---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, Nov 27, 2015 at 7:30 AM
Subject: “Changing the Demography”: Violent Expropriation and Destruction
of Farmlands in Darfur, November 2014 – November 2015
To: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>


*“Changing the Demography”: Violent Expropriation and Destruction of
Farmlands in Darfur, **November 2014 – November 2015**Eric Reeves, author*

*Maya Baca, editing and research*

[*Note: *This final distillation of dispatches from Radio Dabanga takes a
very lengthy and more radical form, explained in the narrative that
follows. Using all data from the past year (November 1, 2014 – present), I
have represented violent expropriation of African farmlands by Arab
militias—primarily, but far from exclusively, the Rapid Support Forces—as
fully as possible. Beyond the framing narrative below, I provide a timeline
of significant events for the period in question, as well as a guide to
Darfur’s geography, and critical individuals and organizations. There is
also a brief bibliography, followed by examples of contrasts in the
reporting of Darfur’s realities by Radio Dabanga and by the Khartoum
regime.  Since this project is almost entirely reliant on Radio Dabanga,
this contrast is of some significance. *[All elements except for the maps
are provisionally here
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/11/26/annexes-to-changing-the-demography-violent-expropriation-and-destruction-of-farmlands-in-darfur-november-2014-november-2015/>]*
.

The quantification here of violent land expropriation—increasingly by Arab
groups from outside Sudan—is unprecedented. My hope is that the
significance of the issue can be rendered clearly, revealing what an
enormous obstacle to any meaningful Darfur peace process this expropriation
of land has created—and continues to go unaddressed in any negotiating
process.

The project is in process at www.changingthedemography.org; the most
important element, a data spreadsheet representing every relevant event for
the past year, is available *here
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/11/26/spreadsheet-for-events-bearing-on-violent-land-expropriation-in-darfur-november-2014-november-2015/>*;
in turn, this data will be visually represented on a set of Darfur maps
(primary guidance on names and locations is the 2005 UN OCHA’s collection
of Darfur Atlases
<http://sudanreeves.org/2014/04/16/darfur-field-atlas-collection-from-un-ocha-continues-to-be-the-most-reliable-guide-to-the-locations-of-smaller-towns-and-villages/>
).

What follows is the framing narrative.
*Introduction*

The primary purpose of this framing narrative is to provide context for the
accompanying data spreadsheet and map set, both of which give a sense of
the tremendous scale of violent expropriation and destruction of farms and
arable land by *Khartoum*-backed *Arab* militias in *Darfur*, the vast
western region of *Sudan*. This expropriation has been continuous since the
beginning of the conflict, and indeed had occurred on a smaller scale in
earlier years. *Massalit* lands were targeted in particular during this
early phase of expropriation. The primary source for data is, perforce, *Radio
Dabanga* <http://www.radiodabanga.org/>, which has done a truly remarkable
job of providing current, accurate, and detailed accounts of what is
occurring in *Darfur*. In journalistic style and standards, it has improved
dramatically over the past six years, and is now without rival in providing
us insight into Darfur’s realties. Without Radio Dabanga these realities,
it is safe to say, would be known only—and only very partially—by those on
the ground; Radio Dabanga represents a pioneering effort in journalism
amidst ongoing genocide. It should also be said, however, that *Human
Rights Watch* has issued two highly significant reports on Darfur over the
past year, and the *UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA)* has been the source of a great deal of data concerning
humanitarian issues.

*[Proper nouns, unusual nouns, dates, and some numerical figures in the
text have been put in bold* *on first appearance; all emphases
in bold within quoted materials have been added; unless otherwise
indicated, all dispatches and reports are from Radio Dabanga. See here
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/11/26/annexes-to-changing-the-demography-violent-expropriation-and-destruction-of-farmlands-in-darfur-november-2014-november-2015/>
for
an extensive compilation of names, places, terms, as well as humanitarian,
diplomatic, and military actors.]*
*Time-frames*

The time-frame for the narrative and data is *November 1, 2014* *to the
present*—a little over a year. November 1 is only a partially
arbitrary *terminus
a quo*, for it was also the date on which the 36 hours of brutal sexual
violence in *Tabit, North Darfur* finally ended. By then more than 220
girls and women had been raped by regular *Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)*
soldiers—on
the orders of the local garrison commander (something the commander has
admitted
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/commander-admits-to-mass-rape-by-soldiers-in-north-darfur>).
International response subsequently is a tale of weak, cowardly, and
dishonest posturing; only a *February 11, 2015* report by Human Rights
Watch, conducted on the basis of a remarkable series of interviews with
victims and eyewitnesses, provides authoritative insight into the events at
Tabit (see below).

The present report may cover only a year of violent land expropriation and
destruction—destroyed in the sense that armed Arab militias and militant
groups set crops ablaze or bombed fields <http://www.sudanbombing.org/> or
loose their cattle and camels on lands that had been planted, with crops
approaching harvesting. But it is a year that largely replicates what had
occurred the year before, and essentially the year before that, *mutatis
mutandis*. And again, violent expropriation of farmland, livestock, indeed
all portable possessions of value has been a constant in the genocidal
<http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol31/iss4/8/> counter-insurgency
campaign of Khartoum’s *National Islamic Front/National Congress Party* regime.
Elements of the campaign could be discerned in the events of *2002*, but
the broader effort began in earnest following the successful *April
2003* attack
on the* El Fasher (North Darfur) *air base by the *Sudan Liberation
Army/Movement (SLA/M*—at the time a relatively united force).

