Hungry for change: the economics underlying DR Congo’s political crisis
Posted on December 12, 2016 by Hans Hoebeke & Phillipe Kadima Cintu     
At the heart of disenchantment with President Kabila’s government lie
deep economic woes.
Credit: Garrett Ziegler.

Food prices have increased considerably in the past year, making life
for many struggling families even more precarious. Credit: Garrett
Ziegler.

High taxes. Harassment by the revenue authorities. Lack of a stable
exchange rate. Cheap imports from neighbouring countries. Lower
demand.

All these factors and more were cited in a 4 November letter sent by
the local Federation of Congolese Enterprises (FEC) to Kongo Central
province officials, in western Democratic Republic of Congo. The
revealing message was informing the authorities of the forthcoming
closure of the Bralima brewery, a major employer in the city of Boma.

The concerns raised echo structural problems expressed by other
Congo-based businesses contacted by Crisis Group during the past year
in Bukavu, Lubumbashi and Kinshasa as well as by the national FEC.

As the DRC’s political crisis deepens – with the official end of
President Joseph Kabila’s mandate on 19 December fast approaching –
the combination of political uncertainty, predatory state institutions
and low commodity prices are contributing to an increasingly toxic
situation.

Recent street protests, in which dozens are estimated to have died,
have focused on the constitution and delays to the electoral process.
But the wish for change, usually focused on Kabila’s failure to
improve the lot of ordinary people, has a strong economic sub-text.

[Africa’s least loved leader marches on]

Stagnant GDP, shrinking budget

Over the last ten years, the government has focused on macro-economic
stability and investment in high-profile prestige projects such as
Congo Airways, a new government building, airports, and roads in the
wealthier parts of Kinshasa. This has done little to alleviate Congo’s
deep inequalities. Nevertheless, riding on high mineral prices,
Congo’s GDP growth averaged 7.7% from 2010 to 2015.

This year, however, the economy has hit a slump, leading official
growth projections to be revised down to 4.3% for 2016, only slightly
outpacing demographic growth. This stagnant outlook has seriously
affected the already meagre state budget. Over the course of the year,
the government lowered spending from $8 billion to $6 billion, though
actual expenditure will come in even lower at around $4.5 billion.
This leaves very little for new policies or to fund future elections
whose cost is estimated at over $1 billion.

In January 2016, then Prime Minister Matata Ponyo announced a package
of 28 measures to restructure the economy. In October, the government
and parts of the opposition reached an agreement following their
National Dialogue to push the presidential election due this year back
to 2018. African regional powers quickly backed the deal, and soon
afterwards opposition figure Samy Badibanga was appointed prime
minister in accordance with the agreement.

But Badibanga will struggle to continue his predecessor’s
donor-friendly reform programme at the same time as responding to
various political pressures. This is especially the case since the
reforms’ impacts – including desperately needed diversification of the
mining-dependent economy – will only be felt in the medium-to-long
term at best.

Currency troubles

The economic crisis has also caused a serious depreciation of the
Congolese franc (FC). This currency was stable at 920/930 FC per $1
for about three years, but has recently dropped to 1,170 officially,
though rates are even lower on the street. Confidence continues to
wane amid fears of a return to undisciplined money printing and
consequent spiral of inflation.

The Central Bank’s resources to support the franc are also decreasing;
foreign reserves are currently estimated at below $1 billion, less
than four weeks of imports. Meanwhile, the government has reverted to
paying the money it owes large companies in Congolese francs, drawing
the ire of the business community.

In October, the government announced measures to cushion the effects
of currency depreciation, including reducing import taxes and making
available hard currency to import basic foodstuffs such as sugar and
palm oil. But their impact is expected to run out in March 2017, after
which price evolution will become more uncertain according to
businesses consulted by Crisis Group. Fuel prices cause greatest
concern; they have been stable due to subsidies and the low
international market price, but any rise would have knock-on effects
on commodities and urban transport relied on by most city dwellers.

Corruption is also an ongoing drag on the economy. The government’s
anti-corruption taskforce, led since June 2015 by a former justice
minister, has had little impact, though several high-level cases have
recently come to light, including one that touches on election
financing.

Former PM Ponyo previously complained that he had no control over
large parts of the economy, including the mammoth parastatal mining
company Gecamines, and that he had to “navigate crocodile infested
waters”. Large-scale corruption scandals damage the economy, though
citizens and businesses suggest they are most concerned by the
omnipresent, mid-level or “petty” corruption which permeates their
daily lives.

Prices rise, salaries fall

With the prices of bread, rice, cornmeal and palm oil rising steadily
over the past six months, poorer urban families are seeing their
precarious living conditions eroded. A normal loaf of bread still
costs 200 FC but now it is much smaller. Households dependent on
cornmeal have seen their food expenditure increase by 12%.

