*South Sudan: Civil war again / IHS Economics and Country Risk 26.07.16*
*Disagreements within the leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) just days after fighting between forces loyal to First Vice-President Riek Machar and President Salva Kiir Mayardit in Juba will likely paralyse South Sudan's unity government, rendering the implementation of the peace agreement improbable.* [image: 157b8337-301d-443c-b7d8-0568333afc71.jpg] First Vice-President Riek Machar (left), President Salva Kiir (centre), and James Wani Igga, vice-president, during a press conference at the Presidential Palace in Juba, South Sudan, after fighting erupted on 8 July. - *Following three days of fighting that started on 8 July between forces loyal to the first vice-president, Riek Machar, and others loyal to President Salva Kiir Mayardit, disagreements have emerged among the leadership of the SPLM-IO on how to deal with the fall-out from the fighting, effectively halting the implementation of the August 2015 peace agreement.* Together with his forces, Machar has left the capital, Juba, and declared that he will return only if a multinational peacekeeping force with a mandate to enforce the August 2015 peace treaty is deployed there. However, President Kiir has rejected the deployment of any such force and part of the SPLM-IO leadership, including Minister of Mining Taban Deng Gai, has declared that such a deployment is not necessary at this stage. Machar announced on 22 July Gai's sacking from the cabinet and the party, but this was countered on 23 July by Gai's nomination to be first vice-president by a section of the SPLM-IO's leadership, replacing Machar during his absence from Juba. - *Renewed fighting is likely between militias allied to Riek Machar, his own forces, and government forces in the Greater Upper Nile region, as Machar will seek to show that his consent and presence is indispensable for lasting peace in South Sudan.*Reports in Jonglei state suggest that the government has been building a strong military presence there, especially around the town of Bor, but also in Aweil, a stronghold of current army chief of staff Paul Malong. The build-up is likely in anticipation to expected attacks from Machar's forces, which have in the past targeted Bor, seen as a gateway to Juba. Reports from Maridi in Western Equatoria suggest that Machar has attempted to mobilise forces there to open a western front against the government. Fighting is likely to be localised around towns such as Bor, leer, Malakal, Bentiu, and Renk lasting no more than a few days at a time and involving predominantly small arms, with tanks and heavy guns used by the government to defend major towns such as Bor. - *Disagreements between the government of South Sudan and the African Union over the deployment of an intervention force in Juba are likely to further isolate South Sudan internationally and lead to UN-backed sanctions.* The AU summit in mid-July 2016 recommended that a multinational peacekeeping force, which is to oversee the implementation of the August 2015 peace treaty, be sent to Juba in response to fighting which broke out on 8 July. The government's resistance to such a deployment and continued fighting will make UN sanctions against South Sudan very likely. - *Resumption of civil conflict in South Sudan exposes aviation to high risk from small arms.* Air assets have given government forces a significant advantage in the fighting, and the SPLM-IO will attempt to target any air assets it deems to be unfriendly. While the SPLM-IO is unlikely to target clearly identified UN aircraft and UN installations in and around the airport, it is likely to target private helicopters and aircraft that the South Sudanese government frequently rents out to boost its logistics capabilities. However, UN and other non-governmental air assets are exposed to a high risk of collateral damage. *Indicators of changing risk environment* - The resumption of negotiations between the government and Riek Machar. - The imposition of UN sanctions against South Sudan. - The passing of joint resolutions and declarations by the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD. - The resumption of fighting in Jonglei, especially around Bor. - The opening of a western front in Western Equatoria. - Further defections and the emergence of new militias and political groups in both the opposition and the government camp. - A rise in world oil prices. - Sudan's decision on the structure of oil transit fees. AUTHOR: Verner Ayukegba * IHS Expert Directory <https://connect.ihs.com/AnalystsDirectory/Analysts?SelectedDomain=All%2BSectors&connectPath=LandingPage.HotTopics>* -- To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/d/forum/southsudankob View this message at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/southsudankob/topic-id/message-id For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "South Sudan Info - The Kob" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/SouthSudanKob. 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