The enormous success of the attack (which included destroying military
aircraft on the ground, abducting the base commander, and making off with
large stocks of weapons, ammunition and vehicles) was an intolerable
scandal in the eyes of the leading military figures in the regime,
including then *Minister of the Interior (General) Abdel Rahim Mohamed
Hussein*. (An arrest warrant has been issued for Hussein by the *International
Criminal Court* for massive *crimes against humanity*; warrants for both
massive crimes against humanity and multiple counts of genocide in Darfur
have been issued for* President Omar al-Bashir*.) The Arab militias
recruited by these men and others in the regime were composed substantially
of northern *abbala*, or camel-herding, fighters, but a number of Arab
tribal groups in the south and west contributed as well. They became
internationally notorious as the *Janjaweed*.

The years *2003 – 2005 *saw almost inconceivable levels of village looting
and destruction, killings, rapes, and violence of all descriptions. But
while this diminished in subsequent years—largely because the vast majority
of* non-Arab/African *villages had been destroyed—it did not cease, despite
efforts in some quarters to suggest otherwise
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/01/07/a-note-on-the-assessment-of-darfur-by-alex-de-waal-may-2009-how-was-darfur-so-badly-understood-and-so-terribly-managed-by-the-international-community-7-january-2015/>.
The consensus among my numerous informed Darfuri contacts—with regular
access to information coming from Darfur—was that by the end of *2006*
 roughly *80 percent of all African villages* had been destroyed, wholly or
partially (for a variety of reasons, I prefer the designation *African* to
*non-Arab*, if only because it is increasingly the means of
self-identification by the people meant to be designated). I have
chronicled in detail the violence that continued after 2006, both in my
lengthy e-Book *Compromising With Evil: An archival history of greater
Sudan, 2007 – 2012* <http://www.compromisingwithevil.org/> and in the
archives of my website | http://sudanreeves.org/archive/. (For a thin but
all too complete bibliography, see *here
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/11/26/annexes-to-changing-the-demography-violent-expropriation-and-destruction-of-farmlands-in-darfur-november-2014-november-2015/>*
.)

What has been insufficiently recalled is how comprehensive the violent
destruction of villages was, and how often it entailed destruction of the
agricultural livelihoods of those whose villages had been attacked. Arab
militia forces, especially in the early years of the genocide, worked
hand-in-glove with the Khartoum regime’s Sudan Armed Forces when attacks
were launched, very frequently early in the morning. *Russian-built
helicopter gunships* and *Antonov “bombers”* would begin assaults on the
village, rousing residents who were shot by *Janjaweed* and SAF forces when
they left their homes—or forced to flee with nothing.

Men and boys were the particular targets for killings; women and girls were
more likely to be raped (and perhaps scarred or branded to ensure that the
fact of rape could not be concealed). Destruction of villages entailed
burning seed stocks and food stocks, the tearing up of irrigation systems,
cutting down fruit trees, and—most destructively—poisoning wells with human
or animal corpses. After all plundering of valuables was completed, the
entire village would be torched. Once the village was destroyed, lands that
had been planted with crops were often turned into foraging grounds for
cattle and camels, further ensuring that food production would be
impossible should villagers return.

We have had no relevant *mortality data* or data analysis since *2010*. But
by *July 2010*, data was sufficiently comprehensive to permit reasonable
extrapolation to a figure for total mortality in excess of *500,000 human
beings*
<http://sudanreeves.org/2010/08/07/quantifying-genocide-darfur-mortality-update-august-6-2010/>,
dying directly from violence or the effects of violent displacement. For
many fleeing their villages ended up dying of dehydration or lack of food
because of the inauspicious direction in which they were forced to flee;
many more died in camps that were insufficiently equipped to respond to the
vast influx of displaced persons. There are now, according to the most
recent report from the *UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs*, some *2.7 million* internally displaced Darfuris
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA_Sudan_Weekly_Humanitarian_Bulletin_Issue_44_%2826_October_-_1_November_2015%29.pdf>,
and this figure may well be low since only some of the displacement
occurring over the past year is reflected in this figure; it also does not
include those displaced living not in camps but instead with relatives,
friends, and others in neighboring villages or even the larger towns of the
Darfur region. Additionally, the most recent figure from the *UN High
Commission for Refugees* puts the total number of Darfuri refugees in *eastern
Chad* at *370,000* <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c226.html>—perhaps the
most invisible of all large refugee populations in the world.

There have been two Darfur “peace agreements” signed over the past nine
years—both disastrously conceived and falling apart rapidly without any
positive impact on the level of violence. The *Darfur Peace Agreement of
2006 (Abuja, Nigeria)* succeeded mainly in dividing the rebel groups, since
only one prominent rebel figure, *Minni Minawi*, signed the agreement. The
rebel groups not associated with Minawi’s breakaway Sudan Liberation Army
faction rejected the agreement, but were soon fighting among themselves;
chances for a successful insurgency against the Khartoum regime were
radically diminished.

