Hi Nick,

Thanks for your response and update. Indeed everything has been addressed.

Many thanks,
Ketan


On Fri, 16 Oct, 2026, 9:55 pm Nick Buraglio, <[email protected]>
wrote:

> I believe all but the noted comment was addressed in -18
>
> On Wed, Oct 14, 2026 at 1:32 PM Ketan Talaulikar via Datatracker <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Ketan Talaulikar has entered the following ballot position for
>> draft-ietf-spring-srv6-security-18: No Objection
>>
>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>
>>
>> Please refer to
>> https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/
>> for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>
>>
>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-spring-srv6-security/
>>
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> COMMENT:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Many thanks to the authors and the WG for this important work on SRv6
>> security considerations. This would be very helpful for everyone
>> implementing
>> and deploying SRv6.
>>
>> Note: This review is provided inline in the idnits output of v17 of this
>> document. Please look for the tag <EoRv17> at the end to ensure you have
>> the
>> full review.
>>
>> #Updated for v18: Thanks for taking care of the discussion points and
>> several
>> of the comments/suggestions in my original ballot. I've only retained
>> those
>> (NON-BLOCKING) points that were not updated or perhaps missed out and
>> deleted
>> all the rest - I leave them to the authors' discretion.
>> The idnits extracts still refer to v17.
>>
>> #new for v18 - please fix the warnings reported by idnits, especially the
>> ones
>> related to references.
>>
>> <editorial> Perhaps gather the practices for securing an SR domain, now
>> spread
>> across Sections 7.1.1 to 7.2 and 8.2, into a short subsection, for
>> example:
>>
>> NEW (perhaps subsection after 7.2?)
>>    The practices described in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 can be summarized as
>>    follows:
>>
>>    *  Allocate SIDs from a dedicated address block (Section 7.1.3,
>>       [RFC9602]), separate from infrastructure and customer addresses.
>>
>>    *  Use a hierarchical locator plan that summarizes into a few
>>       prefixes [I-D.ietf-srv6ops-srv6addressing].
>>
>>    *  Filter packets destined to the SID block at the SR domain
>>       boundary and at SRv6 enabled nodes, together with ingress source
>>       address validation (BCP 38, BCP 84) (Section 7.1.3; Section 5.1
>>       of [RFC8754]).
>>
>>    *  Encapsulate traffic at the SR ingress node (Section 7.2).
>>
>>    *  Do not advertise locators, the SID block, or SR information in
>>       BGP outside the SR domain ([RFC8402], Section 9.2 of [RFC9252]).
>>
>>    *  Where hosts add an SRH, consider the HMAC TLV (Section 7.3;
>>       Section 5.2 of [RFC8754]).
>>
>> Again, just a suggestion for the authors' consideration.
>>
>>
>> <about references> Unless the analysis is extended to them, RFC 9020, RFC
>> 9256,
>> RFC 9491 and RFC 9524 could move to the Informative References: nothing
>> in the
>> document as written seems to depends on them?
>>
>> Rest of the comments/suggestions are provide inline in the document text:
>>
>>
>> 896        In order to apply such a filtering mechanism the SR domain
>> needs to
>> 897        have an infrastructure address range for SIDs and an
>> infrastructure
>> 898        address range for source addresses that can be detected and
>> enforced.
>>
>> <minor> Section 7.1.3 could align with draft-ietf-srv6ops-srv6addressing:
>> SIDs
>> from a range separate from infrastructure and customer addressing (it
>> calls
>> the SID range "infrastructure"), loopbacks optionally taken from the
>> locator,
>> and a hierarchical plan that summarizes so the filters stay few. Now, that
>> draft is focussed on CSID, but the hierarchical and summarization aspects
>> apply
>> for all of SRv6. Suggest:
>>
>> CURRENT
>>    In order to apply such a filtering mechanism the SR domain needs to
>>    have an infrastructure address range for SIDs and an infrastructure
>>    address range for source addresses that can be detected and enforced.
>> SUGGEST
>>    In order to apply such a filtering mechanism the SR domain needs to
>>    have an address range for SIDs, separate from the infrastructure and
>>    customer address ranges, and an infrastructure address range for
>>    source addresses, both of which can be detected and enforced.
>>
>> CURRENT
>>    Many operators reserve a /64 block for all loopback addresses and
>>    allocate /128 for each loopback interface.  This simplifies the
>>    filtering of permitted source addresses.
>> SUGGEST
>>    Many operators reserve a /64 block for all loopback addresses and
>>    allocate /128 for each loopback interface. This simplifies the
>>    filtering of permitted source addresses. Alternatively, loopback
>>    addresses can be allocated from each node's locator
>>    [I-D.ietf-srv6ops-srv6addressing], in which case the permitted source
>>    addresses are covered by the SID address range. In either case, a
>>    hierarchical addressing plan whose locators summarize at domain and
>>    area boundaries [I-D.ietf-srv6ops-srv6addressing] keeps the filters
>>    to a few stable prefixes.
>>
>> OLD: Many operators reserve a /64 block for all loopback addresses and
> allocate /128 for each
> NEW: Alternatively, loopback addresses can be allocated from each node's
> locator, in which case the permitted source addresses are covered by the
> SID address range. A hierarchical addressing plan whose locators summarize
> at domain and area boundaries keeps the filters to a few stable prefixes.
>
>>
>> 920        Many operators reserve a /64 block for all loopback addresses
>> and
>> 921        allocate /128 for each loopback interface.  This simplifies the
>> 922        filtering of permitted source addresses.
>>
>> <minor> Loopback addresses can alternatively be allocated from each node's
>> locator, and a hierarchical locator plan keeps the source-address filters
>> to a
>> few stable prefixes. Please see my comments on line 896, which include
>> suggested text for this paragraph.
>>
>> <EoRv17>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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