the States Council have revealed
that 80 percent of youths from Darfur and South Kordofan are school
dropouts, warning that the phenomenon might continue growing.... *FULL
STORY <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74346>*

   - *South Darfur judicial staff arrested after heist*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74344>

NYALA (4 June 2014) - Sudanese Security Services have arrested three
employees of the judicial authority of South Darfur in the aftermath of an
armed robbery last Thursday, during which gunmen made off... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74344>*

   - *Ambushes, vehicles stolen in Central and South Darfur*
   <https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74293>

DARFUR (3 June 2014) - On Monday, militiamen ambushed a vehicle of the
South Darfur State’s Ministry of Health in the area of Digeis in South
Darfur. In Um Dafug, South Darfur, the vehicle of a... *FULL STORY
<https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/74293>*


Eric Reeves
Smith College

Northampton, MA  01063

[email protected]

www.sudanreeves.org


All woodturning purchases benefit the work of Oxfam in Sudan and South Sudan

https://www.etsy.com/shop/EricReevesWoodturner

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