The Bangui Carousel: How the recycling of political elites reinforces
instability and violence in the Central African Republic


The successful February 2016 election of President Faustin Archange
Touadéra marks a new beginning for the Central African Republic (CAR) and
provides hope that the country is now stabilizing after three years of
violence and political transition. Touadéra has been endorsed by many of
his political opponents, and the country remained largely peaceful in the
weeks following the elections.
By Christopher Day and Enough Project team | Aug 2, 2016
Download the full PDF version
<http://www.enoughproject.org/files/TheBanguiCarousel_080216.pdf> | En
Français
<http://www.enoughproject.org/files/BanguiCarousel_080216_French.pdf> (PDF)

*Executive Summary*

The successful February 2016 election of President Faustin Archange
Touadéra marks a new beginning for the Central African Republic (CAR) and
provides hope that the country is now stabilizing after three years of
violence and political transition. Touadéra has been endorsed by many of
his political opponents, and the country remained largely peaceful in the
weeks following the elections.

But CAR is still a long way from political stability. If policymakers fail
to address the structural issues that led to the crisis in CAR, the country
is likely to repeat its violent past. Sworn in on March 30, Touadéra, a
former math teacher and prime minister, faces massive challenges. Armed
groups and criminal gangs continue to destabilize the countryside,
controlling valuable mining areas and commercial towns where they extort
illicit taxes and trade diamonds and gold. More than 2 million people, or
half of the country’s population, are experiencing hunger; close to 415,000
people remain internally displaced, and 467,000 refugees are only slowly
trickling back. Thousands of people have been killed since the March 2013
military coup by the Séléka alliance and the violence that followed.

CAR has endured persistent violence and instability for decades.
Institutional weakness, poverty, and exclusion do much to explain the
country’s history of disorder. But by significant measure, it is also the
deliberate maintenance of such weakness by a small political elite that is
at the root of CAR’s endemic kleptocracy, a source of political
instability, and a driver of violence in the country. Whether ushered in by
coup or popular election, successive governments have proved unable to
bring about meaningful change in CAR, in part because of the pattern of
appointing many of the same people—often relatives and personal friends—to
senior government offices.

In sum, successive rulers in CAR have maintained authority largely by
centralizing control where possible, and extended personal rule by
dispensing patronage in return for political support, in particular by
personally appointing to senior posts those who served in previous
governments or trusted family members. This system has fostered division
between the capital and the countryside, incubated the grievances of armed
groups, and above all, created significant incentives to hijack the state
through violence. This occurs as groups have competed for control of the
state to access resources and privileges, instead of to benefit Central
Africans.

This elite recycling is a key component of what we present here as the
“Bangui Carousel” to reflect the many people who rotate through the
country’s regimes, time and again.  This pattern of elite recycling, which
is not *per se* unique to CAR, is more critical in this country than
elsewhere because it is interwoven with a near-complete lack of
governance.  There are few effective state or local government
institutions, making the role and impact of the recycled individual leaders
that much more potent. Unfortunately, it has been the complete dismantling
of institutional checks and balances, the weakening of political parties
and civil society organizations, and the use of violence to suppress
opposition that have been the hallmark of many of these leaders.

This combination of elite recycling on top of a governmental and civic
system with little to no capacity and that often reinforces its hold on
power through violence defines the Bangui Carousel. It is at the heart of
what passes for Central African governance. The recycling and maintenance
of a small group of elites—regardless of leadership at the top—combined
with the absence of effective state institutions is a fundamental feature
of government in CAR. Understanding this matters most to address the
structural roots of the country’s persistent instability and eventually
stop the Bangui Carousel from spinning, so that government can bring about
the change the country desperately needs.

The recycling of elites is present throughout much of CAR’s modern history.
To illustrate patterns of elite recycling, the report focuses on
appointments to government ministries since early 2013. To gather
information and supplement field research, the authors analyzed hundreds of
presidential decrees, 15 of which provided information about government
reorganizations ordered by former Presidents François Bozizé, Michel
Djotodia, and Catherine Samba-Panza. This was then used to develop an
overview of the members in each government and their inter-connections.

