Sudan’s Two Areas: Politicizing of humanitarian relief

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The International Community Continues to Accept Khartoum’s
Humanitarian Blockade in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile

Eric Reeves | June 20, 2016

Unseemly haste and a disgraceful refusal to accept the moral
consequences of their action have prompted European countries to
accelerate rapprochement with the Khartoum regime in order to step the
flow of African refugees to Europe. The European Union gives every
sign of increasing political, diplomatic, and economic ties to the
National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime as a crude and
ineffective means to this end. We should note clearly that the
assistance now offered to the regime extends even to high-tech
surveillance and registration equipment—nominally to assist Khartoum
in containing refugees in “closed camps.”

This equipment will of course be used almost exclusively by the
infamous National Intelligence and Security Services, Military
Intelligence, and others in the vast security network that the regime
depends on for its survival. A report by the German newspaper Der
Spiegel (May 13, 2016) cites—without denial or rebuttal—EU documents
that contain truly extraordinary revelations:

Minutes from the March 23 meetings and additional classified documents
obtained by SPIEGEL and the German public television station ARD show
"Report Mainz" show that the focus of the project is border
protection. To that end, equipment is to be provided to the countries
in question.

>From these minutes we learn that:

Europe want[s] to send cameras, scanners and servers for registering
refugees to the Sudanese regime in addition to training their border
police and assisting with the construction of two camps with detention
rooms for migrants. The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development has confirmed that action plan is binding, although no
concrete decisions have yet been made regarding its implementation…

Germany and the other EU member states … seem determined to push ahead
with their pact with the [regime president, Omar al-Bashir]. Sudanese
authorities say there have been numerous visitors from Germany in
recent weeks who were there to discuss the construction of closed
camps. When questioned about its role, Germany’s GIZ issued a written
reply that there were no concrete plans in the country yet.

Was the EU aware of the dangerous waters into which they were
venturing? Evidently they did:

The ambassadors of the 28 European Union member states had agreed to
secrecy. "Under no circumstances" should the public learn what was
said at the talks that took place on March 23rd, the European
Commission warned during the meeting of the Permanent Representatives
Committee. A staff member of EU High Representative for Foreign
Affairs Federica Mogherini even warned that Europe’s reputation could
be at stake.

Astonishingly, Ms. Mogherini retains her job, and continues to make
fatuous statements about EU policy toward Sudan.

This is an appropriate point at which to note something of Khartoum’s
regard for refugees and refugee issues. Most notably, more than
300,000 Darfuri refugees, desperate to return home, are trapped in
eastern Chad by the regime’s ongoing genocidal counter-insurgency in
Darfur itself. All of Darfur is insecure, but the extent of
ethnically-targeted violence in East Jebel Marra and Jebel Marra
during the past three dry seasons makes clear that a great many of
these refugees will have nothing to return to. The UN High Commission
for Refugees, tired of the refugee crisis in eastern Chad, is making
permanent settlement—with Chadian nationalization—the only alternative
to returning to Darfur. The UN’s World Food Program is doing its part
by allowing rations for refugee camps to drop to what is effectively
only about one third of the 2,100 kilocalories daily necessary for
health human existence.

On another front in the world-wide refugee crisis, Human Rights Watch
recently reported on Khartoum’s forcible deportation of more than 400
Eritrean refugees—some of whom had been formally recognized as such by
UNHCR. Khartoum, Human Rights Watch Reports, has also denied access to
claimants to refugee status—an extremely ominous sign. Both are
conspicuous and egregious violations of international humanitarian
law.

Moreover, we may be sure that the high-tech, “closed camps” that
Germany has taken lead in committing to building will be nothing short
of concentration camps—with people “concentrated” on the basis of
ethnicity, nationality, race, and religion. And we may be sure that
UNHCR will continue to be denied access as the regime deems necessary.
That such camps will be built by Germany is utterly shocking.

This concern for imposing a “refugee embargo” on people of African
nationalities is particularly perverse, since it mirrors Khartoum’s
own embargo on humanitarian relief aid to the civilian populations of
South Kordofan and Blue Nile. People in areas controlled by the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N) have been denied
international assistance for five years.