In *July 2011* a contrived, factitious group of “rebel leaders,” under the
newly created name of the *“Liberation and Justice Movement,”* signed,
along with the Khartoum regime, the *“Doha Document for Peace in Darfur”
(DDPD)*. Julie Flint, a keen observer of the Abuja negotiating process, on
learning of how talks were conducted in *Qatar*, described them as “Abuja
replayed as farce” (personal communication, March 22, 2011). And it has
proved as much in the past four and a half years. The DDPD had no
meaningful buy-in from *Darfuri civil society*, which has overwhelmingly
rejected the Document. And for its part, Khartoum never abided by the terms
of either the *2006* agreement or the *2011* agreement, and this was to be
expected. The National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime, which
came to power by military coup in June 1989, has never abided by a single
agreement made with any Sudanese party of actor—no one, not ever (for an
extensive timeline of abrogated agreements, see *here
<http://sudanreeves.org/2012/05/07/part-1-a-timeline-for-khartoums-abrogation-of-agreements-to-date-in-2012/>*).
Nor has the regime felt obliged to respect the “demands” of the *UN
Security Council*. For example, when the Council belatedly recognized the
role of Arab militias in the Darfur counter-insurgency campaign, it
“demanded” of Khartoum in *Resolution 1556 (July 2004)*
<http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/sudan/1556> that
the regime disarm and bring to justice the *Janjaweed:*

            [Under Chapter 7 authority, the UN Security Council…]

   1. *Demands* that the Government of Sudan fulfill its commitments to *disarm
   the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders
   and their associates who have incited and carried out human rights and
   international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities*, and
   further *requests the Secretary General to report in 30 days, and
   monthly thereafter, to the Council on the progress or lack thereof by the
   Government of Sudan on this matter and expresses its intention to consider
   further actions, including measures* as provided for in Article 41 of
   the Charter of the United Nations on the Government of Sudan, in the event
   of non-compliance;

Khartoum’s response was contempt, and to the extent that it has responded
to *Janjaweed *predations—often carried out in coordination with Khartoum’s
regular ground and air forces—it has been by recycling *Janjaweed* militiamen
into other paramilitary guises: the *Popular Defense Forces (PDF)*, *the
Central Reserve Police (Abu Tira)*, the *Border Intelligence Guards*, and
most recently the *Rapid Support Forces,* or *RSF *(*al-Quwat al-Da’m
al-Sari’ *in Arabic).

The latter are far better armed and equipped than the *Janjaweed*,
and—significantly—enjoy the open support of all senior officials in the
regime, including President al-Bashir. Khartoum never acknowledged the
existence of the *Janjaweed*, even though the evidence of continuing
military coordination between the SAF and various *Janjaweed* elements was
consistent and overwhelming (see “Entrenching Impunity: Government
Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur,” Human Rights Watch,
December 2005 <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/>). Now,
however, the RSF are celebrated as a key to “crushing the
rebellions”—al-Bashir’s unfulfilled promise for the past three years,
referring to popular military uprisings in not only Darfur, but also in
*South* *Kordofan*
<http://sudanreeves.org/2011/07/22/south-kordofan-a-critical-moment-for-action-enough-project-july-22-2011/>
 and *Blue Nile*
<http://sudanreeves.org/2011/09/04/blue-nile-state-sudan-and-the-resumption-of-country-wide-war/>.
Khartoum has also militarily annexed the contested *Abyei*
<http://sudanreeves.org/2011/05/27/an-abyei-timeline-the-long-road-to-khartoums-military-invasion/>
region,
which was denied a self-determination referendum in *January 2011* and
seized by Khartoum in *May 2011.*

[By far the most thorough and authoritative study of the RSF is contained
in a report by Human Rights Watch: “‘Men With No Mercy”: Rapid Support
Forces Attacks Against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan,” Human Rights Watch |
September 9, 2015 <http://www.hrw.org/node/280756>. Based on a great many
interviews, including with those who had defected from the RSF and SAF, it
is our best source other than Radio Dabanga in recording human rights
abuses in Darfur; a distillation of the report may be found at |
http://sudanreeves.org/2015/09/13/darfur-radio-dabanga-news-digest-number-24-13-september-2015/.
Research was conducted between *May 2014* and *July 2015*, and thus
provides very considerable overlap with this narrative, although more
broadly inclusive in its design, and less data-driven.]

Without fuller understanding of the character and extent of violent
expropriation of farmland, and the violence that prevents farming and
farm-related activities, the challenges to bring peace to Darfur simply
cannot be understood. For the increasing pace and violence of land
expropriation is made fully clear by the data assembled here; and this
deadly acceleration shows no sign of diminishing.
*“Changing the Demography”*

*Forced returns of refugees and displaced persons*

Returns of displaced persons from the camps in which they have lived, often
for many years is a critical issue and something that the displaced greatly
wish for—*if *there is adequate security. According to Radio Dabanga
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/herders-expel-returning-farmers-in-tawila-north-darfur>
, *96.9 percent of those displaced worked in agriculture before they were
displaced*. More than anything, they wish to return to their lands and
farms; but they will not do so when countless reports make clear the
intensifying insecurity in the regions where their farms are located.

For its part, Khartoum has settled on a strategy for Darfur that rests on
forcibly shutting down camps for displaced persons, doing so under the
guise of “voluntary” returns, attempting to abuse the demographic and
geographic ignorance of people desperate to return to their home and
villages—or to new, *“model” villages*. Overwhelmingly, however, the people
in the camps are all too aware of the new demographic realities—the
continuing, relentlessly violent predations of Arab militias and the
SAF—and refuse to leave what small bit of security is provided by the
camps. That they chose to stay is telling: the camps for displaced persons
in Darfur have what is now a long and gruesome history.