The report then focuses on some of the individuals who have participated in
or benefited from the Bangui Carousel.  Those in the report were selected
for different reasons: their affiliations with different armed groups,
their mere affiliation with past regimes, potential connections to
corruption, or their family ties, each of which tends to undermine the
possibility of good governance. The analysis has been done with the
objective to understand how groups and individuals get access to the Bangui
Carousel and how they often benefit from their political appointments at
the expense of CAR’s citizens or simply forfeit the government’s ability to
earn the public’s trust.  Reference to any particular individual in this
report does not, in and of itself, mean the individual is responsible for
the violence or corruption that typically flows from the Bangui Carousel
system. Rather, we highlight these individuals simply to demonstrate how
the elite recycling element of the Bangui Carousel has worked. Subsequent
reports will examine the governance elements in more detail, as well as the
role of foreign powers, such as France and Chad, in perpetuating the system.

To disrupt, and eventually, stop the entirety of the Carousel,
accountability and effective governance must exist in CAR. And in place of
the Carousel, a system of principled governance and greater merit-based
criteria for appointments responsive to the needs of ordinary Central
Africans must be established. A way forward to accomplish this in part is
addressed in the recommendations below. To this end, the Enough Project
recommends the following:

*Recommendations*

Bringing change to the underlying governance structures in CAR, ending
decades of misrule, and eroding widespread poverty requires clear direction
and leadership from Touadéra.  He must set forth policies targeting
practices that sustain both the elite recycling and poor governance that
mark the Bangui Carousel, and follow through with action against
individuals who would seek to undermine any such positive efforts for their
own benefit.  This will take time and persistence, and will require
sustained attention and engagement by the international community, both
with financial support and accountability through sanctions and other
multilateral measures.  Such policies must ultimately strike at the core of
elite behavior in CAR, steering governance away from nepotism and
self-promotion and towards inclusion, accountability, and broad-based
development.

   1. *Establish robust and independent anti-corruption institutions. *The
   CAR government should implement a transparent and accountable system for
   financial management, including a strong auditor general-type function,
   empowerment of tax authorities to ensure proper revenue collection measures
   are followed, and review of major contracts issued by both past and current
   governments. Anti-corruption bodies must be established within the new
   government, and senior officials should declare their assets upon
   appointment and annually thereafter. Although too early for the country to
   attain eligibility and seek membership, the principles and criteria of the
   Open Government Partnership should be used as a guidepost for the
   government. The U.S. government, European Union, the World Bank, and others
   should emphasize the importance of these steps and be prepared to provide
   assistance to support them.

   2. *Prioritize transparency in natural resource revenues, contracting,
   and spending to prevent corruption. *The U.S. government and other
   donors should urge the CAR government to set up mechanisms to prevent
   high-level corruption and provide technical assistance to help implement
   them. These should include a transparent bidding process for the awarding
   of natural resource concessions, the annual publishing of the government
   budget and establishing a requirement that natural resource exploitation
   contracts are made public. The government should engage with international
   institutions, such as the Open Contracting Partnership and the Global
   Initiative for Fiscal Transparency, for assistance in this area, including
   in capacity building to use their data standards and governance
   models. Finally, the government should establish robust and independent
   anti-corruption mechanisms and implement budget and fiscal transparency
   measures.

   3. *Impose targeted sanctions and strengthen enforcement against those
   who undermine peace. *Development of the types of strong institutions
   referenced in recommendations #1 and #2 requires a complementary level of
   accountability. To this end, the U.N. Security Council, the U.S.
   government, and the European Union should impose additional sanctions on
   individuals and companies that attempt to undermine stability and the
   transition to good governance through acts of armed violence or through
   facilitating public corruption. Particular attention should be made towards
   enforcement of sanctions, as individuals in particular have been able to
   circumvent the sanctions because of insufficient enforcement. This includes
   direct outreach to ensure neighboring countries, particularly Cameroon,
   Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—and their financial
   institutions—implement asset freeze measures and travel bans imposed by the
   Security Council, as they are obligated to do as U.N. member states.  Where
   these governments and their financial institutions lack in necessary
   capacity for effective implementation, the U.S. government and other donors
   should offer technical assistance.

