The Gulf Cooperation Council’s looming shadow over Khartoum
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By Luciano Arvin
Pragmatism seems to be the name of the game in Khartoum, as Sudan
drastically shifts its allegiance from one regional superpower, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, to the other, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
For the balance of his 26-year presidency, Omar al-Bashir has enjoyed
warm relations with Tehran, on a number of issues. For the former, it
provided access to weaponry and financial aid and infrastructure
development, while the latter gained a geopolitical ally, who was
willing to grant docking rights and serve as an important gateway for
Iran to enter Africa. Following major sanctions placed on Iran,
beginning in 2010, it proved unable to sustain the level of aid it was
providing to Khartoum, and the relationship slowly began to erode. At
this time, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC)
nations offered ample financial resources to Sudan, with the intent of
weakening Iran’s position in Northern Africa. Between 2010 and 2014,
Saudi Arabia invested heavily in Sudan—by one estimate, $11 billion
worth, creating 395 different projects, joint ventures, and companies.
In 2015, another $2.2 billion was transferred from Saudi Arabia and
Qatar, amidst Khartoum’s rapidly deteriorating financial woes
However, as the old saying goes, “there is no such thing as a free lunch.”
Since accepting the GCC’s aid, Sudan has taken a number of steps to
improve its relationship with select Western nations, in part because
it hopes they will help its struggling economy but also because these
nations aid the GCC in taking a hard stance against Iran. Similarly,
the al-Bashir government has closed Iranian and Shia cultural centres
in Khartoum, a move that has been scorned by Shia groups loyal to
Iran. Neither will the recent deployment of Sudanese troops to Yemen,
to aid in the Saudi-led intervention against the Houthi be taken
kindly to by Iran. Now speculation has emerged that Sudan will become
embroiled in multifaceted Syrian civil war, although it is speculative
which one of the numerous factions Sudanese forces would aid. Sudan
was among a number of nations to break off ties with Iran in the
aftermath of the burning of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran
following the execution of Shia Sheik Nimr al-Nimr in January of 2016.
As pressure from Saudi Arabia increasingly compromises the sovereignty
of Sudanese foreign policy, one must ask why it is that a government
which receives vast swathes of aid from a host of nations, is unable
to create projects that would bring it economic stability, thereby
leveraging it away from such sticky diplomatic situations. Moreover,
if Khartoum wishes to induce political stability anytime in the future
it will need realistic parameters on the impacts of foreign aid on
Sudan’s foreign policy.
Luciano Arvin is an independent scholar based out of Peterborough,
Canada. He primarily covers the foreign relations of Iran, Iraq and
the GCC. His work has seen publication in the African Defence Review,
the Diplomat, and the International Policy Digest.
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