In *2004* a UN inter-agency investigating team found clear evidence that
some of the camps for displaced persons had been turned into what were
essentially “death camps.”
<http://sudanreeves.org/2004/12/13/darfur-ongoing-genocide-dissent-magazine-fall-2004/>
The
comparisons by seasoned relief workers, deeply shaken by what they found,
were to Rwanda in 1994. Not coincidentally, in 2004 discussion began in
Khartoum about compelling the returns of displaced persons in the camps,
led by then-Minister of the Interior Abdel Rahmin Mohamed Hussein. This
again became a central issue in *2010*
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33084> in what would be billed
by Khartoum as *“**The New Strategy for Darfur*
<http://sudanreeves.org/2010/10/08/accommodating-genocide-international-response-to-khartoums-new-strategy-for-darfur-dissent-magazine-on-line-ocober-8-2010/>
*.”*

The thinking by the regime has been that if the camps could be shut down,
the rationale for an international humanitarian presence in Darfur would
end. But security has never been great enough for people to return, and if
some have succeeded, the vast majority have not. Camps themselves have been
attacked frequently following the first major *Janjaweed *assault against
displaced persons in Aro Sharow camp (West Darfur) in September 2005
<http://sudanreeves.org/2005/12/17/a-final-solution-for-darfur-the-view-from-khartoum-october-9-2005/>.
These direct militia and military assaults on the camps have increased
dramatically over the past decade, becoming more threatening and more
violent. Overwhelmingly, Darfuris, both in Darfur and eastern Chad, reject
returns as far too dangerous. News accounts of Darfur, except those from
Radio Dabanga, are very rarely able to give voice to the views of Darfuris
on this issue; this is also true of intimidated UN agencies, even as they
are well aware of the importance Khartoum attaches to silencing these
distressed and vulnerable voices.

But the realities of extreme insecurity cannot be wished away, nor will
Darfuris be foolishly led to believe that a few *“Potemkin villages” *represent
any fundamental shift in the attitude of the Khartoum regime. Several
dispatches from Radio Dabanga make this eminently clear:

Displaced refuse to obey Darfur Authority and leave camps
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/displaced-refuse-to-obey-darfur-authority-and-leave-camps>
| July
31, 2015 | Zalingei, formerly West Darfur / El Geneina, West Darfur

*Displaced people living in Central Darfur state have rejected the project
for the voluntary return of the displaced population, set up by the Darfur
Regional Authority. “None of the displaced people will return to their home
villages, because of the lack of security.”* The coordinator of the Central
Darfur camps said that the people refuse the voluntary return offered by
the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA), *“because the reasons for their
displacement still exist.”* He stressed that weapons from the militias
should be collected, and criminals should be prosecuted, prior for the mass
return of the displaced people. *“We need to survive first before having
institutions and buildings.”*

Despite the obvious cogency of the argument for security, pressure to
return from the camps has been applied by other actors, including *U.S.
special envoy for Sudan Scott Gration* during his disastrous two-year tenure
<http://sudanreeves.org/2011/01/23/us-special-envoy-on-returns-of-displaced-persons-in-darfur-september-2009/>
(March
2009 – March 2011). He was taken to task by humanitarian actors who pointed
out how little he knew about the implications of such returns. Gration also
supported enthusiastically Khartoum’s “New Strategy for Darfur,” little
more than a roadmap for ridding Darfur of international humanitarian
actors, potential witnesses to what was occurring in Darfur. Of remaining
relief workers in Darfur, *97 percent are Sudanese nationals* and
particularly vulnerable should they attempt to communicate what they have
seen to the world outside Darfur, including the construction of “model
villages”:

Central Darfur displaced reject model villages
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/central-darfur-displaced-reject-model-villages-1>
| August
27, 2015 | Ronga Tas, formerly West Darfur

*The more than 30,000 residents of Ronga Tas camp for the displaced in
Central Darfur's Azum locality reject the moving of schools and health
centres from the camp to model villages constructed by the Darfur Regional
Authority.* On Wednesday the coordinator of the Central Darfur camps told
Radio Dabanga that the *state government closed two basic schools, a
secondary school and a health centre in the camp on Tuesday. “This is the
first step towards the dismantling of the Ronga Tas camp* which is part of
the *Darfur Regional Authority *plans to force all displaced in Darfur to
move to model villages it constructed with the financial support of Qatar,”
he said. *[The “Darfur Regional Authority” was a creation of the Doha
Document for Peace in Darfur; under the leadership of Tijani Sese, the DRA
has become riddled with corruption—ER]*

Qatar is trying in effect to “buy” the “success” of the Doha Document for
Peace in Darfur with its funding of “model villages.” This is well
understood by Darfuris—only one of the reasons there is such deep distrust
of Qataris as participants in a Darfur peace process.

Moreover, there have been a number of attempts to return displaced persons
that have ended in catastrophe:

Militia kill nine, torch “voluntary return” village in South Darfur
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/militia-kill-nine-torch-voluntary-return-village-in-south-darfur>
| December
14, 2014 | Gireida Locality, South Darfur

On Saturday, nine villagers were killed, and their homes burned to ashes in
an attack by militiamen on Abu Jabra in Gireida locality, South Darfur. *“About
five weeks ago, the people of Abu Jabra had returned to their village, in
the voluntary return programme organised by the Darfur Regional Authority,”
an eyewitness from a neighbouring village told Radio Dabanga. “The formerly
displaced had begun to settle themselves again at the place, located 20 km
north of Gireida town.”* “However, on Saturday afternoon*, a large group of
about 100 militiamen on camels and horses attacked the village, without any
warning or clear reason. They fired at the people, killing nine instantly.
After pillaging the entire village, they set it ablaze.”*

In fact, there is a clear reason for the attack: the Arab militia forces
have laid claim to the lands that are necessary for a village to thrive,
indeed to survive at all. This was not only a murderous attack on people
who had been led to believe that they really could begin life again, but a
warning to others in camps throughout Darfur, making clear that despite
Khartoum’s rhetoric, the militias that wield so much power in Darfur were
determined that current land dispensations would not be challenged by
returns. Surveying *over 3 million internally displaced persons and
refugees*, these militias are prepared to use extreme violence to ensure
that trends toward returns will not be allowed, whatever the regime in
Khartoum may wish.