   4. *Ensure that the restart of the Kimberley Process prevents the flow
   of conflict diamonds. *The restart of the Kimberley Process (KP) for
   rough diamonds in the Central African Republic could give the government
   legitimate revenue streams, or conversely, allow armed groups to profit
   from a conflict diamond trade again, depending on how it is run. The CAR
   government, United States, European Union, and the U.N. Multidimensional
   Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
   should help ensure that the voices of Central African civil society are
   truly included at all stages of the KP decision making process in CAR.
   Donors should also provide capacity building to CAR civil society
   organizations to properly monitor KP implementation and provide legal aid
   for civil society protection. In the key trading and manufacturing centers
   for CAR diamonds, specifically Antwerp, Dubai, Tel Aviv, and Mumbai, KP
   authorities should be communicating to industry actors about the need to
   demonstrate meaningful due diligence and following up to ensure such due
   diligence is occurring.  Industry bodies should inform the trade about the
   KP’s steps and ensure necessary vigilance by members of the trade. Where
   authorities or industry bodies discover violations or suspicious activity,
   action should be taken and reported publicly.

   5. *Restart the EITI process to make resource revenues more transparent.
   *If fully implemented, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
   (EITI) can help prevent and reduce corruption in the natural resource trade
   by making revenue payments and receipts transparent.  CAR was suspended
   from EITI in 2013 because of the political instability.  The newly
   installed CAR government should prioritize the work necessary to apply for
   removal of the 2013 suspension from EITI. This will include reconstituting
   the EITI multi-stakeholder group (with civil society and business
   participation), ensuring space for civil society and that necessary
   assistance is available, further developing the new work plan to implement
   EITI, and beginning to implement the new EITI 2016 standard, including
   identifying areas for data coverage and focusing on the pilot effort
   investigating beneficial ownership. The international EITI board should
   only move forward with CAR’s efforts to rejoin EITI once meaningful
   progress has been made towards these goals.

   6. *Strengthen the judiciary in CAR and promote Special Criminal Court
   prosecutions. *International donors such as the U.S. government, the
   European Union, and the World Bank should increase funding to rebuild the
   crippled judiciary in CAR, and in particular, make sure that the Special
   Criminal Court has sufficient funds, international expertise, and
   independence to operate and prosecute those responsible for human rights
   violations and abuses.

   7. *Help improve capacity and safeguards for civil society and the
   media. *The role of civil society and the press is critical in
   monitoring, and eventually diminishing, the Bangui Carousel and ensuring
   that those involved in government in CAR are serving the people rather than
   their own interests. The new CAR government should opt in to the World
   Bank’s Global Partnership for Social Accountability, so that the country
   can benefit from the bank’s capacity building opportunities for civil
   society. The KP and EITI should ensure that civil society focused on the
   natural resource trade is able to monitor, report back, and participate in
   the processes without fear for safety. Separately, the U. S. Department of
   State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should seek
   ways to foster and support press freedom in CAR, a country where working
   journalists operate in a “Not Free” country, according to Freedom House.

   8. *Reform the government appointment process. *It is not unusual for
   political patronage to inform government appointments, but in CAR this has
   been extreme. The CAR government should develop and incorporate merit-based
   criteria for the appointment of ministers and other political appointees in
   CAR such that patronage is much more balanced with merit. CAR should also
   implement a process that requires appointed officials to declare assets.

Download the full PDF version
<http://www.enoughproject.org/files/TheBanguiCarousel_080216.pdf> | En
Français
<http://www.enoughproject.org/files/BanguiCarousel_080216_French.pdf> (PDF)

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