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From: "John Ashworth" <[email protected]>
Date: 7 Jan 2016 12:30
Subject: [sudans-john-ashworth] Sudan's 60 Years of Bitter Harvest
To: "Group" <[email protected]>
Cc:

Sudan's 60 Years of Bitter Harvest

Posted: 01/05/2016 5:09 pm EST Updated: 01/05/2016 5:59 pm EST
Gamal Gasim
Huffington Post

On the eve of January 1, 1956, Sudan became a fully independent
country ending several decades of Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule.
Very few developing countries were as fortunate as Sudan, which gained
independence during the post-World War II era. Sudan was then not only
the largest Arab and African country, with a total land area nearly
nine times the size of its former British colonial power, but also had
a prosperous agricultural economy. The country inherited from its
colonial rulers a well-functioning and efficient infrastructure that
included a web of railways, Gordon Memorial college -- later renamed
the University of Khartoum, the Gezira scheme, competent civil
service, a fair formal judiciary system, and a strong local currency
where the value of the Sudanese pound was more than two U.S. dollars.
Most importantly, the country was born with a vibrant multi-party
democratic system. Unlike some former African and Asian colonies,
Sudan maintained very good relations with its former colonizers. The
general public was very optimistic and jubilant on the eve of Sudan's
independence. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Sudanese enjoyed
glorious success in sports, music, and foreign diplomacy. For example,
Sudan hosted the most successful Arab summit in the history of the
Arab League in 1967. This was the Sudan fondly referred to by the
Sudanese people as the "beautiful past." Today, Sudan has been torn by
conflicts and plagued by poverty, divided into two countries since
2011.

What went wrong? Two key issues contributed to major conflict in
Sudan, the issue of national identity and the debate surrounding the
role of Islam in public life. The founding fathers of modern Sudan
failed to lay a strong foundation of national identity that would
unify all Sudanese ethnic and religious groups. At the heart of the
national identity issue are such questions as whether Sudan should
wholeheartedly embrace its Arab or African identity. Unrest in
southern Sudan exacerbated this problem and fueled uprisings and civil
conflicts. The civil war in South Sudan, once considered Africa's
largest civil war, resulted from deep negative sentiment among
southerners who believed that the Arabs in the North controlled power
throughout the country. Indeed, the former British colonial
administration in Sudan planted seeds of political mistrust between
the northerners and southerners through its controversial policy of
"closed districts," which limited social and political interactions
between the groups.

Although the role of Islam in public life is closely related to the
issue of national identity, it has unique political effects in the
north, as two key political actors -- the Sudanese Communist party and
the Islamic movement -- employed it in different ways to gain
political benefits and seize power. In 1969, the Neimiri regime,
backed by the Sudanese Communist party, adopted strong socialist
policies including the celebration of Marxist teachings within a very
traditional Muslim majority country and the national confiscation of
private businesses and small agricultural projects. These policies
proved to be disastrous to the Sudanese national economy for several
years to come. In contrast to Neimiri's socialist leanings, the
Al-Bashir regime, backed by the Islamic National Front, has embarked
upon a number of Islamization projects in education, banking, public
life, and mobilization of youth from the Islamic movement to fight in
the south during the early 1990s. However, this ambitious agenda aimed
at significant social engineering led to extensive political
corruption, poverty, expansion of government, and the decline of the
middle class. The Al-Bashir regime adopted belligerent liberal
economic policies to remove or significantly reduce government
subsidies of education, healthcare, and basic food items. The social
cost of these policies was enormously negative, and the resulting
increases in school dropout rates and income inequality have impacted
the once strong Sudanese social fabric. Today, many educated Sudanese
youth view working outside their home country as the only conceivable
way to achieve their dreams in life. Furthermore, the discovery of oil
during the late 1990s in the southern part of Sudan, which provided
revenue before the separation from the south, distorted the Sudanese
national economy because it led to negligence of the agricultural
sector.

Faced with increased international isolation and pressure, the
Al-Bashir regime finally signed a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA)
with the leaders of the Sudan Liberation Movement in 2005 that ended
the civil war and eventually led to the separation of the South. After
holding power for more than two decades, the Al-Bashir regime has
recently initiated a national dialogue that is unlikely to end major
political problems such as the conflicts in Dar Fur,southern Kordofan,
and the Blue Nile once and for all.

The current political stalemate has been further complicated by the
weakness of the Sudanese opposition parties. Although Sudan was a
pioneer among Arab and African countries in terms of adopting liberal
democracy, the country has hosted very weak political parties that are
dominated by a small group of political elites. The political
leadership of the 1960s continued to dominate Sudanese politics
through the beginning of this millennium. As in many other Arab
countries, the Sudanese political elites have rarely opted for such
options as political retirement. The Sudanese have very little to
celebrate on the 60th anniversary of their independence aside from the
relative stability of Sudan in comparison with other countries
experiencing Arab awakening.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gamal-gasim/sudan-bitter-harvest_b_8916860.html

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