We should remember that there is a continual “referendum” on security in
Darfur, conducted every day by the 370,000 Darfuri refugees in eastern
Chad: they adamantly refuse to return to their lands and their country
because insecurity is simply too great. And camps in eastern Chad are in
many ways even less well served than those in Darfur itself. In *August
2015*, the *UN’s World Food Program* announced
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/food-rations-for-darfuri-refugees-in-chad-may-be-cut-next-year>
that
in *2016* there would be no funding for continuing the provision of food to
the refugee populations in the *twelve refugee camps *running north to
south along the *Chad/Sudan border*. This comes on top of what have already
been severe cuts to daily rations.

Despite the privation and extreme difficulty of life in eastern Chad, the
refugees stay—and each day that they stay represents a collective judgment
that as bad as life may be in Chad, the violent insecurity in Darfur is
worse:

Refugees in eastern Chad refuse to return to Darfur
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/refugees-in-eastern-chad-refuse-to-return-to-darfur>
|
November 1, 2015 | Eastern Chad

*The Darfuri refugees in eastern Chad categorically refuse to join the
voluntary repatriation programme in the current insecure climate.* The
refugees set the restoration of the rule of law, disarmament of the
militias, prosecution of the perpetrators of war crimes, and compensation,
as conditions for their voluntary return. *A delegation of the UN refugee
agency (UNHCR) and a representative of the Chadian government, held a
meeting with refugee leaders in the Djabal camp on Tuesday concerning the
voluntary repatriation programme, as agreed between the UNHCR and the
Sudanese and Chadian authorities in September.*

“They told us that a Sudanese delegation will visit the camps in November
to prepare for the return of the refugees,” El Zein Mohamed Ahmed, Radio
Dabanga correspondent in eastern Chad reported. *“The refugee elders and
sheikhs asserted their categorical rejection of the voluntary repatriation
programme while the situation in most parts of Darfur is still extremely
unsafe and insecure,” he said. “They told them the refugees will not
welcome any delegation from the Khartoum regime, which is the main cause of
their suffering.”*

It will bear close watching in the coming weeks and months to see if
pressure from the UN High Commission for Refugees or *Chadian strongman
Idriss Déby’s* regime in *N’Djamena* is brought to bear to force returns.
Such compelled repatriation clearly violates international humanitarian law.

The connection between violent land expropriation and the issue of returns
is captured in miniature in a single Radio Dabanga dispatch, and reveals
just how unwilling Khartoum is to take on the new Arab settlers of lands
that have been violently expropriated from the displaced:

Kalma displaced reject South Darfur housing plans
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/kalma-displaced-reject-south-darfur-housing-plans>
 *| *September 30, 2015 | Kalma camp

The* residents* *of* *Kalma camp, near Nyala, capital of South Darfur,
denounced the state Governor’s announcement of housing projects for the
displaced on Tuesday. Their places of origin have been taken over by new
settlers. The Governor intends to house the displaced in other areas.* Yagoub
Mohamed Abdallah, the coordinator-general of the Darfur camps told Radio
Dabanga that in a meeting between Kalma camp leaders and *Governor Adam El
Faki*, the latter said his government is seeking to implement a housing
project at the camp site, similar to the one planned in neighbouring Kass
locality. “El Faki intends to grant the more than 160,000 displaced in
Kalma camp about 3,000 residential plots in Kass and, after re-planning of
the Kalma camp itself, around 10,000 plots at the camp site.”

*“[Governor el Faki] said that we cannot return to our areas of origin, as
new migrant groups have settled there. This is unacceptable of course.”*

The victims of the Darfur genocide and Khartoum’s effort to “change the
demography of Darfur” will not yield to such misleading blandishments. They
want their own lands back, and cannot be made to understand why Arab
militiamen—some from Chad, *Niger*, even *Mali*—have been allowed to settle
on those lands. The weakness of Khartoum’s “New Strategy for Darfur”
(“model villages” representing “development,” as opposed to humanitarian
responses to acute needs, justifying an international presence) could not
be clearer. One way of understanding the upsurge of attacks on camps for
the displaced—by both militia and regular military and security forces—is
as a reflection of the regime’s belief that it can terrify weary residents,
suffering from years of privation, into fleeing to these “Potemkin
villages.”
*The recent past*

Despite poor reporting from international news organizations about Darfur
<http://sudanreeves.org/2012/03/31/the-new-york-times-vs-radio-dabanga-what-is-the-truth-about-returns-to-darfur-from-eastern-chad/>,
it is clear that following the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in
Darfur—after a short hiatus for appearance’s sake—genocidal
counter-insurgency began to accelerate again in *early 2012*. For almost
four years, violence has escalated, as suggested by various individual
archival entries for *2012*
<http://sudanreeves.org/category/briefs-and-advocacy-post-machakos-12/>,
*2013*
<http://sudanreeves.org/category/briefs-and-advocacy-post-machakos-13/>*,*
*2014*
<http://sudanreeves.org/category/briefs-and-advocacy-post-machakos-14/>,
and *2015* <http://sudanreeves.org/category/briefs-and-advocacy-15/> from
*www.sudanreeves.org* <http://www.sudanreeves.org/>*.* The past two years
have seen extraordinary levels of violence, rivaling the destruction in the
early years of the genocide. A *timeline of events* for the past year
appears *here
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/11/26/annexes-to-changing-the-demography-violent-expropriation-and-destruction-of-farmlands-in-darfur-november-2014-november-2015/>*.
The militia and regular military forces have continued to sweep across all
regions of Darfur, but have come over the past two years to concentrate on
North Darfur, and in particular that area of North Darfur known as *“East
Jebel Marra”*—east of the *Jebel Marra massif* and west of *El Fasher,
capital of North Darfur.*