Corn is particularly important in southern provinces, where a price
spike earlier in 2016 added to local political tensions and led the
government to send senior officials to Zambia to try to increase
imports. But Congo’s southern neighbours have themselves been hit by a
recent drought. In early December 2016, prices increased again.

The salaries of public servants, except for those in the security
services, have declined by 30% since June, typically from the
equivalent of $100 to $70. Food allowances were also cut for soldiers.
In the private sector, businesswomen called maman ya zando have
struggled because of the franc depreciation. Commercial banks
contacted by Crisis Group said they have recently seen more small
businesses defaulting on debt repayments.

Particularly vulnerable groups such as sex workers, often the sole
bread winners for their households, are also feeling the pressure. The
numerous, mostly young, street traders selling shoe shines or paper
handkerchiefs for 250 FC barely survive in normal conditions. Even a
small increase in their costs can push them and their dependents into
hunger.

Financial pressure on families also puts the solidarity system within
communities under stress, particularly in dealing with illness and
schooling. In Ituri, primary school fees have increased dramatically
from 1,500 to 5,500 FC for the 2016-2017 school year. The minimum fees
in Kinshasa are around $350 per year, an ever-increasing sum in local
francs. This has pushed numerous children out of school. Education, a
cornerstone for social change, is a high priority for the population,
but both access and quality have suffered.

The economy turns political

Economic troubles are gaining political prominence. In a defensive 15
November state of the nation address, President Kabila painted a
positive picture of his 15 years in power, but also acknowledged that
“the absence of jobs and the resulting idleness obscure future
prospects”. He warned that such frustrations should not be used for
political ends.

At the start of the school year in September, the opposition platform
le Rassemblement attempted to tie the economic and political crises
together through actions known as écoles mortes (school boycotts).
Many children did stay away from school, partly for fear of violent
incidents.

[DR Congo in crisis: Can Kabila trust his own army?]

Youth groups, in particular Lutte pour le changement (Lucha), focus on
the economy and unemployment, but they too see politics and economics
as two sides of the same coin. Initially campaigning for better public
services in Goma, they are now focused on protecting the constitution,
particularly the provision that the president can only serve two
terms.

Students are easily mobilised when confronted with rising costs, such
as tuition fees. In early November, a fee increase at a higher
education institute in Kinshasa led to violent riots. The measure was
quickly reversed and the institute’s director sacked. On 19 November,
one month before the end of Kabila’s second term, Lucha in association
with other youth platforms launched the new campaign “bye bye Kabila”
on social media and on the street, but it was quickly repressed by
authorities.

The economic slowdown is most visibly felt in the cities. Illuminating
new research shows differences in the evolution of prices across the
country, pointing to possible different political reactions in rural
areas. This suggests that economic decline will not necessarily lead
to more coherent political protest as people are driven first and
foremost by survival, something the government is keenly aware of. But
as the government’s resources for patronage shrink, things could
unravel even in remote areas. New provinces hurriedly established
through the breakup of existing provinces (decoupage) in 2015 lack
resources, and the appearance of new armed groups in North Kivu and
recent violence in Kasai Central province are provoking considerable
stress.

Prime Minister Badibanga and his new government have to allay social
unrest while funding what will be a costly election process. This may
prove a near-impossible task, while the combination of political
uncertainty and a major economic recession is creating a dangerous
impasse.

The risk is not just an explosion of anger on 19 December when
Kabila’s term was supposed to end, but a slow atrophy thereafter. A
major concern is the funding of salaries and operational expenditure
for the army and other security forces. If this significantly
deteriorates, it is likely to cause major disorder as was the case in
1991 and 1993.

The population is hungry for change, but is frustrated by the lack of
development and socio-economic opportunities, and by the complacency
of the governing elite. Economic mismanagement fuelled popular anger
during the slow decline of the Mobutu regime in the 1990s.

Political change through elections symbolise hope, and the government
and the international community should do all they can to make them
happen in the right conditions, with no further undue delay.

Hans Hoebeke is the Senior Analyst for DR Congo at International
Crisis Group, the independent conflict-prevention organisation.

Philippe Kadima Cintu is the Giustra Fellow for Africa at
International Crisis Group.
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One thought on “Hungry for change: the economics underlying DR Congo’s
political crisis”

    Stephen Yearwood says:      
    December 14, 2016 at 11:41 am

    One possibility would be to implement the revolutionary monetary
system that is available for consideration at
http://www.ajustsolution.com. With it in place there could be no
(involuntary) unemployment or poverty–at no cost, without having to
redistribute anything. Also, government would be funded forever at the
current per capita rate without using taxes or debt.

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