Regime officials have made explicit their determination that these
areas will not “become another Darfur,” in which international
humanitarian organizations might provide food assistance to severely
malnourished children and adults, or provide desperately needed
primary medical care. Of course Darfur itself continues to suffer from
dramatically declining international humanitarian capacity and
constant harassment of relief organizations—including by means of
violence. For all thirteen years of the Darfur conflict Khartoum has
systematically denied relief access to various points in Darfur. The
regime has expelled more than two dozen of the world’s finest relief
organizations during this time, as well as targeting for expulsion
senior officials of the UN and nongovernmental relief organizations.

This is the face of the regime with which the EU is now negotiating
with to serve as bulwark against the African refugee flow to Europe.
That such negotiations should occur with no commitment to seeing the
end of the humanitarian blockade on South Kordofan and Blue Nile is
especially shameful—and reveals a deep cynicism about devoting the
diplomatic and political resources necessary to change Khartoum’s
behavior, including pressure in the form of EU financial and economic
sanctions similar to those of the U.S.

The most conspicuous evidence of this cynicism is a willingness to see
the truly critical issue of humanitarian access linked directly to
political and military issues in the so-called “Roadmap for Peace.”
The “Roadmap” comes from Thabo Mbeki, leader of the now conspicuously
incompetent African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP).
(The original “Roadmap” to have been “implemented” was Mbeki’s foolish
diplomatic effort of 2009, which failed miserably.) There are many
issues that might be discussed in connection with the various terms of
the current “Roadmap” so enthusiastically endorsed by the UN, the EU,
the AU, and the Obama administration in the U.S. What I wish to argue
here is that whatever the merits of the plan’s elements—and all in
some sense require compliance by Khartoum of a sort for which there is
no historical evidence—it is a diplomatic, finally moral error of the
first order to link political and military issues to humanitarian
access.

Such linkage can take the form of “bundling” issues together, as Mbeki
insisted his Roadmap did:

For his part, Mbeki said the Roadmap met the most important demands of
the “Sudan Call” force including the comprehensive ceasefire and
allowing access to humanitarian relief in war areas besides the
recognition of the NUP and the Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF) as
partners in the national dialogue. (Sudan Tribune, June 3, 2016)

Or the linkage can take implicit form in the ignoring of Khartoum’s
previous refusal to accept a call from the normally feckless African
Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC):

[The AUPSC] Expresses its grave concern about the ongoing conflict and
humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the Two Areas, including the
reported violations of humanitarian law associated with the conflict,
and calls upon the parties to urgently reach agreements to facilitate
and allow humanitarian assistance to reach those in need and to
respect human rights and International Humanitarian Law. Council calls
upon the Parties to take all necessary measures to create conditions
for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of the displaced persons
and refugees to their homes… (Communiqué of the 539th meeting of the
PSC on the activities of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel
(AUHIP) for Sudan and South Sudan, August 25, 2015)

That the various urgings of the AUPSC were simply ignored by Khartoum
seems to have made no difference—either to the AUPSC itself or those
international actors professing a concern for humanitarian issues in
Sudan.

Let’s be very clear about this. For a variety of expedient reasons,
the international community has found it appropriate to endorse an
agreement, a “Roadmap,” that finally makes relief for suffering and
dying human beings contingent upon various specific military and
political steps, articulated by Mbeki in his “Roadmap,” which was
fashioned in close coordination with the Khartoum regime itself. The
agreement does not give singular priority to humanitarian access, nor
does it offer a clear plan for how such access is to be achieved. It
is revealing that Mbeki took the extraordinary step of signing his own
agreement despite rejections by the Sudan Revolutionary Forces and
political opposition groups in Addis: he and Khartoum remain the only
signatories.

[Radio Dabanga reports (June 20, 2016) today that the opposition
groups have agreed to sign the “Roadmap” provisionally, which hardly
makes the “Roadmap” a true agreement, since whatever “provisions” the
opposition groups have stipulated, they are extremely unlikely to be
meaningfully accepted by Khartoum. This “provisional agreement” comes
in the wake of heavy pressure on the opposition groups in Addis from
U.S. special envoy for the Sudans, Donald Booth.]

By virtue of the international support for the Mbeki’s/Khartoum’s
“Roadmap,” as well as excessive and asymmetrical pressure on the
opposition groups, we may be sure that the “Roadmap” will remain
configured as it is at present, i.e., a lifting of the humanitarian
blockade on South Kordofan and Blue Nile will, in effect, remain
politically and militarily contingent. Nothing changes with
“provisional agreement” to the “Roadmap” by the opposition groups.

This is deeply immoral and sets an extraordinarily bad precedent for
future conflicts.