*Tawila* and *Kutum* have been the epicenters for the destruction in East
Jebel Marra (EJM), both because there are relatively rich agricultural
lands and because the region is a stronghold of the *Fur tribe*—the largest
African ethnic group in Darfur *(“Dar Fur”* means something like *“homeland
of the Fur”*). The Sudan Liberation Army faction of *Abdel Wahid al-Nur* is
strong in Jebel Marra and parts of EJM, and Khartoum calculates that by
destroying the Fur civilian base of support for al-Nur, they will gradually
bring his forces to their knees. In short, what we are witnessing is an
effort to further the enterprise first articulated in a memorandum
from the *Misterhiya,
North Darfur* headquarters of *Musal Hilal*, the most notorious of the
*Janjaweed* leaders and identified by numerous witnesses as being present
as commander in some of the very worst atrocities in the early years of
violence. Dated August 2004, the memorandum has a chillingly clear central
exhortation
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/11/05/musa-hilal-and-the-changing-of-darfurs-demography/>:
“Change the demography of Darfur; empty it of African tribes.”

“Changing the demography of Darfur” in recent years has meant primarily the
violent expropriation of farmlands from African farmers. This expropriation
is also violently enforced, should farmers attempt to return to their
lands, even from relatively nearby camps for displaced persons. Women and
girls leaving to work on farms have been subject to an onslaught of sexual
violence, long evident and still epidemic in nature. Men and boys are more
likely to be killed, or simply badly beaten if they are lucky. Camels, the
primary livestock of northern militia elements, are turned loose in huge
numbers on lands where crops have been planted and are in various stages of
maturation.

The ethnic animus in RSF and other militia’s violence is captured in an
extraordinary passage from the Human Rights Watch report (“Men with No
Mercy,” see above):

Ahmed, a 35-year-old officer in the Border Guards, spent two weeks at a
military base in Guba [North Darfur] in *December 2014* before being sent
to fight rebels around Fanga. Two senior RSF officials, the commanding
officer, Alnour Guba, and Col. Badre ab-Creash were present on the *Guba
base*.

*Ahmed said that a few days prior to leaving for East Jebel Marra,** Sudanese
Vice President Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman directly addressed several
hundred army and RSF soldiers:*

*“Hassabo told us to clear the area east of Jebel Marra. To kill any male.
He said we want to clear the area of insects… He said East Jebel Marra is
the kingdom of the rebels. We don’t want anyone there to be alive.”*

Skepticism about whether genocide continues in Darfur would seem to be
incinerated by such reports; moreover, the reference to the African rebel
groups as “insects” has terribly ominous echoes of Rwanda.

The RSF and other militia and paramilitary forces have declared ownership
of the lands they have cleared on behalf of the Khartoum regime, and
therein lies the greatest obstacle to peace in Darfur. Unless this pattern
is changed decisively, and expropriated agricultural lands restored to
their rightful owners, peace cannot come to Darfur. Those who have lost
their lands will never accept a peace in which they are required to
sacrifice their major livelihood asset; failure to address this issue
realistically was the major flaw in both the Darfur Peace Agreement and the
Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The latter—which has provided a
diplomatic excuse for inaction on the part of many Western countries,
including the U.S.—has now been dismissed as unworkable and useless by all
good faith actors, again including the U.S. Only Khartoum cleaves to the
Doha agreement as a means of avoiding true mediation of the 12-year-old
conflict.

But there is a terrible obverse to the problem of restoring lands to the
displaced African farming communities, again now numbering more than 2.7
million internally displaced persons along with 370,000 Darfuri refugees in
eastern Chad. For the various Arab militias—including some authoritatively
reported to be from Chad, Niger, and Mali—will not willingly give up land
they now see as theirs. This, they believe, is their reward for the
genocidal counter-insurgency effort that has been directed primarily
against African farmers in rural villages and areas, and increasingly in
the camps and their immediate environs.

Certainly these violent expropriations and control of farmlands have
occurred with the clear approval of Khartoum, however chaotic the violence
becomes at times (militia groups fighting one another, or even attacking
local police and the SAF itself). But there can be no peace without a
restoration of African farmlands, even if that restoration cannot be
complete: Khartoum’s sanctioning of Arab efforts to seize lands and use
them as pasturage for their livestock has created a situation the regime
will find increasingly difficult to reverse, had it the will to do so. Any
attempt by Khartoum to induce the Arab militias to give up the lands they
have violently claimed would produce a violent backlash, and involve the
regime in a new war—this time against Arab groups as well as the present,
largely African rebel groups.

This issue points to the primary obstacle to a real peace in Darfur, and
yet there is no international discussion of this issue. It has not figured
in meaningful ways in either the Darfur Peace Agreement or the Doha
Document for Peace in Darfur. And in *December of last year*, the
incompetent and perversely ambitious *Thabo Mbeki *and his so-called *African
Union High-Level Implementation Panel* suspended Darfur peace mediation
efforts
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/auhip-suspends-darfur-peace-talks-indefinitely>.
There is presently no momentum behind any talks, merely vague discussion of
possible mediation by *Gulf states* (this despite the fact that the
*Qataris* are deeply mistrusted by Darfuris after their complicity in the
Doha agreement, as are Arab actors in general, having acquiesced in
Darfur’s destruction for so many years).

