Hi Josh,

>> I do not believe the RP needs to know the IdP-specific identifier ever
>> (worse: I think it should never be allowed to know it, or even be
>> allowed to see it!).

JH> Why not?

PRIVACY.  Page back and read trough my posts to this list for the
intricate details.

JH> Where is power being granted to the RP? It has pretty much none.
JH> It *does* have responsibility, but only as much as is necessary to
JH> make the protocol work.

If RPs are allowed to build up linked portfolios of everyones
identifiers, they can get together with other RPs (or sniff IDs in
google) to snoop on and conspire against our users behind their backs.
If the true spirit of OpenID is to empower users, it's seriously
neglectful to block users from protecting their own privacy.

>> Can we not adopt my earlier suggestion: just ensure OpenID can permit
>> IdP-initiated logins.  This permits every scenario of portability (and
>> privacy) that everyone wants, without us having to continue to debate
>> it ?

JH> Huh? How is IdP-initiated login related to privacy or portability?

It is ** NONE OF THE RPs BUSINESS ** how the OpenID that got presented
to it was originally selected by, or resolved for, our Users.  Letting
the IdP initiate a login allows the IdP to PRIVATELY negotiate with
the user over which identity to present (which for anyone who cares
about privacy, will usually be a per-site identity not linked to their
main OpenID or vanity domain or whathaveyou.).

The beauty of this suggestion is that we don't even need to debate it:
so long as IdP initiated logins are supported, market forces will then
decide whether or not privacy and security become widespread in

I'm not saying this should be the *only* way an OpenID login can take
place - just that if this simple concept is implemented, that we can
then defer all privacy issues to the IdPs in future, and concentrate
now on getting this spec out the door.


I notice the current spec:
does not even *mention* privacy? (besides the allusion in the
abstract: "It does this without the Relying Party needing access to
password, email address, or other sensitive information." - but
somehow nobody's understanding that the users OpenID *itself* is
"sensitive information", especially in the way google will in future
let anyone troll back through our users online "tracks" using this

Also missing are

16.  Security Considerations


16.1.  Preventing Attacks

Perhaps someone should add a section on privacy, and someone should
take a crack at the security aspects!  Who is in charge of writing
this stuff?  I've submitted 102 (one hundred and two!!!) security
considerations in the posts I've made to this list so far:  Shouldn't
someone be documenting this?


specs mailing list

Reply via email to