KHARTOUM’S REFUSAL TO LIFT THE HUMANITARIAN BLOCKADE

Shortly after fighting began in South Kordofan in June 2011, and
subsequently in Blue Nile in August 2011, the National Islamic
Front/National Congress Party imposed a broad humanitarian embargo on
areas in these two states under the control of the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N). Militarily, the SPLM/A-N
essentially represents two divisions of the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) as it had been organized during the long civil
war (1983 – 2005). During that war, soldiers from both areas fought as
part of the SPLA, and fully expected that they would be included in a
meaningful way in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (January 2005).

I well remember the determination of military and civil society
leaders I met with in January 2003, insisting to me in the most
vehement of terms that they would not be left out of the agreement
that was clearly being negotiated. This was a moment following the
Machakos Protocol (July 2002), guaranteeing South Sudan the right of a
self-determination referendum, as well as the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement of October 2002 (CoHA)—but before the Naivasha negotiations
were well begun. (Although I witnessed first-hand the extent of
Khartoum’s violations of the CoHA, fighting had largely ended by
February 2003.)

But despite their fierce determination not to be left out of this
peace agreement—as they felt they had been left out of the
arrangements for independence in 1956 and again with the Addis Ababa
Peace Agreement (1972)—in the end, negotiations at Naivasha, Kenya did
not culminate with a meaningful plan to address the profound
grievances of the peoples of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. They were
granted instead largely opaque plans for “popular consultations”—plans
that never took meaningful form. The seeds of conflict in 2011 were
sowed with the CPA of 2005.

When Khartoum quickly moved to impose a humanitarian embargo in June
2011 it was a reprise of what had occurred in the 1990s, when, inter
alia, Khartoum fired artillery shells at planes attempting to land in
places such as Kauda in the Nuba Mountains. Although the embargo was
not airtight, either then or now, the effect in terms of malnutrition
rates and morbidity was overwhelming. The same is true of Blue Nile
currently.

In February 2012, the SPLM/A-N agreed to a humanitarian access
proposal put forward not only by the UN and African Union, but by the
Arab League as well. Even so, Khartoum refused the agreement, and
despite various ambiguous noises from the regime about signing the
agreement in some modified form, today—five years after it was first
imposed—the embargo is still in place as Khartoum’s intransigence
remains as great as ever.

For the past five years the people of South Kordofan have endured a
relentless bombing campaign targeting civilians and civilian
agriculture. Displacement must be measured in the hundreds of
thousands, and local reports indicate some populations have a very
high percentage of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM). For children, this
is typically a death sentence. Overall mortality is very great but we
have no adequate data—about morality, morbidity, or malnutrition. This
is one extremely serious consequence of the absence of a humanitarian
presence. As always, children—as is the case throughout Sudan—suffer
most in such situations of acute deprivation.

And yet despite the brutality of Khartoum’s conduct of war in South
Kordofan and Blue Nile, despite the savagery of the
ethnically-targeted destruction, rape, and murder in Darfur, the
international community is prepared to link humanitarian access to
other, non-humanitarian issues. These issues must be resolved, to be
sure, although to the extent they depend upon Sudan enjoying a true
“National Dialogue,” one part of the Mbeki “Roadmap,” we have to date
no evidence whatsoever that the Khartoum regime takes such a
“dialogue” seriously, but rather regards it as a means of
prevarication and delay. Viewed in the context of the regime’s
astonishing record of reneging on agreements—it is has never abided by
a single one with any Sudanese party…not one, not ever—it is simply
incomprehensible that a plan relying on unprecedented regime adherence
to a signed agreement is taken seriously by the UN, the AU, the EU,
and the U.S., all of which have enthusiastically endorsed the Mbeki
“Roadmap.”

But most shamefully, none of these powerful international actors has
faced squarely the essential moral issue posed by the “Roadmap”: can
humanitarian access to desperately needy human populations ever be
made contingent in any way upon political and military agreements? The
question is made more urgent by Khartoum’s reprehensible record of
violating, ignoring, and abrogating agreements—and its longstanding,
supremely callous disregard for the well-being of the people of Sudan.

Humanitarian access to the South Kordofan and Blue Nile must be
demanded unequivocally and unconditionally. The same is true of
humanitarian delivery in Darfur. All economic assistance, all
provision of new technology, all military assistance, all political
rapprochement should be withheld until this most basic and essential
demand is met.

Eric Reeves has been researching and writing about greater Sudan for
the past 17 years


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