But violence in Darfur continues at a shocking level (see my most
recent *Darfur
News Digest, November 6, 2015*
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/11/06/darfur-radio-dabanga-news-digest-number-28-6-november-2015/>,
which includes links to all previous reports). We have continual reports of
rape, murder, beatings, and kidnappings as a means of extortion—and most
significantly, violent expropriation of farmlands and violence used as a
means of keeping farmers from returning to or working on these lands. The
destruction of crops by livestock let loose to forage has been especially
intense this harvest season.
*Prospects*

In short, the situation in Darfur is not static; it is getting worse, a
great deal worse. The present security force in the region, the *UN/African
Union “hybrid” Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), *has been a dismaying failure,
and is slowly being drawn down by the *UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations* under *Hervé Ladsous*. A force originally mandated to include
over 25,000 personnel will soon have only about 15,000 and Khartoum is
pushing hard for further reductions—indeed, for an “exit strategy” from all
of Darfur. *West Darfur* came very close to being sacrificed in the *June
2015* <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55529> UN Security
Council renewal (UNAMID would have been required to pull all its personnel
from this area of Darfur). And yet any survey of violence over the past
year reveals a tremendous amount has occurred in West Darfur—and much more
if we recall that *“Central Darfur” *is an artificial geographical cut-out
from West Darfur by the Khartoum regime, created entirely for political
purposes.

The incompetence, corruption, and dishonesty of UNAMID have been repeatedly
exposed, particularly in the leadership of *Rodolphe Adada*
<http://sudanreeves.org/2009/09/03/has-war-ended-in-darfur/>*
(Congo)*, *Ibrahim
Gambari*
<http://sudanreeves.org/2011/09/19/the-uns-man-in-darfur-the-expedient-mendacity-of-ibrahim-gambari/>
* (Nigeria)*, and *Mohamed Ibn Chambas*
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sga1505.doc.htm>* (Ghana)*. Urgent pleas
from victims of ongoing atrocity crimes go unheeded
<http://sudanreeves.org/2011/09/18/%E2%80%9Cwhat-we-learn-of-unamid-from-the-september-2010-tabarat-massacre%E2%80%9D/>,
protection provided by the force is minimal for a mission of this size.
Khartoum repeatedly denies access to UNAMID, even into camps for displaced
persons, grounds UNAMID aircraft
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/north-darfur-govt-imposes-no-fly-ban-on-unamid>,
and on at least one occasion denied the medical evacuation of a critically
injured peacekeeper, who later died of his wounds. Unsurprisingly,
suffering from poor morale, UNAMID makes fewer and fewer forays into
dangerous areas, and reporting on events is inevitably dismal, indeed
largely worthless. In trying to understand the context for UNAMID failures,
however, we should bear in mind that Khartoum-backed Arab militias are
clearly responsible for a majority of the most serious and deadly armed
attacks on UNAMID patrols and convoys. The evidence in aggregate
<http://sudanreeves.org/2013/05/09/killing-un-peacekeepers-a-ruthless-proclivity-of-khartoums-saf-militia-proxies/>
is
overwhelming, and yet no international actor of consequences will say as
much.
*Radio Dabanga versus UNAMID as a reporting authority on events in Darfur*

We catch clear sight of the reason for using the dispatches of *Radio
Dabanga*, upon which this report is essentially based (as opposed to the
terse and uninformative UNAMID reports), in surveying UNAMID’s response to
the mass rapes at Tabit, North Darfur. For 36 hours, from October 31 into
November 1, 2014, regular Sudan Armed Forces troops, on orders from their
garrison commander, brutally raped more than 220 girls and women in Tabit,
and severely beat many men. The first report of the nature of the events at
Tabit came from Radio Dabanga in a November 2, 2014 dispatch, accurate to
an astonishing degree given the chaos that followed such a terrifying
event. Virtually all in the dispatch was confirmed by an extraordinary
report from *Human Rights Watch* (“Mass Rape in North Darfur,” February 11,
2015
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/02/11/mass-rape-north-darfur/sudanese-army-attacks-against-civilians-tabit>),
using the evidence gathered so diligently and effectively by lead
researcher *Jonathan Loeb*.

What was UNAMID’s response to reports of the events at Tabit, easily
accessible by road from a nearby UNAMID post? A team of investigators was
allowed in only after *eight days* (*November 9*) had passed, giving
Khartoum and the SAF, along with *Military Intelligence*, ample time to
sanitize the crime scene and terrify into silence all potential witnesses.
The security presence during the UNAMID investigation was overwhelming and
highly intimidating, and everything that occurred during the investigation
was conspicuously recorded
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-army-filmed-unamid-mass-rape-investigations-in-tabit>.
On the basis of interviews conducted in this environment, UNAMID
nonetheless published a very short report (November 10) declaring
<http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=11027&mid=14214&ItemID=24158>
it
“found no evidence of mass rapes.” Shortly thereafter, however, an internal
UNAMID report on the investigation
<http://sudanreeves.org/2014/11/20/internal-unamid-document-reporting-on-tabit-investigation/>
was
leaked to me, making clear that UNAMID was well aware of the impossibility
of their conducting a meaningful investigation in the circumstances that
prevailed.

