---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: John Ashworth <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, Jul 24, 2016 at 9:14 AM
Subject: [sudans-john-ashworth] A South Sudanese Peace?
To: Group <[email protected]>


A South Sudanese Peace?

By Naomi Pendle, July 2016

In Juba on the evening of Monday 11th July 2016, as the previous days
of gun battles subsided, South Sudanese firemen came to the streets to
collect lorry loads of bodies. They also washed away the blood that
coloured the streets, leaving only traces where the blood had seeped
into the sandy roads. The specificity of those who had fallen was
disregarded. Family members crowded to the hospital to find their own,
but they could not even access the bodies to count if their loved ones
had died. The hospital had no money for fuel for the generator to
power electric lighting to see individual faces amongst the piles of
deceased. There was no refrigeration.

In recent decades, South Sudanese have often been confronted with
careless, mass deaths that make life and death seem worthless. As one
Dinka chief described to me, “Humans are now like bird poo. They are
like waste that falls to the ground and is washed away without a
trace. They come to nothing. We die so easily that we are nothing more
than bird poo”. The challenge now for the families of those who have
just died in Juba is to reclaim their lives and deaths to make life
more valuable than “bird poo”. They need to find a way to cool their
grieving hearts. The way peace is made or the way war is fought will
either empower or undermined South Sudanese as they attempt to reclaim
control over their lives and deaths.

When the fighting erupted outside the Presidential Palace on Friday
8th July, the guns exploding in Juba quickly evoked memories of
December 2013. Since then, there have been two and a half years of
careful diplomacy and expensive East African hotel bills that
culminated in the August 2015 peace agreement. Since fighting subsided
in Juba on Monday 11th July, the leaders of the warring parties have
affirmed that they believe that the August 2015 peace agreement still
has legitimacy. However, key generals and soldiers on either side have
long rejected the agreement. Some elites’ objections were based on
personal loss of power. Yet, most South Sudanese were also excluded
from the negotiations, entrenching their lack of power to determine
either the terms of the wars or the peace that they must live under.
On Sunday 10th and Monday 11th, the soldiers fired guns at each other.
Yet, these shots also resisted the notions of the peace that was being
imposed upon them. As they fought in Juba, soldiers seemed to clearly
demonstrate that the August 2015 peace had failed to peacefully
restore human dignity in life and death, and that they were not ready
to live under the terms of this peace deal.

Making peace in South Sudan

In their own lifetimes, most South Sudanese have lived through a
multiplicity of episodes of war and attempts at peace building that
have taken place in different settings at various spatial and
political distances from the people.[1] These peace processes, as the
wars, reshuffled political alliances and positions creating winners
and losers in the architectures of power. Since the 1980s, these
agreements have reshuffled power between a circle of now notorious
elites. The agreements have often been made behind closed doors in
foreign lands based on opaque relationships constructed decades
before.

In writing these peace agreements, the parties have also reshaped
relationships between the governing elites and the people they claim
to govern. The government wars have often left South Sudanese fearful
that their lives are worth nothing more than ‘bird poo’. This is as
peace agreements have often only reinforced how worthless life is by
not prioritizing justice or compensation for the dead masses. The
peace agreements have rarely even tried to cool the hearts of the
grieving. Instead they have shifted power over peace and war into the
hands of a few government elites.

In the 2004 peace negotiations between Garang and Kiir in Rumbek, a
repetitive warning to Garang was that he should not lose touch with
the opinion of the public. The 1999 Wunlit people – to – people peace
agreement between western Dinka and Nuer chiefs was partly a success
as politicians were confronted with the opinion of the public, as
mediated by these chiefs. Yet, even at Wunlit, chiefs did not exchange
compensation to help cool hearts and as a way to reimagine meaning in
the death.

Where was the August 2015 peace made?

