Islamic State deepens foothold in Somalia’s Puntland state

Posted on November 21, 2016 by Zakaria Yusuf & Abdul Khalif

A year after a faction of al-Shabaab defected to IS, the group has
exploited state disorder to seize a stretch of Somalia’s coast.

Puntland’s security forces are overstretched as they face several threats.
Credit: Kate Holt/IRIN.

On 26 October, more than 50 heavily-armed Somali Islamic State (IS)
fighters seized the town of Qandala in Puntland federal state. It was a
small, but highly symbolic, step forward for the group and demonstrates
again how armed extremists exploit state disorder and local tensions to
develop safe havens and rebuild after defeats.

Unless Puntland treats this threat seriously and resolves internal tensions
and conflicts with neighbouring federal states, IS in Somalia could grow in
strength and destabilise much larger parts of the country.

The takeover of Qandala comes one year after the IS leader in Somalia,
Sheikh Abdulqadir Mumin, defected from country’s main Islamist group
al-Shabaab, which is aligned with al-Qaeda. While Mumin’s pledge of
allegiance to IS failed to split al-Shabaab, which remains a far larger
movement and still dominates areas outside government control in South and
Central Somalia, it did stir up internal ructions that now threaten to
undermine its organisational and ideological cohesion.

[Al-Shabaab steps up attacks in run up to the Somalia elections]

IS’s expansion to Qandala, 75km east of Bosaso, the main port of Puntland,
wins not just symbolic and propaganda value for the small group, but also
the logistical advantages of an outlet to the sea, new financial
opportunities, and better connections to southern Yemen.

However, the move is not without operational risks, considering its limited
military capabilities and the superior firepower of the forces arrayed
against it. This includes the US, which has significantly stepped up its
drone strikes across Somalia in recent years.

[Could America’s War on Terror creep across Africa?]

The emergence of IS factions represents a serious threat to jihadist unity
in Somalia, though al-Shabaab’s leaders have so far resisted bids by IS to
switch their allegiance from al-Qaeda.

Al-Shabaab’s security and intelligence wing, Amniyat, has been hard at work
quashing IS sympathisers and factions operating in southern Somalia. Many
suspected IS supporters have either been arrested or killed, among them the
prominent al-Shabaab commander Abu Nu’man Sakow.

This purge coincided with the Somali Federal Government’s own anti-IS
sweeps, which led to the arrest of four suspected pro-IS militants
operating in Interim South West Federal State in September.

Clan dynamics

The IS faction’s success in Qandala, in the Bari region, exploits clan
grievances and the government’s failure to consolidate its foothold in
Puntland since October 2015 when IS leader Mumin went into hiding to begin
recruiting and training his faction. Qandala is also home to Mumin’s clan
(Majerteen Ali Saleban) as well as other minority clans increasingly
aggrieved by perceived marginalisation by the Puntland government.

The largest active clan militia is led by the former Bari region governor,
Abdisamad Mohamed Galan, an outspoken critic of the current Puntland
administration. He hails from the same clan family as Mumin and enjoys the
support of other minority clans. He and other armed clans in the region
operate largely outside the control of the Puntland government.

Despite territorial gains in South and Central Somalia, al-Shabaab has also
failed to gain a significant foothold in Puntland. In March 2016,
Puntland’s local paramilitary “Darawiish” forces, fighting alongside those
of the Galmudug Interim Administration, thwarted an attempt by al-Shabaab
to infiltrate the Mudug coast.

Al-Shabaab was apparently pursuing rival IS-affiliated factions hiding in
the Golis Mountains. The following month, IS released a propaganda video
showing militants training for combat. Recruitment also increased from
around 30 this time last year to roughly 200.

Exploiting disorder

Deteriorating relations between Puntland and the Galmudug Interim
Administration have helped IS grow. Both administrations engaged in heavy
fighting in the historically divided city of Galkayo in November 2015, and
large-scale armed combat resumed in October 2016, killing more than 50
civilians, wounding hundreds, and displacing tens of thousands.

A new federal government, African Union (AU), UN and European Union (EU)
brokered ceasefire agreement was signed in Galkayo on 13 November after a
UAE-brokered ceasefire collapsed.Both sides deploy propaganda and
disinformation, and accuse each other of supporting al-Shabaab.

In August 2016, the Galmudug administration accused Puntland of providing
military fatigues to al-Shabaab, while Puntland accused Galmudug of
facilitating two deadly al-Shabaab suicide bomb attacks in Galkayo that
killed more than 20 people.

The latest fighting was triggered by a September 2016 US airstrike that it
admitted killed ten Galmudug troops. The Galmudug interim administration
accused Puntland of duping the US into launching the attack.

Puntland’s security forces are now severely overstretched with: policing
the long frontier with South and Central Somalia; keeping an eye on
rebellious clans in Sool and Sanaag (regions also claimed by neighbouring
Somaliland); battling hostile armed groups in Galkayo (against Galmudug
forces); fighting al-Shabaab in the Galgala Mountains; and combating
Galan’s militia in Qandala.

This turbulence has given IS the space to reorganise and operate more
freely than they had before. Mumin was until now a marginal figure, unable
to attract a significant following. His bold takeover of Qandala along a
strategic stretch of the coastline coincides with the rise of IS in Yemen
and is certain to raise his profile and perhaps also his ability to attract
recruits and funding.

The prospect of an emboldened IS poses an additional security worry for the
authorities in Puntland and neighbouring states. Such threats can no longer
be dismissed as insignificant. A concerted and multi-pronged response by
both the federal government and its member states is now urgently required
– at the top of which must be a genuine political initiative to address
local clan grievances, build inclusive local governance institutions, and
find a lasting solution to the renewed armed hostilities in Galkayo.

Zakaria Yusuf is a Somalia analyst at International Crisis Group.

Abdul Khalif is a research assistant for Horn of Africa at International
Crisis Group.

This article was originally published on ICG.

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