But having allowed one UNAMID mission to investigate Tabit, however badly,
Khartoum refused to allow a subsequent UNAMID mission, and has denied all
subsequent international calls, including from the UN, the *EU*, and the
U.S., for an independent investigation. But no real pressure was applied on
Khartoum, and predictably, the regime offered no opportunity for further
investigation. It did close down UNAMID’s human rights office in
Khartoum (November
25, 2015
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-shuts-down-unamid-s-human-rights-office-in-khartoum>);
it did expel two senior UN humanitarian officials the following month; and
it has become much more emphatic in its demands for UNAMID to withdraw
entirely. Supported unstintingly by *Russia* on the Security Council
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/russia-to-keep-tabit-mass-rape-off-security-council-agenda-sudan>,
even on the matter of investigating events at Tabit, Khartoum will likely
prevail in reducing further the mandate and makeup of UNAMID when it comes
up for renewal in *June 2016.*

To this day, Khartoum denies anything occurred at Tabit, denies all charges
of rape by SAF soldiers, and upbraids the international community for
fabricating a story meant to discredit the regime. This is despite the fact
noted above and first reported by Radio Dabanga that the garrison commander
admitted the rapes occurred
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/commander-admits-to-mass-rape-by-soldiers-in-north-darfur>
.
*Khartoum’s ambitions*

Instead of searching for a viable peace process, al-Bashir and his generals
remain committed to military success that entails “crushing the rebellion
<https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-rebels-to-be-eliminated-soon-al-bashir>,”
and the army is currently preparing for yet another dry season offensive in
South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Aerial attacks on civilian and humanitarian
targets have long been a constant in both regions as a means of collapsing
the agricultural economy and terrifying people into fleeing; the very same
strategy has long been deployed in Darfur <http://www.sudanbombing.org/>,
and gives all signs of continuing with brutal regularity and complete lack
of discrimination between military targets and civilians. Such attacks are
war crimes, and in aggregate constitute crimes against humanity under the
Rome Treaty that is the statutory basis for the International Criminal
Court (see pages 19 – 20 of “‘They Bombed Everything that Moved”: Aerial
military attacks on civilians and humanitarians in Sudan, 1999 – 2012
<http://www.sudanbombing.org/>”).

Unless the international community puts serious pressure on Khartoum to
halt these war crimes, they will continue indefinitely. The same is true of
violent land expropriation in Darfur, particularly North Darfur. There are
no signs that the problem is well understood by recent negotiators,
including Mbeki, and no signs that the international community intends to
pressure Khartoum to halt attacks that make peace increasingly difficult.

Khartoum has been enormously successful in turning Darfur into a “black
box” from which very little information is allowed to flow to the outside
world. The vast range of contacts that provide Radio Dabanga with its
ability to report so fully is quite unique, indeed represents something
unprecedented on the part of people in the very midst of ongoing genocidal
destruction. But by excluding journalists—except on rare, heavily
controlled visits to particular locations—and by keeping all human rights
reporters out of Darfur, the regime has succeeded in obscuring almost
entirely a region that once had broad international advocacy support in its
bid to escape tyranny and violence. And even as this “black box” has been
created, there have been energetic efforts to re-write the Darfur narrative
<http://sudanreeves.org/2009/06/14/on-the-re-writing-of-the-darfur-narrative/>,
some extraordinarily perverse.

The UN humanitarian agencies, for their part, have been almost completely
intimidated by the regime and release very little of the information they
possess by virtue of their presence in Darfur. Rigid self-censorship became
the norm under perversely accommodating former UN head of mission *Georg
Charpentier*
<http://sudanreeves.org/2010/09/05/un-collaboration-in-the-silencing-of-darfur-dissent-magazine-on-line-september-5-2010/>;
and this in turn imposed the same obligation of silence on *international
nongovernmental humanitarian organizations (INGOs)*, thirteen of which were
expelled at a stroke in early *March 2009*. UN officials at the time
estimated that the effect of the expulsions was to *reduce humanitarian
capacity in Darfur by approximately 50 percent.* Altogether, *more than 30
INGOs* have been expelled from Darfur, or forced by insecurity or lack of
funding to halt operations. None of those INGOs remaining dare to go beyond
what the UN says in speaking about Darfur’s horrific realities.

It is hardly surprising that Khartoum has worked very hard to shut down
Radio Dabanga (based in *The Netherlands*), block its signal, and do
whatever it can with alternative broadcast sources in an effort to reduce
the huge following Radio Dabanga has in its radio broadcasts and
web-distributed dispatches. In July of this year the Arab Satellite
Communication Organization yielded to Khartoum’s demand that it end
broadcasting Radio Dabanga.
*Data on **violent expropriation and destruction of farmlands in Darfur*

While the data represented in the *spreadsheet
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/11/26/spreadsheet-for-events-bearing-on-violent-land-expropriation-in-darfur-november-2014-november-2015/>*
(more
than *500 discrete entries*) and a *series of maps* *[**in process]* focus
specifically on violent land expropriation and the violence that prevents
farmers from working their lands, this is only part of the story of
violence in Darfur (see *here
<http://sudanreeves.org/2015/11/26/annexes-to-changing-the-demography-violent-expropriation-and-destruction-of-farmlands-in-darfur-november-2014-november-2015/)>*).
But the issue is critical, as I’ve stressed, and must be placed squarely at
the center of negotiations before there is any chance of a peaceful
resolution to the fighting. The international community has done a terrible
job to date in recognizing the problem and its centrality to the peace that
is so widely sought in the abstract.

The Khartoum regime appears far from prepared to accept land issues as a
serious matter under the auspices of the Doha agreement to which it cleaves
ferociously. It is almost certain that regime change will be necessary
before meaningful negotiations can begin. Meanwhile, Darfur drifts further
and further into a violent chaos in which the most basic human needs are
not met. At the same time, the degree of insecurity prevailing on the
ground may oblige all remaining relief organizations to withdraw. If this
includes UN agencies such as the *World Food Program *and *World Health
Organization*, massive mortality will surely ensue.

The stakes for millions of human beings are very, very high. The
international community seems content with a vague grasp of realities on
the ground, and has yet to see the import of data such as those collected
in this report.
-- 

Eric Reeves
Smith College

Northampton, MA  01063

[email protected]

www.sudanreeves.org


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