If you step out of the taxi on the busy Addis street, a smartly
uniformed doorman directs you through a brief security screening as
you enter the multistory, international hotel. It was 2014 and the
elites of South Sudan mingled across the polished floor of the hotel
lobbies to negotiate the peace that would finally be signed in August
2015 and enacted when Riek Machar and the SPLA-IO troops came to Juba.
In the hotel lobby, generals who had been fighting in the swamps just
weeks before now lounged on soft chairs sipping large cuts of tea.
They had left behind soldiers still fighting in the battlefields. When
it was time for the daily donor-funded dinner, the politicians and
generals ate together from the same bowls of abundant food and sat at
adjacent tables. For many South Sudanese it is an affront to basic
moral and spiritual dignity to eat with those you are at war with. The
warring parties in those Addis hotels did not look like leaders of
sides who continued to fight.

During those months in Addis Ababa, lots of the smartly suited men
were eager to craft politics and slaved over the details of
negotiations. Others knew there were other priorities.  One general
joked to me that his political leader had just sent him to the
negotiations to make sure he was well fed and rested before battle. He
did not seem to be active in lobbying or negotiating.

However, just as dangerous as the disagreeing generals was the growing
inability for South Sudanese to themselves decide the legitimate terms
of peace and justice. By playing with the negotiations in a distant
city, the elites and diplomats excluded their citizens from the
decisions that would determine the wars and peace that they expected
them to support. The negotiations, by their very spatial and political
distance from ordinary people, eroded their potential to construct
peace and reimagine the consequences of death. They had no space to
make life worth more than ‘bird poo’.

If South Sudanese voices were heard at all at the negotiations, they
were mediated by civil society that struggled not to be belittled. The
mediators in these negotiations had made unprecedented efforts to
include civil society, the church and even chiefs in the negotiations,
yet the settings of the talks and the final places at the table all
empowered the elites. Unlike previous peace agreements, the August
agreement mentioned transitional justice mechanisms yet South Sudanese
lacked certainty that these would be justly implemented and deliver a
justice that would restore the value of the lives that were lost. Many
of the warring parties and civil society were aware that the hearts of
the public were still hot. They were aware that there was a demand for
justice before peace. Yet, the South Sudanese, at their spatial
distance from Addis, were easy to ignore. Elites and diplomats, in
hotels with polished floors that were fully inaccessible to South
Sudanese, could easily reimagine a different South Sudan that was more
palatable to their own interests and priorities.

At the time, a short walk away, in a dusty Addis hospital down the
road, a prominent leader of the Upper Nile White Armies was receiving
medical treatment after a battlefield injury. The White Armies were
local defence forces that had been active in militarily supporting the
armed opposition. This White Army leader’s heart still burned with
anger and a desire to return to the battlefield to seek justice. The
public politics of the hotel lobby was at total dissonance from this
man’s thoughts, fears and aspirations. He had seen so many die that he
wanted to return to fight to do them justice and give their deaths
meaning. The peace negotiations appeared to have little connection to
the reality of the ever more complex struggles of South Sudanese.

How can we find a South Sudanese peace now?

As the international community and the elites of South Sudan respond
to the July 2016 violence, we should honestly ask ourselves whether
the peace we construct enables the people of South Sudan to claim
sovereignty over life and death, war and peace. Does the peace make
sense to the public of South Sudan? Is it inclusive and accessible to
the people of South Sudan? Or is it pursued as a quick fix for
political gain for South Sudan’s leaders or international political
markets? Are we just again enforcing on the South Sudanese a model of
statehood that would allow our foreign interests to be restored
(whether those interests are oil, security or saving the African)? Are
we willing to focus on the specificity of each context and death, and
avoid the lazy, endless assumptions of equal culpability between the
government and SPLA-IO? Will we preserve space for people to pursue
their understandings accountability and justice? Will we count and
name the dead and restore their dignity to make sure the lives lost
are more valued than bird poo and not just washed away?

[1] For a discussion of lessons that can be learned from previous
peace negotiations in South Sudan see: Rift Valley Institute, We have
lived too long to be deceived: South Sudanese discuss the lessons of
historic peace agreements, Juba University Lectures 2014.

Note: articles present the views of their authors, and not necessarily
the position of the Justice and Security Research Programme, nor of
the London School of Economics and Political Science.

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/jsrp/2016/07/22/a-south-sudanese-peace/

END
______________________
John Ashworth

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This is a personal e-mail address and the contents do not necessarily
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